第7章

Andevenifshecouldcommandit,theprocesswouldbetooslowtoaffordeffectualrelief.ItisimpossibletoimaginethatanyfreeandsovereignStateeverdesignedtosurrenderherpowerofselfprotectioninacaselikethis,orevermeanttoauthorizeanyotherpowertoreducehertoasituationsohelplessandcontemptible.25

Yielding,therefore,totheSupremeCourtallthejurisdictionandauthoritywhichproperlybelongstoit,wecannotsafelyorwiselyreposeinitthevasttrustofascertaining,definingorlimitingthesovereignpowersoftheStates.

Letusnowfollowtheauthorintheenquiry,bywhatrulesshalltheConstitutionbeinterpreted?Manyofthosewhichhehasgivenaremerelysuchasweapplytoeveryinstrument,andtheydonot,therefore,requireanyparticularexamination.Theprincipalone,andthatfromwhichhededucesmanyothersasconsequences,isthis:"Itistobeconstruedasaframeorfundamentallawofgovernment,establishedbythepeopleoftheUnitedStates,accordingtotheirownfreepleasureandsovereignwill.Inthisrespect,itisinnowisedistinguishablefromtheconstitutionsoftheStategovernments."ThatourConstitutionis"aframeofgovernment"willscarcelybedeniedbyanyone,andthis,whetheritbeinitsnaturefederalorconsolidated.Itis,also,asineveryotherconstitutionofgovernment,"afundamentallaw."Itistheacknowledgedbasisofallfederalpowerandauthority,thesolechartbywhichfederalofficersaretodirecttheircourse.Butallthisleavestheenquirystillopen,whatisthisfundamentallaw,whatisthecourseindicatedbythechartoffederalpower,andhowisittobeascertained?JudgeStoryseemstosupposethatafullanswertothisquestionmaybefoundinthefact,thatthisframeorfundamentallawofgovernmentwasestablishedby"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,accordingtotheirfreepleasureandsovereignwill."Ifthefactwerereallyso,itwouldundoubtedlyexertanimportantinfluence,andwouldgofartojustifyhisconstructionoftheConstitution.Weherediscerntheusefulnessandnecessityofthathistoricalenquiry,whichhasjustbeenfinished.Fromthatenquiry,welearn,distinctlyandwithoutdoubt,thattheConstitutionwasnotestablishedby"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,"and,consequently,thatitdoesnotresemble,inthatrespect,theconstitutionsoftheStates.Thereisnosuchanalogybetweenthem,aswillpresentlybeshown,astorequirethattheyshouldbeconstruedbythesamerules.TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesistobeconsideredasacompactorconfederationbetweenfree,independentandsovereignStates,andistobeconstruedassuch,inallcaseswhereitslanguageisdoubtful.

Thisistheleadingandfundamentalrule,fromwhichthefollowingmaybededucedasconsequences.

Itistobeconstruedstrictly.JudgeStorysupposesthattheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesoughttoreceiveasfavorableaconstructionasthoseoftheStates;thatitistobeliberallyconstrued;thatdoubtfulwordsaretobetakenmoststronglyinfavorofthepowersoftheFederalGovernment;

andthatthereis"nosolidobjectiontoimpliedpowers."Allthesearebutinferencesfromthegreatrulewhichhefirstlaiddown,towit,thattheConstitutionistobeconsideredasaframeofgovernment,establishedbythepeopleoftheUnitedStates.Asthatrulecannotapply,becausethefactonwhichitwasfoundedisnottrue,itwouldseemtofollow,asanecessaryconsequence,thattheinferencesdeducedfromitcannotbeallowed.Nevertheless,theyshallreceiveamoreparticularconsiderationunderthepresentenquiry.

Accordingtotheprinciplesofallourinstitutions,sovereigntydoesnotresideinanygovernmentwhatever,neitherStatenorfederal.Governmentisregardedmerelyastheagentofthosewhocreateit,andsubjectinallrespectstotheirwill.IntheStatesthesovereignpowerisinthepeopleoftheStatesrespectively;andthesovereignpoweroftheUnitedStateswould,forthesamereason,bein"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,"

iftherewereanysuchpeople,knownasasinglenation,andtheframersoftheFederalGovernment.Wehavealreadyseen,however,thattherearenosuchpeople,inastrictpoliticalsense,andthatnosuchpeoplehadanyagencyintheformationofourConstitution,butthatitwasformedbytheStates,emphaticallyassuch.Itwouldbeabsurd,accordingtoallprinciplesreceivedandacknowledgedamongus,tosaythatthesovereignpowerisinoneparty,andthepowerwhichisinthegovernmentisinanother.

ThetruesovereigntyoftheUnitedStates,therefore,isintheStates,andnotinthepeopleoftheUnitedStates,norintheFederalGovernment.

Thatgovernmentisbuttheagentthroughwhomaportionofthissovereignpowerisexerted;possessingnosovereigntyitself,andexertingnopower,exceptsuchonlyasitsconstituentshaveconferredonit.Inascertainingwhatthesepowersare,itisobviouslyproperthatweshouldlookonlytothegrantfromwhichtheyarederived.Theagentcanclaimnothingforitself,andonitsownaccountTheConstitutionisacompact,andthepartiestoitareeachState,witheachandeveryotherState.TheFederalGovernmentisnotaparty,butisthemerecreatureoftheagreementbetweentheStatesasparties.EachStateisbothgrantorandgrantee,receivingfromeachandalltheotherStatespreciselywhat,initsturn,itconcedestoeachandallofthem.Therule,therefore,thatthewordsaretobetakenmoststronglyinfavorofthegrantee,cannotapply,because,aseachStateisbothgrantorandgrantee,itwouldgiveexactlyasmuchasitwouldtakeaway.Theonlymode,therefore,bywhichwemaybecertaintodonoinjusticetotheintentionsoftheparties,isbytakingtheirwordsasthetrueexponentsoftheirmeaning.

JudgeStorythinks,however,thatamoreliberalruleoughttobeadopted,inconstruingtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,because"thegrantinuressolelyandexclusivelyforthebenefitofthegrantorhimself";

andthereforehesupposesthat"noonewoulddenytheproprietyofgivingtothewordsofthegrantabenignandliberalinterpretation."Admitthatitisso,anditwouldseemtofollowthat"thebenefitofthegrantor"

requiresthatweshouldtakefromhimaslittleaspossible,andthatan"interpretationofthewordsofthegrant"wouldnotbe"benignandliberal"

astohim,ifitdeprivedhimofanymoreofhisrightsandpowers,thanhisownwordsprovethatheintendedtorelinquish.Itisevidentthatthisremarkoftheauthorproceedsupontheleadingidea,thatthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesaretheonlypartytothecontract;anideawhich,wehavealreadyseen,canbynomeansbejustifiedorallowed.TheStatesareparties;eachagreeingwitheach,andalltherest,thatitwillexercise,throughacommonagent,preciselysomuchofitssovereignrightsandpowers,aswill,initsownopinion,bebeneficialtoitselfwhensoexercised.

Thegrant"inurestothesoleandexclusivebenefitofthegrantor";andwhobutthegrantorhimselfshalldeterminewhatbenefithehadinview,andhowfarthegrantshallextend,inordertosecureit?Thishehasdone,inthecasebeforeus,bytheverytermsofthegrant.Ifyouholdhimboundbyanythingbeyondthoseterms,youenableotherstodecidethismatterforhim,andmaythusvirtuallyabrogatehiscontract,andsubstituteanotherinitsplace.

Icertainlydonotmeantosay,thatinconstruingtheConstitution,weshouldatalltimesconfineourselvestoitsstrictletter.Thiswould,indeed,bestickinginthebark,totheworstpossiblepurpose.Manypowersaregrantedbythatinstrument,whicharenotincludedwithinitsexpressterms,literallytaken,butwhichare,nevertheless,withintheirobviousmeaning.ThestrictconstructionforwhichIcontend,appliestotheintentionoftheframersoftheConstitution;andthismayormaynotrequireastrictconstructionoftheirwords.ThereisnofairanalogyastothismatterbetweentheFederalConstitutionandthoseoftheStates,althoughtheauthorbroadlyassertsthattheyarenot"distinguishableinthisrespect";

andthiswillsufficientlyappearfromthefollowingconsiderations:

1.TheentiresovereigntyofeachStateisinthepeoplethereof.Whentheyformforthemselvesaconstitutionofgovernment,theypartwithnoportionoftheirsovereignty,butmerelydeterminewhatportionthereofshallliedormant,whatportiontheywillexercise,andinwhatmodesandbywhatagenciestheywillexerciseit.Thereisbutonepartytosuchagovernment,towit,thepeopleoftheState.Whateverpowertheirgovernmentmaypossess,itisstillthepowerofthepeople;andtheirsovereigntyremainsthesame.Sofar,therefore,thereis"nosolidobjectiontoimpliedpowers"inaStateconstitution;because,byemployingpowerinthegovernment,youtakenopowerfromthosewhomadethegovernment.

2.Asgovernmentistheagentandrepresentativeofthesovereignpowerofthepeople,thepresumptionis,thattheyintendtomakeittheagentandrepresentativeofalltheirpower.Ineveryframeoflimitedgovernment,thepeopledenytothemselvestheexerciseofsomeportionoftheirrightsandpowers,butthelargerportionneverliesthusdormant.Inthiscase,therefore,(viz.:ofagovernmentestablishedbyanaggregatepeople),thequestionnaturallyis,notwhatpowersaregranted,butwhataredenied;

andtheruleofstrictconstruction,ifappliedatall,shouldbeappliedonlytothepowersdenied.Thiswouldhavetheeffectofenlargingthepowersofgovernment,bylimitingtherestraintsimposedonit.

3.Asitisfairtopresumethatapeopleabsolutelysovereign,andhavinganunlimitedrighttogovernthemselvesastheyplease,wouldnotdenytothemselvestheexerciseofanypowernecessarytotheirprosperityandhappiness,weshouldadmitallfairandreasonableimplicationsinfavorofthegovernment,because,otherwise,somepowernecessarytothepublicweal,mightbedormantanduseless.

Intheserespects,thereisnojustanalogybetweentheStateconstitutionsandthatoftheUnitedStates.

Inthefirstplace,theConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisnotaframeofgovernmenttowhichthereisbutoneparty.TheStatesareparties,eachstipulatingandagreeingwitheachandalltherest.Theiragreementis,thatacertainportionofthatpowerwhicheachisauthorizedtoexercisewithinitsownlimitsshallbeexercisedbytheircommonagent,withinthelimitsofallofthem.Thisisnottheseparatepowerofeach,butthejointpowerofall.Inproportion,therefore,asyouincreasethepowersoftheFederalGovernment,younecessarilydetractfromtheseparatepowersoftheStates.Wearenottopresumethatasovereignpeoplemeantosurrenderanyoftheirpowers;stilllessshouldwepresumethattheymeantosurrenderthem,tobeexertedoverthemselvesbyadifferentsovereignty.Inthisrespect,then,everyreasonableimplicationisagainsttheFederalGovernment.

Inthesecondplace,theConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisnottheprimarysocialrelationofthosewhoformedit.TheStategovernmentswerealreadyorganized,andwereadequatetoallthepurposesoftheirmunicipalconcerns.TheFederalGovernmentwasestablishedonlyforsuchpurposesastheStategovernmentcouldnotanswer,towit:thecommonpurposesofalltheStates.Whether,therefore,thepowersofthatgovernmentbegreaterorless,thewholepoweroftheStates,(orsomuchthereofastheydesigntoexerciseatall),isrepresented,eitherintheFederalGovernmentorintheirown.Inthisrespect,therefore,thereisnonecessitytoimplypowerintheFederalGovernment.

Inthethirdplace,whateverpowertheStateshavenotdelegatedtotheFederalGovernment,theyhavereservedtothemselves.Everyusefulfacultyofgovernmentisfoundeitherintheoneortheother.WhatevertheFederalGovernmentcannotdoforalltheStates,eachStatecandoforitself,subjectonlytotherestraintsofitsownconstitution.Nopower,therefore,isdormantanduseless,exceptsofaronlyastheStatesvoluntarilydeclinetoexertit.Inthisrespect,also,thereisnonecessitytoimplypowerintheFederalGovernment.

Inalltheseparticulars,theFederalConstitutionisclearly"distinguishablefromtheconstitutionsoftheStategovernments."Theviewsjustpresentedsupportthisobviousdistinction,thatintheStateconstitutionseverypowerisgrantedwhichisnotdenied;intheFederalConstitution,everypowerisdeniedwhichisnotgranted.Thereareyetotherviewsofthesubject,whichleadustothesameconclusion.

TheobjectsforwhichtheFederalGovernmentwas,established,arebynomeansequalinimportancetothoseoftheStateconstitutions.ItisdifficulttoimagineanynecessityforaFederalGovernmentatall,exceptwhatspringsfromtherelationoftheStatestoforeignnations.Aunionamongthemisundoubtedlyvaluableformanypurposes.Itrendersthemstrongerandmoreabletoresisttheirenemies;itattractstothemtherespectofothercountries,andgivesthemadvantagesintheformationofforeignconnections;itfacilitatesalltheoperationsofwar,ofcommerceandofforeigndiplomacy.Buttheseobjects,althoughhighlyimportant,arenotsoimportantasthosegreatrightswhicharesecuredtousbytheStateconstitutions.TheStatesmightsinglyprotectthemselves;singlyformtheirforeignconnections,andsinglyregulatetheircommerce,notsoeffectually,itistrue,buteffectuallyenoughtoaffordreasonablesecuritytotheirindependenceandgeneralprosperity.Inadditiontoallthis,werelyexclusivelyontheStategovernmentsforthesecurityofthegreatrightsoflife,libertyandproperty.Allthevaluableandinterestingrelationsofthesocialstatespringfromthem.Theygivevaliditytothemarriagetie;

theyprescribethelimitsofparentalauthority;theyenforcefilialdutyandobedience;theylimitthepowerofthemaster,andexacttheproperdutiesoftheservant.Theirpowerpervadesallranksofsociety,restrainingthestrong,protectingtheweak,succoringthepoor,andliftingupthefallenandhelpless.Theysecuretoallpersonsanimpartialadministrationofpublicjustice.Inallthedailybusinessoflife,wesetundertheprotectionandguidanceoftheStategovernments.Theyregulateandsecureourrightsofproperty;theyenforceourcontractsandpresideoverthepeaceandsafetyofourfiresides.Thereisnothingdeartoourfeelingsorvaluableinoursocialcondition,forwhichwearenotindebtedtotheirprotectingandbenignantaction.TakeawaytheFederalGovernmentaltogether,andstillwearefree,ourrightsarestillprotected,ourbusinessisstillregulated,andwestillenjoyalltheotheradvantagesandblessingsofestablishedandwell-organizedgovernment.ButifyoutakeawaytheStategovernments,whathaveyouleft?AFederalGovernment,whichcanneitherregulateyourindustry,secureyourproperty,norprotectyourperson!Surelytherecanbenojustreasonforstealing,byliberalconstructionsandimplications,fromthesebeneficentStategovernments,anyportionoftheirpower,inordertoconferitonanothergovernment,which,fromitsveryorganization,cannotpossiblyexertitforequallyusefulpurposes.

AstrictconstructionoftheConstitutionwillgivetotheFederalGovernmentallthepowerwhichitcanbeneficiallyexert,allthatisnecessaryforhertopossess,andallthatitsframerseverdesignedtoconferonit.

Totheseviewsofthesubjectwemayadd,thatthereisanaturalandnecessarytendencyintheFederalGovernmenttoencroachontherightsandpowersoftheStates.AstherepresentativeofalltheStates,itaffords,initsorganization,anopportunityforthesecombinations,bywhichamajorityoftheStatesmayoppresstheminority,againstthespiritoreventheletteroftheConstitution.ThereisnodangerthattheFederalGovernmentwilleverbetooweak.Itsmeansofaggrandizingitselfaresonumerous,anditstemptationstodosoaresostrong,thatthereisnottheleastnecessitytoimplyanynewpowerinitsfavor.TheStates,onthecontrary,havenomotivetoencroachontheFederalGovernment,andnopowertodoso,eveniftheydesiredit.Inorder,therefore,topreservethejustbalancebetweenthem,weshouldincline,ineverydoubtfulcase,infavoroftheStates;confidentthattheFederalGovernmenthasalwaystheinclination,andalwaysthemeans,tomaintainitselfinallitsjustpowers.

TheConstitutionitselfsuggeststhatitshouldbestrictlyandnotliberallyconstrued.Thetenthamendmentprovides,that"thepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStates,norprohibited,totheStates,bytheConstitution,arereservedtotheStatesandthepeople."TherewasacorrespondingprovisionintheArticlesofConfederation,whichdoubtlesssuggestedthisamendment.

Itwasconsiderednecessary,inordertopreventthatlatitudeofconstructionwhichwascontendedforbyoneofthegreatpoliticalpartiesofthecountry,andmuchdreadedandstrenuouslyopposedbytheother.IntheArticlesofConfederationall"rights,jurisdictionandpowers"arereserved,exceptonlysuchasareexpresslydelegated:butintheConstitutiontheword"expressly"isomitted.JudgeStorybelieves,fromthisfact,thatitwastheintentionoftheframersofthetenthamendmenttoleave"thequestion,whethertheparticularpowerwhichisthesubjectofcontest,hasbeendelegatedtoonegovernmentorprohibitedtotheother,todependuponafairconstructionofthewholeinstrument";doubtlessintendingbytheword"fair,"aconstructionasliberalaswouldbe,appliedtoanyotherframeofgovernment.Thisargumentismuchreliedon,andiscertainlynotwithoutplausibility,butitlosesallitsforce,iftheomissioncanbeotherwisesatisfactorilyaccountedfor.TheConstitutionprovidesthatCongressshallhavepowertopassalllawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperforcarryingintoeffectthevariouspowerswhichitgrants.Ifthisclauseconfersnoadditionalfacultyofanysort,itiswhollyuselessandoutofplace;thefactthatitisfoundintheConstitutionissufficientproofthatsomeeffectwasintendedtobegiventoit.Itwascontemplatedthat,inexecutingthepowersexpresslygranted,itmightbenecessarytoexertsomepowernotenumerated,andastowhichsomedoubtmight,forthatreason,beentertained.Forexample,thepowertoprovideanavyisnot,initself,thepowertobuildadrydock;but,asdrydocksarenecessaryandpropermeansforprovidinganavy,Congressshallhavepowertoauthorizetheconstructionofthem.Butiftheword"expressly"hadbeenusedinthetenthamendment,itwouldhavecreatedaveryrationalandstrongdoubtofthis.Therewouldhavebeen,atleast,anapparentrepugnancebetweenthetwoprovisionsoftheConstitution;notarealone,Iadmit,butstillsufficientlyprobabletogiverisetoembarrassingdoubtsanddisputes.

Hencethenecessityofomittingtheword"expressly,"inthetenthamendment.

ItleftfreefromdoubtandunaffectedthepowerofCongresstoprovidethenecessaryandpropermeansofexecutingthegrantedpowers,whileitdeniedtotheFederalGovernmenteverypowerwhichwasnotgranted.ThesameresultwasdoubtlessexpectedfromthisamendmentoftheConstitution,whichwasexpectedfromthecorrespondingprovisionintheArticlesofConfederation;andthedifferenceinthetermsemployedisbutthenecessaryconsequenceofthedifferenceinotherprovisionsofthetwosystems.

Strictlyspeaking,then,theConstitutionallowsnoimplicationinfavoroftheFederalGovernment,inanycasewhatever.Everypowerwhichitcanproperlyexertisagrantedpower.AlltheseareenumeratedintheConstitution,andnothingcanbeconstitutionallydone,beyondthatenumeration,unlessitbedoneasameansofexecutingsomeoneoftheenumeratedpowers.Thesemeansaregranted,notimplied;theyaregivenasthenecessaryincidentsofthepoweritself,or,moreproperlyspeaking,ascomponentpartsofit,becausethepowerwouldbeimperfect,nugatoryanduseless,withoutthem.Itistrue,thatinregardtotheseincidentalpowers,somediscretionmust,ofnecessity,beleftwiththegovernment.Butthereisatthesametime,apeculiarnecessitythatastrictconstructionshouldbeappliedtothem;becausethatistheprecisepointatwhichthegovernmentismostapttoencroach.Withoutsomestrict,definiteandfixedrulesuponthesubject,itwouldbeleftundernorestraint,exceptwhatisimposedbyitsownwisdom,integrityandgoodfaith.Inproportionasapowerisliabletobeabused,shouldweincreaseandstrengthenthechecksuponit.Andthisbringsustotheenquiry,whataretheseincidentalpowers,andbywhatrulesaretheytobeascertainedanddefined?

Theonlysourcefromwhichtheseincidentalpowers,arederivedisthatclauseoftheConstitutionwhichconfersonCongressthepower"tomakealllawswhicharenecessaryandproperforcarryingintoexecutiontheforegoingpowers,andallotherpowersvestedbythisConstitutioninthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates,orinanydepartmentorofficerthereof."

ThetruecharacterofthisclausecannotbebettergiventhaninthewordsofJudgeStoryhimself:"Itneitherenlargesanypowerspeciallygranted,norisitagrantofanynewpowertoCongress.Butitismerelyadeclaration,fortheremovalofalluncertainty,thatthemeansofcarryingintoexecution,thoseotherwisegranted,areincludedinthegrant."Hisgeneralreasoninguponthesubjectisverylucid,and,toacertainextent,correctandconvincing.

Hecontendsthattheword"necessary""isnottobetakeninitsrestrictedsense,asimportingabsoluteandindispensablenecessity,butistobeunderstoodinthesenseof"convenience,""useful,""requisite";asbeingsuchthat,withoutthem,"thegrantwouldbenugatory."Thedangerouslatitudeimpliedbythisconstruction,hethinkssufficientlyrestrainedbytheadditionalword"proper,"whichimplies,thatthemeansshallbe"constitutionalandbonafideappropriate,totheend."Inallthisheisundoubtedlycorrect;

buttheconclusionwhichhedrawsfromitcannotbesoreadilyadmitted.

"If,"sayshe,"therebeanygeneralprinciplewhichisinherentintheverydefinitionofgovernment,andessentialtoeverystepoftheprogresstobemadebythatoftheUnitedStates,itisthateverypowervestedinthegovernmentis,initsnature,sovereign,andincludes,byforceoftheterm,arighttoemployallthemeansrequisite,andfairlyapplicabletotheattainmentoftheendofsuchpower,unlesstheyareexceptedintheConstitution,orareimmoral,orarecontrarytotheessentialobjectsofpoliticalsociety."Thisisbynomeansalegitimateconclusionfromhisownfairandforciblereasoning.Thedoctrinehereis,ineffect,thattheFederalGovernmentisabsolutelyunrestrictedintheselectionanduseofthemeansofexecutingitsownpowers,exceptonlysofarasthosemeansareexceptedintheConstitution.Whetherornottheyare"requisite,"

"fairlyapplicabletotheattainmentoftheendofsuchpower,""immoralorcontrarytotheessentialobjectsofpoliticalsociety,"allthesearequestionswhichthegovernmentalonecandecide,and,ofcourse,astheirownjudgmentanddiscretionaretheironlyrule,theyareundernosortoflimitationorcontrolintheserespects.Thestandardsofpoliticalmorality,ofpublicconvenienceandnecessity,andofconformitytotheessentialobjectsofsociety,arequitetoofluctuatingandindeterminatetobereliedon,byafreepeople,aschecksuponthepowersoftheirrulers.

Theonlyrealrestriction,then,whichtheauthorproposesintheabovepassage,isthatwhichmaybefoundinthefact,thattheproposedmeansare"excepted"intheConstitution;andthisisdirectlycontrarytotheletterandspiritofthatinstrument.TheFederalGovernmentpossessesnopowerwhichisnot"delegated";"thepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheConstitution,norprohibitedbyittotheStates,arereservedbytheStatesrespectively,ortothepeople."JudgeStory"sideais,thateverythingisgrantedwhichisnotexcepted;whereas,thelanguageofthetenthamendmentisexpress,thateverythingisexceptedwhichisnotgranted.Iftheword"excepted"istobeunderstoodinthissense,theauthor"sideaiscorrect;butthisdoesnotaccordwiththegeneralscopeofhisopinions,andreasoning.Heapproachesmuchnearertothetrueruleinthefollowingpassage.Lettheendbelegitimate;letitbewithinscopeoftheConstitution;andallmeanswhichareappropriate,whichareplainlyadaptedtotheend,andwhicharenotprohibited,butareconsistentwiththeletterandspiritoftheinstrument,areconstitutional."

Thewordsinitalicsareallimportant,inthematter,andgivetothepassageameaningwhollydifferentfromthatofthepassagefirstquoted.

JudgeStory"serrorisequallygreat,andfarmoredangerous,insupposingthatthemeansofexecutingitspowersareconferredonthegovernment.

Thegeneralpropositionistrue,ashehasstatedit;butitisnottrueintheapplicationwhichhehasmadeofittoourgovernment.Heregardsthetenthamendmentasaltogetherunnecessary,andtellsus,inexpressterms,thatthepowersofthegovernmentwouldbeexactlythesamewithorwithoutit.Thisisagreatandobviousmistake.ThetenthamendmentwaswiselyincorporatedintotheConstitutionfortheexpresspurposeofdenyingtothegovernmentthatunboundeddiscretionintheselectionanduseofitsmeans,forwhichitcontends.ThepowertomakealllawsnecessaryandproperforcarryingintoeffectthegrantedpowersisconferredonCongressalone;itisexclusivelyalegislativepower.Sofar,therefore,asthegovernmentisconcerned,itderivesnopowerfromthisclause;andthesameistrueofitsseveraldepartments.Theyhavenodiscretionintheselectionofanyincidentalmeansofexecutingtheirseveraltrusts.

Iftheyneedtheuseofsuchmeans,theymustapplytoCongresstofurnishthem;anditisdiscretionarywiththatbodywhethertofurnishthemornot.AllthisisperfectlyclearfromtheverylanguageoftheConstitution,andtheproprietyofsuchaprovisionmustbeapparenttoeveryone.Ifpowercouldbeimpliedinfavorofsuchagovernmentasours,itwould,ifnothingwereaddtothecontrary,beimpliedinfavorofeverydepartmentandofficerthereof,totheexecutionofwhosedutiesitmightseemtobenecessary.Thiswouldbeawideextentofdiscretion,indeed;sowide,thatitwouldrenderallthelimitationsoftheConstitutionnugatoryanduseless.Itispreciselythisresultwhichwasintendedtobepreventedbytheclauseinquestion.TheStateswereunwillingtoentrustsuchadiscretioneithertothegovernment,ortotheseveraldepartmentsorofficersthereof.TheywerewillingtoconferitonCongressalone;onthelegislativedepartment,themoreimmediaterepresentativesoftheStatesandtheirpeople,whowouldbemostapttodischargethetrustproperly,becausetheyhadtheleasttemptationtoabuseit.Itisnottrue,then,asourauthorsupposes,or,atleast,itisnottrueofoursystem,that"everypowerinthegovernmentis,initsnature,sovereign,andincludes,byforceoftheterm,arighttoemployallthemeansrequisite,andfairlyapplicabletotheattainmentoftheendsofsuchpower,unlesstheyareexceptedintheConstitution,orforbiddenbysomeconsiderationofpublicmorals,orbytheirunsuitablenesstotheproperobjectsofgovernment."

Inourgovernment,themeansareatthedisposalofonedepartmentonly,whichmayeithergrantorwithholdthematitspleasure.

What,than,aretheproperlimitationsofthepowerofCongressinthisrespect?Thishasalwaysbeenasubjectofgreatdifficulty,andofmarkeddifferenceofopinion,amongpoliticians.IcannothopethatIshallbeableperfectlytodisembarrassit;butIthink,nevertheless,thatthereareafewplainrules,theproprietyofwhichallwilladmit,andwhichmaymateriallyaidusintheformationofasoundopinionuponthesubject.

Inthefirstplace,then,itistobeobservedthatCongresshasnopowerunderthisclauseoftheConstitution,excepttoprovidethemeansofexecutingthegrantedpowers.Itisnotenoughthatthemeansadoptedaresufficienttothatandtheymustbeadoptedbonafide,withaviewtoaccomplishit.Congresshasnorighttousefortheaccomplishmentofonepurpose,meansostensiblyprovidedforanothertodosowouldbeapositivefraud,andamanifestusurpation;for,ifthepurposebelawful,itmaybeaccomplishedbyitsownappropriatemeans,andifitbeunlawful,itshouldnotbeaccomplishedatall.Itisquiteobviousthat,withoutthischeck,Congressmay,byindirection,accomplishalmostanyforbiddenobject;foramongthegreatvarietyofmeansadaptedtocarryoutthegrantedpowers,somemaybefoundequallycalculatedtoeffect,eitherbytheirdirectorindirectaction,purposesofawhollydifferentcharacterandtendency.Itis,therefore,oftheutmostimportancetothepreservationofthetrueprinciplesoftheConstitution,thatstrictfaithshouldbekeptuponthispoint.

Inthesecondplace,themeansprovidedmustnotonlybe"necessary,"

buttheymustalsobe"proper."Iftheword"necessary"stoodalone,itwouldbesusceptibleofaveryextendedmeaning,andwouldprobablybeconsideredasembracingpowerswhichitneverwasinthecontemplationoftheframersoftheConstitutiontogrant.Itwasnecessary,then,tolimitandrestrainitbysomeotherword,andtheword"proper"wasveryhappilyselected.Thiswordrequiresthatthemeansselectedshallbestrictlyconstitutional.Inascertainingthis,wemusthaveregardnotonlytotheexpressprovisionsoftheConstitution,butalsotothegeneralnatureandcharacterofourinstitutions.Oursisafreegovernment,whichimpliesthatitisalsoanequalgovernment;itthereforeauthorizestheemploymentofnomeansfortheexecutionofitspowers,exceptsuchasareconsistentwiththespiritoflibertyandequality.Oursisaconfederatedgovernment;

itthereforeauthorizesnomeanswhichareinconsistentwiththedistinctsovereigntyoftheStates,theconfederatingpowers.Oursisagovernmentof"delegated"powers,limitedandspecificallyenumerated;itthereforeauthorizesnomeanswhichinvolve,intheuseofthem,anydistinctsubstantivepower,notgranted.Thissinglerule,iffairlyandhonestlyobserved,willgofartoremovemanyseriousdifficultiesuponthispoint,andwilldeprivetheFederalGovernmentofmanyimportantpowerswhichithashithertoexercised,andwhicharestillclaimedforit,byJudgeStory,andthewholepoliticalworldtowhichhebelongs.Theproprietyand,indeed,theabsolutenecessityoftherule,appeartometobeobvious.Ifpowersnotgrantedmightbeusedasmeansofexecutingthegrantedpowers,itismanifestthatnopowerwhatevercouldbeconsideredasdenied.Itisnotenoughthatthereisnoapparentunconstitutionalityintheuseofsuchmeans,intheparticularcase.Iftheyinvolveaprinciplewhichwillauthorizetheuseofungrantedpowersinanyothercase,theyareforbiddenbytheConstitution.Toillustratethisideabyanexample:CongresshaspowertoregulatecommerceamongtheseveralStates.Thisissupposedbysometogivethempowertoopenchannelsofcommerce,bymakingroads,cuttingcanalsetc.,throughtheterritoriesoftheStates.Butthisisasubstantivepowerinitself,notgrantedtotheUnitedStates,butreservedtotheStatesrespectively,andthereforeisnotallowedasameansofregulatingcommerceamongtheStates.Letussuppose,however,thattheopeningofroadsandcuttingofcanalsaretheverybestmeansoffacilitatingandregulatingcommerceamongtheStates,andthatthereisnothinginthelanguageoftheConstitutiontoforbidit;wearestilltoinquirewhatfartherpowerswouldbenecessarilyimplied,asincidentsofthis.WefindthatthepowertoopenaroadthroughaState,impliesthepowertokeepitinrepair:toimposefinesandpenaltiesonthosewhoinjureit,and,consequently,toenforcethosefinesandpenaltiesbytheexerciseofajurisdictionoverit.Wefind,also,thatthepowertomakesucharoad,impliesthepowertolocateit;and,asthereisnothingtocontrolthediscretionofCongressinthisrespect,thereisnothingtoforbidthemtolocatetheirroad,uponthebedofaStatecanal,oralongthewholecourseofaStateturnpike.TheeffectofthiswouldbetotransfertotheUnitedStates,againsttheconsentoftheState,andwithoutcompensation,improvementsmadebytheStatewithinherownterritoryandatherownexpense.Nay,thesupremacyclaimedforthepowersofCongressinthisrespectwould,uponthesameprinciple,authorizethemtorunaroadthroughthecentreofaStatecapital,ortocoverhalfherterritorywithroadsandcanals,overwhichtheStatecouldexertneitherjurisdictionnorcontrol.

Theimprovementsofindividuals,too,andofcorporatebodiesmadeundertheauthorityofStatelaws,wouldthusbeheldatthemercyoftheUnitedStates.Whenwesee,then,thatthemeansofregulatingcommerceamongtheStateswouldnecessarilyimplythesevastandforbiddenpowers,weshouldunhesitatinglyrejectthemasunconstitutional.Thissingleinstance,givenbywayofexampleandillustration,presentsarulewhich,ifstrictlyadheredtoinallanalogouscases,wouldgofartoremovethedifficulties,andtopreventthecontests,whichsooftenariseonthispartoftheConstitution.

Thesefewsimplerulesare,intheirnature,technical,andmayatalltimesbeeasilyapplied,ifCongresswillobservegoodfaithintheexerciseofitspowers.Thereisanotherofamoreenlargedandliberalcharacter,whichtheword"proper"suggests,andwhich,ifappliedwithsoundjudgment,perfectintegrityandimpartialjustice,willrenderallotherscomparativelyunnecessary.ItexactsofCongressanextendedandfairviewoftherelationsofalltheStates,andastrictlyimpartialregardtotheirrespectiverightsandinterests.Althoughthedirectactionofagrantedpower,bythemeansalsograntedintheConstitution,maybebothunequalandunjust,thosemeanswould,nevertheless,beperfectlyconstitutional.Suchinjusticeandinequalitywouldbebutthenecessaryconsequenceofthatimperfection,whichcharacterizeseveryhumaninstitution,andtowhichthosewhoundertaketoproscribespecificrulestothemselvesareboundtosubmit,Butwhen,Congressarecalledontoprescribenewmeansofexecutingagrantedpower,noneare"proper,"andthereforenoneareconstitutionalwhichoperateunequallyandunjustlyamongtheStatesorthepeople.Itintruethatperfectandexactequalityinthisrespectisnottobeexpected;butanearapproachtoitwillalwaysbemadebyawiseandfairlegislation.

Greatandobviousinjusticeandinequalitymayatalltimesbeavoided.

No"means"whichinvolvetheseconsequencescanpossiblybeconsidered"proper";eitherinamoralorinaconstitutionalsense.Itrequiresnohighintellectualfacultytoapplythisrule;simpleintegrityisallthatisrequired.

IhavenotthoughtitnecessarytofollowtheauthorthroughhisextendedexaminationofwhathetermstheincidentalpowersofCongress,arisingundertheclauseoftheConstitutionweareexamining.Itwouldbeindeedanendlesstasktodoso;forIamunabletoperceivethatheproposesanylimittothematall.Indeed,hetellsusinsomanywords,that"uponthewhole,theresultofthemostcarefulexaminationofthisclauseis,thatifitdoesnotenlarge,itcannotbeconstruedtorestrainthepowersofCongress,orimpairtherightofthelegislaturetouseitsbestjudgmentintheselectionofmeasurestocarryintoexecutiontheconstitutionalpowersofthenationalgovernment."Thisis,indeed,asweepofauthority,boundlessandunrestricted.The"bestjudgment"ofCongressistheonlylimitproposedtoitspowers,whilstthereisnothingtocontrolthatjudgment,nortocorrectitserrors.Governmentisabandonedemphaticallytoitsowndiscretion;forevenifacorrectivebesupposedtoexistwiththepeople,thatcorrectivecanneverbeappliedinbehalfofanoppressedminority.AretheruleswhichIhaveproposedindeednothing?Isnoeffectwhatevertobegiventothisword"proper,"inthisclauseoftheConstitution?

CanJudgeStorypossiblyberightinsupposingthattheConstitutionwouldbethesamewithoutitaswithit;andthattheonlyobjectofinsertingitwas"thedesiretoremoveallpossibledoubtrespectingtherighttolegislateonthevastmassofincidentalpowerswhichmustbeinvolvedintheConstitution,ifthatinstrumentbenotasplendidpageant,oradelusivephantomofsovereignty?"Itwas,indeed,theobjectoftheframersoftheConstitution"toremoveallpossibledoubt"fromthissubject.Theydesiredneitherasplendidpageantnorasplendidgovernment.Theyknewthatwithoutthisrestrictionourswouldbeboth;andaspowerfulassplendid.

Theydidnotdesignthatanypowerwithwhichtheythoughtpropertoclotheitshouldbeinoperativeforwantofmeanstocarryitintoexecution;

buttheyneverdesignedtogiveittheboundlessfieldofitsownmerewill,fortheselectionofthosemeans.Havingspecificallyenumerateditspowers,asfaraswaspracticable,theyneverdesignedtoinvolvethemselvesintheabsurdityofremoving,byasingleclause,everyrestrictionwhichtheyhadpreviouslyimposed.Theymeanttoassuretheiragentthat,whilenoneofthepowerswithwhichtheyhadthoughtpropertoclotheitshouldbenugatory,noneofthemshouldbeexecutedbyanymeanswhichwerenotboth"necessary"and"proper."

Theloversofastrongconsolidatedgovernmenthavelaboredstrenuously,andIfearwithtoomuchsuccess,toremoveeveryavailablerestrictionuponthepowersofCongress.ThetendencyoftheirprinciplesistoestablishthatlegislativeomnipotencewhichisthefundamentalprincipleoftheBritishConstitution,andwhichrenderseveryformofwrittenconstitutionidleanduseless.Theysufferthemselvestobetoomuchattractedbythesplendorsofagreatcentralpower.Dazzledbythesesplendors,theylosesightofthemoreuseful,yetlessostentatiouspurposesoftheStategovernments,andseemtobeunconsciousthat,inbuildingupthishugetempleoffederalpower,theynecessarilydestroythoselesspretendingstructuresfromwhichalonetheyderiveshelter,protectionandsafety.Thisistheignisfatuuswhichhassooftendeceivednations,andbetrayedthemintothesloughofdespotism.Onallsuch,theimpressivewarningofPatrickHenry,drawnfromthelessonsofallexperience,wouldbeutterlylost: