第3章

andintheexplanationwhichhehimselfelaborated，hethoughtthatsomepartorotherofhissystemembracedandcoincidedwithwhateverwastrueinthedifferenttheoriesofhispredecessors。

CHAPTERII。THEPHENOMENAOFSYMPATHY。

Thephenomenaofsympathyorfellow-feelingshow，accordingtoAdamSmith，thatitisoneoftheoriginalpassionsofhumannature。Weseeitintheimmediatetransfusionofanemotionfromonemantoanother，whichisantecedenttoanyknowledgeonourpartofthecausesofanotherman"sgrieforjoy。Itisaprimaryfactorofourconstitutionashumanbeings，asisshownintheinstinctivewithdrawalofourlimbsfromthestrokeweseeaimedatanother。Itisindeedsomethingalmostphysical，asweseeinthetendencyofamobtotwisttheirbodiessimultaneouslywiththemovementsofarope-dancer，orinthetendencyofsomepeopleonbeholdingsoreeyestofeelasorenessintheirown。

Sympathyoriginatesintheimagination，whichalonecanmakeusenterintothesensationsofothers。Ourownsenses，forinstance，cannevertellusanythingofthesufferingsofamanontherack。Itisonlybyimaginingourselvesinhisposition，bychangingplaceswithhiminfancy，bythinkingwhatourownsensationswouldbeinthesameplight，thatwecometofeelwhatheendures，andtoshudderatthemerethoughtoftheagoniesbefeels。Butananalogousemotionspringsup，whatevermaybethenatureofthepassion，inthepersonprincipallyaffectedbyit；andwhetheritbejoyorgrief，gratitudeorresentment，thatanotherfeels，weequallyenterasitwereintohisbody，andinsomedegreebecomethesamepersonwithhim。Theemotionofaspectatoralwayscorrespondstowhat，bybringingthecaseofanotherhometohimself，heimaginesshouldbethatother"ssentiments。

Butalthoughsympathyisthusaninstantaneousemotion，andtheexpressionofgrieforjoyinthelooksorgesturesofanotheraffectuswithsomedegreeofasimilaremotion，fromtheirsuggestionofageneralideaofhisbadorgoodfortune，therearesomepassionswithwhoseexpressionnosympathyarisestilltheirexcitingcauseisknown。Suchapassionisanger，forinstance。Whenwewitnessthesignsofangerinamanwemorereadilysympathizewiththefearorresentmentofthoseendangeredbyitthanwiththeprovokedmanhimself。Thegeneralideaofprovocationexcitesnosympathywithhisanger，forwecannotmakehispassionourowntillweknowthecauseofhisprovocation。Evenoursympathywithjoyorgriefisveryimperfect，tillweknowthecauseofit:infact，sympathyarisesnotsomuchfromtheviewofanypassionasfromthatofthesituationwhichexcitesit。Henceitisthatweoftenfeelforanotherwhathecannotfeelhim-self，

thatpassionarisinginourownbreastfromthemereimaginationwhicheventherealityfailstoarouseinhis。Wesometimes，forinstance，blushfortherudenessofanotherwhoisinsensibleofanyfaulthimself，becausewefeelhowashamedweshouldhavefelthadhisconductandsituationbeenours。Oursorrow，again，foranidiotisnoreflectionofanysentimentofhis，wholaughsandsings，andisunconsciousofhismisery；norisoursympathywiththedeadduetoanyotherconsiderationthantheconceptionofourselvesasdeprivedofalltheblessingsoflifeandyetconsciousofourdeprivation。Tothechangeproduceduponthemwejoinourownconsciousnessofthatchange，ourownsenseofthelossofthesunlightofhumanaffections，andhumanmemory，andthensympathizewiththeirsituationbysovividlyimaginingitourown。

Butwhatevermaybethecauseofsympathy，thereisnodoubtofthepleasurewhichtheconsciousnessofaconcordoffeelingproduces，andofthepainwhicharisesfromasenseofitsabsence。Somehaveaccountedforthisbytheprincipleofself-love，bysayingthattheconsciousnessofourownweaknessandourneedoftheassistanceofothersmakesustorejoiceintheirsympathyasanearnestoftheirassistance，andtogrieveintheirindifferenceasasignoftheiropposition。Butboththepleasureandpainarefeltsoinstantaneously，anduponsuchfrivolousoccasions，thatitisimpossibletoexplainthemasarefinementofself-love。Forinstance，wearemortifiedifnobodylaughsatourjests，andarepleasediftheydo；notfromanyconsiderationofself-interest，butfromaninstinctiveneedandlongingaftersympathy。

Neithercanthefact，thatthecorrespondenceofthesentimentsofotherswithourownisacauseofpleasure，andthewantofitacauseofpain，beaccountedforentirelybytheadditionalzestwhichthejoyofotherscommunicatestoourown，orbythedisappointmentwhichtheabsenceofitcauses。Thesympathyofotherswithourownjoymay，indeed，enliventhatjoy，andsogiveuspleasure；buttheirsympathywithourgriefcouldgiveusnopleasure，ifitsimplyenlivenedourgrief。Sympathy，however，whilstitenlivensjoy，alleviatesgrief，andsogivespleasureneithercase，bythemerefactofthecoincidenceofmutualfeeling。

Thesympathyofothersbeingmorenecessaryforusingriefthaninjoy，wearemoredesiroustocommunicatetoothersourdisagreeablepassionsthanouragreeableones。"Theagreeablepassionsofloveandjoycansatisfyandsupporttheheartwithoutanyauxiliarypleasure。Thebitterandpainfulemotionsofgriefandresentmentmorestronglyrequirethehealingconsolationofsympathy。"Hencewearelessanxiousthatourfriendsshouldadoptourfriendshipsthanthattheyshouldenterintoourresentments，anditmakesusmuchmoreangryiftheydonotenterintoourresentmentsthaniftheydonotenterintoourgratitude。

Butsympathyispleasurable，andtheabsenceofitdistressing，notonlytothepersonsympathizedwith，buttothepersonsympathizing。Weareourselvespleasedifwecansympathizewithanother"ssuccessoraffliction，anditpainsusifwecannot。Theconsciousnessofaninabilitytosympathizewithhisdistress，ifwethinkhisgriefexcessive，givesusevenmorepainthanthesympatheticsorrowwhichthemostcompleteaccordancewithhimcouldmakeusfeel。

SucharethephysicalandinstinctivefactsofsympathyuponwhichAdamSmithfoundshistheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobationandourmoralideas。Beforeproceedingwiththisdevelopmentofhistheory，itisworthnoticingagainitsclosecorrespondencewiththatofHume，wholikewisetracedmoralsentimentstoabasisofphysicalsympathy。"Whereverwego，"

saysHume，"whateverwereflectonorconverseabout，everythingstillpresentsuswiththeviewofhumanhappinessormisery，andexcitesinourbreastasympatheticmovementofpleasureoruneasiness。"Censureorapplauseare，then，theresultoftheinfluenceofsympathyuponoursentiments。

Ifthenaturaleffectsofmisery，suchastearsandcriesandgroans，neverfailtoinspireuswithcompassionanduneasiness，"canwebesupposedaltogetherinsensibleorindifferenttowardsitscauses，whenamaliciousortreacherouscharacterandbehaviourarepresentedtous？"

CHAPTERIII。MORALAPPROBATION，ANDTHEFEELINGOFPROPRIETY。

Havinganalyzedthefactsofsympathy，andshownthatthecorrespondenceofthesentimentsofotherswithourownisadirectcauseofpleasuretous，andthewantofitacauseofpain，AdamSmithproceedstoshowthattheamountofpleasureorpainfeltbyonemanintheconductorfeelingsofanotheristhemeasureofhisapprobationorthecontrary。Thesentimentsofanyonearejustandproper，orthereverse，accordingastheycoincideornotwiththesentimentsofsomeoneelsewhoobservesthem。Hisapprobationvarieswiththedegreeinwhichhecansympathizewiththem，andperfectconcordofsentimentmeansperfectapprobation。

JustasamanwhoadmiresthesamepoemorpicturethatIdo，orlaughsatthesamejoke，allowsthejusticeofmyadmirationormirth，sohe，whoentersintomyresentment，andbybringingmyinjurieshometohimselfsharesmyfeelings，cannotbuttherebyapproveofthemasjustandproper。

Accordingashissympatheticindignationfailstocorrespondtomine，accordingashiscompassionfallsshortofmygrief，according，inshort，tothedegreeofdisproportionhemayperceivebetweenmysentimentsandhis，doeshefeelstrongerorweakerdisapprovalofmyfeelings。

Moralapprobationadmitsofthesameexplanationasintellectualapprobation。

Forjustastoapproveordisapproveoftheopinionsofothersisnothingmorethantoobservetheiragreementordisagreementwithourown，sotoapproveordisapproveoftheirfeelingsandpassionsissimplytomarkasimilaragreementordisagreementexistingbetweenourownandtheirs。

Consequentlythesentimentsofeachindividualarethestandardandmeasureofthecorrectnessofanother"s，anditishardlypossibleforustojudgeofanother"sfeelingsbyanyothercanonthanthecorrespondentaffectioninourselves。Theonlymeasurebywhichonemancanjudgeofthefacultyofanotherisbyhisownfacultyofthelikekind。Aswejudgeofanother"seyesight，hearing，orreason，bycomparisonwithourowneyesight，hearing，orreason，sowecanonlyjudgeofanother"sloveorresentmentbyourownloveorourownresentment。If，uponbringingthecaseofanotherhometoourselves，wefindthatthesentimentswhichitproducesinhimcoincideandtallywithourown，wenecessarilyap-proveofhisasproportionedandsuitabletotheirobjects，whileifotherwise，wenecessarilydisapproveofthemasextravagantandoutofproportion。

Since，then，onepointofviewineverymoraljudgmentisthe"suitableness"

whichanyaffectionoftheheartbearstothecauseorobjectwhichexcitesit，theproprietyorimproprietyoftheaction，whichresultsfromsuchaffection，dependsentirelyontheconcordordissonanceoftheaffectionwiththatfeltsympatheticallybyaspectator。HencethatpartofmoralapprobationwhichconsistsinthesenseoftheProprietyofasentimenttoitscause(say，ofangertoitsprovocation)，arisessimplyfromtheperceptionofacoincidencebetweenthesentimentofthepersonprimarilyaffectedbyitandthatofthespectatorwho，byforceofimagination，putshimselfintheother"splace。

Letustake，forinstance，asaconcretecase，theexhibitionoffortitudeundergreatdistress。Whatisthesourceofourapprobationofit？Itistheperfectcoincidenceofanother"sfirmnesswithourowninsensibilitytohismisfortunes。Byhismakingnodemandonusforthathigherdegreeofsensibilitywhichwefindtoourregretthatwedonotpossess，heeffectsamostperfectcorrespondencebetweenhissentimentsandours，whichcausesustorecognizetheperfectproprietyof"hisconduct。Theadditionalelementwhichraisesourfeelingofmereapprobationintooneofadmiration，isthewonderandsurprisewefeelatwitnessingadegreeofself-commandfarabovethatusuallymetwithamongmankind。

Thereare，however，severalfactswhichmodifyoursenseoftheproprietyorimproprietyofanotherperson"ssentimentsbytheirconcordordisagreementwithourown，andwhichitisimportanttonotice。

Firstofall，itisonlywhentheobjectswhichexciteanysentimentbearsomedirectrelationtothepersonprimarilyaffectedbythesentimentortoourselvesassympatheticallyaffectedbyit，thatanymoraljudgmentofhissentimentarisesonourpart。Forinstance，"thebeautyofaplain，thegreat-nessofamountain，theornamentsofabuilding，theexpressionofapicture，thecompositionofadiscourse，theconductofathirdperson……allthegeneralsubjectsofscienceandtaste，arewhatweandourcompanionsregardashavingnopeculiarrelationtoeitherofus。"Thereisnooccasionforsympathy，orforanimaginarychangeofsituations，inordertoproduce，withregardtosuchthings，themostperfectharmonyofsentimentsandaffections。Wherethereissuchharmony，weascribetoamangoodtasteorjudgment，butrecognizenodegreeofmoralpropriety。

Butitisotherwisewithanythingwhichmorecloselyaffectsus。Amisfortuneorinjurytoanotherisnotregardedbyhimandbyusfromthesamepointofviewasapoemorpictureare，fortheformercannotbutmorecloselyaffecthim。Henceacorrespondenceoffeelingismuchmoredifficultandmuchmoreimportantwithregardtomatterswhichnearlyconcernhim，thanwithregardtomatterswhichconcernneitherhimnorus，andarereallyindifferenttoouractualinterests。Wecaneasilybearwithdifferenceofopinioninmattersofspeculationortaste；butweceasetobebearabletooneanother，ifhehasnofellow-feelingformymisfortunesormygriefs；

orifhefeelseithernoindignationatmyinjuriesornonethatbearsanyproportiontomyresentmentofthem。

Thiscorrespondenceoffeeling，then，beingatthesametimesodifficultofattainmentandyetsopleasurablewhenattained，twooperationscomeintoplay:theeffortonourpart，asspectators，toenterintothesentimentsandpassionsofthepersonprincipallyconcerned，andtheeffortonhispartalsotobringhissentimentsintounisonwithours。Whilstwestrivetoassume，inimagination，hissituation，hestrivestoassumeours，andtobringdownhisemotionstothatdegreewithwhichweasspectatorscansympathize。Consciousasheisthatoursympathymustnaturallyfallshortoftheviolenceofhisown，andlongingashedoesforthatreliefwhichhecanonlyderivefromacompletesympathyoffeeling，heseekstoobtainamoreentireconcordbyloweringhispassiontothatpitchwhichheissensiblethatwecanassume。Doeshefeelresentmentorjealousy，hewillstrivetotoneitdowntothepointatwhichwecanenterintoit。Andbythusbeingledtoimaginehowhehimselfwouldbeaffected，wereheonlyaspectatorofhisownsituation，heisbroughttoabatetheviolenceofhisoriginalpassion。Sothatinasortofmeeting-pointofsympathyliesthepointofperfectpropriety，ashasbeenshowninthecaseoftheproprietyoffortitude。

Onthistwofoldtendencyofourmoralnaturetwodifferentsetsofvirtuesarebased。Onourefforttosympathizewiththepassionsandfeelingsofothersarefoundedthegentlervirtuesofcondescension，toleration，andhumanity；whilstthesternervirtuesofself-denialandself-commandarefoundedonourefforttoattuneourpassionstothatpitchofwhichotherscanapprove。Inaunionofthesetwokindsofvirtuesinfeelingmuchforothersandlittleforourselves，inrestrainingourselfishandindulgingourbenevolentaffectionsconsiststhehighestperfectionofwhichhumannatureiscapable。

Buthowdowepassfromaperceptionoftheproprietyofthesegoodqualitiestoaperceptionoftheirvirtue，forproprietyandvirtuemeandifferentthings？Theansweris，thatproprietyofsentimentwhich，whendisplayedintheusualdegree，meetswithourapprobationmerely，callsforouradmirationandbecomesvirtuouswhenitsurprisesusbyanunusualmanifestationofit。Admirationis"approbation，heightenedbywonderandsurprise。""Virtueisexcellence，somethinguncommonlygreatandbeautiful，whichrisesfarabovewhatisvulgarandordinary。"Thereisnovirtueintheordinarydisplayofthemoralqualities，justasintheordinarydegreeoftheintellectualqualitiestherearenoabilities。

Forsensibilitytobeaccountedhumanityitmustexceedwhatispossessedbythe"rudevulgarofmankind；"and，inlikemanner，forself-commandtoamounttothevirtueoffortitude，itmustbemuchmorethantheweakestofmortalsiscapableofexerting。

Thereare，infact，twodifferentstandardsbywhichweoftenmeasurethedegreeofpraiseorblameduetoanyaction，oneconsistingintheideaofcompleteproprietyorperfection，incomparisonwithwhichallhumanactionmusteverappearblameable，andtheotherconsistinginthatapproachtosuchperfectionofwhichthemajorityofmenarecapable。Justinthesamewayasaworkofartmayappearverybeautifulwhenjudgedbythestandardofordinaryperfection，andappearfulloffaultswhenjudgedbythestandardofabsoluteperfection，soamoralactionorsentimentmayfrequentlydeserveapplausethatfallsshortofanidealvirtue。

Ithavingthusbeenshownthattheproprietyofanysentimentliesinameeting-pointbetweentwodifferentsympathies，orinasortofcompromisebetweentwodifferentaspectsof"thesamepassion，itisevidentthatsuchproprietymustlieinacertainmediocrityormeanstatebetweentwoextremes，orinjustthatamountofpassionintowhichanimpartialspectatorcanenter。Thatgrieforresentment，forexample，isproperwhicherrsneitheronthesideofexcessorofdefect，whichisneithertoomuchnortoolittle。Theimpartialspectator，beingunableeithertoenterintoanexcessofresentmentortosympathizewithitsdeficiency，blamestheoneextremebycallingit"fury，"andtheotherbycallingit"wantofspirit。"

OnthispointitisnoticeablethatAdamSmith"stheoryofProprietyagrees，ashesayshimself，"prettyexactly"withAristotle"sdefinitionofVirtue，asconsistinginameanorbetweentwoextremesofexcessordefect。Forin-stance，courage，accordingtoAristotle，liesinthemeanstatebetweentheoppositevicesofcowardiceandrashness。Frugalityisasimilaravoidanceofbothavariceandprodigality，andmagnanimityconsistsinavoidingtheextremesofeitherarroganceorpusillanimity。AndasalsocoincidentineveryrespectwithhisowntheoryofPropriety，AdamSmithclaimsPlato"saccountofvirtuegivenintheRepublic，whereitisshowntoconsistinthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfinesitselftoitsproperspherewithoutencroachingonthatofanyother，andperformsitsproperofficewithexactlythatdegreeofstrengthwhichbynaturebelongstoit。

Butitisobviousthatthemeanstateorpointofproprietymustbedifferentindifferentpassions，lyingnearertotheexcessinsomeandnearertothedefectinothers。Anditwillbefoundthatthedecencyorindecencyofgivingexpressiontoourpassionsvariesexactlyinproportiontothegeneraldispositionofmankindtosympathizewiththem。

Toillustratetheapplicationofthisprinciple，AdamSmithdividesallhumanpassionsintofivedifferentclasses。ThesearethePassionswhichtaketheiroriginfromthebody，thosewhichtaketheiroriginfromaparticularturnoftheimagination，theunsocialPassions，thesocialPassions，andtheselfishPassions。AndwhateverdoubtsmaybefeltastothetruthofAdamSmith"sgeneraltheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobation，thereisnodoubtoftheinterestwhichattachestohisaccountoftheinfluenceofoursympathiesinconditioningthenatureofourmoralsentiments。

1。Tobeginwiththepassionswhichhavetheiroriginfromthebody。Thebodilypassions，suchashungerandthirst，beingpurelypersonal，failtoexciteanygeneralsympathy，andinproportiontotheimpossibilityofsuchsympathyistheimproprietyorindecencyofanystrongexpressionofthem。Therealoriginofourdisliketosuchpassionswhenwewitnesstheminothers，therealreasonwhyanystrongexpressionsofthemaresodisagreeable，isnotthefactthatsuchpassionsarethosewhichweshareincommonwiththebrutes(forwealsosharewiththemnaturalaffectionandgratitude)，butsimplythefactthatwecannotenterintothem，thattheyareinsufficienttocommandoursympathies。

Withthepassionswhicharisefromtheimaginationitisotherwisethanwithpassionswhichoriginatefromthebody。Forinstance，adisappointmentinloveorambitioncallsforthmoresympathythanthegreatestbodilyevil，forourimaginationlendsitselfmorereadilytosympathizewiththemisfortunesaffectingtheimaginationsofothers，thanispossibleinthecaseofthesufferingsoftheirbodies。Ourimaginationmouldsitselfmoreeasilyupontheimaginationofanotherthanourbodilyframecanbeaffectedbywhataffectshis。Thuswecanreadilysympathizewithamanwhohaslosthisfortune，forheonlysuffersinhisimagination，notinhisbody；andwecanfancy，justashedoes，thelossofdignity，theneglectofhisfriends，thecontemptfromhisenemies，thedependence，want，andmiserywhichhehimselfforeseesinstoreforhim。Thelossofalegisamorerealcalamitythanthelossofamistress；butwhilstitwouldberidiculoustofoundatragedyontheformerloss，thelattermisfortunehasgivenrisetomanyafineplay。Merepainnevercallsforthanylivelysympathy，andforthatreasontherewerenogreaterbreachesofdecorumcommittedintheplaysoftheGreeks，thanintheattempttoexcitecompassionbytherepresentationofphysicalagonies，asinthecriesofPhiloctetes，(5)orthetorturesofHippolytusandHercules。Itisonthislittlesympathywhichwefeelwithbodilypainthatisfoundedtheproprietyofconstancyandpatienceinitsendurance。