第10章

Thefourfollowingpropositionsformthebasisofthisconclusion。Ontheformationofsociety，priortopositivelaws，certainrulesofmoralactionnecessarilyarise，thefoundationofwhichistheobservanceofjusticeamongthemembersofthesociety。OntheformationoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，suchrulesarosewithoutbeingexpressed:thebreachofthemconstitutesoffencesagainsttheUnitedStates。IfnojudiciarypowerhadbeenintroducedintotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，thestatecourtscouldhavepunishedthosebreaches。Thecreationofsuchjudiciarypowerwasintendedtoconferjurisdictionoversuchandotheroffences，nottonegativeordestroyit。1。ItwasintendedbyDivineProvidencethatmenshouldliveinastateofsociety。Reasonandreflectionweregiventohimtobeusedandimproved。

Socialaffectionswerecreated，asnaturalimpulsestopromotetheiruseandimprovement，byleadingandkeepingmankindtogether。Whensocietiescommence，certainrulesofactionarenecessary。Menarenotequallyhonestandvirtuous；withoutsomerestraint，injusticeandviolencewouldsoonthrowtheassociation，howeversmall，intodisorderandconfusion。Hencearisesatoncealawoftacitconvention，foundedonafewplainprinciples。

Itrequiresnopositivelawtohaveitunderstood，thatoneshallnot，withoutcause，depriveanotherofhisproperty，ordoinjurytohisperson。

Whentheperiodarrivesfortheformationofpositivelaws，whichisaftertheformationoftheoriginalcompact，thelegislatureisemployed，notinthediscoverythattheseactsareunlawful，butintheapplicationOfpunishmentstopreventthem。Ineverycodewefindadistinctionbetweenthingsmalainse，thingsinthemselvesunlawful；andmalaprohibita，thingswhichbecomeunlawfulfrombeingprohibitedbythelegislature。

Butcircumstancesmaydelaytheformationortheactionofalegislativebody，oritsprovisionsmaybeinadequatetotheredressofexperiencedorexpectedevils。Inthisintervalcannorightstopropertybeacquiredorpreserved?cannobindingcontractsbemade?aretheft，robbery，murder，nocrimes?Opinionssomonstrouscanbeentertainedbynone。Onthecontrary，thehumanheart，theuniversalsenseandpracticeofmankind，theinternalconsciousnessoftheDivinewill，allconcurinpointingouttherulesandobligationsbywhichwearebound。

Emphaticallytermedthelawofnature，itisimplantedinusbynatureitself；itisfelt，notlearned；itisnevermisunderstood，andthoughnotalwaysobserved，neverisforgotten。CiceroinhisTreatisedeLegibus，remarksthatlaw，(andheexplainsthathespeaksofgeneral，notpositivelaw，)istheperfectionofreason，seatedinnature，commandingwhatisright，andprohibitingwhatiswrong。Itsbeginningistobetracedtotimesbeforeanylawwaswritten，oranyexpressformofgovernmentadopted。

Thispropositionisindeedtooplaintobecontradicted；andwethereforepassontothesecond，whichmayrequireacloserexamination。

2。WehaveseenthattheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswastheworkofthepeople。Itwastheformationofanewandpeculiarassociation，havingforitsobjectstheattainmentorsecurityofmanyimportantpoliticalrights，whichcouldnototherwisebefullyattainedorsecured；butnotembracinginitssphereofactionallthepoliticalrightstowhichitsmemberswereindividuallyentitled。Sofarasrelatedtothoseotherrights，thepeopleweresatisfiedwithotherassociations，ineachofwhichthelawofnature，undertheusualappellationofthecommonlaw，prevailed。

Sofarasrelatedtothenewrightsandduties，springingfromthenewpoliticalassociation，thesametacitcompactwhichisacknowledgedtoexistinallsociety，necessarilyaccompaniedthis。Nothingshortofexpressnegationcouldexcludeit。Everymemberofsocietyhasadirectinterestinthepreventionorpunishmentofeveryactcontrarytothewellbeingofthatsociety。BeforetheConstitutionwasadopted，everyactofsuchatendency，havingrelationtothestateassociation，waspunishablebythecommonlawofsuchstate，butwhenitwasadopted，certainactions，whetherconsideredinreferencetopersons，toparticularplaces，ortothesubjectitself，wereeitherexpresslyorbyimplicationwithdrawnfromtheimmediatecognizanceofthestates。ThepeopleoftheUnitedStatesdidnot，however，meanthatifthoseactionsamountedtooffencestheyshouldgounpunished。Therightofprosecutionandofpunishmentwasnotmeanttobesurrendered。Inthisinstance，theconvergeofthewellknownproposition，thatwhateverisnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesisreservedtothepeople，isthetrueconstruction。Thepeoplepossessedatthemomentthefullrighttothepunishmentofoffencesagainstthelawofnature，thoughtheymightnotbethesubjectofpositivelaw。TheydidnotsurrenderthisrightbyadoptingtheConstitution。Anoffenceagainsttheminastatecapacity，becameincertaincasesanoffenceagainsttheminrelationtotheUnitedStates。Infact，thereisnooffenceagainsttheUnitedStateswhichisnotanoffenceagainstthepeopleoftheUnitedStates。Theydidnot，perhapswemayevensay，thatwithoutbeinginsomedegreeguiltyofpoliticalsuicide，theycouldnotcedeorrelinquishtherighttopunishsuchacts。Iftheyhadsodone，thesystemitselfwouldsoondissolve。

Theygavenopowertocongresstopassanypenallawswhatever，exceptonthisbasis。Everyact，declaringacrimeandimposingapenalty，restsuponit。Itfollowsthatthissourceofthepowerofcongressmustbeadmitted。

Itmaybeattenuatedbypositivelaw，butitnevercanbeexhausted，unlesswecansupposethatpositivelawsmaymeetandprovideforalltheincalculablevarietiesofhumandepravity。Butinnocountryhasthisbeenfoundpracticable。

IntheverytermsmadeuseofintheConstitution，itismanifestthatanewanddistinctclassofdutiesweretoarisewhichwouldtendtoproduceanewanddistinct。classofoffences。Thewordsare，aswehavealreadyseen?thatthejudicialpower。shallextendtoallcasesinlawandequityarisingunderthisConstitution，thelawsoftheUnitedStatesandtreaties。

Nojurisdictionovercrimesisgiven，exceptastheyareincludedintheantecedentwords，casesinlaw；butitisdeclaredthattheyshallbetriedonlybyjury。Wehavethusthreedivisionsofjudicialsubjects。

I。CasesincludingcrimesarisingundertheConstitution。

II。Casesincludingcrimesarisingunderactsofcongress。

III。Thosearisingundertreaties。

TheremaythenbecrimesarisingundertheConstitution，onwhichnoactofcongresshasbeenpassed；butifsuchanacthasbeenpassed，asinallcountriespositivelawscontrolthe，commonlaw，theactispunishableundersuchpositivelaw。

Ifonlytheinfractionoftreatiesandactsofcongresshadbeenconsideredascriminalacts，therewouldhavebeenamanifestimproprietyintheintroductionofthosewords"arisingundertheConstitution。"Buttheywerecertainlyusedwith。theintentionthattheyshouldhavethesameeffectincriminalasincivilcases。Theconstructionweventuretoaffix，appearstoustorenderthewholesystemharmonious，efficient，andcomplete。

3。Ournextpositionis，thatiftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateshadbeenwhollyunfurnishedwithajudicialpower，offencesofthisdescriptioncouldbepunishedthroughthemediumofthestatecourts。

Intheyear1779，oneCorneliusSweers，adeputycommissaryoftheUnitedStates，wasindictedinacourtofoyerandterminerthenheldbythejudgesoftheSupremeCourtofPennsylvania，forforgingandalteringtworeceiptsgiventohimbypersonsofwhomhehadpurchased，goodsfortheuseoftheUnitedStates。Theindictment，incompliancewithjudicialforms，waslaidtobeagainstthepeaceanddignityofthecommonwealthofPennsylvania，withintenttodefraudtheUnitedStates。McKean，C。J。afterhearingtheargumentsofcounsel，supportedtheindictment。6Itisamemorableinstanceofthepowerofthecommonlawtoaccommodateitselftotheattainmentofsubstantialjustice。Eventhearticlesofconfederationdidnotthenexist，butthecourtrecognisedtheUnitedStatesasacorporation。

ItwasanoffenceagainsttheUnitedStates，inwhichthestateofPennsylvaniahadnootherinterestthanasoneofthirteenstates。ButtheprosecutionwastechnicallysupportedasanoffenceagainstthestateofPennsylvania。

Anotherimportantconsiderationarisesfromthiscase。ThereexistedatthattimenoactofassemblyinPennsylvaniawhichrenderedsuchanactionacrime。BytheEnglishcommonlawitwasnotforgery。Thecourtmusthaveproceededthereforeonhigherground。Theprincipleslaiddowninoursecondpositionsupporttheirjudgment。Thesoundnessofthisdecision，aswellas，thatinthecaseofDeLongChamps，7hasneverbeenquestioned。Wemaythereforesafelyinfer，thatthestatejudicatureswould，ifitwerenecessary，affordaneasyandacertainremedyinallcasesofacriminalnature，arisingtindertheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates。

4。Itonlyremainstoinquire，whethertheadditionofajudiciarysystemtotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesdiminishesthepowerofpunishingoffencesarisingunderit。Itiswellunderstoodthatthemotivesforannexingajudiciarypowerweretogiveforceandenergytothegovernment。ItwasapprehendedthatlessinterestintheconcernsoftheUnion，andlessuniformityofdecisionmightbefoundinthestatecourts；anditwasthoughtexpedientthatasuitablenumberoftribunalsundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStatesshouldbedispersedthroughthecountry，subjecttotherevisionofsuperiorcourts，andfinallycenteringinacommonhead，theSupremeCourt。Tothesetribunalswasimpartedthepowerwhichthestatecourtswould，itispresumed，haveotherwisecontinuedtoexercise，ofexpoundingandenforcingwhateverwasproperlycognizableasanoffenceagainsttheUnitedStates。Butitcannotbeconceived，thatasystemintendedtostrengthenandinvigoratethegovernmentoftheUnion，canimpairandenfeebleit。Itcannotbesupposed，thattheeffectofprovidingweaponsforitsdefence，istostripitofitsarmour。NeithercanitbesupposedthatitwasintendedtoestablishasystemsoincongruousastoconfinetheUnitedStatescourtstothetrialofoffencesagainstpositivelaw，andtorelyuponthestatecourtsforreliefagainstactsofanotherdescriptioninjurioustotheUnitedStates；

noryetthattheUnitedStates，havingsostronganinterestinbeingprotectedagainstsuchacts，meanttorelinquishandabandontheremediesagainstthemaltogether。

Inadditiontothesegeneralgrounds，weoughtnottoomitthepeculiarjurisdictiongivenbytheConstitutionoverdistrictscededbystatesforcertainpurposes，andalsoovertheterritoriesacquiredfromthestatesorfromforeignpowers。Aconstructionwhichimpliesthatinsuchplacesanyoffencenotexpresslyprohibitedbyanactofcongressmaybecommittedwithimpunity，cannotbeasoundone。

Letusalsoconsiderpersonsofacertaindescription。TheConstitution，aswehavealreadyseen，givestothecourtsoftheUnitedStatesjurisdictioninallcasesaffectingconsuls。Congress，increatingtheinteriorcourts，assignedtothemanexclusivejurisdictionincriminalcasesoverconsuls。

In1816，aforeignconsulwaschargedwiththecommissionofanatrociouscrimewithinthestateofPennsylvania，forwhichanindictmentwasfoundagainsthim。Hedeniedthejurisdictionofthestatecourt，andwasdischarged。

Hestillgoesuntried，labouringunderanunmeritedimputationifinnocent，andifguilty，unpunished，which，ifthedoctrinehereopposediscorrect，isanunavoidableconsequence。

Still，however，althoughthesepositionsmaybeconsideredassound，someseriousobjectionsremainfordiscussion。

1。Intheinquiry，whetherthecourtsoftheUnitedStatespossessjurisdictionofacriminalnatureinanycasenotprovidedforbyanactofcongress，ithasalwaysbeensupposedthatthecommonlawofEnglandwasalonetobeconsidered。Chase，J。says，"IftheUnitedStatescanforamomentbesupposedtohaveacommonlaw，itmust，Ipresume，bethatofEngland。"8

Thustheattentionhasbeenconfinedtoapartonlyofthegeneralquestion；

andifitisunderstoodbycourts，thattheyareonlytodecidewhetherthecommonlawofEnglandisinsuchcasestobethesoleruleofdecision，itiseasytoaccountforsomeoftheopinionsthathavebeengiven。BothChase，J。andJohnson，J。justlyobserve，thatthecommonlawofEnglandhasbeengraduallyvariedinthedifferentstates，andthatthereexistsnouniformrulebywhichtheUnitedStatescouldbegovernedinrespecttoit。Thelatter，withgreattruthandeffectremarks，thatifthepowerimpliedontheformationofanypoliticalbody，topreserveitsownexistenceandpromotetheendandobjectofitsowncreation，isapplicabletothepeculiarcharacterofourConstitution，(whichhedeclinestoexamine，)

itisaprinciplebynomeanspeculiartothecommonlaw[ofEngland。]

"Itiscoevalprobablywiththefirstformationofalimitedgovernment，belongstoasystemofuniversallaw，andmayaswellsupporttheassumptionofmanyotherpowers，asthosepeculiarlyacknowledgedbythecommonlawofEngland。"9

WemayaccountformostoftheoppositioninvariouspartsoftheUnionfromthequestionhavingbeenmisunderstood。ThatthecommonlawofEnglandwaskeptinview，toacertainextentbytheframersoftheConstitution，evenincriminalcases，andassuchadoptedbythepeople，cannotbedoubted。

Theinstancesarenumerous。Impeachment，treason，felony，breachofthepeace，habeascorpus，thetrialbyjury，andmanyotherphrasesandappellations，derivedfromthecommonlawofEngland，appearbothintheoriginaltextandtheamendments。Butthis，asjustlyobservedbyalearnedjurist，10wasnotintendedasasourceofjurisdiction，butasaruleormeanforitsexercise。Inthissensealonewearetoacceptthosetechnicalterms，andbynomeansasevidencethatifanycommonlawwasintendedbytheConstitutiontobeadoptedasaruleofaction，itwasthecommonlawofEngland。

2。Itisplausiblyurged，thatasystemoflawwhichdefinescrime，withoutappropriatingpunishment，possessesnoefficacyanddoesnotmeritadoption，anditisinquiredinwhatmannerareoffencesagainstthelawofnaturetobepunished。

Thequestionisnotwithoutitsintrinsicdifficulty，andananswercannotbeattemptedwithoutsomediffidence，butitishopedthatthefollowingviewwillbesatisfactory。

1。Wemaylayitdownasanaxiom，thatineverysystemoflaw，whetherexpressorimplied，crimeisheldtobeliabletopunishmentofsomesort。

Themeresenseofguilt，howeverunhappyitmayrendertheoffender，yieldsnocompensation，andaffordstosecuritytosociety。

2。Punishmentoughtalwaystobearajustrelationtothenatureanddegreeoftheoffence。Positivelawissometimesarbitraryandunreasonablysevere；buttheunitedsenseofthecommunity，someofwhommaycommit，andallofwhommaysufferfromthecommissionofcrimes，isgenerallyappositeandreasonable。Ifthereisanydeviationfromthestrictmeasureofpunishment，itisgenerallyonthesideofhumanity。

3。Recurring，asfaraswehavematerials，tothehistoryofancientlawinEurope，forwecannottakeAsiaorAfricaasourguides，wefindthatalthoughtheinjuredindividual，orhisnearestfriends，weresometimesheldtobeentitledtotakeredressintotheirownhands，andpursuetheoffenderbytheirownpower；apracticesodangerouswasgraduallyoverruled，andpunishment，renderedtheactofthewhole，affordedthroughthemediumofthewhole，satisfactionproportionedtotheoffence。11

4。Inremotetimes，andinmostcountries，thissatisfactionconsistedinheforfeitureofsomethingofvalue；wehavetothisaffecttheauthorityofHomer，Iliad，b。9，v。743。Thepriceofblooddischarged，themurdererlives。"OfTacitus，inrespecttotheancientGermans，"Luituretiamhomicidiumcertoarmentorumacpecorumnumero，"&；c。

homicideisalsopunishedbytheforfeitureofacertainnumberofcattleorsheep；andheadds，thatthoseconvictedofothercrimeswerefinedinproportion，apartofwhichwaspaidtotheprince，andparttohimwhowaswronged，ortohisrelations。Imprisonmentwasaddedeithertocoercepayment，orasafurtherpunishment。

Therewasatime，saysBeccaria，whenallpunishmentswerepecuniary。12LordKaimeslaysdownthesameposition，anditisasettledprincipleintheancientlawofEngland，thatwhereanoffencehasbeencommittedtowhichnospecificpunishmentisaffixedbystatute，itispunishablebyfineandimprisonments。13Herethenwehavematerialswhichlaboriousinquirywouldprobablyincrease，forascertainingthenatureofthosepunishmentsthatbycommonconsentprecededpositivelaw。Theirmildnessoughtnottoleadustorejectthem。

Itwouldbeasorryargumenttosay，thatbecauseaseverepunishmentcannotbeinflicted，theoffendershallnotbepunishedatall。JudgeStorytrulyremarks，14thatitisasettledprinciple，thatwhenanoffenceexiststowhichnospecificpunishmentisaffixedbystatute，itispunishablebyfineandimprisonment，butwhenheadds，thatiftreasonhadbeenleftwithoutpunishmentbyanactofCongress，thepunishmentbyfineandimprisonmentmusthaveattachedtoit；wemustrecollectthatthepowertodeclarethepunishmentbeingexpresslygiventocongress，itseemstobetakenoutofthegeneralprinciplethatwouldotherwisebeapplicable。

Onthewhole，wearriveattheconclusion，thatcrimescommittedagainstsocietyhavebeenatalltimesthesubjectofpunishmentofsomesort；

thatindependentofpositivelaw，theforfeitureofproperty，orpersonalliberty，hasbeenthegeneral，thoughnotperhapstheuniversalcharacterofpunishment；foradifferenceofmannerswillalwayshaveastronginfluenceontheextentofpunishment，asthepeoplearemildandpeaceableorruggedandferocious；andthatthetribunalsofjusticeineverycasewithintheirjurisdiction，arethusprovidedwithaguide，whichiffoundinadequatetothesafetyofsociety，mayatanytimeberenderedmoreeffectualbythelegislativepower。

Ithasbeensaid，thattogiveiteffect，thecommonlawoughttohavebeenexpresslyenactedaspartoftheConstitution。Buthowcouldthishavebeendone?ShouldithavebeendescribedasthecommonlawofEngland?

Itwasnotcontemplated。ThecommonlawofanyparticularstateintheUnion?Thiswouldhavebeenequallyinadmissible。Itcouldhavebeenintroducedinnootherthansomephrasesasthefollowing:

"Thelawofnature，orthejustandrationalobligationsofmeninastateofpoliticalsociety，shallbetheruleordecisioninallcasesnototherwiseprovidedfor。"Andsurelyitwouldhavebeendeemedamostunnecessarydeclaration。Ithasbeenwellobservedthattheattempttoenumeratethepowersnecessaryandpropertocallthegeneralpowerintoeffect，wouldhaveinvolvedacompletedigestoflawsoneverysubjecttowhichtheConstitutionrelates?accommodatednotonlytotheexistingstateofthings，buttoallpossiblechanges；forineverynewapplicationofageneralpower，theparticularpowers，whicharethemeansofattainingtheobject，mustoftennecessarilyvary，althoughtheobjectremainsthesame。15

IndeliveringtheopinionoftheSupremeCourtintheUnitedStatesv。HudsonandGoodwin，JudgeJohnsonobserves，thatit"isnotnecessarytoinquirewhetherthegeneralgovernmentpossessesthepowerofconferringonitscourtsajurisdiction，incasessimilartothepresent，itisenoughthatsuchjurisdictionhasnotbeenconferredbyanylegislativeact，ifitdoesnotresulttothesecourtsasaconsequenceoftheircreation。"

Withgreatdeferencetoanauthoritysorespectable，itissubmittedthatiftheprecedingobservationsarecorrect，thatjurisdictionhasbeenexpresslygivenbytheactofSeptember24，1789，whichalthoughrepealedbytheactofFebruary13，1801，wasrevivedbytheactofMarch8，1802，andisnowinfullforce。Bythisactthecircuitcourtsareexpresslyinvestedwiththecognizance，(theexclusivecognizancesaysthelaw，)

ofallcrimesandoffencescognizableundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，exceptwherethelawsoftheUnitedStatesshallotherwisedirect。Iftheoffencesofwhichwehavebeenspeaking，ariseundertheConstitution，theymustbecognizableundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，andarethusrenderedcognizableinthecircuitcourts。

Thesamelearnedjudgeinasubsequentcase，whenhealsodeliveredtheopinionoftheSupremeCourt，mostcorrectlydrewfromtheConstitutionitself，certainprinciplesnecessarytosupporttheassertedjurisdictionofalegislativebodytopunishcontemptsagainstitself，whichhejustlyobservesinvolvestheinterestofthepeople。

"Theinterestsanddignityofthosewhocreatedthepublicfunctionaries，requiretheexertionofthepowersindispensabletotheattainmentoftheendsoftheircreations。"16

Thequestionbeforethecourtwasonlyonthejurisdictionofthehouse。

Theprecisenatureoftheoffencecommitted，didnotappearonthefaceofthepleadings。Itwasobservedbyhim，"thatwearenottodecidethatthisjurisdictiondoesnotexist，becauseitisnotexpresslygiven。Itistrue，thatsuchapower，ifitexists，mustbederivedfromimplication，andthegeniusandspiritofourinstitutionsarehostiletotheexerciseofimpliedpowers。Hadthefacultiesofmanbeencompetenttotheframingofasysteminwhichnothingwouldhavebeenlefttoimplication，theeffortwouldundoubtedlyhavebeenmade。ButinthewholeofouradmirableConstitution，thereisnotagrantofpowers，whichdoesnotdrawafteritothersnotexpressed，butvitaltotheirexercise，notsubstantiveandindependent，butauxiliaryandsubordinate。"

Nowwemaybepermittedtoremark，thatthejurisdictionthusraisedandsupportedbynecessaryimplication，couldinthiscase，haveoperatedonlyonthoseacts，which，byanimplicationequallynecessary，weretobeconsideredasoffences。Noactofcongresshasdeclaredwhatshallconstitutethoseoffences。Theymustthereforeessentiallybe，whataretermedcontempts，orbreachesofprivilegeatcommonlaw。ItwascompetentfortheSupremeCourt，(wasitnotincumbentonthem?)tonoticethatthenon-existenceofanylegislativeprovisionsonthesubject，rendereditimpossibletojustifyanimprisonmentbyvirtueofthespeaker"swarrantforanon-existingoffence。Buttheobservationis，that"thepowertoinstituteaprosecutionmustbedependentonthepowertopunish。Ifthehouseofrepresentativespossessednopowertopunishforcontempt，theinitiatoryprocessissuedintheoperationofthatauthority，musthavebeenillegal；therewasawantofjurisdictiontojustifyit。"Andtheomissiontotakethisground，seemstosupporttheargumentexcludingthenecessityofastatutoryprovision。

Onthesamegroundwemayadverttotheexerciseofthepowerofimpeachment。

Inneitherofthecasesalreadymentioned，weretheactschargedonthepartiesaccused，statutoryoffences。Yetthedoctrineopposedinthisworkwouldrenderthepowerofimpeachmentanullity，inallcasesexceptthetwoexpresslymentionedintheConstitution，treasonandbribery；untilcongresspasslaws，declaringwhatshallconstitutetheother"highcrimesandmisdemeanors。"

Andthusthequestionseemstobeatrestinthecontemplationofboththesecourts，forsuchtheymustbetermed，whenactinginthosecapacities，andbothofthemarecourtsfromwhosedecisionthereisnoappeal。

1。ActofSeptember24，1789。

2。3Wheaton，222。Hobsonv。Campbell。

4Wheaton，414。UnitedStatesv。Howland。

3。3Wheaton，ubisupra，and3

Dallas，425。Sims"slesseev。Irvine。

4。May8，1792。Thelanguageoftheactisgeneral。Itspeaksoftheprinciples，rules，andusages"whichbelongtocourtsofequityascontra-distinguishedfromcourtsofcommonlaw。"

5。Itdoesnotappearthatthisinterestingquestion，thoughoftendiscussed，hasyetbeendefinitivelysettledbythesupremecourtoftheUnitedStates。ItwasfirstraisedinthecaseoftheUnitedStatesv。Warrell，2Dall。297，whenJudgePetersdissentedfromJudgeChase。Theclearandmanly，thoughbriefexpositionoftheopinionoftheformer，meritsgreatattention。Inthefollowingyear，1799，inthecaseoftheUnitedStatesv。Williams，ChiefJusticeEllsworthheldthatthecommonlawofthiscountryremainedthesameasitwasbeforetherevolution。Otherdecisions，notreported，arebelievedtohavetakenplace。IntheUnitedStatesv。McGillJudgeWashingtonisrepresentedtohavesaid，thathehadoftensodecidedit，4Dall。429。ThecaseoftheUnitedStatesv。HudsonandGoodwin，cameintothesupremecourtin1812，itwasnotargued。In1816anothercasewasbroughtup。ThejudgeofthecircuitcourtforthedistrictofMassachusetts，maintainingacommonlawjurisdictioninoppositiontothedistrictjudge，thecaseoftheUnitedStatesv。Coolidge，wasremovedaccordingtotheprovisionsofthejudiciarybillintothesupremecourt。

Unfortunatelytheattorney-generalagaindeclinedtheargument。Threeofthesevenjudgesobservedthattheydidnotconsiderthequestionassettled，butthecourtdeclaredthatalthoughtheywouldhavebeenwillingtobearthequestiondiscussedinsolemnargument，yet，underthecircumstances，theywouldnotreviewtheirformerdecisionordrawitintodoubt。See1Wheaton，415，andfortheoriginalcase，1Gallison，488。Twocases，earlierthananyofthese，UnitedStatesv。Ravara，in1792，andUnitedStatesv。Henfield，in1793，arepassedover，becausethequestionwasnotdistinctlyraisedineither。AndforthesamereasonnorelianceisplacedontheUnitedStatesv。Pickering，onanimpeachmentbeforethesenatein1804，allthechargesinwhichwerepurelyatcommonlaw。

6。1Dallas，41。

7。ThecaseofDeLongChampsin1783，thoughnotequallystrong，wasofthesamenature。ThiswasafterthearticlesofconfederationinwhichtheintercoursewithforeignpowerswasexclusivelyreservedtotheUnitedStates。ThedefendanthadassaultedthesecretaryofthelegationfromFrance。Theindictmentherewasremarkable。

ItdescribedthepersonassaultedassecretaryofthelegationofFrance?consulgeneraltotheUnitedStates，andconsultotheStateofPennsylvania，anditconcluded?"Inviolationofthelawofnations，againstthepeace，anddignityoftheUnitedStates，andofthecommonwealthofPennsylvania。"

Itwaslearnedlyargued；butthecourtwithoutdifficultydecidedthattheyhadjurisdiction，andthatitwaspunishableasanoffenceagainstthelawofnations。?1Dallas，111。SomepartsoftheopinionofChiefJusticeKentinLynch"scase，11Johnson，549，coincidewiththeseremarks。

8。2Dallas，384。

9。7Cranch，32。UnitedStatesv。

Hudson。Asthiscasewasnotarguedbycounsel，itdoesnotdistinctlyappearwhyitwasdeemedbythecourttodependonthecommonlawofEngland，andwhyitshouldnothavebeentakenuponthegeneralprinciplealludedtobyJudgeJohnson。Thisspontaneousassumptionofthegroundofdecisioninthecourtbelow，confinesthejudgmentofthesupremecourttothequestiononthecommonlawofEngland。

IntheUnitedStatesv。Burr，ChiefJusticeMarshallalsoreferstothat"generallyrecognizedandlongestablishedlaw，whichformsthesubstratumofthelawsofeverystate。"(SeeRobertson"sReportoftheTrialofAaronBurr。)

TheChiefJusticeofPennsylvania，inacasein5Binney，558，trulyobserves，that"everynationhasitscommonlaw。"AndarenottheUnitedStatesanation?

10。Mr。DuponceauinhislateworkonthejurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。

11。SeetheelegantelucidationofthissubjectbyLordKaimesinhishistoricallawtracts。

12。C。17，§；46。

13。SeealsoGrotius，b。1，c。2。Puff。

b。viii。c。3，§；IItothesameeffect。

14。UnitedStatesv。Coolidge，1Gallison，488。

15。Federalist，No。44。

16。6Wheaton，204。Andersonv。Dunn。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXXCHAPTERXXX。OFCHECKSANDRESTRAINTSONTHEJUDICIALBRANCH。FROMthesegeneralviewsofthejudicialpower，wecollectthatitisinthenatureofaprincipleincorporatedforusefulpurposesintotheConstitution，vestedinvariousagents，someofwhomderivetheirauthorityfromtheUnitedStates，andsomefromthestates，andholdingtheiroffices，aswillappearbyreferencetothoseconstitutions，onvarioustenures，butallpossessingtherightofdecidingonthevalidityofalaw。

Ifthispowerisinitselfinordinate，ifitisnotconsistentwiththetrueinterestsofthepeople，itmighthavebeenexcludedfrom，orcarefullyqualifiedin，theConstitution；butithasbeenestablishedbythepeopleonfulldeliberation；andafewadditionalreflectionsonitsnatureandutilitymaybeadmitted。

Inthefirstplace，wemayobserve，thatajudicialpowerwithsuchextensiveattributes，isprobablypeculiartothiscountry。Wherethereisnotafixedandsettledconstitution，whetherwrittenorunwritten，whichcannotbealteredbythelegislature，thejudiciaryhasnopowertodeclarealawunconstitutional。Insuchcountries，thepeopleareatthemercyofthelegislature。Theappealswhichtheymaymaketotheirconstitutionsaredisregardediftheycannotbeenforced，andtheconstitutionpossessesmerelyanominalvalue。Ittendsindeedtoexcitediscontents，byexhibitingrightsthatcannotbeenjoyed，andpromisingrestraintsongovernmentthatmaybebrokenwithimpunity。

TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswasnotframed，inthisrespect，ongroundnewtous。Theprinciplehadbeenpreviouslyinsertedinallthestateconstitutionsthenformed。Ithasbeenpreservedinallthosesinceestablished，andnoneofthealterationswhichwehaveheretoforenoticed，havebeenextendedtothispoint。

Wemaytheninquire，inwhatmodeorformoflanguageitcouldhavebeenexcludedfromtheConstitution，andwhatwouldhavebeentheeffectofsuchexclusion。Beinginitselfanecessaryincidenttoaregularandcompletegovernment，itsexistenceisimpliedfromthemerefactofcreatingsuchagovernment；ititisintendedthatitshouldnotbecommensuratewithallthepowersandobligationsofthegovernment，orthatitshouldnotformanypartofitwhatever，expresstermsofqualificationorexclusionwouldcertainlyberequired。

Nowitwouldbedifficulttoreconcilethemindsoffreemen，towhomwassubmittedtheconsiderationofaschemeofgovernment，professingtocontainthoseprinciplesbywhichafuturelegislatureandexecutiveweretoberegulated，toanydeclarationsthatasubversionorabandonmentofthoseprinciples，byeitherbranch，andparticularlybythelegislature，shouldbeliabletonoresistanceorcontrol。Thejudicialpowerpotentiallyexistedbeforeanylawswerepassed；itcouldnotbewithoutanobject；

thatobject，isatfirsttheConstitution。Asthelegislatureproceedstoact，thejudicialpowerfollowstheirproceedings。ItisacorrectiveimposedbytheConstitutionontheiracts。Thelegislaturearenotdeceivedormisled。Nothingindicatesthattheyalonearetodecideontheconstitutionalityoftheirownacts，orthatthepeoplewhomaybeinjuredbysuchacts，areunprovidedwithanyotherdefencethanopenresistancetothem。Butwithoutanadequatepowerinthejudiciarytotheeffectrequired，thepeoplewouldeitherbedriventosuchresistance；obligedtowaittilltheycouldobtainredressthroughtheexerciseoftheirelectivepowers；

orbecompelledtopatientsubmission。

Therightsofthepeoplearebettersecuredbythegeneralundefinedjudicialpower，necessarilyinferredfromthegenerallanguageoftheConstitutionitself，pre-existingintheirownstateconstitutions，andneversurrenderedtotheUnitedStates。Inthelastmentionedaspect，itwouldappearsurprisingthatthosewhoweremostapprehensiveoftheself-increasingpowerofthegeneralgovernment，didnotperceivethebulwarkoftheirsafety。Thecourtsandthejudgesofeverystatepossess，asbeforeobserved，therighttodecideontheconstitutionalityofalawoftheirownstateandoftheUnitedStates。Theprincipleitself，andnotthemeretribunal，constitutesthepublicsecurity。Thatsuchdecisionsaresubjecttotheappellatejurisdictionheretoforespokenof，formsnoobjectiontotheirusefulness。Theobjectofthisjurisdictionistoproduceuniformity。Insteadofreducing，itenhancesthevalue，whileitprovestheuniversalbearingoftheprincipleitself。

Intheorganizationofthispowerthussalutary，thusnecessary，isfoundtheonlydifficulty。Torenderitwhollyindependentofthepeople，isobjectedtobymany:toaffectitsnecessaryindependencebythemodesofcreatingandappointingitsministers，isliabletoequalobjections。

Inthefirstcase，arbitraryanddespoticproceedingsareapprehended。

Itissupposedtobethenaturaldispositionofman，whenplacedabovecontrol，toabusehispower，or，ifnocorruptmotivesproducethisconsequence，theresometimesarefoundalaxity，acarelessness，awantofsufficientexertionanddeliberatejudgmentintheexerciseofit。Ontheotherhand，ifinsteadofavailinghimselfofhisownknowledgeandcapacity，thejudgesubmitstobegovernedbytheopinionsofothers；ifheallowsthedesiretoretainhisoffice，thefearofgivingoffence，ortheloveofpopularity，toformanypartoftheingredientsofhisjudgment，anequalviolationofhistrustisapparent。Itisthereforenotwithoutanxietythatthepatrioticmindendeavourssotoregulatetheorganizationofthisallessentialpower，thatitshallbesafelysteeredbetweenthetwoextremes。

Inallgovernmentsretainingasemblanceofthepreservationofpopularrights，itisbelievedthatthestructureofthejudicialpoweroughttobefoundedonitsindependence。Thetenureofofficeisthereforegenerallyduringgoodbehaviour。Butinsomeofourstategovernments，judgesareappointedforatermofyears。Insome，theappointmentsaremadebytheexecutive，insomebythelegislativepower。Themodeofappointmentisoflittleconsequenceastotheprinciple，if，whenithasbeenmade，themagistrateisindependentofthefurtherfavouroftheappointingpower。

Themoreimportantquestionistheconditionanddurationoftheappointment。

Theconditionofgoodbehaviournecessarilyaccompaniesalljudicialappointments，forwhatevertermtheymaybegranted。Therearenoneduringpleasureinthiscountry，althoughthecaseisotherwiseastosomehighjudicialstationsinEngland。1Casesofmisbehaviourarethereforetobeprovidedagainst。Honesterrorsinjudgmentdonotamounttomisbehavior。Thecourtofthelastresortistocorrectallthosewhichtakeplaceintheprevioustribunals。Ifthiscourtshallitselfbedeemedtohavecommittedanerror，therecanbenoredress，becausefromthenatureofthings，theremustbesomepointatwhichtostop:anditisbetterthatanindividualshouldsustainaninjury，thanthatthewholesystemshouldbethrownintodisorder。

Thislastresortmaybedifferentlyconstituted，buttheremustbesomefinalmodeofdeciding。

Onsomeoccasionsofdissatisfactionwiththedecisionsofthesupremecourt，differentmodesofrevisingeventheirdecisionshavebeensuggested。

Thelastoftheseknowntotheauthorhasbeentoconvertthesenateintothefinalcourtoferrorandappeal。

Oftheircompetencyinapracticalview，nodoubtcanbeentertained，butofthebenefitwhichthepublicwouldderivebytheirunavoidablesuspensionoflegislativebusiness，withotherhighfunctionsdevolvedonthem，whiletheirtimewasoccupiedinthetrialofcauses，therewouldbemuchroomfordoubt。

But，howeverthisultimatetribunalmaybeconstituted，itisstilltobethelastresort；and，sincehumaninfallibilitycannowherebefound，itmayalsopronounceerroneousjudgmentsforwhichtherewouldbenoredress。

Inalltheseinstitutionswemustthereforerecognisetheimperfectionofman，andcontentourselveswiththeintentiontoactrightly，althoughthedecision，intheapprehensionofmany，maybewrong。

Insomestates，apoweris，giventotheexecutiveauthorityontheapplicationofacertainproportionofthelegislaturetoremoveajudgefromoffice。Reasonswilloccurbothforandagainstsuchaprovision。

Ifajudgeshouldbeincapacitatedbyinfirmity。orage，orbeotherwise，withoutanyfaultofhisown，preventedfromperforminghisduties，hewouldnotbeapropersubjectforremovalbyimpeachment；yet，wheredutiescannotbeperformed，theofficershouldnotbecontinued。Theincapacityshould，however，beestablishedinthespecificcase，andtolaydownageneralrule，thatontheattainmentofacertainage，thejudgeshallnolongerbeadmittedtoact，maywithdrawfromtheserviceofthepublicapersoncapableofbeinghighlyusefultothem。InNewYorkthecommissionexpiresattheageofsixtyyears；inConnecticutatseventyyears；andthustheirconstitutionsseemtointendtoimposelawsonnatureitself，ortodrivefromtheirownservicemeninwhommaystillresidethemostusefulfaculties，improvedbytimeandexperience。TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesabstainsfromthiserror。

Butthepowerofremovalintended，inthosestateswhereitisfound，tobeexercisedincasesofactualandnotimpliedincapacity，mayinpracticebecarriedfurther，andiftherepresentativesofthepeopleholdtheopinionthattheproceedingsofajudgearecontrarytothepublicinterests，anapplicationforhisremovalmaybemadetothegovernor。If，forinstance，hehasdecidedthatoneoftheirlawsisunconstitutional，andtheyretainadifferentopinion，orifhisconstructionsof，andproceedingsunderalawnotobjectionableinitself，differfromtheirownviewsofthesamesubject，dissatisfactionwithhisconductwhichmaybeveryhonestlyfelt，mayoccasionanaddressforhisremoval，notasamodeofavoidingorreversinghisdecisions，forthatcouldnotbetheeffect，butasanexampletoothers，andperhapsinsomedegree，itmightbecalculatedforapunishmenttohimself。

Now，layingasideallpartyconsiderationswhichsometimesmayoperate，perhapsunconsciously，withthebestmen，wemustinquireintotheprincipleonwhichsuchremovalwouldbefounded，andweshallfindittobethatofsettingupthejudgmentofthepeoplethroughtheirrepresentativestocorrectthejudgmentofthejudicialpower。

IftheConstitutionoftheparticularstatefairlyadmitsofthisconstruction，itisthewillofthepeople，andmustbeobeyed。Itisacontrolreservedtothemselvesoverthegeneralcharacterofthejudicialpower，andtothatextentimpairsitsabsoluteindependence。Intheabsenceofcorruptmotives，whichmightjustifyanimpeachment，itistheonlymodeofrectifyingacourseoferroneousjudgmentstendingtoproducepublicinjury。Butitisliabletotheobjectionthatthosewhothusundertaketodecide，areseldomsowellqualifiedforthetaskasthosewhosepeculiarstudiesandoccupationmaybeconsideredashavingenabledthemtojudge。Anotherobjectionis，thatremovalinthismannerbeingineverysenseanevil，afearofdispleasingthelegislaturemayalwayshoveroverthemindofthejudge，andpreventhisbeingtheimpartial"andinflexiblemediatorbetweenthelegislatureandthepeople，whichthepeopleintendedheshouldbe。

TheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofthewholesubjectmusthavebeendulyconsideredbytheframersofourConstitution，andthepeopleatlargehaveconfirmedtheresultoftheirjudgment。

Thereis，however，onepowervestedinthelegislature，ofwhichtheycannotbedeprived。Theyareauthorized"fromtimetotime"toordainandestablishtribunalsinferiortothesupremecourt，andsuchcourtstheymayatanytimeabolish。Thus，asbeforenoticed，theactof1801，establishingcertaincircuitcourtswasrepealedin1802，andthecommissionsgrantedtothejudgeswereconsequentlyavoided。

Tothisinstancewemaybepermittedtorefer，forthepurposeofshowingthehighindependenceofallpartyconsiderations，thatappertainstothecharacterofajudge。Thesupremecourt，whichaffirmedadecisionbywhichthevalidityoftherepealingactwasestablished，2wasatthattimecomposedentirelyofmenpoliticallyadversetothatwhich，byasuddenrevolution，hadbecomethepredominantpartyinthelegislature。

Yetthedecisionwasunanimouslygiven，oneofthejudgesonlybeingabsentonaccountofill-health。Andsucharethetruenatureandspiritofajudicialinstitution，thattherecanbenodoubtthatthesameprinciple；

thesameentirerepudiationofpartyspirit，wouldgovernmenofallpoliticalimpressions，whenrequiredtoactonsimilaroccasionsbytheConstitutionandtheircountry。Partyspiritseldomcontaminatesjudicialfunctions。

Onthewhole，itseemsthatwiththerighttonewmodelalltheinferiortribunals，andtherebytovacate，thecommissionsoftheirjudges，andwiththepowertoimpeachalljudgeswhatever，asufficientcontrolisretainedoverthejudiciarypowerforeveryusefulpurpose；thatitisabranchofgovernmentwhichthepeoplehavethestrongestmotivestocherishandsupport，andthatiftheyvalueandwishtopreservetheirConstitution，theyoughtnevertosurrendertheindependenceoftheirjudges。

1。Thelordchancellor，thejudgesofthecourtsofadmiralty，vice-admiralty，&；c。

2。Stuartv。Laird，1Cranch，308。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXXICHAPTERXXXI。OFCHECKSANDCONTROLSONOTHERBRANCHESOFTHEGOVERNMENT。ISthereanyfoundationfortheposition，thatinarepublicthepeoplearenaturallybetrayedbythoseinwhomtheytrust?

Isittruethatpersonal，powerandindependenceinthemagistrate，beingtheimmediateconsequenceofthefavourofthepeople，theyareunderanunavoidablenecessityofbeingbetrayed?1

Werethisobjectionwellfounded，weshouldshrinkwithhorrorfromtheformationofarepublic。Letusexaminehowitisattemptedtobesupported。

Thefirstpostulateis，thatthosewhoareinpossessionofpower，generallystrivetoenlargeitfortheirownadvantageinpreferencetothepublicgood。Inthosegovernmentswherenorestraintontheconductofpublicofficersisprovided，weseetowhatanextentthispropensityhasbeensometimescarried。Romeisthefavouriteexampleadducedtosupporttheproposition。

Itwasfoundimpossibleforthepeopleofthatstate，ever，tohavefaithfuldefenders。Neitherthosewhomtheyexpresslychose，northosewhomsomepersonaladvantagesenabledtogoverntheassemblies，wereunitedtothembyanycommonfeelingofthesameconcern。Thetribunespursuedwithzealandperseverance，nogreaterobjectthantoprocureadmissiontoallthedifferentdignitiesintherepublic。Toadmittheplebeianstoparticipateinofficespreviouslyconfinedtopatricians，wasconsidersaitgreatvictoryoverthelatter。Theusetheymadeofthepowerofthepeoplewastoincreaseprerogatives，whichtheyfalselycalledtheprerogativesofall，butwhichthetribunesandtheirfriendsalonewerelikelytoenjoy。

Butitdoesnotappearthattheyeversetboundstotheterriblepowerofthemagistrates，orrepressedthatclassofcitizenswhoknewhowtomaketheircrimespassunpunished，ortoregulateandstrengthenthejudicialpower；precautionswithoutwhichmenmightstruggletotheendoftime，andneverattaintrueliberty。

Sucharetheviewstakenofthisgreat，butinternallyimperfectrepublic，andageneralpropositionisillogicallydeducedfromaparticularinstance。

IfaConstitutionissoframedthatofficialpowerbecomesatonceabsoluteandindependentoflaw；ifthemagistrateswhoaretoadministerthelawareauthorizedlikethepræ；tors，tomakeitfromtimetotimeastheythinkproper，andifacompetitionisadmittedamongthepublicofficers，astowhoshallexercisethemostauthority，andhewhosucceedsthebest，cannotbecompelledbythepeopleeithertosurrenderorreduceit；theveryappointment，insuchcase，tendstostimulatealltheevilpropensities，andcreateaderelictionofallthemoralobligationsofman。Butitisanerrortosuppose，(ifitissupposed，)thatthisisconfinedtorepublicanforms。Thedistinctionwouldonlybeinname。Createagovernmentofanykind，andinvestitsofficerswithpowerssoextensiveanduncontrollable，andtherewillbethesameabuses。Theonlydifferencewillbethatinonecaseweshallsaythepeopleareoppressed；intheotherthattheyarebetrayed。

Aknowledgeofhumannature，tooperspicaciousnottoperceivethedanger，andtoocautiousnottoprovideagainstit，dictatedinthecompositionofourConstitution，thosechecksandbalancesonwhichitspurityandcontinuancewerecalculatedtodepend。Whileallnecessarypowerwasgranted，everysoundprecautionwasadoptedtopreventitsabuse。

Wehavealreadyconsideredtheexpressrestrictionsonthelegislature，andhaveseenthatonsomepointstheycannotlegislateatall，andonmanyotherstheycanactonlytoalimitedextent；butawiderviewmaybenowtaken，andanexaminationoftheentirecontextwillfullyexhibitapervadingprinciple，which，whileitsecuresthedueperformanceofpublicduty，preventsitsabuse。

ThelegislatureisinthefirstplacerestrainedbyafixedandabsoluteConstitution，overwhichithasnosortofpower。Inwinecountries，andinoneofourownstates，2thelegislaturelayingtheirhandsontheConstitution，maysomoulditfromtimetotime，astogiveasanctiontomeasuresnotwithinitsoriginalcontemplation。

ButtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，theworkofthepeople，alterableonlybythepeople，possessesasacredandintangiblecharacterinrespecttothelegislature。Thisis，therefore，thegreatrestraint。WhenthelegislaturefeelsthatithasnopowerunlesstheConstitutionhasgivenit，themereshameofbeingdefeatedinanystepwhichcannotbesupported，compelsittolooktotheConstitutionforitsauthority，andifitcannotfinditthere，todesistfromthemeasure。

Secondly，asthismaynotalwaysbeasufficientrestraint，thejudicialpowerpresentsaneffectualbarrieragainstitsexcesses，theobservationsonwhichheadneednotbe，repeated。But，asobserved，thejudicialpowerpossessesnospontaneousmotion?itmustbecalledintoactionbytheapplicationofotherseitherindividuals，orconstitutedauthorities，?

andinthemeantime，theobnoxiouslawmaynotonlytakeitsplaceinthestatutebook，butbeinjuriouslyactedupon。Thethirdcorrectivetherefore，isthehandsofthepeople，whodonot，asdisingenuouslyremarked，3makenootheruseoftheirpowerthantogiveitaway。Thebiennialelectionofthehouseofrepresentatives，ofwhichthepeoplecanbynoartificebedeprived，securestothemthepowerofremovingeverymemberofthathousewhohasshown，eitheraninabilitytocomprehend，oranunwillingnesstoconformtothetranscendentobligationsoftheConstitution，whichhehassworntosupport。Here，then，wehavetheprotectionandsafetyunknowntothosecountrieswhere，eitherthelegislatureelectthemselves，orenjoyanhereditaryright，orwhere，althoughtherepresentativeprinciplemaybenominallykeptup，itsexercisemaybesuspendedorpostponedatthepleasureofanotherpartofthegovernment。

Itistrue，thatthismodeofreformingtheabuse，isnotatfirstfullandcomplete。Thesenate，whichmusthaveconcurredintheunconstitutionallaw，isnotrenewedatthesameperiod，buttheConstitution，whichforreasonsheretoforeassigned，conferredonthisbodyalongerdurationofoffice，hasregulatedthecontinuanceofeachsenator，sothatattheendofeverytwoyearsone-thirdofthewholemustbechosenanew。Thesenseofthepeople，indicatedbyafullchangeinthehouseofrepresentatives，andbythechangeofone-thirdofthesenate，couldnotbewithouteffect，andintwoyearsmoreitwouldbeimperiousandirresistible。

Afurtherrestraint，thoughlessdefinite，yetnotwithoutconsiderableweight，maybeconceivedintheinfluencearisingfromtheportionofsovereigntyremaininginthestates。

Although，tothefullextentestablishedbytheConstitution，thepowerofthelegislatureoftheUnitedStatesissuperiortothatofthestates，yetinthesmallestparticularinwhichtheypassbeyondthetrueline，thepowerofthestatesisinfulleffect。Thestateswillalwaysmaintainareasonablejealousyonthissubject。

Inallmattersnottransferredtothegeneralgovernment，therightsandinterestsofthepeopleareconfidedtothecareofthestategovernments，andananxietytosecureanddefendthemhasbeenuniformlyapparentinallthestates。Thedesireofpreservingharmonyandorder，nay，theveryloveofpower，alwaysmorevaluablewhereitisleastresisted，willoperatewithgreateffectonthenationallegislaturetopreventitsfallingintounnecessarycollisionswiththestates。Thisconsiderationwillhavethegreatestinfluencewiththemembersofthesenate，who，althoughtheydonotinanysensesitandactasstatesinafederativequality，andarenotboundbyinstructions?yetcannotbutlookwithmuchrespectto，andfeelacloseconnectionwiththelegislatureofthestatethatappointsthem。

2dly。Thefearsofthosetheoreticalwriters，whohavegratifiedthemselvesbylamentingtheinternaldangersofourrepublic，havebeenchieflydirectedagainstthetendencyoftheexecutiveauthoritytooverpowerthefreedomofthepeople。

Itissupposedthatmuchistobeapprehendedfromtheinfluenceofanofficerwhohasthepowerofappointingsomanyotherofficers，andwhoisentrustedwiththemanagementofthemilitaryforce。Itistrue，theyadmitthatashehasnotexclusivelytheappointmenttooffice，thisinfluenceistherebysomewhatdiminished，buttherecommendationsproceedingfromhimalone，andthepowerofdismissionbeingexclusivelywithhim，thehopeoftheone，andthefearoftheother，mustconferonhimanexcessiveandalarminginfluence。Alltheseconsiderationsmayhaveweight，yettheevilconsequencespredictedarenotlikelytoensue。

Themilitaryforce，aswehaveseen，iswellregulatednotonlybytheconstitutionalprohibitiontoprovideforitssupportforalongertermthantwoyears，butalsobythepowerthatcongresshavetoshorteneventhatperiod，andbythegreatimprobabilitythatanAmericanarmywouldconsenttosubstituteforregularsubsistenceandtheapprobationoftheircountrymen，thetumultuaryandprecariousexactionsofinternalwarfare，andconvulsions，personaldangerswhichmustbecertain，andeventualruinfromwhichtheycannotbeexempted。Theinfluencesupposedtoariseinrespecttotheappointmentsto，ordismissionsfromoffice，canoperateonlyinanarrowcircle，andhoweverfaritmightbecarried，wouldnottendtothesubversionofthegovernment，oreventoanymaterialalterationofit，sincethevalueoftheofficeswouldalwaysdependonthepreservationoftheConstitutionandthelaws，andtheiremolumentscouldnotbecarriedbeyondtheirlegallimits。

Nopersoniseligibletotheofficeofpresidentbeforeheattainstheageofthirty-fiveyears，norunlesshehasbeenaresidentwithintheUnitedStatesforfourteenyears。

Theobjectofthelatterprovisionis，thathishabitsandopinionsshallbeasmuchaspossiblepurelyAmerican，buttemporaryabsenceonpublicbusiness，andparticularlyonanembassytoaforeignnation，wouldnotbeaninterruptionofresidenceinthesensehereaffixedtoit。

Thesenatormusthaveattainedtheageofthirtyyears，andthemembersofthehouseofrepresentativestheageoftwentyfiveyears。

Insomeofthestates，thechiefexecutivemagistrateisnotagaineligible，untilanintervalhaselapsed，afterhavingservedacertaintime。TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，onthecontrary，admitsthesameindividualtobecontinuedinofficebyre-electionduringhislife。

Theproprietyofarotationinoffice，hashadsomewarmadvocates。

Thechiefargumentsinitsfavourseemtobe，1。Thatitrendersthepeoplemoresecureintheirrightsagainstanartfulandambitiousman。Ifitwereimpossiblethatthechiefmagistrateshouldbere-electedafterservingforagiventime，itwouldbeinvainforhimtoconcertplansandcreateaninsidiousinfluenceforthepromotionofhisowncontinuanceinpower。

2。Onanoppositeprinciple，itissupposedthathewouldbemoreindependentintheexerciseofhisoffice:when，knowingthathecouldnotbere-electedtoit，hewouldnotbeunderthenecessityofcourtingthepopularfavour。