第6章

Congressmayproposeamendments,"whenevertwo-thirdsofbothhousesshalldeemitnecessary."ThissecurestheStatesagainstanyactionuponthesubjectbythepeopleatlarge.Inlikemanner,Congressmaycallaconventionforproposingamendments,"ontheapplicationofthelegislaturesoftwo-thirdsoftheseveralStates."Itisremarkablethat,whetherCongressortheStatesactuponthesubject,thesameproportionisrequired;notlessthantwo-thirdsofeitherbeingauthorizedtoact.Fromthis,itisnotunreasonabletoconclude,thattheconventionconsideredthatthesamepowerwouldactinbothcases;towit:thepoweroftheStates,whomighteffecttheirobjecteitherbytheirseparateactionasStates,orbytheactionofCongress,theircommonfederativeagent;but,whethertheyadoptedtheonemodeortheother,notlessthantwo-thirdsofthemshouldbeauthorizedtoactefficiently.

Theamendmentsthusproposed"shallbevalidtoallintentsandpurposes,aspartofthisConstitution,whenratifiedbythelegislaturesofthree-fourthsoftheseveralStates,orbyconventionsinthree-fourthsthereof,astheoneortheothermodeofratificationmaybeproposedbyCongress."Itistheactofadoptionorratificationalonewhichmakesaconstitution.

Inthecasebeforeus,theStatesalonecanperformthatact.ThelanguageoftheConstitutionadmitsofnodoubt,andgivesnopretextfordoubleconstruction.ItisnotthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesintheaggregate,merelyactingintheirseveralStates,whocanratifyamendments.Three-fourthsoftheseveralStatescanalonedothis.Theideaofseparateandindependentpoliticalcorporationscouldnotbemoredistinctlyconveyed,byanyformofwords.IfthepeopleoftheUnitedStates,asonepeople,butactingintheirseveralStates,couldratifyamendments,thentheverylanguageoftheConstitutionrequiresthatthree-fourthsofthemshallconcurtherein.

Isitnot,then,trulywonderfulthatnomodehasyetbeenprescribedtoascertain,whetherthree-fourthsofthemdoconcurornot?Bywhatpowercanthenecessaryarrangementuponthispointbeeffected?Inpointoffact,amendmentshavealreadybeenmade,instrictconformitywiththisprovisionoftheConstitution.Weaskourauthor,whetherthree-fourthsofthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesconcurredinthoseamendmentsornot;

andiftheydid,whencedoeshederivetheproofofit?

IfJudgeStory,andthepoliticiansofhisschool,becorrectintheidea,thattheConstitutionwasformedby"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,"

andnotbytheStates,assuch,thisclauserelatingtoamendmentspresentsasingularanomalyinpolitics.TheirideaisthattheStatesovereigntiesweremerged,toacertainextent,inthatact,andthatthegovernmentestablishedwasemphaticallythegovernmentofthepeopleoftheUnitedStates.Andyet,thosesamepeoplecanneitheralternoramendthatgovernment.

Inordertoperformthisessentialfunction,itisnecessarytocallagainintolifeandactionthoseveryStatesovereigntieswhichweresupposedtobemergedanddead,bytheveryactofcreatingtheinstrumentwhichtheyarerequiredtoamend.Toalteroramendagovernmentrequiresthesameextentofpowerwhichisrequiredtoformone;foreveryalterationoramendmentis,astosomuch,anewgovernment.And,ofallpoliticalacts,theformationofaconstitutionofgovernmentisthatwhichadmitsandimplies,themostdistinctlyandtothefullestextent,theexistenceofabsolute,unqualified,unconditional,andunlimitedsovereignty.Solong,therefore,asthepowerofamendingtheConstitutionrestsexclusivelywiththeStates,itisidletocontendthattheyarelesssovereignnowthantheywerebeforetheadoptionofthatinstrument.

TheideawhichIamendeavoringtoenforce,ofthefederativecharacteroftheConstitution,isstillfartherconfirmedbythatclauseofthearticleunderconsideration,whichprovidesthatnoamendmentshallbemadetodepriveanyStateofitsequalsuffrageintheSenate,withoutitsownconsent.SostronglyweretheStatesattachedtothatperfectequalitywhichtheirperfectsovereigntyimplied,andsojealousweretheyofeveryattackuponit,thattheyguardedit,byanexpressprovisionoftheConstitution,againstthepossibilityofoverthrow.Allotherrightstheyconfidedtothatpowerofamendmentwhichtheyreposedinthree-fourthsofalltheStates;butthistheyrefusedtoentrust,excepttotheseparate,independentandsovereignwillofeachState;givingtoeach,initsowncase,anabsolutenegativeuponalltherest.22

TheobjectoftheprecedingpageshasbeentoshowthattheConstitutionisfederative,inthepowerwhichframedit;federativeinthepowerwhichadoptedandratifiedit;federativeinthepowerwhichsustainsandkeepsitalive;federativeinthepowerbywhichaloneitcanbealteredoramended;

andfederativeinthestructureofallitsdepartments.Inwhatrespect,then,canitjustlybecalledaconsolidatedornationalgovernment?Certainly,themerefactthat,inparticularcases,itisauthorizedtoactdirectlyonthepeople,doesnotdisproveitsfederativecharacter,sincethatverysovereigntyintheStates,whichaconfederationimplies,includeswithinittherightoftheStatetosubjectitsowncitizenstotheactionofthecommonauthorityoftheconfederatedStates,inanyformwhichmayseempropertoitself.NeitherisourConstitutiontobedeemedthelessfederative,becauseitwastheobjectofthosewhoformedittoestablish"agovernment,"andoneeffectiveforallthelegitimatepurposesofgovernment.

Muchemphasishasbeenlaiduponthisword,anditevenhasbeenthought,byonedistinguishedstatesmanofJudgeStory"sschool,thatoursis"agovernmentproper,"whichIpresumeimpliesthatitisagovernmentinapeculiarlyemphaticsense.IconfessthatIdonotveryclearlydiscernthedifferencebetweenagovernmentandagovernmentproper.Nothingisagovernmentwhichisnotproperlyso;andwhateverisproperlyagovernmentisagovernmentproper.Butwhetheroursisa"governmentproper,"oronlyasimplegovernment,doesnotprovethatitisnotaconfederation,unlessitbetruethataconfederationcannotbeagovernment.

Formyself,IamunabletodiscoverwhyStates,absolutelysovereign,maynotcreateforthemselves,bycompact,acommongovernment,withpowersasextensiveandsupremeasanysovereignpeoplecanconferonagovernmentestablishedbythemselves.Inwhatotherparticularoursisaconsolidatedornationalgovernment,Ileaveittotheadvocatesofthatdoctrinetoshow.CHAPTERIX.EXTENTANDLIMITSOFTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHESUPREME

COURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES.Wecomenowtoamoreparticularanddetailedexaminationofthequestion,"Whoisthefinaljudge,orinterpreterinconstitutionalcontroversies?"

ThefourthchapterofthisdivisionofJudgeStory"sworkisdevotedtothisinquiry;andtheelaborateexaminationwhichhehasgiventothesubject,showsthatheattachedajustimportancetoit.Theconclusion,however,towhichhehasarrived,leavesstillunsettledthemostdifficultandcontestedpropositionswhichbelongtothispartoftheConstitution.Hisconclusionis,that,"inallquestionsofajudicialnature,"theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesisthefinalumpire;andthattheStates,aswellasindividuals,areabsolutelyboundbyitsdecisions.Hisreasoninguponthispartofthesubjectisnotnew,anddoesnotstrikemeasbeingparticularlyforcible.Withoutdeemingitnecessarytofollowhiminthepreciseorderofhisargument,Ishallendeavortomeetitinallitsparts,intheprogressofthisexamination.Itsgeneraloutlineisthis:Itiswithintheproperfunctionofthejudiciarytointerpretthelaws;theConstitutionisthesupremelaw,andthereforeitiswithintheproperfunctionofthejudiciarytointerprettheConstitution;ofcourse,itistheprovinceofthefederaljudiciarytointerprettheFederalConstitution.

AndasthatConstitution,andalllawsmadeinpursuancethereof,arethesupremelawoftheland,anythinginthelawsorconstitutionofanyStatetothecontrarynotwithstanding,therefore,theinterpretationsofthatConstitution,asgivenbytheSupremeCourt,areobligatory,finalandconclusive,uponthepeopleandtheStates.

Beforeweenteruponthisinvestigation,itispropertoplacethepropositiontobediscussedintermssomewhatmoredefiniteandprecisethanthosewhichtheauthorhasemployed.What,then,ismeantby"finaljudgeandinterpreter?"Intheordinaryacceptationoftheseterms,weshouldunderstandbythematribunalhavinglawfulcognizanceofasubject,andfromwhosedecisionsthereisnoappeal.Inthisviewofthequestion,therecanbenodifficultyinadmittingthatthedecisionsoftheSupremeCourtarefinalandconclusive.Whatevercomeswithinthelegitimatecognizanceofthattribunal,ithasarighttodecide,whetheritbeaquestionofthelaworoftheConstitution,andnoothertribunalcanreverseitsdecision.

TheConstitution,whichcreatestheSupremeCourt,createsnoothercourtofsuperiororappellatejurisdictiontoit,and,consequently,itsdecisionsarestrictly"final."Thereisnopowerinthesamegovernmenttowhichthatcourtbelongstoreverseorcontrolit,norarethereanymeansthereinofresistingitsauthority.Sofar,therefore,astheFederalConstitutionhasprovidedforthesubjectatall,theSupremeCourtis,beyondquestion,thefinaljudgeorarbiter;andthis,too,whetherthejurisdictionwhichitexercisesbelegitimateorusurped.

Theterms"constitutionalcontroversies"arestillmoreindefinite.

Everycontroversywhichissubmittedtothedecisionofajudicialtribunal,whetherStateorfederal,necessarilyinvolvestheconstitutionalityofthelawunderwhichitarises.Ifthelawbenotconstitutional,thecourtcannotenforceit,and,ofcourse,thequestionwhetheritbeconstitutionalornot,necessarilyarisesineverycasetowhichthecourtisaskedtoapplyit.Theveryactofenforcingalawpresupposesthatitsconstitutionalityhasbeendetermined.Inthissense,everycourt,whetherStateorfederal,isthe"judgeorarbiterofconstitutionalcontroversies,"arisingincausesbeforeitandiftherebenoappealfromitsdecision,itisthe"final"

judgeorarbiter,inthesensealreadyexpressed.

Letusnowinquirewhat"constitutionalcontroversies"thefederalcourtshaveauthoritytodecide,andhowfaritsdecisionsarefinalandconclusiveagainstalltheworld.

ThethirdarticleoftheConstitutionprovidesthat"thejudicialpowersshallextendtoallcasesinlawandequity,arisingunderthisConstitution,thelawsoftheUnitedStates,andthetreatiesmade,orwhichshallbemade,undertheirauthority;toallcasesaffectingambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsulstoallcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdictiontocontroversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty;tocontroversiesbetweentwoormoreStates;betweenaStateandcitizensofanotherState;

betweencitizensofdifferentStates;betweencitizensofthesameState,claiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentStates;andbetweenaStateandthecitizensthereof,andforeignStates,citizensorsubjects."

Theeleventhamendmentprovidesthat"thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuitinlaworequity,commencedorprosecutedagainstoneoftheUnitedStatesbycitizensofanotherState,orbycitizensandsubjectsofanyforeignState."

Itwillbeconcededonallhandsthatthefederalcourtshavenojurisdictionexceptwhatishereconferred.Thejudiciary,asapartoftheFederalGovernment,derivesitspowersonlyfromtheConstitutionwhichcreatesthatgovernment.Theterm"cases"impliesthatthesubjectmattershallbeproperforjudicialdecision;andthepartiesbetweenwhomalonejurisdictioncanbeentertained,arespecificallyenumerated.Beyondthese"cases"andthesepartiestheyhavenojurisdiction.

ThereisnopartoftheConstitutioninwhichtheframersofithavedisplayedamorejealouscareoftherightsoftheStates,thaninthelimitationsofthejudicialpower.Itisremarkablethatnopowerisconferredexceptwhatisabsolutelynecessarytocarryintoeffectthegeneraldesign,andaccomplishthegeneralobjectoftheStates,asindependent,confederatedStates.ThefederaltribunalscannottakecognizanceofanycasewhateverinwhichalltheStateshavenotanequalandcommoninterestthatajustandimpartialdecisionshallbehad.AbriefanalysisoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionwillmakethissufficientlyclear.

Cases"arisingundertheConstitution"arethoseinwhichsomerightorprivilegeisdenied,whichtheConstitutionconfers,orsomethingisdonewhichtheConstitutionprohibits,asexpressedintheConstitutionitself.Thosewhicharise"underthelawsoftheUnitedStates"aresuchasinvolverightsorduties,whichresultfromthelegislationofCongress.

CasesofthesekindsaresimplythecarryingoutofthecompactoragreementmadebetweentheStates,bytheConstitutionitself,and,ofcourse,alltheStatesarealikeinterestedinthem.Forthisreasonalone,iftherewerenoother,theyoughttobeentrustedtothecommontribunalsofalltheStates.Thereisanotherreason,however,equallyconclusive.Thejudicialshouldalwaysbeatleastco-extensivewiththelegislativepower;foritwouldbeastrangeanomaly,andcouldproducenothingbutdisorderandconfusion,toconferonagovernmentthepowertomakealaw,withoutconferringatthesametimetherighttointerpretandthepowertoenforceit.

Casesarisingundertreaties,madeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates,andthose"affectingambassadorsandotherpublicministersendconsuls,"couldnotproperlybeentrustedtoanyotherthanthefederaltribunals.TreatiesaremadeunderthecommonauthorityoftheStates,andall,alike,areboundforthefaithfulobservanceofthem.AmbassadorsandotherpublicministersandconsulsarereceivedunderthecommonauthorityofalltheStates,andtheirdutiesrelateonlytomattersinvolvingaliketheinterestsofall.Thepeaceofthecountry,andtheharmonyofitsrelationswithforeignpowers,depend,inapeculiardegree,onthegoodfaithwithwhichitsdutiesinreferencetothesesubjectsaredischarged.

Henceitwouldbeunsafetoentrustthemtoanyotherthantheirowncontrol;

andevenifthiswerenotso,itwouldbealtogetherincongruoustoappealtoaStatetribunal,toenforcetherights,theobligationsorthedutiesoftheUnitedStates.Forlikereasons,casesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdictionareproperlyentrustedtothefederaltribunals.

ControversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeapartyshould,upongeneralprinciples,belongonlytoherowncourts.TherewouldbeneitherproprietynorjusticeinpermittinganyoneStatetodecideacaseinwhichalltheStatesareparties.Inlikemanner,thosebetweentwoormoreStates?betweenaStateandcitizensofanotherState,wheretheStateisplaintiff?(itcannotbesued)?andbetweencitizensofdifferentStates,couldnotbeentrustedtothetribunalsofanyparticularStateinterested,orwhosecitizensareinterestedtherein,withoutdangerofinjusticeandpartiality.Jurisdictionisgiventothefederalcourts,inthesecases,simplybecausetheyareequallyinterestedforalltheparties,arethecommoncourtsofalltheparties,andthereforearepresumedtoformtheonlyfairandimpartialtribunalbetweenthem.ThesamereasoningappliestocasesbetweencitizensofthesameState,claiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentStates.CasesofthissortinvolvequestionsofthesovereignpoweroftheStates,andcouldnot,withanyshowofpropriety,beentrustedtothedecisionofeitherofthem,interestedasitwouldbetosustainitsownacts,againstthoseofthesisterState.ThejurisdictioninthiscaseisgivenuponthesameprincipleswhichgiveitincasesbetweentwoormoreStates.

ControversiesbetweenaStateorthecitizensthereof,andforeignStates,citizensorsubjects,dependonadifferentprinciple,butoneequallyaffectingthecommonrightsandinterestsofalltheStates.AforeignStatecannot,ofcourse,besued;shecanappearinourcourtsonlyasplaintiff.Yet,inwhateverformsuchcontroversies,orthoseaffectingthecitizensofaforeignState,mayarise,alltheStateshaveadeepinterestthatanimpartialtribunal,satisfactorytotheforeignparty,shouldbeprovided.Thedenialofjusticeisalegitimate,andnotanunfruitfulcauseofwar.AsnoStatecanbeinvolvedinwarwithoutinvolvingalltherest,theyallhaveacommoninteresttowithdrawfromtheStatetribunalsajurisdictionwhichmaybringthemwithinthedangerofthatresult.AlltheStatesarealikeboundtorenderjusticetoforeignStatesandtheirpeople;andthiscommonresponsibilitygivesthemarighttodemandthateveryquestioninvolvingitshallbedecidedbytheircommonjudicatory.

ThisbriefreviewofthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates,asgivenintheConstitution,isnotofferedasafullanalysisofthesubject;

forthequestionbeforeusdoesnotrenderanysuchanalysisnecessary.

Bydesignhasbeenonlytoshowwithwhatextremereservejudicialpowerhasbeenconferred,andwithwhatcautionithasbeenrestrictedtothosecases,only,whichthenewrelationbetweentheStatesestablishedbytheConstitutionrenderedabsolutelynecessary.Inallthecasesabovesupposed,thejurisdictionofthefederalcourtsisclearandundoubted;andastheStateshave,intheframeoftheConstitution,agreedtosubmittotheexerciseofthisjurisdiction,theyareboundtodoso,andtocompeltheirpeopletolikesubmission.Butitistoberemarked,thattheyareboundonlybytheiragreement,andnotbeyondit.TheyareundernoobligationtosubmittothedecisionsoftheSupremeCourt,onsubjectmatternotproperlycognizablebeforeit,nortothosebetweenpartiesnotresponsibletoitsjurisdiction.23Who,then,istodecidethispoint?ShalltheSupremeCourtdecideforitself,andagainstalltheworld?Itisadmittedthateverycourtmustnecessarilydetermineeveryquestionofjurisdictionwhicharisesbeforeit,and,sofar,itmustofcoursebethejudgeofitsownpowers.Ifitbeacourtofthelastresort,itsdecisionisnecessarilyfinal,sofarasthoseauthoritiesareconcerned,whichbelongtothesamesystemofgovernmentwithitself.

Thereis,infact,noabsoluteandcertainlimitation,inanyconstitutionalgovernment,tothepowersofitsownjudiciary;for,asthosepowersarederivedfromtheConstitutionandasthejudgesaretheinterpretersoftheConstitution,thereisnothingtopreventthemfrominterpretinginfavorofanypowerwhichtheymayclaim.TheSupremeCourt,therefore,mayassumejurisdictionoversubjectsandbetweenparties,notallowedbytheConstitution,andthereisnopowerintheFederalGovernmenttogainsayit.Eventheimpeachmentandremovalofthejudges,forignoranceorcorruption,wouldnotinvalidatetheirdecisionsalreadypronounced.

Isthere,then,noredress?TheConstitutionitselfwillanswerthisquestioninthemostsatisfactorymanner.

ThetentharticleoftheAmendmentsoftheConstitutionprovidesthat"ThepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheConstitution,norprohibitedbyittotheStates,arereservedtotheStatesrespectively,ortothepeople."Thepowersthusreserved,arenotonlyreservedagainsttheFederalGovernmentinwhole,butagainsteachandeverydepartmentthereof.ThejudiciaryisnomoreexceptedoutofthereservationthanisthelegislatureortheExecutive.Ofwhatnature,then,arethosereservedpowers?Notthepowers,ifanysuchtherebe,whicharepossessedbyalltheStatestogether,forthereservationisto"theStatesrespectively";

thatis,toeachStateseparatelyanddistinctly.NowwecanformnoideaofanypowerpossessedbyaStateassuch,andindependentofeveryotherState,whichisnot,initsnature,asovereignpower.Everypowersoreserved,therefore,mustbeofsuchacharacterthateachStatemayexerciseit,withouttheleastreferencetoresponsibilitytoanyotherStatewhatever.

WehavealreadyseenthattheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswasformedbytheStatesassuch,andthereservationabovequotedisanadmissionthatinperformingthatwork,theyactedasindependentandsovereignStates.

Itisincidenttoeverysovereigntytobealonethejudgeofitsowncompactsandagreements.NootherStateorassemblageofStateshastheleastrighttointerferewithit,inthisrespect,andcannotdosowithoutimpairingitssovereignty.TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisbuttheagreementwhicheachStatehasmade,witheachandalltheotherStates,andsodistinguishable,intheprincipleweareexamining,fromanyotheragreementbetweensovereignStates.EachState,therefore,hasarighttointerpretthatagreementforitself,unlessithasclearlywaivedthatrightinfavorofanotherpower.Thattherightisnotwaivedinthecaseunderconsideration,isapparentfromthefactalreadystated,thatifthejudiciarybethesolejudgesoftheextentoftheirownpowers,theirpowersareuniversal,andtheenumerationintheConstitutionisidleanduseless.Butitisstillfartherapparentfromthefollowingview:

TheFederalGovernmentisthecreatureoftheStates.ItisnotapartytotheConstitution,buttheresultofit?thecreationofthatagreementwhichwasmadebytheStatesasparties.Itisamereagent,entrustedwithlimitedpowersforcertainspecificobjects;whichpowersandobjectsareenumeratedintheConstitution.Shalltheagentbepermittedtojudgeoftheextentofhisownpowers,withoutreferencetohisconstituent?

Toacertainextent,heiscompelledtodothis,intheveryactofexercisingthem,butthisisalwaysinsubordinationtotheauthoritybywhomhispowerswereconferred.Ifthiswerenotso,theresultwouldbe,thattheagentwouldpossesseverypowerwhichtheconstituentcouldconfer,notwithstandingtheplainestandmostexpresstermsofthegrant.Thiswouldbeagainstallprincipleandallreason.Ifsucharulewouldprevailinregardtogovernment,awrittenconstitutionwouldbetheidlestthingimaginable.

Itwouldaffordnobarrieragainsttheusurpationsofthegovernment,andnosecurityfortherightsandlibertiesofthepeople.IfthentheFederalGovernmenthasnoauthoritytojudge,inthelastresort,oftheextentofitsownpowers,withwhatproprietycanitbesaidthatasingledepartmentofthatgovernmentmaydoso?Nay,itissaidthatthisdepartmentmaynotonlyjudgeforitself,butfortheotherdepartmentsalso.Thisisanabsurdityasperniciousasitisgrossandpalpable.IfthejudiciarymaydeterminethepowersoftheFederalGovernment,itmaypronouncethemeitherlessormorethantheyreallyare.ThatgovernmentatleastwouldhavenorighttocomplainofthedecisionsofanumpirewhichithadchosenforitselfandendeavoredtoforceupontheStatesandthepeople.Thusasingledepartmentmightdenytoboththeotherssalutarypowerswhichtheyreallypossessed,andwhichthepublicinterestorthepublicsafetymightrequirethemtoexercise;oritmightconferonthempowersneverconceded,inconsistentwithprivateright,anddangeroustopublicliberty.

Inconstruingthepowersofafreeandequalgovernment,itisenoughtodisprovetheexistenceofanyrule,toshowthatsuchconsequencesasthesewillresultfromit.Nothingshortoftheplainestandmostunequivocallanguageshouldreconcileustotheadoptionofsucharule.NosuchlanguagecanbefoundinourConstitution.Theonlyclause,fromwhichtherulecanbesupposedtobederived,isthatwhichconfersjurisdictionin"allcasesarisingundertheConstitution,andthelawsmadeinpursuancethereof";

butthisclauseisclearlynotsusceptibleofanysuchconstruction.Everyrightmaybesaidtobeaconstitutionalright,becausenorightexistswhichtheConstitutiondisallows;and,consequently,everyremedytoenforcethoserightspresents"acasearisingundertheConstitution."Butaconstructionsolatitudinouswillscarcelybecontendedforbyanyone.Theclauseunderconsiderationgivesjurisdictiononlyastothosematters,andbetweenthoseparties,enumeratedintheConstitutionitself.Wheneversuchacasearises,theFederalcourtshavecognizanceofit;buttherighttodecideacasearisingundertheConstitution,doesnotnecessarilyimplytherighttodetermineinthelastresortwhatthatConstitutionis.IftheFederalcourtsshould,intheveryteethoftheeleventhamendment,takejurisdictionofcases"commencedorprosecutedagainstoneoftheStatesbycitizensofanotherState,"thedecisionsofthosecourts,thattheyhadjurisdiction,wouldcertainlynotsettletheConstitutioninthatparticular.TheStatewouldbeundernoobligationtosubmittosuchadecision,anditwouldresistitbyvirtueofitssovereignrighttodecideforitself,whetherithadagreedtotheexerciseofsuchajurisdictionornot.

Consideringthenatureofoursystemofgovernment,theStatesoughttobe,andIpresumealwayswillbe,extremelycarefulnottointerposetheirsovereignpoweragainstthedecisionsoftheSupremeCourtinanycasewherethatcourtclearlyhasjurisdiction.Ofthischaracterarethecasesalreadycitedatthecommencementofthisinquiry;such,forexample,asthosebetweentwoStates,thoseaffectingforeignministers,thoseofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction,&c.Astoallthesesubjectsthejurisdictionisclear,andnoStatecanhaveanyinteresttodisputeit.

ThedecisionsoftheSupremeCourt,therefore,oughttobeconsideredasfinalandconclusive,anditwouldbeabreachofthecontractonthepartofanyStatetorefusesubmissiontothem.Thereare,however,manycasesinvolvingquestionsofthepowersofgovernment,Stateandfederal,whichcannotassumeaproperformforjudicialinvestigation.Mostquestionsofmerepoliticalpowerareofthissort;andsuchareallquestionsbetweenaStateandtheUnitedStates.Astothese,theConstitutionconfersnojurisdictiononthefederalcourts,and,ofcourse,itprovidesnocommonumpiretowhosedecisiontheycanbereferred.Insuchcases,therefore,theStatemustofnecessitydecideforitself.Buttherearealsocasesbetweencitizenandcitizen,arisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates,andbetweentheUnitedStatesandthecitizen,arisinginthesameway.

Sofarasthefederaltribunalshavecognizanceofsuchcases,theirdecisionsarefinal.Iftheconstitutionalityofthelawunderwhichthecasearises,shouldcomeintoquestion,thecourthasauthoritytodecideit,andthereisnorelieffortheparties,inanyotherjudicialproceeding.Ifthedecision,inacontroversybetweentheUnitedStatesandacitizen,shouldbeagainsttheUnitedStates,itis,ofcourse,finalandconclusive.Ifthedecisionshouldbeagainstthecitizen,hisonlyreliefisbyanappealtohisownState.Heisundernoobligationtosubmittofederaldecisionsatall,exceptsofaronlyashisownStatehascommandedhimtodoso;

andhehas,therefore,aperfectrighttoaskhisStatewhetherhercommandsextendtotheparticularcaseornot.Hedoesnotaskwhetherthefederalcourthasinterpretedthelawcorrectlyornot,butwhetherornotsheeverconsentedthatCongressshouldpassthelaw.IfCongresshadsuchpower,hehasnorelief,forthedecisionofthehighestfederalcourtisfinal;ifCongresshadnotsuchpower,thenheisoppressedbytheactionofausurpedauthority,andhasarighttolooktohisownStateforredress.

HisStatemayinterposeinhisfavorornot,asshemaythinkproper.Ifshedoesnot,thenthereisanendofthematter;ifshedoes,thanitisnolongerajudicialquestion.Thequestionisthenbetweennewparties,whoarenotboundbytheformerdecision;betweenaStateandtheUnitedStates.Asbetweenthesepartiesthefederaltribunalshavenojurisdiction,thereisnolongeracommonumpiretowhomthecontroversycanbereferred.

TheStatemustofnecessityjudgeforitself,byvirtueofthatinherent,sovereignpowerandauthority,which,astothismatter,ithasneversurrenderedtoanyothertribunal.Itsdecision,whateveritmaybe,isbindinguponitselfanduponitsownpeople,andnofarther.

Agreatvarietyofcasesarepossible,someofwhicharenotunlikelytoarise,involvingthetrueconstructionoftheFederalConstitution,butwhichcouldnotpossiblybepresentedtothecourts,inaformproperfortheirdecision.Thefollowingareexamples:

Bythe4thsectionofthe4tharticleitisprovidedthat"CongressshallguarantytoeveryStateintheUnionarepublicanformofgovernment."Whatisarepublicanformofgovernment,andhowshallthequestionbedecided?Initsverynature,itisapolitical,andnotajudicialquestion,anditisnoteasytoimaginebywhatcontrivanceitcouldbebroughtbeforeacourt.SupposeaStateshouldadoptaconstitutionnotrepublican,intheopinionofCongress,whatcoursewouldbepursued?

Congressmight,byresolution,determinethattheconstitutionwasnotrepublican,anddirecttheStatetoformanewone.AndsupposethattheStateshouldrefusetodoso,onthegroundthatithadalreadycompliedwiththerequisitionsoftheFederalConstitutioninthatrespect?CouldCongressdirectanissuetotrythequestionatthebaroftheSupremeCourt?Thiswould,indeed,beanoddwayofsettlingtherightsofnations,anddeterminingtheextentoftheirpowers!Besides,whowouldbepartiestotheissue?atwhosesuitshouldtheStatebesummonedtoappearandanswer?NotatthatoftheUnitedStates,becauseaStatecannotbesuedbytheUnitedStates,inafederalcourt;notatthatofanyotherState,norofanyindividualcitizen,becausetheyarenotconcernedinthequestion.

Itisobviousthatthecasedoesnotpresentpropersubjectmatterforjudicialinvestigation;andevenifitdid,thatnopartiescouldbefoundauthorizedtopresenttheissue.

Again,Congresshasauthority"toprovidefororganizing,arminganddiscipliningthemilitia,andforgoverningsuchpartofthemasmaybeemployedintheserviceoftheUnitedStates;reservingtotheStates,respectively,theappointmentoftheofficersandtheauthorityoftrainingthemilitiaaccordingtothedisciplineprescribedbyCongress."SupposethatCongressshouldusurptherighttoappointthemilitiaofficers,ortheStateshouldinsistontrainingthemilitiaintheirownway,andnot"accordingtothedisciplineprescribedbyCongress."HowcouldthismatterbebroughtbeforetheSupremeCourt?Andevenifproperlybroughtthere,howcoulditssentencebeexecuted?

Again,supposethatCongressshouldenactthatalltheslavesofthecountryshouldimmediatelybefree.Thisiscertainlynotimpossible,andIfearnotevenimprobable,althoughitwouldbethegrossestandmostpalpableviolationoftherightsoftheslaveholder.ThiswouldcertainlyproducethemostdirectconflictbetweentheStateandFederalGovernments.

Itwouldinvolveamerequestionofpoliticalpower?thequestionwhethertheactofCongressforbiddingslavery,orthelawsandConstitutionoftheStateallowingit,shouldprevail.Andyetitismanifestthatitpresentsnosubjectmatterproperforjudicialdecision,andthatthepartiestoitcouldnotbeconvenedbeforetheSupremeCourt.

Theseexamplesaresufficienttoshowthatthereisalargeclassof"constitutionalcontroversies,"whichcouldnotpossiblybebroughtunderthecognizanceofanyjudicialtribunal,andstilllessunderthatofthefederalcourts.Astothesecases,therefore,eachStatemust,ofnecessity,forthereasonsalreadystated,beitsown"finaljudgeorinterpreter."

Theyinvolvethemerequestionofpoliticalpower,asbetweentheStateandFederalGovernments;andthefactthattheyareclearlywithheldfromthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt,goesfartoprovethattheStatesinframingtheConstitutiondidnotdesigntosubmittothatcourtanyquestionofthelikekind,inwhateverformorbetweenwhateverpartiesitmightarise,exceptsofaronlyasthepartiesthemselveswereconcerned.

JudgeStoryhimselfdoesnotcontendthattheSupremeCourtisthe"finaljudgeorinterpreter"inallcaseswhatsoever;he,ofcourse,admitsthatnocourtcandecideanyquestionwhichisnotsusceptibleofaproperformforjudicialenquiry.Buthecontendsthat,inallcasesofwhichtheSupremeCourtcantakecognizance,itsdecisionsarefinal,andabsolutelybindingandconclusiveinallrespects,toallpurposes,andagainsttheStatesandtheirpeople.Itisthissweepingconclusionwhichithasbeenmyobjecttodisprove.Icanseeinthefederalcourtsnothingmorethantheordinaryfunctionsofthejudiciaryineverycountry.Itistheirproperprovincetointerpretthelaws;buttheirdecisionsarenotbinding,exceptbetweenthepartieslitigantandtheirprivies.Sofarastheymayclaimtheforceofauthority,theyarenotconclusive,evenuponthosewhopronouncethem,andcertainlyarenotsobeyondthesphereoftheirowngovernment.AlthoughtheJudiciarymay,andfrequentlydo,enlargeorcontractthepowersoftheirowngovernments,asgenerallyunderstood,yettheycanneverenlargeorcontractthoseofothergovernments,forthesimplereasonthatothergovernmentsarenotboundbytheirdecisions.Andsoinourownsystems.

Thereisnocaseinwhichajudicialquestioncanarise,beforeafederalcourt,betweenaStateandtheFederalGovernment.Uponwhatprinciple,then,aretheStatesboundbythedecisionsofthefederaljudiciary?Uponnoprinciple,certainly,exceptthat,astocertainsubjects,theyhaveagreedtobesobound.ButthisagreementtheymadeintheircharacterofSovereignStates,notwiththeFederalGovernment,butwithoneanother.

AssovereignStates,theyalonearetodeterminethenatureandextentofthatagreement,and,ofcourse,theyaretodeterminewhetherornottheyhavegiventhefederalcourtsauthoritytobindtheminanygivencase.ThisprinciplehasfrequentlybeenassertedbytheStates,andalwayssuccessfully.24

Butthesemeretechnicalrules,uponwhichwehavehithertoconsideredthesubject,arealtogetherunworthyofitsimportance,andfarbeneathitsdignity.Sovereignnationsdonotasktheirjudgeswhataretheirrights,nordotheylimittheirpowersbyjudicialprecedents.Stilllessdotheyentrusttheseimportantsubjectstojudicialtribunalsnottheirown,andleastofall,tothetribunalsofthatpoweragainstwhichtheirownpowerisasserted.ItwouldhavebeenagrossinconsistencyintheStatesofourUniontodothis,sincetheyhaveshownineverypartoftheircompactwithoneanother,themostjealouscareoftheirseparatesovereigntyandindependence.Itistruetheyhaveagreedtobeboundbythedecisionsoffederaltribunalsincertainspecifiedcases,anditisnottobedoubtedthat,solongastheydesirethecontinuanceoftheirpresentunion,theywillfeelthemselvesbound,ineverycasewhichcomesplainlywithintheiragreement.ThereisnonecessitytocallintheaidoftheSupremeCourttoascertaintowhatsubjects,andhowfarthatagreementextends.Sofarasitisplain,itwillbestrictlyobserved,asnationalfaithandhonorrequire;thereisnootherguarantee.Sofarasitisnotplain,orsofarasitmaybethewillandpleasureofanyStatetodenyortoresistit,theutterimpotencyofcourtsofjusticetosettlethedifficultywillbemanifestedbeyondalldoubt.Theywillbeadmonishedoftheirresponsibilitytothepowerwhichcreatedthem.TheStatescreatedthem.TheyarebutanemanationofthesovereignpoweroftheStates,andcanneitherlimitnorcontrolthatpower.

Ordinarily,thejudiciaryaretheproperinterpretersofthepowersofgovernment,buttheyinterpretinsubordinationtothepowerwhichcreatedthem.Ingovernmentsestablishedbyanaggregatepeople,suchasarethoseoftheStates,apropercorrectiveisalwaysfoundinthepeoplethemselves.

Ifthejudicialinterpretationconfertoomuchortoolittlepoweronthegovernment,areadyremedyisfoundinanamendmentoftheConstitution.

Butinourfederalsystemtheeviliswithoutremedy,ifthefederalcourtsbeallowedtofixthelimitsoffederalpowerwithreferencetothoseoftheStates.ItwouldplaceeverythingintheStategovernments,excepttheirmereexistence,atthemercyofasingledepartmentoftheFederalGovernment.Themaxim,staredecisis,isnotalwaysadheredtobyourcourts;

theirowndecisionsarenotheldtobeabsolutelybindinguponthemselves.

Theymayestablisharighttodayandunsettleittomorrow.AdecisionoftheSupremeCourtmightarrestaStateinthefullexerciseofanimportantandnecessarypower,whichapreviousdecisionofthesamecourthadascertainedthatshepossessed.ThusthepowersoftheStategovernments,astomanyimportantobjects,mightbekeptindeterminateandconstantlyliabletochange,sothattheywouldlosetheirefficiency,andforfeitalltitletoconfidenceandrespect.Itistrue,thatinthiscase,too,thereisapossiblecorrectiveinthepowertoamendtheConstitution.ButthatpowerisnotwiththeaggrievedStatealone;itcouldbeexertedonlyinconnectionwithotherStates,whoseaidshemightnotbeabletocommand.