第11章

And3dly。Ithasoccurredtotheimaginationsofsome，thattherewouldbenosmalldangerthatthegreatpowersofEurope，beinginterestedinhavingafriendinthepresidentoftheUnitedStates，wouldinterposeinhiselection，andthedangersandmisfortunesofPolandberenewedinAmerica。4Inanswertotheseobjections，ithasbeensaidwithgreattruthandforce:

1st。Thatoneilleffectoftheexclusionwouldbeadiminutionoftheinducementstogoodbehaviour。Lesszealwouldbefeltinthedischargeofaduty，whentheadvantageofthestationmustberelinquishedatadeterminateperiod。Thedesireofrewardisoneofthestrongestincentivesofhumanconduct，andthebestsecurityforfidelity，istomakeinterestcoincidewithduty。Eventheloveoffame，therulingpassionofnobleminds，promptingamantoplanandundertakearduousenterprisesforthepublicbenefit，whichmightrequiretimetoperfectthem，woulddeterhimfromtheundertaking，ifheforesawthathemustquitthescenebeforehecouldaccomplishthework，andcommitit，togetherwithhisownreputation，tobandsthatmightbeunequalorunfriendlytothetask。

2dly。Experienceistheparentofwisdom，andhighlydesirableinthefirstmagistrateofanation。Itwouldbeinjuriousandabsurdtodeclare，thatassoonasitisacquired，itspossessorshallbecompelledtoabandonthestationinwhichheacquiredit，andtowhichitisadapted。

3dly。Athirdilleffectoftheexclusionwouldbe，thebanishingmenfromstationsinwhichtheirpresencemightbeofthegreatestmomenttothepublicinterestonparticularemergencies。Anordinancewhichpreventsanationfrommakinguseofitsowncitizens，inthemannerbestsuitedtopeculiarexigenciesandcircumstances，mustbeunwise。Suppose，forinstance，awartoexist，andthepresidenttheninplace，peculiarlyfittedbyhismilitarytalentsandexperiencetoconductittoadvantage:tobeobligedtoexcludehimfromoffice，perhapstosubstituteinexperienceforexperience，andtherebyunhingeandsetafloatthesettledtrainofadministration，mightbeofthegreatest，detriment。5

Theapprehensionoftheinterferenceofforeignnationsinregardtotheofficeofpresident，unlesshewasatfirstelectedforlife，seemstobewithoutfoundation。Whileheiselectedonlyforfouryearsatatime，itisevidentthatitwouldbeofnousetoforeignpowerstocorrupthim，unlesstheycanintimidateorcorruptthosewhoelecthim；butbytheguardedprovisionsoftheConstitution，itisimpossibletoknowforalongtimebeforehand，whothoseelectorswillbe。As，however，thismodeofelectionhasnowbecometheactofthepeople，andtheelectorsaremerelynominal，thewholebodyofthepeople，oratleastamajorityofthem，mustbecorruptedorintimidated，beforesuchaschemecansucceed；

ameasurenotverypracticablebyanyforeignpower。ItiswellknownthatinPoland，thekingwaselected，notbythepeopleatlarge，butbyanaristocraticclass，smallinnumber，andthereforeaccessibletoforeignintrigues。

IfItweredesiredbysuchpowerstoobtainanundueascendancyinourgovernment，theattemptswouldbemade，notonthepresident，butonthemembersofthelegislature，andparticularlyofthesenate，butinnogovernmentisitrecollectedthatanecessaryrotationinofficewaseverimposedonthemembersofthelegislature。

Downtothepresentmoment，nothinginpointoffacthasoccurredamongustoexcitearegretatthecontinuedeligibilityofthesameindividual。

Noundueinfluencehasbeenpractised，andthevoiceofthepeople，sovereigninfact，aswellasintheory，hasbeenindependentlyexercised，bothinthecontinuanceandintheremovaloftheirpublicagents。ThepredominantfeatureoftheAmericancharacter，seems，intruth，tobethatsortofgoodsense，whichinvariablyleadstojustdistinctionsbetweenpartialandgeneralbenefit。Itisnotpretended，thatpartyebullitionsdonotsometimesoverpowerthecalmreflectionofthecommunity，buttheillusionsaretemporary，andthesoundjudgmentwhichneverwhollydepartsfromtheentirebody，ultimatelyrecoversitsascendancy。

Thatuniversalphrenzyofthenation，ofwhichEurope，bothinancientandmoderntimeshasexhibitedinstances，neverfoundplacewithus。Temperateandself-collectedinthemosttryingseasons，Americaalwayspursuedaregularcourse，terminatinginthatsecurityandpeace，whichviolentagitationsandtumultuouspassionscouldnothaveprocured。Theirgoodsensedisplaysitselfintheutterrejectionofpersonalinfluence，whenthepursuitsofthepartyarehostiletothegeneralsentiment。Whatisbelievedtobeforthepublicgood，isneversacrificedtotheviewsofanyindividual，howeverdistinguished。

Buttherearecertainlegitimaterestraintsontheofficeofpresident，whichremovefromthepeopleeverycauseofuneasinessinrespecttoit。

Theserestraintsconsist，inpart，ofthosealreadymentionedinregardtothelegislativebodies。Inthefirstplace，heisequallyboundbytheConstitution，andmustfeetthesameinterestinconformingtoit，thatisfeltbythosebodies。HehasevenlesstodoinrespecttoalterationsoftheConstitutionthanthetwohouseshave。Hecannotrecommendtothepeopleanamendmentofit，andifthetwohousesresolvetosubmitonetothem，hisconcurrenceintheirsodoingisnotrequired，6andperhapswouldnotbeallowed。

Self-interest，(asjustbeforeobserved，)isoneofthestrongestpermanentinfluencesofhumanaction，andwhereveritcanbecoupledwithpublicduty，itaffordsgreatreasonforbelievingthattheywillactinconcert。

Now，ifweconsiderthatthepresident，beingasingleofficer，withoutthosecombinationswhichmaybeformedbythemembersofthetwohouses；

notatanytimeduringhisofficialexistence，returningtoandmixingwiththemassofthepeople，andtherebytosomeextentenabledtodeceiveandmisleadthem；butwhatevermaypersonallybehissocialhabitsandrepublicansimplicity，stillseparatedfromextensivepracticalintercoursebytheverynatureofhisoffice；weshallatonceperceivethatalleyesbeingconstantlyfixedonhim，hismotionswillalwaysbescrupulouslywatched，andsomuchoftheregularexecutionofhispowerasmaybeconsideredtodependonpopularacquiescence，willbediminished，inproportionasheevincesadesigntoextenditbeyonditsconstitutionalbounds。

Norwouldthesupposedinfluenceoftheotherexecutiveofficerssupporthiminsuchcases。Comparedwiththemassofthepeople，theirnumbersaresmall，andtheirverydependenceonhimwouldrenderthemsuspected。

Buttheinterestsofthoseofficerswouldoperateinanotherdirection:

asawilfulinfringementoftheConstitutionwillnaturallyterminateinsomeway，inadestitutionofthepresident"spower，theirinterestwouldnotbepromotedbycontributingtoaneventinjurioustothemselves，sincehissuccessorwouldofcoursemanifestadeferencetopublicopinionbyremovingallthepromotersandparticipatorsoftheprecedingdelinquency。

TheConstitutionmaythereforebeconsideredashavingastillstrongerholdonthepresident，thanonthelegislativebody。

2dly。If，fromitsnature，anypoliticalorcasualmotivescouldhaveaneffectonthejudicialinterpositionwhenregularlycalledforth，itwouldseemthatitwouldbeexercisedwithmorealacrityagainstasingleofficer，alreadybecomethesubjectofgeneralsuspicionordisapprobation，thanagainstthoseactswhichmustbeconsideredasthemeasuresoftheentiregovernment。

Butthisisaltogetheranillegitimateviewofthecharacterofthejudicialpowerandmodeofaction。Onthecontrary，thepresident，whilelabouringunderpublicreprobation，wouldlookforwardtothejudiciary，withacertainconfidencethatprejudiceanderrorwouldfindnoroominthejudgmentsbywhichthelegalityofhisconductwouldbedecided。

Thischeckuponlamwouldthereforebethemorecompletebybeingunbiassedandcertain。

3dly。But，asbeforeobservedinregardtothelegislature，theopportunityforthisjudicialinterventioninitscommonform，mayberemote，andonetransgressionnotresisted，mayleadtoanother，tilltheaccumulationbecomestooheavytobeborne。

Then，thepowerofthepeoplearisesinitsmajesty，andthroughtheirappropriateorgans，thehouseofrepresentatives，thejudicialpowerisappealedtoinanother，amostimposingandconclusiveform。

ThedignifiedtribunalwhichtheConstitutionhasprovidedforthetrialofimpeachments，hasnowtheeyesofthepublicimmovablyfixedonit。

Guiltorinnocence，notprejudiceorpartymotives，formthegroundofdecision，andalthoughthesenatedoesnotdirectlyvacateorannultheillegalactsthathavetakenplace，whicharestilllefttotheredressoftheordinarytribunals；itpreventsthepossibilityoftheirbeingagaincommittedbythesameindividual，andtheprobabilityoftheirbeingcopiedbyanother。

4thly。Andsoeffectualarethedisqualificationswhichthesenatemaypronounce，thatifthepeople，subsequentlyimposedonandmisledbythediscardedpresidentorhispartisans，wereinclinedagaintoconfideapublictrusttohim，itwouldnotbeintheirpowertodoso。Thesentenceofthesenateisimmutable。

Nosimilarcaution，noanalogousdefenceofthepeopleagainsttheirowndangerousclemencyorforgetfulness，aretobefoundelsewhere。TheostracismofAthens，theinterdictionsfromfireandwaterofRome，thedisqualificationsinsentencesonimpeachmentsinEngland，mightallberepealed，andtheparty，howeverpoliticallydangerous，berestoredtohisformerrank。

Itmaybeinquired，whythepowerofpardoningshouldbeabsolutelyexcludedinsuchacaseasthis?Theanswerhasalreadybeengiven。Thesafetyofthepeopleisthesupremelaw:theirlibertiesproperlyregulatedandsecuredarethecardinalobjectsofrepublicanconstitutions。Thosewhohaveevincedthecapacitytoabuseapublictrustoughtnottohaveasecondopportunitytodoso。Ifitwerepossibletoremovethedisqualificationthussolemnlyimposed，thestatemightbethrownintodisorder；factionsinfavourofthedelinquentbeformed；contrarypretensionsbewarmly，perhapsforciblyasserted?andthebloody，civiccontestsofancientRomemightberenewedonthepollutedarenaofamodernandatemperaterepublic。Itisinfinitelypreferablethatonemanshouldbemeritedlydeprivedofpartoftherightsandprivilegesofcitizenship，thanthatthepeaceandhappinessofthewholecommunityshouldbeendangered。

Thesentenceitselfisattheutmostamildone；buttheobjectofitisstillliabletotheordinaryprocessofjustice。Ifhiscrimeshouldbeofthathighclasswhichsubjectshimtotheforfeitureoflife，thepresidentforthetimebeingstillpossessesthepowertopreventitsinfliction。

Theindividualwiththeaccumulatedweightoftwoconvictions，mightsafelybepardonedinrespecttothesecond。Henevercouldagainbecomeanobjectofpublicconfidence。

Totheseviewsofthechecksuponthisoffice，wemayaddthepowerofthepeople，whenthequadrennialperiodofelectionreturns，toremovehim，whoseconduct，althoughitmaynothaveamountedtoactualdelinquency，hasexcitedeventheirsuspicion。

Referring，withoutrepeatingit，tothelastchapter，wemaythusrecogniseineverypartoftheConstitutionthosecautiousprovisions，forming，adequatechecksoneverypoweritconfers，restrainingallfromdoingwrong，yetnotproductiveofaninconvenientinterferencewitheachotherwhenalldoright；contributingtopreserveanecessarypurityandvigour，andrenderingthemeredistributionofpowerthemeansofcorrectingitsabuse。

1。Seethisboldassertionanditsfeebleillustration，inDelolme，book2，ch。ix。

2。ThestateofMaryland。ThelegislatureofthatstatemayalterorabolishanypartoftheConstitutionorthebillofrights，providedthebillforthatpurposeispassedthreemonthsbeforeanewelection，andisconfirmedbythegeneralassemblyatthefirstsessionaftersuchelection，theobjectofwhichprovisoundoubtedlyistoaffordthepeopleanopportunitytotestifybytheremovalofthemembersadisapprobationoftheirmeasures。

3。ByDelolme，inthechapteralreadyreferredto。

4。SeedebatesinVirginiaconvention，vol。iii。p。67。

5。Federalist，No。72。

6。4Hollingsworthv。Virginia，3Dallas，378。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXXIICHAPTERXXXII。OFTHEPERMANENCEOFTHEUNION。Quassatarespublicamultaperderetetornamentadignitatisetpræ；sidiastabilitatissuæ；。OratioproMarcello。HAVINGthusendeavouredtodelineatethegeneralfeaturesofthispeculiarandinvaluableformofgovernment，weshallconcludewithadvertingtotheprinciplesofitscohesion，andtotheprovisionsitcontainsforitsowndurationandextension。

ThesubjectcannotperhapsbebetterintroducedthanbypresentinginitsownwordsanemphaticalclauseintheConstitution。

TheUnitedStatesshallguaranteetoeverystateintheUnionarepublicanformofgovernment，shallprotecteachofthemagainstinvasion，andonapplicationofthelegislature，oroftheexecutivewhenthelegislaturecannotbeconvened，againstdomesticviolence。

TheUnionisanassociationofthepeopleofrepublics；itspreservationiscalculatedtodependonthepreservationofthoserepublics。Thepeopleofeachpledgethemselvestopreservethatformofgovernmentinall。Thuseachbecomesresponsibletotherest，thatnootherformofgovernmentshallprevailinit，andallareboundtopreserveitineveryone。

Butthemerecompact，withoutthepowertoenforceit，wouldbeoflittlevalue。Nowthispowercanbenowheresoproperlylodged，asintheUnionitself。Hence，thetermguarantee，indicatesthattheUnitedStatesareauthorizedtooppose，andifpossible，preventeverystateintheUnionfromrelinquishingtherepublicanformofgovernment，andasauxiliarymeans，theyareexpresslyauthorizedandrequiredtoemploytheirforceontheapplicationoftheconstitutedauthoritiesofeachstate，"torepressdomesticviolence。"Ifafactionshouldattempttosubvertthegovernmentofastateforthepurposeofdestroyingitsrepublicanform，thepaternalpoweroftheUnioncouldthusbecalledforthtosubdueit。

Yetitisnottobeunderstood，thatitsinterpositionwouldbejustifiable，ifthepeopleofastateshoulddeterminetoretirefromtheUnion，whethertheyadoptedanotherorretainedthesameformofgovernment，oriftheyshould，withthe，expressintentionofseceding，expungetherepresentativesystemfromtheircode，andtherebyincapacitatethemselvesfromconcurringaccordingtothemodenowprescribed，inthechoiceofcertainpublicofficersoftheUnitedStates。

Theprincipleofrepresentation，althoughcertainlythewisestandbest，isnotessentialtothebeingofarepublic，buttocontinueamemberoftheUnion，itmustbepreserved，andthereforetheguaranteemustbesoconstrued。Itdependsonthestateitselftoretainorabolishtheprincipleofrepresentation，becauseitdependsonitselfwhetheritwillcontinueamemberoftheUnion。Todenythisrightwouldbeinconsistentwiththeprincipleonwhichallourpoliticalsystemsarefounded，whichis，thatthepeoplehaveinallcases，arighttodeterminehowtheywillbegoverned。

Thisrightmustbeconsideredasaningredientintheoriginalcompositionofthegeneralgovernment，which，thoughnotexpressed，wasmutuallyunderstood，andthedoctrineheretoforepresentedtothereaderinregardtotheindefeasiblenatureofpersonalallegiance，issofarqualifiedinrespecttoallegiancetotheUnitedStates。Itwasobserved，thatitwascompetentforastatetomakeacompactwithitscitizens，thatthereciprocalobligationsofprotectionandallegiancemightceaseoncertainevents；anditwasfurtherobserved，thatallegiancewouldnecessarilyceaseonthedissolutionofthesocietytowhichitwasdue。

Thestates，then，maywhollywithdrawfromtheUnion，butwhiletheycontinue，theymustretainthecharacterofrepresentativerepublics。Governmentsofdissimilarformsandprinciplescannotlongmaintainabindingcoalition。

"Greece，"saysMontesquieu，"wasundoneassoonasthekingofMacedonobtainedaseatintheamphyctioniccouncil。"1Itisprobable，however，thatthedisproportionateforceaswellasthemonarchicalformofthenewconfederatehaditsshareofinfluenceintheevent。Butwhetherthehistoricalfactsupportsthetheoryornot，theprincipleinrespecttoourselvesisunquestionable。

Wehaveassociatedasrepublics。Possessingthepowertoformmonarchies，republicswerepreferredandinstituted。Thehistoryoftheancient，andthestateofthepresentworld，arebeforeus。Ofmodernrepublics，Venice，Florence，theUnitedProvinces，Genoa，allbutSwitzerlandhavedisappeared。

Theyhavesunkbeneaththepowerofmonarchy，impatientatbeholdingtheexistence，ofanyotherformthanitsown。AninjuredprovinceofTurkey，recallingtoitsmindtheillustriousdeedsofitsancestors，hasventuredtoresistitsoppressors，andwitharevivalofthenameofGreece，ahopeisentertainedofthepermanentinstitutionofanotherrepublic。Butmonarchystandsbywithajealousaspect，andfearfullestitsownpowershouldbeendangeredbytherevivalofthemaxim，thatsovereigntycaneverresideinthepeople，affectsacoldneutrality，withtheprobableanticipationthatitwillinducetobarbariansuccess。Yetthatgallantcountry，itistrusted，willpersevere。Anenlightenedpeople，disciplinedthroughnecessity，andemboldenedevenbythegloomofitsprospects，mayaccomplishwhatitwouldnotdaretohope。2

Thisabstractprinciple，thisaversiontotheextensionofrepublicanfreedom，isnowinvigoratedandenforcedbyanallianceavowedlyforthepurposeofoverpoweringalleffortstorelievemankindfromtheirshackles。

Itisessentiallyandprofessedlytheexaltationofmonarchiesoverrepublics，andevenovereveryalterationintheformsofmonarchy，tendingtoacknowledgeorsecuretherightsofthepeople。Theexistenceofsuchacombinationwarrantsandrequiresthatinsomepartofthecivilizedworld，therepublicansystemshouldbeabletodefenditself。Butthiswouldbeimperfectlydone，bytheerectionofseparate，independent，thoughcontiguousgovernments。

Theymustbecollectedintoabody，stronginproportiontothefirmnessofitsunion；respectedandfearedinproportiontoitsstrength。TheprincipleonwhichalonetheUnionisrenderedvaluable，andwhichalonecancontinueit，isthepreservationoftherepublicanform。

Inwhatmannerthisguarantyshallbeeffectuatedisnotexplained，anditpresentsaquestionofconsiderablenicetyandimportance。

NotawordintheConstitutionisintendedtobeinoperative，andonesosignificantasthepresentwasnotlightlyinserted。TheUnitedStatesarethereforeboundtocarryitintoeffectwhenevertheoccasionarises，andfindingaswedo，inthesameclause，theengagementtoprotecteachstateagainstdomesticviolence，whichcanonlybebythearmsoftheUnion，weareassistedinadueconstructionofthemeansofenforcingtheguaranty。

Ifthemajorityofthepeopleofastatedeliberatelyandpeaceablyresolvetorelinquishtherepublicanformofgovernment，theyceasetobemembersoftheUnion。Ifafaction，aninferiornumber，makesuchaneffort，andendeavourtoenforceitbyviolence，thecaseprovidedforwillhavearisen，andtheUnionisboundtoemployitspowertopreventit。

ThepoweranddutyoftheUnitedStatestointerferewiththeparticularconcernsofastatearenot，however，limitedtotheviolenteffortsofapartytoalteritsconstitution。Iffromanyothermotives，orunderanyotherpretexts，theinternalpeaceandorderofthestatearedisturbed，anditsownpowersareinsufficienttosuppressthecommotion，itbecomesthedutyofitspropergovernmenttoapplytotheUnionforprotection。

ThisisfoundedonthesoundprinciplethatthoseinwhomtheforceoftheUnionisvested，indiminutionofthepowerformerlypossessedbythestate，areboundtoexerciseitforthegoodofthewhole，andupontheobviousanddirectinterestthatthewholepossessesinthepeaceandtranquillityofeverypart。Atthesametimeitisproperlyprovided，inorderthatsuchinterferencemaynotwantonlyorarbitrarilytakeplace；thatitshallonlybe，ontherequestofthestateauthorities:otherwisetheself-governmentofthestatemightbeencroacheduponatthepleasureoftheUnion，andasmallstatemightfearorfeeltheeffectsofacombinationoflargerstatesagainstitundercolourofconstitutionalauthority；butitismanifest，thatineverypartofthisexcellentsystem，therehasbeentheutmostcaretoavoidencroachmentsontheinternalpowersofthedifferentstates，wheneverthegeneralgooddidnotimperiouslyrequireit。

Noformofapplicationforthisassistanceispointedout，norhasbeenprovidedbyanyactofcongress，butthenaturalcoursewouldbetoapplytothepresident，orofficerforthetimebeing，exercisinghisfunctions。

NooccasionalactofthelegislatureoftheUnitedStatesseemstobenecessary，wherethedutyofthepresidentispointedoutbytheConstitution，andgreatinjurymightbesustained，ifthepowerwasnotpromptlyexercised。

Intheinstanceofforeigninvasion，thedutyofimmediateandunsolicitedprotectionisobvious，butthegenericterminvasion，whichisusedwithoutanyqualification，mayrequireabroaderconstruction。

Ifamongtheimprobableeventsoffuturetimes，weshallseeastateforgetfulofitsobligationtoreferitscontroversieswithanotherstatetothejudicialpoweroftheUnion，endeavourbyforcetoredressitsrealorimaginarywrongs，andactuallyinvadetheotherstate，weshallperceiveacaseinwhichthesupremepoweroftheUnionmayjustlyinterfere；perhapswemaysayisboundtodoso。

Theinvadedstate，insteadofrelyingmerelyonitsownstrengthfordefence，andinsteadofgratifyingitsrevengebyretaliation，mayprudentlycallforandgratefullyreceivethestrongarmoftheUniontorepeltheinvasion，andreducethecombatantstotheequallevelofsuitorsinthehightribunalprovidedforthem。Inthiscourse，thepoliticalestimationofneitherstatecouldreceiveanydegradation。Thedecisionofthecontroversywouldonlyberegulatedbythepurestprinciplesofjustice，andthepartyreallyinjured，wouldbecertainofhavingthedecreeinitsfavourcarriedintoeffect。ItrestswiththeUnion，andnotwiththestatesseparatelyorindividually，toincreasethenumberofitsmembers。3Theadmissionofanotherstatecanonlytakeplaceonitsownapplication。

Wehavealreadyseen，thatintheformationofcoloniesunderthedenominationofterritories，thehabithasbeen，toassuretothemtheirformationintostateswhenthepopulationshouldbecomesufficientlylarge。Onthatevent，theinhabitantsacquirearighttoassembleandformaconstitutionforthemselves，andtheUnitedStatesareconsideredasboundtoadmitthenewstateintotheUnion，provideditsformofgovernmentbethatofarepresentativerepublic。ThisistheonlycheckorcontrolpossessedbytheUnitedStatesinthisrespect。

Ifameasuresoimprobableshouldoccurinthecolony，astheadoptionofamonarchicalgovernment，itcouldnotbereceivedintotheUnion，althoughitassumedtheappellationofastate，buttheguarantyofwhichwehavespoken，wouldnotliterallyapply?theguarantyisintendedtosecurerepublicaninstitutionstostates，anddoesnotintermsextendtocolonies。

Assoon，however，asastateisformedoutofacolony，andadmittedintotheUnion，itbecomesthecommonconcerntoenforcethecontinuanceoftherepublicanform。Therecanbenodoubt，however，thatthenewstatemaydeclinetoapplyforadmissionintotheUnionbutitdoesnotseemequallyclear，thatifitsformofgovernmentcoincidedwiththerulesalreadymentioned，itsadmissioncouldberefused。TheinhabitantsemigratefromtheUnitedStates，andforeignersarepermittedtosettle，undertheexpressorimpliedcompact，thatwhenthepropertimearrives，theyshallbecomemembersofthegreatnationalcommunity，withoutbeinglefttoanexposedandunassistedindependence，orcompelledtothrowthemselvesintothearmsofaforeignpower。Itwouldseem，however，thattheconstitutionadopted，oughttobesubmittedtotheconsiderationofcongress，butitwouldnotbenecessarythatthismeasureshouldtakeplaceatthetimeofitsformation，anditwouldbesufficientifitwerepresentedandapprovedatthetimeofitsadmission。Thepracticeofcongresshasnot，however，correspondedwiththesepositions，nopreviousapprobationoftheconstitutionhasbeendeemednecessary。

Itmustalsobeconceded，thatthepeopleofthenewstateretainthesamepowertoaltertheirconstitution，thatisenjoyedbythepeopleoftheolderstates，andprovidedsuchalterationsarenotcarriedsofarastoextinguishtherepublicanprinciple，theiradmissionisnotaffected。

ThesecessionofastatefromtheUniondependsonthewillofthepeopleofsuchstate。Thepeoplealoneaswehavealreadyseen，boldthepowertoaltertheirconstitution。TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesistoacertainextent，incorporatedintotheconstitutionsortheseveralstatesbytheactofthepeople。Thestatelegislatureshaveonlytoperformcertainorganicaloperationsinrespecttoit。TowithdrawfromtheUnioncomesnotwithinthegeneralscopeoftheirdelegatedauthority。Theremustbeanexpresspro-visiontothateffectinsertedinthestateconstitutions。

Thisisnotatpresentthecasewithanyofthem，anditwouldperhapsbeimpolitictoconfideittothem。Amattersomomentous，oughtnottobeentrustedtothosewhowouldhaveitintheirpowertoexerciseitlightlyandprecipitatelyuponsuddendissatisfaction，orcauselessjealousy，perhapsagainsttheinterestsandthewishesofamajorityoftheirconstituents。

Butinanymannerbywhichasecessionistotakeplace，nothingismorecertainthanthattheactshouldbedeliberate，clear，andunequivocal。

Theperspicuityandsolemnityoftheoriginalobligationrequirecorrespondentqualitiesinitsdissolution。Thepowersofthegeneralgovernmentcannotbedefeatedorimpairedbyanambiguousorimpliedsecessiononthepartofthestate，althoughasecessionmayperhapsbeconditional。Thepeopleofthestatemayhavesomereasonstocomplaininrespecttoactsofthegeneralgovernment，theymayinsuchcasesinvestsomeoftheirownofficerswiththepowerofnegotiation，andmaydeclareanabsolutesecessionincaseoftheirfailure。Still，however，thesecessionmustinsuchcasebedistinctlyandperemptorilydeclaredtotakeplaceonthatevent，andinsuchcase?asinthecaseofanunconditionalsecession，?thepreviousligamentwiththeUnion，wouldbelegitimatelyandfairlydestroyed。Butineithercasethepeopleistheonlymovingpower。

Asuggestionrelativetothispartofthesubjecthasappearedinprint，whichtheauthorconceivestorequirenotice。

Ithasbeenlaiddownthatifallthestates，oramajorityofthem，refusetoelectsenators，thelegislativepowersoftheUnionwillbesuspended。4

Ofthefirstofthesesupposedcasestherecanbenodoubt。Ifoneofthenecessarybranchesoflegislationiswhollywithdrawn，therecanbenofurtherlegislation，butifapart，althoughthegreaterpartofeitherbranchshouldbewithdrawnitwouldnotaffectthepowerofthosewhoremained。

InnopartoftheConstitutionisaspecificnumberofstatesrequiredforalegislativeact。Underthearticlesofconfederationtheconcurrenceofninestateswasrequisiteformanypurposes。IffivestateshadwithdrawnfromthatUnion，itwouldhavebeendissolved。InthepresentConstitutionthereisnospecificationofnumbersafterthefirstformation。Itwasforeseenthattherewouldbeanaturaltendencytoincreasethenumberofstateswiththeincreaseofpopulationthenanticipatedandnowsofullyverified。Itwasalsoknown，thoughitwasnotavowed，thatastatemightwithdrawitselfThenumberwouldthereforebevariable。

InnopartoftheConstitutionisthereareferencetoanyproportionofthestates，exceptinthetwosubjectsofamendments，andofthechoiceofpresidentandvice-president。

Inthefirstcase，two-thirdsorthree-fourthsoftheseveralstatesisthelanguageused，anditsignifiesthoseproportionsoftheseveralstatesthatshallthenformtheUnion。

Inthesecond，thereisaremarkabledistinctionbetweenthechoiceofpresidentandvicepresident，incaseofanequalityofvotesforeither。

Thehouseofrepresentatives，votingbystates，istoselectoneofthethreepersonshavingthehighestnumber，forpresident，aquorumforthispurposeshallconsistofamemberormembersfromtwo-thirdsofthestates，andamajorityofallthestatesshallbenecessaryforthechoice。

Thesenatenotvotingbystates，butbytheirmembersindividually，asinallothercases，selectsthevicepresidentfromthetwopersonshavingthehighestnumberonthelist。Aquorumforthispurposeshallconsistoftwo-thirdsofthewholenumberofsenators，andamajorityissufficientforthechoice。

Now，ifbytheomissionofthelegislatorsofmorethanonethirdofthestates，therewerenosenatorsfromsuchstates，thequestionwouldarisewhetherthequorumispredicatedofthestatesrepresented，orofallthestates，whetherrepresentedornot。

Theformeropinionismostconsistentwiththegeneralrule，thatweshouldalwayspreferaconstructionthatwillsupport，toonethathasatendencytodestroyaninstrumentorasystem。Othercausesthandesignonthepartofastatelegislature，maybeimaginedtooccasionsomestatestobeunrepresentedinthesenateatthemoment。

Itseemstobethesafest，andispossiblythesoundestconstruction，toconsiderthequorumasintendedtobecomposedoftwo-thirdsofthethenexistingsenators。

Butwemaypursuethesubjectsomewhatfurther。

TowithdrawfromtheUnionisasolemn，seriousact。Wheneveritmayappearexpedienttothepeopleofastate，itmustbemanifestedinadirectandunequivocalmanner。Ifitiseverdoneindirectly，thepeoplemustrefusetoelectrepresentatives，aswellastosuffertheirlegislaturetore-appointsenators。Thesenatorwhosetimehadnotyetexpired，mustbeforbiddentocontinueintheexerciseofhisfunctions。

Butwithoutplain，decisivemeasuresofthisnature，proceedingfromtheonlylegitimatesource，thepeople，theUnitedStatescannotconsidertheirlegislativepowersoversuchstatessuspended，northeirexecutiveorjudicialpowersanywayimpaired，andtheywouldnotbeobligedtodesistfromthecollectionofrevenuewithinsuchstate。

Astotheremainingstatesamongthemselves，thereisnoopeningforadoubt。

Secessionsmayreducethenumbertothesmallestintegeradmittingcombination。

Theywouldremainunitedunderthesameprinciplesandregulationsamongthemselvesthatnowapplytothewhole。ForastatecannotbecompelledbyotherstatestowithdrawfromtheUnion，andtherefore，iftwoormoredeterminetoremainunited，althoughalltheothersdesertthem，nothingcanbediscoveredintheConstitutiontopreventit。

Theconsequencesofanabsolutesecessioncannotbemistaken，andtheywouldbeseriousandafflicting。

Thesecedingstate，whatevermightbeitsrelativemagnitude，wouldspeedilyanddistinctlyfeelthelossoftheaidandcountenanceoftheUnion。TheUnionlosingaproportionofthenationalrevenue，wouldbeentitledtodemandfromitaproportionofthenationaldebt。Itwouldbeentitledtotreattheinhabitantsandthecommerceoftheseparatedstate，asappertainingtoaforeigncountry。Inpublictreatiesalreadymade，whethercommercialorpolitical，itcouldclaimnoparticipation，whileforeignpowerswouldunwillinglycalculate，andslowlytransfertoit，anyportionoftherespectandconfidencebornetowardstheUnitedStates。

Evilsmorealarmingmayreadilybeperceived。Thedestructionofthecommonhandwouldbeunavoidablyattendedwithmoreseriousconsequencesthanthemeredisunionoftheparts。

Separationwouldproducejealousiesanddiscord，whichintimewouldripenintomutualhostilities，andwhileourcountrywouldbeweakenedbyinternalwar，foreignenemieswouldbeencouragedtoinvadewiththeflatteringprospectofsubduingindetail，thosewhom，collectively，theywoulddreadtoencounter。

SuchinancienttimeswasthefateofGreece，brokenintonumerousindependentrepublics。Rome，whichpursuedacontrarypolicy，andabsorbedallherterritorialacquisitionsinonegreatbody，attainedirresistiblepower。

Butitmaybeobjected，thatRomealsohasfallen。Itistrue；andsuchisthehistoryofman。Naturallifeandpoliticalexistencealikegivewayattheappointedmeasureoftime，andthebirth，decay，andextinctionofempiresonlyservetoprovethetenuityandillusionofthedeepestschemesofthestatesman，andthemostelaboratetheoriesofthephilosopher。

Yetitisalwaysourdutytoinquireinto，andestablishthoseplansandformsofcivilassociationmostconducivetopresenthappinessandlongduration:therestwemustleavetoDivineProvidence，whichhithertohassograciouslysmiledontheUnitedStatesofAmerica。

WemaycontemplateadissolutionoftheUnioninanotherlight，moredisinterestedbutnotlessdignified，andconsiderwhetherwearenotonlyboundtoourselvesbuttotheworldingeneral，anxiouslyandfaithfullytopreserveit。

Thefirstexamplewhichhasbeenexhibitedofaperfectself-government，successfulbeyondthewarmesthopesofits，authors，oughtnevertobewithdrawnwhilethemeansofpreservingitremain。

Ifinothercountries，andparticularlyinEurope，asystematicsubversionofthepoliticalrightsofmanshallgraduallyoverpowerallrationalfreedom，andendangerallpoliticalhappiness，thefailureofourexampleshouldnotbeheldupasadiscouragementtothelegitimateoppositionofthesufferers；if，ontheotherhand，anemancipatedpeopleshouldseekamodelonwhichtoframetheirownstructure；ourConstitution，aspermanentinitsdurationasitissoundandsplendidinitsprinciples，shouldremaintobetheirguide。

Ineveryaspectthereforewhichthisgreatsubjectpresents，wefeelthedeepestimpressionofasacredobligationtopreservetheunionofourcountry；wefeelourglory，oursafety，andourhappiness，involvedinit；weunitetheinterestsofthosewhocoldlycalculateadvantageswiththosewhoglowwithwhatislittleshortoffilialaffection；andwemustresisttheattemptofitsowncitizenstodestroyit，withthesamefeelingsthatweshouldavertthedaggeroftheparricide。

Thisworkcannotperhapsbebetterconcludedthanwithaquotationfromthevaledictoryaddressofonewhosecharacterstampsinestimablevalueonallthatliehasuttered，andwhoseexhortationsonthissubject，springingfromthepurestpatriotismandthesoundestwisdom，oughtnevertobeforgottenorneglected。5

InthisaddressWashingtonexpressedhimselfasfollows:?

"ThenameofAmerican，whichbelongstoyouinyournationalcapacity，mustalwaysexaltthejustprideofpatriotism，morethananyappellationderivedfromlocaldiscriminations。Withslightshadesofdifference，youhavethesamereligion，manners，habits，andpoliticalprinciples?

youhaveinacommoncausefoughtandtriumphedtogether；theindependenceandlibertyyoupossess，aretheworkofjointcounsels，andjointefforts，ofcommondangers，sufferings，andsuccesses。

"Buttheseconsiderations，howeverpowerfullytheyaddressthemselvestoyoursensibility，aregreatlyoutweighedbythosewhichapplymoreimmediatelytoyourinterest。Hereeveryportionofourcountryfindsthemostcommandingmotivesforcarefullyguardingandpreservingtheunionofthewhole。

"TheNorthinanunrestrainedintercoursewiththeSouth，protectedbytheequallawsofacommongovernment，findsintheproductionsofthelatter，greatadditionalresourcesofmaritimeandcommercialenterprise，andpreciousmaterialsofmanufacturingindustry。

"TheSouth，inthesameintercourse，benefitingbythesameagencyoftheNorth，seesitsagriculturegrowanditscommerceexpand。

TurningpartlyintoitsownchannelstheseamenoftheNorth，itfindsitsparticularnavigationinvigorated，andwhileitcontributesindifferentwaystonourishandincreasethegeneralmassofthenationalnavigation，itlooksforwardtotheprotectionofamaritimestrength，towhichitselfisunequallyadapted。TheEastinalikeintercoursewiththeWest，alreadyfinds，andintheprogressiveimprovementofinteriorcommunicationsbylandandwater，willmoreandmorefind，avaluableventforthecommoditieswhichitbringsfromabroadormanufacturesathome。TheWestderivesfromtheEastsuppliesrequisitetoitsgrowthandcomfort，andwhatisperhapsofstillgreaterconsequence，itmustofnecessityowethesecureenjoymentofindispensableoutletsforitsownproductions，totheweight，influence，andthefuturemaritimestrengthoftheAtlanticsideoftheUnion，directedbyanindissolublecommunityofinterestasonenation。AnyothertenurebywhichtheWestcanholdthisessentialadvantage，whetherderivedfromitsownseparatestrength，orfromanapostateandunnaturalconnexionwithanyforeignpower，mustbeintrinsicallyprecarious。

"While，then，everypartofourcountrythusfeelsanimmediateandparticularinterestinunion，allthepartscombinedcannotfailtofindintheunitedmassofmeansandefforts，greaterstrength，greaterresource，proportionablygreatersecurityfromexternaldanger，alessfrequentinterruptionoftheirpeacebyforeignnations，andwhatisofinestimablevalue，theymustderivefromunionanexemptionfromthosebroilsandwarsbetweenthemselveswhichsofrequentlyafflictneighbouringcountries，nottiedtogetherbythesamegovernment，whichtheirownrivalshipsalonewouldbesufficienttoproduce，butwhichoppositeforeignalliances，attachments，andintrigues，wouldstimulateandembitter。Hence，likewise，theywillavoidthenecessityofthoseovergrownmilitaryestablishments，which，underanyformofgovernmentareinauspicioustoliberty，andwhicharetoberegardedasparticularlyhostiletorepublicanliberty。Inthissense，itisthatyourunionoughttobeconsideredasamainpropofyourliberty，andthattheloveoftheoneoughttoendeartoyouthepreservationoftheother。

"Theseconsiderationsspeakapersuasivelanguagetoeveryreflectingandvirtuousmind，andexhibitthecontinuanceoftheUnionasaprimaryobjectofpatrioticdesire。Isthereadoubtwhetheracommongovernmentcanembracesolargeasphere?Letexperiencesolveit。Tolistentomerespeculationinsuchacasewerecriminal。Weareauthorisedtohopethataproperorganizationofthewhole，withtheauxiliaryagencyofgovernmentsfortherespectivesubdivisions，willaffordahappyissuetotheexperiment。

Withsuchpowerfulandobviousmotivestounion，affectingallpartsofourcountry，whileexperienceshallnothavedemonstrateditsimpracticability，therewillalwaysbereasontodistrustthepatriotismofthosewhoinanyquartermayendeavourtoweakenitshands。"

1。Federalist，No。43。

2。Sincethispassagewaswritten，theaffairsofGreecehaveassumedsomewhatofadifferentaspect。TheTurkishfleethasbeenaccidentallydestroyedbythecombinedpowers，andtheFrenchhavelandedabodyofmen，withanapparentintentiontopromotetheindependenceofthisafflictedcountry。