第5章

Thishasbeenrepeatedlyaffirmedbyourcourts,bothStateandfederal,andhasneverbeendeniedbyanyclassofpoliticians.Who,then,istodeterminewhetherithassotranscendeditsconstitutionalobligationsornot?Itisadmittedthat,toacertainextent,theSupremeCourtisthepropertribunalinthelastresort,becausetheStates,inestablishingthattribunal,haveexpresslyagreedtomakeitso.Thejurisdictionofthefederalcourtsextendstocertaincases,affectingtherightsoftheindividualcitizens,andtocertainothersaffectingthoseoftheindividualStates.SofarastheFederalGovernmentisauthorizedtoactontheindividualcitizen,thepowersoftheoneandtherightsoftheother,areproperlydeterminablebythefederalcourts.Andthedecisionisbindingtoo,andabsolutelyfinal,sofarastherelationofthecitizentotheFederalGovernmentisconcerned.Thereisnot,withinthatsystem,anytribunalofappeal,fromthedecisionsoftheSupremeCourt.AndsoalsoofthosecasesinwhichtherightsoftheStatesarereferredtothefederaltribunals.

Inthissense,andtothisextent,itisstrictlytruethatthepartieshavenot"anindependentrighttoconstrue,controlandjudgeoftheobligations"

oftheFederalGovernment,buttheyareboundbythedecisionsofthefederalcourts,sofarastheyhaveauthorizedandagreedtosubmittothem.Buttherearemanycasesinvolvingthequestionoffederalpowerwhicharenotcognizablebeforethefederalcourts;and,ofcourse,astothese,wemustlookoutforsomeotherumpire.Itispreciselyinthiscasethatthequestion,whoarethepartiestotheConstitution,becomesallimportantandcontrolling.IftheStatesarepartiesassovereignStates,thenitfollows,asanecessaryconsequence,thateachofthemhastherightwhichbelongstoeverysovereignty,toconstrueitsowncontractsandagreements,andtodecideuponitsownrightsandpowers.Ishalltakeoccasion,inasubsequentpartofthisreview,toentermorefullyintothequestion,whoisthecommonumpire?Thestatementheregiven,oftheleadingpointofdifferencebetweenthegreatpoliticalpartiesofthecountry,isdesignedonlytoshowthattheauthor"spropositiondoesnotinvolveit.Thatpropositionmaymisleadthejudgmentofthereader,butcannotpossiblyenlightenit,inregardtothetruenatureoftheConstitution.

Hehasbeenscarcelylessunfortunateinthenextproposition.Takinghiswordsintheirmostenlargedsense,heisprobablycorrectinhisidea,thoughheisnotaccurateinhislanguage;butinthesenseinwhichhisownreasoningshowsthathehimselfunderstandsthem,hispropositioniswhollyuntenable.If,bythewords"stipulationstothateffect,"hemeanssimplythattheeffectmustnecessarilyresultfromtheprovisionsoftheConstitution,hehasmerelyassertedatruismwhichnoonewilldisputewithhim.Certainly,ifitdoesnotresultfromthenatureofallgovernment,thatitisacompact,andiftherebenothinginourConstitutiontoshowthatitisso,thenitisnotacompact.Hisownreasoning,however,showsthathemeansbytheword"stipulations,"somethinginthenatureofexpressagreementordeclaration;and,inthatsense,thepropositionisobviouslyuntrue,andaltogetherdefectiveasastatementforargument.ItisverypossiblethatourConstitutionmaybeacompact,eventhoughitcontainnoexpressagreementordeclarationsodenominatingit,andthoughitmaynot"resultfromthenatureandobjectsofaframeofgovernment,"thatitisso;andthissimplybecauseitmay"resultfromthenatureandobjectsofourgovernment"thatitisacompact,whethersuchbetheresultofothergovernmentsornot.Iftheauthordesignedtotakethisviewofthesubject,theexaminationwhichhehasgivenoftheConstitution,inreferencetoit,isscarcelyasextendedandphilosophicalaswehadarighttoexpectfromhim.Hehasnotevenalludedtotheframeandstructureofthegovernmentinitsseveraldepartments,norpresentedanysuchanalysisofitinanyrespectastoenablethereadertoformanysatisfactoryconclusionastoitstruecharacterintheparticularunderconsideration.Everythingwhichhehasurgedasargumenttoprovehisproposition,maywellbetrue,andeverysentenceoftheConstitutionwhichhehascitedforthatpurpose,maybealloweditsfulleffect,andyetourgovernmentmaybeacompact,eveninthestrictestsenseinwhichhehasunderstoodtheterm.

Hisfirstargumentis,thatthe"UnitedStateswerenostrangerstocompactsofthisnature,"andthatthosewhoratifiedtheConstitution,iftheyhadmeantitasacompact,wouldhaveused"appropriateterms"

toconveythatidea.Ihavealreadyshownthatifhemeansbythis,thattheConstitutionwouldhavecontainedsomeexpressdeclarationtothateffect,heisaltogetherinaccurate.Hehimselfknows,asajudge,thatadeed,orotherinstrument,receivesitsdistinctivecharacter,notfromthenamewhichthepartiesmaychoosetogiveit,butfromitslegaleffectandoperation.Thesameruleappliestoconstitutions.Oursisacompactornot,preciselyasitsprovisionsmakeitso,orotherwise.Thequestion,whoarethepartiestoit,mayinfluence,andoughttoinfluence,theconstructionofitinthisrespect;andIproposepresentlytoshow,fromthisandotherviewsofit,thatitis,initsnature,"amereconfederation,"andnotaconsolidatedgovernment,inanyonerespect.Itdoes,therefore,contain"appropriateterms,"ifwetakethosewordsinanenlargedsense,toconveytheideaofacompact.

Ourauthorsupposes,however,thata"conclusive"argumentuponthissubjectisfurnishedbythatclauseoftheConstitutionwhichdeclaresthat:"ThisConstitution,andthelawsoftheUnitedStates,whichshallbemadeinpursuancethereof,andalltreatiesmade,orwhichshallbemade,undertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates,shallbethesupremelawoftheland;andthejudgesineveryStateshallbeboundthereby,anythingintheConstitutionorlawsofanyStatetothecontrarynotwithstanding."

Henceheconcludesthatthe"peopleofanyStatecannotbyanyformofitsownConstitutionorlaws,orotherproceedings,repealorabrogate,orsuspendit."

Here,again,JudgeStorydisplaysawantofproperdefinitenessandprecision,inthestatementofhisproposition.Thepeoplewhomakealaw,can,upontheprinciplesofallourinstitutions,either"repealorabrogate,orsuspendit";andif,ashesupposes,ourConstitutionwasmadeby"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,"intheaggregate,then"thepeopleofanyState,"orofhalfaState,mayrepeal,orabrogate,or,suspendit,iftheyhappentobeamajorityofthewhole.Theargument,therefore,ifwearetotakeitinthefulllatitudeinwhichitislaiddown,isnotsound,upontheauthor"sownprinciples;anditcanavailnothing,exceptupontheverysuppositionwhichhedisallows,towit:thattheConstitutionwasformedbytheStates,andnotbythepeopleoftheUnitedStates.Eveninthisacceptation,however,Iamatalosstoperceivehowitestablishesthepropositionwithwhichhesetout,towit:thattheConstitutionisnotacompact.Certainlyitisverypossiblesotoframeacompact,thatnopartytoitshallhavearighteitherto"repealorabrogate,orsuspendit";andifitbepossibletodoso,thenthemereabsenceofsuchrightdoesnoteventendtodisprovetheexistenceofcompact.OurownConstitution,evenintheopinionofthosewhoaresupposedbytheauthortobeleastfriendlytoit,isacompactofpreciselythisnature.TheNullifiercontendsonlyfortherightofaStatetopreventtheConstitutionfrombeingviolatedbythegeneralgovernment,andnotfortherighteithertorepeal,abrogateorsuspendit.TheSecederassertsonlythataStateiscompetenttowithdrawfromtheUnionwheneveritpleases;butdoesnotassertthatinsodoingitcanrepeal,orabrogateorsuspendtheConstitution,astotheotherStates.Secessionwould,indeed,utterlydestroythecompactastothesecedingparty;butwouldnotnecessarilyaffectitsobligationastotherest.Ifitwould,thentherestwouldhavenorighttocoercethesecedingState,nortoplaceherintheattitudeofanenemy.Itiscertain,Ithink,theywouldnothavesuchright;butthosewhoassertthattheywould?

andtheauthorisamongthenumber?musteitherabandonthatidea,ortheymustadmitthattheactofsecessiondoesnotbreakuptheConstitution,exceptastothesecedingState.ForthemomenttheConstitutionisdestroyed,alltheauthoritieswhichithasestablishedceasetoexist.ThereisnolongersuchagovernmentasthatoftheUnitedStates,and,ofcourse,theycannot,assuch,eithermakeanydemand,orassertanyright,orenforceanyclaim.

Theconclusion,however,towhichourauthorhasarriveduponthispoint,isnotthattowhichheoriginallydesignedthathispremisesshouldconducthim.Thequestionoftherightofapartytoacompacttorepealorabrogateorsuspendit,doesnotenterintohisoriginalproposition,norresultfromtheargumentwhichhehadimmediatelybeforeusedtosustainit.Thepropositionis,thatourConstitutionisnotacompact,andtheargumentis,thatitisnotacompact,becauseitisasupremelaw.Thesameideaissubstantiallyreaffirmed,inthenextargumentbywhichheproposestoprovethemainproposition."Thedesign"(oftheConstitution)"istoestablishagovernment.This,ofitself,importslegalobligation,permanence,anduncontrollabilitybyany,buttheauthoritiesauthorizedtoalterorabolishit."

Admitting,asIcheerfullydo,thatallthisisstrictlytrue,IamyetunabletoperceivehowitdemonstratesthatourConstitutionisnotacompact.MaynotacompactbetweensovereignStatesbeagovernment?

Isthereanysuchnecessaryrestraintupon,orincidentof,sovereignpower,thatitcannot,inanypossibleexerciseofit,producesucharesult?

Ifthereis,thenitwasincumbentontheauthortoshowit,because,ifthereisnot,hisargumentisofnoforce;andhehimselfwilladmitthattheproposition,tosaytheleastofit,isnotquiteclearenoughtobetakenasapostulate.Hisownhistoricalinformation,ifhehaddrawnonitsamplefunds,musthavefurnishedhimwithnumerousinstancesofgovernmentsestablishedbycompact.Heneednot,however,havegonebeyondourownConfederation,which,althoughacompactamongsovereignStates,inthestrictestsense,wasyettreatedasagovernmentbythepeopleathome,andrecognizedassuchbyallforeignpowers.Itwasalso"supreme,"withinitsprescribedsphereofaction;itsrightsandpowersoverthemostimportantsubjectsofgeneralconcernwerenotonlysuperiortothoseoftheStates,butwereexclusive.Theauthor"spropositionandargument,reducedtotheirsimpleterms,maybethusstated:"OurConstitutionisnotacompact,becauseitisagovernment,andbecausethatgovernmentisthesupremelaw."18Therearefewminds,Ithink,preparedtoembracethisconclusion,ortodiscerntheconnectionwhichithaswiththepromises.Therearestillfewerwhowillnotfeelsurprise,thatourauthorshouldhaveformedsuchaconclusion,sinceaninstancetodisproveit,furnishedbythehistoryofhisowncountry,andexistinginhisowntimes,hadbutjustpassedunderhiscriticalexaminationandreview.

TheremainingargumentsuponthispointaremerelyinferencesdrawnfromtheabsenceofexpresswordsintheConstitution,orfromtheopinionsofmembersofthevariousconventions,expressedinthedebatesconcerningit.Thesehavealreadybeensufficientlyexamined.Takinghiswholechapteruponthissubjecttogether,thereaderwillprobablythinkthatitdoesnotanswertheexpectationswhichthepublichaveformedupontheauthor"spowersasareasoner.Hispoliticalopponentswillbeapttothink,also,thathehasdonesomethinglessthanjusticetothem,intheviewwhichhehasgivenoftheirprinciples.Afterlaboring,inthewaywehaveseen,toprovethatourConstitutionisnotacompact,heinformsusthat"thecardinalconclusionforwhichthisdoctrineofacompacthisbeen,withsomuchingenuityandability,forcedintothelanguageoftheConstitution,(forthelatternowherealludestoit),isavowedlytoestablishthat,inconstruingtheConstitution,thereisnocommonumpire;butthateachState,nay,eachdepartmentofthegovernmentofeachState,isthesupremejudgeforitself,ofthepowersandrightsanddutiesarisingunderthatinstrument."

JudgeStorymustexcuseme?Imeannodisrespecttohim?ifIexpressmyunfeignedastonishmentthatheshouldhaveadmittedthispassageintoagraveanddeliberateworkontheConstitution.Hemust,indeed,havebeenamostcarelessobserverofpassingevents,andastillmorecarelessreaderofthepublicationsofthelasttenyears,uponthisverypoint,ifhehasfoundeitherintheoneortheother,theslightestauthorityfortheopinionwhichishereadvanced.ThemostultraofthosewhohavecontendedfortherightsoftheStates,haveassertednosuchdoctrineashehasimputedtothem.Neitherisitthenecessaryorlegitimateconsequenceofanyprinciplewhichtheyhaveavowed.Icannotimputetoanauthorofhisacknowledgedability,theweaknessofstatingapropositionmerelyforthesakeofthepoortriumphofrefutingit.Withwhatothermotive,then,didhemakeastatementwhichisunsupported,asamatteroffact,whichinvolvesnodisputedordoubtedquestionofconstitutionallaw,andwhichattributestoalargeclassofhisfellow-citizensopinionswhichwouldjustlyexposethemtothescornofallcorrectthinkers?Thatclassprofesstohold,intheirutmostlatitudeandintheirstrictestapplications,thedoctrinesoftheStateRights"schoolofpolitics.TheybelievethatthosedoctrinescontaintheonlyprincipletrulyconservativeofourConstitution;

thatwithoutthemthereisnoeffectivecheckupontheFederalGovernment,and,ofcourse,thatthatgovernmentcanincreaseitsownpowerstoanindefiniteextent;thatthismusthappeninthenaturalcourseofevents,andthat,ultimately,thewholecharacterofourgovernmentwillbesochanged,thatevenitsformswillberejected,ascumbrousanduseless,underthemonarchy,insubstance,intowhichweshallhaveinsensiblyglided.

Itis,therefore,becausetheyareloversoftheConstitutionandoftheUnion,thattheycontendstrenuouslyfortherightsoftheStates.Theyarenoloversofanarchynorofrevolution.Theirprincipleswillceasetobedeartothem,whenevertheyshallceasetosubservethepurposesofgoodorder,andofregularandestablishedgovernment.Itistheirobjecttopreservetheinstitutionsofthecountryastheyare,sincerelybelievingthatnothingmorethanthisisnecessarytosecuretothepeoplealltheblessingswhichcanbeexpectedfromanygovernmentwhatever.Theywouldconsiderthemselvesbutlittleentitledtorespectasapoliticalparty,iftheymaintainedtheloose,disjointed,andworsethanpuerilenotions,whichtheauthorhasnotthoughtitimpropertoimputetothem.

ItisthepeculiarmisfortuneofthepoliticalpartytowhichIhavealluded,tobemisunderstoodandmisrepresentedintheirdoctrines.Thepassageabovequotedaffordsnottheleaststrikinginstanceofthis.ItisagreatmistaketosupposethattheyhaveevercontendedthattherightofStateinterpositionwasgivenintheexpresstermsoftheConstitution;

and,therefore,theyhavenot"forcedthisprincipleintothelanguageofthatinstrument."TherightinquestionissupposedtobelongtotheStates,onlybecauseitisanincidentoftheirsovereignty,whichtheConstitutionhasnottakenaway.Theauthor,itispresumed,couldscarcelyhavefailedtoperceivethedifferenceofthetwopropositions,norcouldhehavebeenunconsciousthattheydidnotdependuponthesamecourseofinvestigationorreasoning.Anditisnottrue,sofarasmyinformationextends,thatanypoliticalpartyhaseverasserted,asageneralproposition,thatinconstruingtheConstitution,thereisnocommonumpire.Caseshavealreadybeenstated,inwhichtheSupremeCourtisuniversallyadmittedtobethecommonumpire,andotherswillbestatedwhenwecomemoredirectlytothatpartofoursubject.Inthebroadsense,then,inwhichtheauthorlaysdowntheproposition,ithasneverbeencontendedforbyanypoliticalpartywhatever.Neitherisittrue,asheispleasedtoassert,thatanypoliticalpartyhaseversupposedthateachdepartmentofthegovernmentofeachStatehadarightto"judgeforitself,ofthepowers,rightsandduties,arisingunder"theConstitution.Bytheword"judge,"hemustbeunderstoodtomeandecidefinally;and,inthissense,Iventuretoaffirm,thatnopoliticalparty,norpoliticalpartizan,eveninthewildestdreamofpoliticalphrensy,haseverentertainedtheabsurdnotionhereattributedtothem.Itisdifficulttosupposethattheauthorcouldhavebeenuninformedofthefact,thatnothingshortofthepowerofalltheState,actingthroughitsownconstitutedauthorities,haseverbeendeemedoftheleastforceinthismatter.Thebetterandmoreprevalentopinionis,thataStatecannotproperlysoact,exceptbyaconventioncalledforthatexpresspurpose.ThiswasthecoursepursuedbySouthCarolina;butinthecaseoftheAlienandSeditionLaws,Virginiaactedthroughherordinarylegislature.

Astothismatter,however,thelegislaturewasveryproperlyconsideredasrepresentingthepowerofthewholeState.

Thus,intheshortparagraphabovequoted,JudgeStoryhasfallenintothreemostremarkableerrors,provingthathehas,inthestrangestwayimaginable,misunderstoodtheprincipleswhichheattemptedtoexplain.

Theyoungandplasticmindstowhichheaddressedhimself,withtheprofessedobjectofinstructingtheminthetruthsofconstitutionalinterpretation,willlookinvainforthepublicationorotherauthoritywhichsustainshim.Andthepoliticalpartywhoseprincipleshehasendeavoredtoholduptoreproach,hasarighttodemandofhimwhyhehaschosentoattributetothemabsurdandrevolutionarynotions,unworthyalikeoftheirpatriotismandtheirreason.

Itissubmittedtothereader"sjudgmenttodeterminehowfarthereasoningoftheauthor,whichwehavejustexamined,supportshispositionthatourConstitutionisnotacompact.TheopinionofthatCongresswhichrecommendedthecalloftheConventionseemstohavebeenverydifferent;they,atleast,didnotsupposethatacompactcouldnotbeagovernment.Theirresolutionrecommendsthecallofaconvention,forthepurposeofrevisingtheArticlesofConfederation,andreportingsuchalterationsandprovisionstherein,aswouldrendertheFederalConstitutionadequatetotheexigenciesofgovernment,andthepreservationoftheUnion."In.theopinionofCongress,theArticlesofConfederation,whichwereclearlyacompact,wereaninadequateConstitution,and,therefore,theyrecommendedsuchalterationsandprovisionstherein,aswouldmakethesamecompactanadequateConstitution.Nothingissaidaboutforminganewgovernment,orchangingtheessentialcharacteroftheexistingone;and,infact,nosuchthingwascontemplatedatthetime.19"Thesoleandexclusivepurpose"

oftheconventionwassotoamend,oraddto,theprovisionsoftheArticlesofConfederation,aswouldform"amoreperfectunion,"&c.,upontheprinciplesoftheUnion.alreadyexisting.Itisclear,therefore,thatintheopinionofCongress,andofalltheStatesthatadoptedtheirrecommendation,thatunionorcompactwasaconstitutionofgovernment.

Itisworthyofremark,thatoftheStates,NewHampshire,andtheauthor"sownStateofMassachusetts,expresslycalltheConstitutionacompact,intheiractsofratification;andnootherStateindicatesadifferentviewofit.Thistendstoprovethatpublicopinionatthetimehadnotdrawnthenicedistinctionwhichisnowinsistedon,betweenagovernmentandacompact;andthatthosewhohadforeightyearsbeenlivingunderacompact,andformingtreatieswithforeignpowersbyvirtueofitsprovisions,hadneverforamomentimaginedthatitwasnotagovernment.

Butlittleimportance,however,oughttobeattachedtoreasoningofthiskind.ThosewhocontendthatourConstitutionisacompact,veryproperlyplacetheirprinciplesuponmuchhigherground.TheysaythattheConstitutionisacompact,becauseitwasmadebysovereignStates,andbecausethatistheonlymodeinwhichsovereignStatestreatwithoneanother.Theconclusionfollowsirresistiblyfromthepremises;andthosewhodenytheone,areboundtodisprovetheother.Ouradversariesbegintoreasonattheverypointatwhichreasoningbecomesnolongernecessary.Insteadofdisprovingourpromises,theyassumethattheyarewrong,andthen,triumphantlydenyourconclusionalso.IfweestablishthattheConstitutionwasmadebytheStates,andthattheywere,atthetime,distinct,independentandperfectsovereignties,itfollowsthattheycouldnottreatwithoneanother,evenwithaviewtotheformationofanewcommongovernment,exceptintheirseveralandsovereigncharacters.Theymusthavemaintainedthesamecharacterwhentheyentereduponthatwork,andthroughoutthewholeprogressofit.Whateverthegovernmentmaybe,therefore,initsessentialcharacter,whetherafederativeoraconsolidatedgovernment,itisstillacompact,ortheresultofacompact,becausethosewhomadeitcouldnotmakeitinanyotherway.Indeterminingitsessentialcharacter,therefore,weareboundtoregarditasacompact,andtogiveitsuchaconstructionasisconsistentwiththatidea.Wearenottopresumethatthepartiestoitdesignedtochangethecharacterinwhichtheynegotiatedwithoneanother.Everyfairandlegitimateinferenceisotherwise.Itssovereigntyistheverylastthingwhichanationiswillingtosurrender;

andnothingshortoftheclearestproofcanwarrantusinconcludingthatithassurrenderedit.Inallcases,therefore,wherethelanguageandspiritoftheConstitutionaredoubtful,andevenwheretheirmostnaturalconstructionwouldbeinfavorofconsolidation,(iftherebeanysuchcase),weshouldstillinclineagainstit,andinfavoroftherightsoftheStates,unlessnootherconstructioncanbeadmitted.CHAPTERVIII.THEUNIONAFEDERATIVEANDNOTANATIONALGOVERNMENTHavingdisposedofthispreliminaryquestion,wenowapproachtheConstitutionitself.Iaffirmthatitis,initsstructure,afederativeandnotaconsolidatedgovernment;thatitissoinallitsdepartments,andinallitsleadinganddistinguishingprovisionsand,ofcourse,thatitistobesointerpreted,byforceofitsownterms,apartfromanyinfluencetobederivedfromthatroleofconstructionwhichhasjustbeenlaiddown.Wewillfirstexamineitinthestructureofitsseveraldepartments.20

TheLegislature.?Thisconsistsoftwohouses.TheSenateiscomposedoftwomembersfromeachState,chosenbyitsownlegislature,whateverbeitssizeorpopulation,andisuniversallyadmittedtobestrictlyfederativeinitsstructure.TheHouseofRepresentativesconsistsofmemberschosenineachState,andisregulatedinitsnumbersaccordingtoaprescribedratioofrepresentation.ThenumbertowhicheachStateisentitledisproportionedtoitsownpopulation,andnottothepopulationoftheUnitedStates;andiftherehappentobeasurplusinanyStatelessthantheestablishedratio,thesurplusisnotaddedtothesurplusorpopulationofanyotherState,inordertomakeuptherequisitenumberforarepresentative,butiswhollyunrepresented.Inthechoiceofrepresentatives,eachStatevotesbyitself,andforitsownrepresentatives,andnotinconnectionwithanyotherState,norfortherepresentativesofanyotherState.EachStateprescribesthequalificationsofitsownvoters,theConstitutiononlyprovidingthattheyshallhavethequalificationswhichsuchStatemayhaveproscribedforthevotersforthemostnumerousbranchofitsownlegislature.And,astherighttovoteisprescribedbytheState,thedutyofdoingsocannotbeenforced,exceptbytheauthorityoftheState.NoonecanbeelectedtorepresentanyState,exceptacitizenthereof.

VacanciesintherepresentationofanyStatearetobesuppliedunderwritsofelection,issuedbytheExecutiveofsuchState.Inallthis,thereisnotonefeatureofnationality.ThewholearrangementhasreferencetotheStatesassuch,andiscarriedintoeffectsolelybytheirauthority.

TheFederalGovernmenthasnoagencyinthechoiceofrepresentatives,exceptonlythatitmayprescribethe"times,placesandmannerofholdingelections."Itcanneitherprescribethequalificationsoftheelectors,norimposeanypenaltyuponthem,forrefusingtoelect.TheStatesalonecandothesethings;and,ofcourse,theveryexistenceoftheHouseofRepresentativesdepends,asmuchasdoesthatoftheSenate,upontheactionoftheStates.AStatemaywithdrawitsrepresentationaltogether,andCongresshasnopowertopreventit,nortosupplythevacancythuscreated.

IftheHouseofRepresentativeswerenational,inanypracticalsenseoftheterm,the"nation"wouldhaveauthoritytoprovidefortheappointmentofitsmembers,toprescribethequalificationsofvoters,andtoenforcetheperformanceofthatduty.AllthesethingstheStatelegislaturescando,withintheirrespectiveStates,anditisobviousthattheyarestrictlynational.InordertomaketheHouseofRepresentativesequallyso,thepeopleoftheUnitedStatesmustbesoconsolidatedthattheFederalGovernmentmaydistributethem,withoutregardtoStateboundaries,intonumbersaccordingtotheprescribedratio;sothatallthepeoplemayberepresented,andnounrepresentedsurplusbeleftinanyState.IfthesethingscouldbedoneundertheFederalConstitution,therewouldthenbeastrictanalogybetweenthepopularbranchesofthefederalandStatelegislatures,andtheformermight,withpropriety,beconsidered"national."Butitisdifficulttoimagineanationallegislaturewhichdoesnotexistundertheauthorityofthenation,andovertheveryappointmentofwhichthenation,assuch,canexertnoeffectivecontrol.

ThereareonlytworeasonswhichIhaveeverheardassignedfortheopinionthattheHouseofRepresentativesisnational,andnotfederative.

Thefirstis,thatitsmeasuresarecarriedbythevotesofamajorityofthewholenumber,andnotbythoseofamajorityoftheStates.Itwouldbeeasytodemonstratethatthisfactdoesnotwarrantsuchaconclusion;

butallreasoningisunnecessary,sincetheconclusionisdisproved,bytheexampleoftheotherbranchofthefederallegislature.TheSenate,whichisstrictlyfederative,votesinthesameway.Theargument,therefore,provesnothing,becauseitprovestoomuch.

Thesecondargumentis,thattheStatesarenotequallyrepresented,buteachonehasarepresentationproportionedtoitspopulation.Thereinnoreason,apparenttome,whyaleaguemaynotbeformedamongindependentsovereignties,givingtoeachaninfluenceinthemanagementoftheircommonconcerns,proportionedtoitsstrength,itswealth,ortheinterestwhichithasatstake.Thisisbutsimplejustice,andtheruleoughttoprevailinallcases,exceptwherehigherconsiderationsdisallowit.Historyaboundswithexamplesofsuchconfederations,oneofwhichIwillcite.TheStatesGeneraloftheUnitedProvinceswerestrictlyafederalbody.TheCouncilofStatehadalmostexclusivelythemanagementandcontrolofalltheirmilitaryandfinancialconcerns;andinthatbody,Hollandandsomeotherprovinceshadthreevoteseach,whilstsomehadtwo,andothersonlyonevoteeach.YetitneverwassupposedthatforthisreasontheUnitedProvinceswereaconsolidatednation.Asingleexampleofthissortaffordsafallillustrationofthesubject,andrenders,allfartherargumentsuperfluous.

Itisnot,however,fromtheapportionmentofitspowers,norfromthemodesinwhichthesepowersareexercised,thatwecandeterminethetruecharacterofalegislativebody,intheparticularnowunderconsideration.

Thetrueruleofdecisionisfoundinthemannerinwhichthebodyisconstituted,andthat,wehavealreadyseen,is,inthecasebeforeus,federative,andnotnational.

Wemaysafelyadmit,however,thattheHouseofRepresentativesisnotfederative,andyetcontend,withperfectsecurity,thatthelegislativedepartmentisso.CongressconsistsoftheHouseofRepresentativesandSenate.Neitherisacompletelegislatureinitself,andneithercanpassanylawwithouttheconcurrenceoftheother.And,astheSenateisthepeculiarrepresentativeoftheStates,noactoflegislationwhatevercanbeperformedwithouttheconsentoftheStates.Theyhold,therefore,acompletecheckandcontroloverthepowersofthepeopleinthisrespect,evenadmittingthatthosepowersaretrulyandstrictlyrepresentedintheotherbranch.Itistruethatthecheckismutual;butifthelegislativedepartmentwerenational,therewouldbenofederativefeatureinit.Itcannotbereplied,withequalpropriety,that,ifitwerefederative,therewouldbenonationalfeatureinit.Thequestionis,whetherornottheStateshavepreservedtheirdistinctsovereigncharacters,inthisfeatureoftheConstitution.Iftheyhavedonesoinanypartofitthewholemustbeconsideredfederative;becausenationallegislationimpliesaunity,whichisabsolutelyinconsistentwithallideaofaconfederation;whereas,thereisnothingtopreventthemembersofaconfederationfromexertingtheirseveralpowers,inanyformofjointactionwhichmayseemtothemproper.

ButthereisoneotherprovisionoftheConstitutionwhichappearstometobealtogetherdecisiveuponthispoint.EachState,whateverbeitspopulation,isentitledtoatleastonerepresentative.Itmaysohappenthattheunrepresentedsurplus,insomeoneState,maybegreaterthanthewholepopulationofsomeotherStateandyetsuchlatterStatewouldbeentitledtoarepresentative.Uponwhatprincipleisthis?Surely,iftheHouseofRepresentativeswerenational,somethinglikeequalitywouldbefoundintheconstitutionofit.Largesurpluseswouldbearbitrarilyrejectedinsomeplaces,andsmallernumbers,notequaltothegeneralratio,berepresentedinothers.Therecanbebutonereasonforthis:

AstheConstitutionwasmadebytheStates,thetrueprinciplesoftheconfederationcouldnotbepreserved,withoutgivingtoeachpartytothecompactaplaceandinfluenceineachbranchofthecommonlegislature.

ThiswasduetotheirperfectequalityassovereignStates.

TheExecutive.?IntheelectionofthePresidentandVice-President,theexclusiveagencyoftheStates,assuch,ispreservedwithequaldistinctness.

Theseofficersarechosenbyelectors,whoarethemselveschosenbythepeopleofeachState,actingbyandforitself,andinsuchmodeasitselfmayprescribe.ThenumberofelectorstowhicheachStateisentitledisequaltothewholenumberofitsrepresentativesandsenators.ThisprovisionisevenmorefederativethanthatwhichapportionsrepresentationintheHouseofRepresentatives;becauseitaddstwototheelectorsofeachState,and,sofar,placesthemonanequality,whateverbetheircomparativepopulation.ThepeopleofeachStatevotewithintheState,andnotelsewhere;

andfortheirownelectors,andfornoothers.EachStateproscribesthequalificationsofitsownelectors,andcanalonecompelthemtovote.

Theelectors,whenchosen,givetheirvoteswithintheirrespectiveStates,andatsuchtimesandplacesastheStatesmayrespectivelyprescribe.

Thereisnottheleasttraceofnationalagency,inanypartofthisproceeding.TheFederalGovernmentcanexercisenorightfulpowerinthechoiceofitsownExecutive."ThepeopleoftheUnitedStates"areequallyunseeninthatimportantmeasure.Neitheramajority,northewholeofthemtogether,canchooseaPresident,exceptintheircharacterascitizensoftheseveralStates.Nay,aPresidentmaybeconstitutionallyelected,withadecidedmajorityofthepeopleagainsthim.21Forexample.NewYorkhasforty-twovotes,Pennsylvaniathirty,Virginiatwenty-three,Ohiotwenty-one,NorthCarolinafifteen,Kentuckyfourteen,andSouthCarolinafifteen.ThesesevenStatescangiveamajorityofallthevotes,andeachmayelectitsownelectorsbyamajorityofonlyonevote.IfweaddtheirminoritiestothevotesoftheotherStates,(supposingthoseStatestobeunanimousagainstthecandidate),wemayhaveaPresidentconstitutionallyelected,withlessthanhalf?perhapswithlittlemorethanafourthofthepeopleinhisfavor.ItistruethathemayalsobeconstitutionallyelectedwithamajorityoftheStates,assuch,againsthim,astheaboveexampleshows;becausetheStatesmay,asbeforeremarked,properlyagree,bytheprovisionsoftheircompact,thattheyshallpossessinfluence,inthisrespect,proportionedtotheirpopulation.Butthereisnomode,consistentwiththetrueprinciplesoffreerepresentativegovernment,bywhichaminorityofthosetowhom,enmasse,theelectivefranchiseisconfided,cancountervailtheconcurrentandopposingactionofthemajority.IfthePresidentcouldbechosenbythepeopleofthe"UnitedStates"intheaggregate,insteadofbytheStates,itisdifficulttoimagineacaseinwhichamajorityofthosepeople,concurringinthesamevote,couldbeoverbalancedbyaminority.

Alldoubtuponthispoint,however,isremovedbyanotherprovisionoftheConstitutiontouchingthissubject.IfnocandidateshouldreceiveamajorityofvotesintheElectoralCollege,theHouseofRepresentativeselectsthePresident,fromthethreecandidateswhichhavereceivedthelargestelectoralvote.Indoingthis,two-thirdsoftheStatesmustbepresentbytheirrepresentatives,oroneofthem,andthentheyvotebyStates,allthemembersofeachStategivingonevote,andamajorityofalltheStatesbeingnecessarytoachoice.Thisispreciselytherulewhichprevailedintheordinarylegislationofthatbody,undertheArticlesConfederationandwhichproveditsfederativecharacterasstronglyasanyotherprovisionofthosearticles.Why,then,shouldthisfederativeprinciplebepreserved,intheelectionofthePresidentbytheHouseofRepresentatives,ifitwasdesignedtoabandonit,intheelectionofsomeofficerbytheElectoralColleges?Nogoodreasonforithasyetbeenassigned,sofarasIaminformed.Onthecontrary,thereiseveryjustreasontosuppose,thatthosewhoconsideredtheprinciplesafeandnecessaryinoneformofelection,wouldadheretoitasequallysafeandnecessaryineveryother,withrespecttothesamepublictrust.AndthisisstillfartherprovedbytheprovisionoftheConstitutionrelatingtotheelectionoftheVice-President.IncaseofthedeathorconstitutionaldisabilityofthePresident,everyexecutivetrustdevolvesonhim;and,ofcourse,thesamegeneralprincipleshould,beapplied,intheelectionofbothofthem.Thisisdoneinexpressterms,sofarastheactionoftheElectoralCollegesiscontemplated.ButifthoseCollegesshouldfailtoelectaVice-President,thattrustdevolvesontheSenate,whoaretochoosefromthetwohighestcandidates.Herethefederativeprincipleisdistinctlyseen,fortheSenateistherepresentativeoftheStates.

ThisviewofthesubjectisstillfartherconfirmedbytheclauseoftheConstitutionrelatingtoimpeachments.ThepowertotrythePresidentisvestedintheSenatealone,thatis,intherepresentativesoftheStates.

Thereisastrictfitnessandproprietyinthis;forthoseonly,whoseofficerthePresidentis,shouldbeentrustedwiththepowertoremovehim.

Itisbelievedtobeneitheraforcednoranunreasonableconclusionfromallthis,thattheExecutiveDepartmentis,initsstructure,strictlyfederative.

TheJudiciary.?TheJudgesarenominatedbythePresident,andapprovedbytheSenate.Thusthenominationsaremadebyafederateofficer,andtheapprovalandconfirmationofthemdependonthosewhoaretheexclusiverepresentativesoftheStates.Thisagencyismanifestlyfederative,and"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates"cannotmingleinit,inanyformwhatever.

AstheConstitutionisfederativeinthestructureofallthreeofitsgreatdepartments,itisequallysointhepowerofamendment.