第1章
1
Thingsaresaidtobenamed"equivocally"when,thoughtheyhaveacommonname,thedefinitioncorrespondingwiththenamediffersforeach。Thus,arealmanandafigureinapicturecanbothlayclaimtothename"animal";yettheseareequivocallysonamed,for,thoughtheyhaveacommonname,thedefinitioncorrespondingwiththenamediffersforeach。Forshouldanyonedefineinwhatsenseeachisananimal,hisdefinitionintheonecasewillbeappropriatetothatcaseonly。
Ontheotherhand,thingsaresaidtobenamed"univocally"whichhaveboththenameandthedefinitionansweringtothenameincommon。
Amanandanoxareboth"animal",andtheseareunivocallysonamed,inasmuchasnotonlythename,butalsothedefinition,isthesameinbothcases:forifamanshouldstateinwhatsenseeachisananimal,thestatementintheonecasewouldbeidenticalwiththatintheother。
Thingsaresaidtobenamed"derivatively",whichderivetheirnamefromsomeothername,butdifferfromitintermination。Thusthegrammarianderiveshisnamefromtheword"grammar",andthecourageousmanfromtheword"courage"。
2
Formsofspeechareeithersimpleorcomposite。Examplesofthelatteraresuchexpressionsas"themanruns","themanwins";oftheformer"man","ox","runs","wins"。
Ofthingsthemselvessomearepredicableofasubject,andareneverpresentinasubject。Thus"man"ispredicableoftheindividualman,andisneverpresentinasubject。
Bybeing"presentinasubject"Idonotmeanpresentaspartsarepresentinawhole,butbeingincapableofexistenceapartfromthesaidsubject。
Somethings,again,arepresentinasubject,butareneverpredicableofasubject。Forinstance,acertainpointofgrammaticalknowledgeispresentinthemind,butisnotpredicableofanysubject;oragain,acertainwhitenessmaybepresentinthebody(forcolourrequiresamaterialbasis),yetitisneverpredicableofanything。
Otherthings,again,arebothpredicableofasubjectandpresentinasubject。Thuswhileknowledgeispresentinthehumanmind,itispredicableofgrammar。
Thereis,lastly,aclassofthingswhichareneitherpresentinasubjectnorpredicableofasubject,suchastheindividualmanortheindividualhorse。But,tospeakmoregenerally,thatwhichisindividualandhasthecharacterofaunitisneverpredicableofasubject。Yetinsomecasesthereisnothingtopreventsuchbeingpresentinasubject。Thusacertainpointofgrammaticalknowledgeispresentinasubject。
3
Whenonethingispredicatedofanother,allthatwhichispredicableofthepredicatewillbepredicablealsoofthesubject。
Thus,"man"ispredicatedoftheindividualman;but"animal"ispredicatedof"man";itwill,therefore,bepredicableoftheindividualmanalso:fortheindividualmanisboth"man"and"animal"。
Ifgeneraaredifferentandco-ordinate,theirdifferentiaearethemselvesdifferentinkind。Takeasaninstancethegenus"animal"
andthegenus"knowledge"。"Withfeet","two-footed","winged","aquatic",aredifferentiaeof"animal";thespeciesofknowledgearenotdistinguishedbythesamedifferentiae。Onespeciesofknowledgedoesnotdifferfromanotherinbeing"two-footed"。
Butwhereonegenusissubordinatetoanother,thereisnothingtopreventtheirhavingthesamedifferentiae:forthegreaterclassispredicatedofthelesser,sothatallthedifferentiaeofthepredicatewillbedifferentiaealsoofthesubject。
4
Expressionswhichareinnowaycompositesignifysubstance,quantity,quality,relation,place,time,position,state,action,oraffection。Tosketchmymeaningroughly,examplesofsubstanceare"man"or"thehorse",ofquantity,suchtermsas"twocubitslong"
or"threecubitslong",ofquality,suchattributesas"white","grammatical"。"Double","half","greater",fallunderthecategoryofrelation;"inamarketplace","intheLyceum",underthatofplace;"yesterday","lastyear",underthatoftime。"Lying","sitting",aretermsindicatingposition,"shod","armed",state;
"tolance","tocauterize",action;"tobelanced","tobecauterized",affection。
Nooneoftheseterms,inandbyitself,involvesanaffirmation;itisbythecombinationofsuchtermsthatpositiveornegativestatementsarise。Foreveryassertionmust,asisadmitted,beeithertrueorfalse,whereasexpressionswhicharenotinanywaycompositesuchas"man","white","runs","wins",cannotbeeithertrueorfalse。
5
Substance,inthetruestandprimaryandmostdefinitesenseoftheword,isthatwhichisneitherpredicableofasubjectnorpresentinasubject;forinstance,theindividualmanorhorse。Butinasecondarysensethosethingsarecalledsubstanceswithinwhich,asspecies,theprimarysubstancesareincluded;alsothosewhich,asgenera,includethespecies。Forinstance,theindividualmanisincludedinthespecies"man",andthegenustowhichthespeciesbelongsis"animal";these,therefore-thatistosay,thespecies"man"andthegenus"animal,-aretermedsecondarysubstances。
Itisplainfromwhathasbeensaidthatboththenameandthedefinitionofthepredicatemustbepredicableofthesubject。Forinstance,"man"ispredictedoftheindividualman。Nowinthiscasethenameofthespeciesman"isappliedtotheindividual,forweusetheterm"man"indescribingtheindividual;andthedefinitionof"man"willalsobepredicatedoftheindividualman,fortheindividualmanisbothmanandanimal。Thus,boththenameandthedefinitionofthespeciesarepredicableoftheindividual。
Withregard,ontheotherhand,tothosethingswhicharepresentinasubject,itisgenerallythecasethatneithertheirnamenortheirdefinitionispredicableofthatinwhichtheyarepresent。
Though,however,thedefinitionisneverpredicable,thereisnothingincertaincasestopreventthenamebeingused。Forinstance,"white"beingpresentinabodyispredicatedofthatinwhichitispresent,forabodyiscalledwhite:thedefinition,however,ofthecolourwhite"isneverpredicableofthebody。
Everythingexceptprimarysubstancesiseitherpredicableofaprimarysubstanceorpresentinaprimarysubstance。Thisbecomesevidentbyreferencetoparticularinstanceswhichoccur。"Animal"
ispredicatedofthespecies"man",thereforeoftheindividualman,foriftherewerenoindividualmanofwhomitcouldbepredicated,itcouldnotbepredicatedofthespecies"man"atall。Again,colourispresentinbody,thereforeinindividualbodies,foriftherewerenoindividualbodyinwhichitwaspresent,itcouldnotbepresentinbodyatall。Thuseverythingexceptprimarysubstancesiseitherpredicatedofprimarysubstances,orispresentinthem,andiftheselastdidnotexist,itwouldbeimpossibleforanythingelsetoexist。
Ofsecondarysubstances,thespeciesismoretrulysubstancethanthegenus,beingmorenearlyrelatedtoprimarysubstance。Forifanyoneshouldrenderanaccountofwhataprimarysubstanceis,hewouldrenderamoreinstructiveaccount,andonemorepropertothesubject,bystatingthespeciesthanbystatingthegenus。Thus,hewouldgiveamoreinstructiveaccountofanindividualmanbystatingthathewasmanthanbystatingthathewasanimal,fortheformerdescriptionispeculiartotheindividualinagreaterdegree,whilethelatteristoogeneral。Again,themanwhogivesanaccountofthenatureofanindividualtreewillgiveamoreinstructiveaccountbymentioningthespecies"tree"thanbymentioningthegenus"plant"。
Moreover,primarysubstancesaremostproperlycalledsubstancesinvirtueofthefactthattheyaretheentitieswhichunderlieevery。
else,andthateverythingelseiseitherpredicatedofthemorpresentinthem。Nowthesamerelationwhichsubsistsbetweenprimarysubstanceandeverythingelsesubsistsalsobetweenthespeciesandthegenus:forthespeciesistothegenusassubjectistopredicate,sincethegenusispredicatedofthespecies,whereasthespeciescannotbepredicatedofthegenus。Thuswehaveasecondgroundforassertingthatthespeciesismoretrulysubstancethanthegenus。
Ofspeciesthemselves,exceptinthecaseofsuchasaregenera,nooneismoretrulysubstancethananother。Weshouldnotgiveamoreappropriateaccountoftheindividualmanbystatingthespeciestowhichhebelonged,thanweshouldofanindividualhorsebyadoptingthesamemethodofdefinition。Inthesameway,ofprimarysubstances,nooneismoretrulysubstancethananother;anindividualmanisnotmoretrulysubstancethananindividualox。
Itis,then,withgoodreasonthatofallthatremains,whenweexcludeprimarysubstances,weconcedetospeciesandgeneraalonethename"secondarysubstance",forthesealoneofallthepredicatesconveyaknowledgeofprimarysubstance。Foritisbystatingthespeciesorthegenusthatweappropriatelydefineanyindividualman;andweshallmakeourdefinitionmoreexactbystatingtheformerthanbystatingthelatter。Allotherthingsthatwestate,suchasthatheiswhite,thatheruns,andsoon,areirrelevanttothedefinition。Thusitisjustthatthesealone,apartfromprimarysubstances,shouldbecalledsubstances。
Further,primarysubstancesaremostproperlysocalled,becausetheyunderlieandarethesubjectsofeverythingelse。Nowthesamerelationthatsubsistsbetweenprimarysubstanceandeverythingelsesubsistsalsobetweenthespeciesandthegenustowhichtheprimarysubstancebelongs,ontheonehand,andeveryattributewhichisnotincludedwithinthese,ontheother。Forthesearethesubjectsofallsuch。Ifwecallanindividualman"skilledingrammar",thepredicateisapplicablealsotothespeciesandtothegenustowhichhebelongs。Thislawholdsgoodinallcases。
Itisacommoncharacteristicofallsub。stancethatitisneverpresentinasubject。Forprimarysubstanceisneitherpresentinasubjectnorpredicatedofasubject;while,withregardtosecondarysubstances,itisclearfromthefollowingarguments(apartfromothers)thattheyarenotpresentinasubject。For"man"ispredicatedoftheindividualman,butisnotpresentinanysubject:
formanhoodisnotpresentintheindividualman。Inthesameway,"animal"isalsopredicatedoftheindividualman,butisnotpresentinhim。Again,whenathingispresentinasubject,thoughthenamemayquitewellbeappliedtothatinwhichitispresent,thedefinitioncannotbeapplied。Yetofsecondarysubstances,notonlythename,butalsothedefinition,appliestothesubject:weshoulduseboththedefinitionofthespeciesandthatofthegenuswithreferencetotheindividualman。Thussubstancecannotbepresentinasubject。
Yetthisisnotpeculiartosubstance,foritisalsothecasethatdifferentiaecannotbepresentinsubjects。Thecharacteristics"terrestrial"and"two-footed"arepredicatedofthespecies"man",butnotpresentinit。Fortheyarenotinman。Moreover,thedefinitionofthedifferentiamaybepredicatedofthatofwhichthedifferentiaitselfispredicated。Forinstance,ifthecharacteristic"terrestrial"ispredicatedofthespecies"man",thedefinitionalsoofthatcharacteristicmaybeusedtoformthepredicateofthespecies"man":for"man"isterrestrial。
Thefactthatthepartsofsubstancesappeartobepresentinthewhole,asinasubject,shouldnotmakeusapprehensivelestweshouldhavetoadmitthatsuchpartsarenotsubstances:forinexplainingthephrase"beingpresentinasubject",westated"thatwemeant"otherwisethanaspartsinawhole"。
Itisthemarkofsubstancesandofdifferentiaethat,inallpropositionsofwhichtheyformthepredicate,theyarepredicatedunivocally。Forallsuchpropositionshavefortheirsubjecteithertheindividualorthespecies。Itistruethat,inasmuchasprimarysubstanceisnotpredicableofanything,itcanneverformthepredicateofanyproposition。Butofsecondarysubstances,thespeciesispredicatedoftheindividual,thegenusbothofthespeciesandoftheindividual。Similarlythedifferentiaearepredicatedofthespeciesandoftheindividuals。Moreover,thedefinitionofthespeciesandthatofthegenusareapplicabletotheprimarysubstance,andthatofthegenustothespecies。Forallthatispredicatedofthepredicatewillbepredicatedalsoofthesubject。Similarly,thedefinitionofthedifferentiaewillbeapplicabletothespeciesandtotheindividuals。Butitwasstatedabovethattheword"univocal"
wasappliedtothosethingswhichhadbothnameanddefinitionincommon。Itis,therefore,establishedthatineveryproposition,ofwhicheithersubstanceoradifferentiaformsthepredicate,thesearepredicatedunivocally。
Allsubstanceappearstosignifythatwhichisindividual。Inthecaseofprimarysubstancethisisindisputablytrue,forthethingisaunit。Inthecaseofsecondarysubstances,whenwespeak,forinstance,of"man"or"animal",ourformofspeechgivestheimpressionthatweareherealsoindicatingthatwhichisindividual,buttheimpressionisnotstrictlytrue;forasecondarysubstanceisnotanindividual,butaclasswithacertainqualification;foritisnotoneandsingleasaprimarysubstanceis;
thewords"man","animal",arepredicableofmorethanonesubject。
Yetspeciesandgenusdonotmerelyindicatequality,liketheterm"white";"white"indicatesqualityandnothingfurther,butspeciesandgenusdeterminethequalitywithreferencetoasubstance:
theysignifysubstancequalitativelydifferentiated。Thedeterminatequalificationcoversalargerfieldinthecaseofthegenusthatinthatofthespecies:hewhousestheword"animal"ishereinusingawordofwiderextensionthanhewhousestheword"man"。
Anothermarkofsubstanceisthatithasnocontrary。Whatcouldbethecontraryofanyprimarysubstance,suchastheindividualmanoranimal?Ithasnone。Norcanthespeciesorthegenushaveacontrary。Yetthischaracteristicisnotpeculiartosubstance,butistrueofmanyotherthings,suchasquantity。Thereisnothingthatformsthecontraryof"twocubitslong"orof"threecubitslong",orof"ten",orofanysuchterm。Amanmaycontendthat"much"isthecontraryof"little",or"great"of"small",butofdefinitequantitativetermsnocontraryexists。
Substance,again,doesnotappeartoadmitofvariationofdegree。I
donotmeanbythisthatonesubstancecannotbemoreorlesstrulysubstancethananother,forithasalreadybeenstated"thatthisisthecase;butthatnosinglesubstanceadmitsofvaryingdegreeswithinitself。Forinstance,oneparticularsubstance,"man",cannotbemoreorlessmaneitherthanhimselfatsomeothertimeorthansomeotherman。Onemancannotbemoremanthananother,asthatwhichiswhitemaybemoreorlesswhitethansomeotherwhiteobject,orasthatwhichisbeautifulmaybemoreorlessbeautifulthansomeotherbeautifulobject。Thesamequality,moreover,issaidtosubsistinathinginvaryingdegreesatdifferenttimes。Abody,beingwhite,issaidtobewhiteratonetimethanitwasbefore,or,beingwarm,issaidtobewarmerorlesswarmthanatsomeothertime。Butsubstanceisnotsaidtobemoreorlessthatwhichitis:amanisnotmoretrulyamanatonetimethanhewasbefore,norisanything,ifitissubstance,moreorlesswhatitis。Substance,then,doesnotadmitofvariationofdegree。
Themostdistinctivemarkofsubstanceappearstobethat,whileremainingnumericallyoneandthesame,itiscapableofadmittingcontraryqualities。Fromamongthingsotherthansubstance,weshouldfindourselvesunabletobringforwardanywhichpossessedthismark。Thus,oneandthesamecolourcannotbewhiteandblack。Norcanthesameoneactionbegoodandbad:thislawholdsgoodwitheverythingthatisnotsubstance。Butoneandtheselfsamesubstance,whileretainingitsidentity,isyetcapableofadmittingcontraryqualities。Thesameindividualpersonisatonetimewhite,atanotherblack,atonetimewarm,atanothercold,atonetimegood,atanotherbad。Thiscapacityisfoundnowhereelse,thoughitmightbemaintainedthatastatementoropinionwasanexceptiontotherule。Thesamestatement,itisagreed,canbebothtrueandfalse。
Forifthestatement"heissitting"istrue,yet,whenthepersoninquestionhasrisen,thesamestatementwillbefalse。Thesameappliestoopinions。Forifanyonethinkstrulythatapersonissitting,yet,whenthatpersonhasrisen,thissameopinion,ifstillheld,willbefalse。Yetalthoughthisexceptionmaybeallowed,thereis,nevertheless,adifferenceinthemannerinwhichthethingtakesplace。Itisbythemselveschangingthatsubstancesadmitcontraryqualities。Itisthusthatthatwhichwashotbecomescold,forithasenteredintoadifferentstate。Similarlythatwhichwaswhitebecomesblack,andthatwhichwasbadgood,byaprocessofchange;andinthesamewayinallothercasesitisbychangingthatsubstancesarecapableofadmittingcontraryqualities。Butstatementsandopinionsthemselvesremainunalteredinallrespects:itisbythealterationinthefactsofthecasethatthecontraryqualitycomestobetheirs。Thestatement"heissitting"
remainsunaltered,butitisatonetimetrue,atanotherfalse,accordingtocircumstances。Whathasbeensaidofstatementsappliesalsotoopinions。Thus,inrespectofthemannerinwhichthethingtakesplace,itisthepeculiarmarkofsubstancethatitshouldbecapableofadmittingcontraryqualities;foritisbyitselfchangingthatitdoesso。
If,then,amanshouldmakethisexceptionandcontendthatstatementsandopinionsarecapableofadmittingcontraryqualities,hiscontentionisunsound。Forstatementsandopinionsaresaidtohavethiscapacity,notbecausetheythemselvesundergomodification,butbecausethismodificationoccursinthecaseofsomethingelse。Thetruthorfalsityofastatementdependsonfacts,andnotonanypoweronthepartofthestatementitselfofadmittingcontraryqualities。Inshort,thereisnothingwhichcanalterthenatureofstatementsandopinions。As,then,nochangetakesplaceinthemselves,thesecannotbesaidtobecapableofadmittingcontraryqualities。
Butitisbyreasonofthemodificationwhichtakesplacewithinthesubstanceitselfthatasubstanceissaidtobecapableofadmittingcontraryqualities;forasubstanceadmitswithinitselfeitherdiseaseorhealth,whitenessorblackness。Itisinthissensethatitissaidtobecapableofadmittingcontraryqualities。
Tosumup,itisadistinctivemarkofsubstance,that,whileremainingnumericallyoneandthesame,itiscapableofadmittingcontraryqualities,themodificationtakingplacethroughachangeinthesubstanceitself。
Lettheseremarkssufficeonthesubjectofsubstance。
6
Quantityiseitherdiscreteorcontinuous。Moreover,somequantitiesaresuchthateachpartofthewholehasarelativepositiontotheotherparts:othershavewithinthemnosuchrelationofparttopart。
Instancesofdiscretequantitiesarenumberandspeech;ofcontinuous,lines,surfaces,solids,and,besidesthese,timeandplace。
Inthecaseofthepartsofanumber,thereisnocommonboundaryatwhichtheyjoin。Forexample:twofivesmaketen,butthetwofiveshavenocommonboundary,butareseparate;thepartsthreeandsevenalsodonotjoinatanyboundary。Nor,togeneralize,woulditeverbepossibleinthecaseofnumberthatthereshouldbeacommonboundaryamongtheparts;theyarealwaysseparate。Number,therefore,isadiscretequantity。
Thesameistrueofspeech。Thatspeechisaquantityisevident:
foritismeasuredinlongandshortsyllables。Imeanherethatspeechwhichisvocal。Moreover,itisadiscretequantityforitspartshavenocommonboundary。Thereisnocommonboundaryatwhichthesyllablesjoin,buteachisseparateanddistinctfromtherest。
Aline,ontheotherhand,isacontinuousquantity,foritispossibletofindacommonboundaryatwhichitspartsjoin。Inthecaseoftheline,thiscommonboundaryisthepoint;inthecaseoftheplane,itistheline:forthepartsoftheplanehavealsoacommonboundary。Similarlyyoucanfindacommonboundaryinthecaseofthepartsofasolid,namelyeitheralineoraplane。
Spaceandtimealsobelongtothisclassofquantities。Time,past,present,andfuture,formsacontinuouswhole。Space,likewise,isacontinuousquantity;forthepartsofasolidoccupyacertainspace,andthesehaveacommonboundary;itfollowsthatthepartsofspacealso,whichareoccupiedbythepartsofthesolid,havethesamecommonboundaryasthepartsofthesolid。Thus,notonlytime,butspacealso,isacontinuousquantity,foritspartshaveacommonboundary。
Quantitiesconsisteitherofpartswhichbeararelativepositioneachtoeach,orofpartswhichdonot。Thepartsofalinebeararelativepositiontoeachother,foreachliessomewhere,anditwouldbepossibletodistinguisheach,andtostatethepositionofeachontheplaneandtoexplaintowhatsortofpartamongtheresteachwascontiguous。Similarlythepartsofaplanehaveposition,foritcouldsimilarlybestatedwhatwasthepositionofeachandwhatsortofpartswerecontiguous。Thesameistruewithregardtothesolidandtospace。Butitwouldbeimpossibletoshowthattheartsofanumberhadarelativepositioneachtoeach,oraparticularposition,ortostatewhatpartswerecontiguous。Norcouldthisbedoneinthecaseoftime,fornoneofthepartsoftimehasanabidingexistence,andthatwhichdoesnotabidecanhardlyhaveposition。
Itwouldbebettertosaythatsuchpartshadarelativeorder,invirtueofonebeingpriortoanother。Similarlywithnumber:incounting,"one"ispriorto"two",and"two"to"three",andthusthepartsofnumbermaybesaidtopossessarelativeorder,thoughitwouldbeimpossibletodiscoveranydistinctpositionforeach。Thisholdsgoodalsointhecaseofspeech。Noneofitspartshasanabidingexistence:whenonceasyllableispronounced,itisnotpossibletoretainit,sothat,naturally,asthepartsdonotabide,theycannothaveposition。Thus,somequantitiesconsistofpartswhichhaveposition,andsomeofthosewhichhavenot。
Strictlyspeaking,onlythethingswhichIhavementionedbelongtothecategoryofquantity:everythingelsethatiscalledquantitativeisaquantityinasecondarysense。Itisbecausewehaveinmindsomeoneofthesequantities,properlysocalled,thatweapplyquantitativetermstootherthings。Wespeakofwhatiswhiteaslarge,becausethesurfaceoverwhichthewhiteextendsislarge;wespeakofanactionoraprocessaslengthy,becausethetimecoveredislong;thesethingscannotintheirownrightclaimthequantitativeepithet。Forinstance,shouldanyoneexplainhowlonganactionwas,hisstatementwouldbemadeintermsofthetimetaken,totheeffectthatitlastedayear,orsomethingofthatsort。Inthesameway,hewouldexplainthesizeofawhiteobjectintermsofsurface,forhewouldstatetheareawhichitcovered。Thusthethingsalreadymentioned,andthesealone,areintheirintrinsicnaturequantities;nothingelsecanclaimthenameinitsownright,but,ifatall,onlyinasecondarysense。
Quantitieshavenocontraries。Inthecaseofdefinitequantitiesthisisobvious;thus,thereisnothingthatisthecontraryof"twocubitslong"orof"threecubitslong",orofasurface,orofanysuchquantities。Amanmight,indeed,arguethat"much"wasthecontraryof"little",and"great"of"small"。Butthesearenotquantitative,butrelative;thingsarenotgreatorsmallabsolutely,theyaresocalledratherastheresultofanactofcomparison。Forinstance,amountainiscalledsmall,agrainlarge,invirtueofthefactthatthelatterisgreaterthanothersofitskind,theformerless。Thusthereisareferenceheretoanexternalstandard,foriftheterms"great"and"small"wereusedabsolutely,amountainwouldneverbecalledsmalloragrainlarge。Again,wesaythattherearemanypeopleinavillage,andfewinAthens,althoughthoseinthecityaremanytimesasnumerousasthoseinthevillage:orwesaythatahousehasmanyinit,andatheatrefew,thoughthoseinthetheatrefaroutnumberthoseinthehouse。Theterms"twocubitslong,"threecubitslong,"andsoonindicatequantity,theterms"great"and"small"indicaterelation,fortheyhavereferencetoanexternalstandard。Itis,therefore,plainthatthesearetobeclassedasrelative。
Again,whetherwedefinethemasquantitativeornot,theyhavenocontraries:forhowcantherebeacontraryofanattributewhichisnottobeapprehendedinorbyitself,butonlybyreferencetosomethingexternal?Again,if"great"and"small"arecontraries,itwillcomeaboutthatthesamesubjectcanadmitcontraryqualitiesatoneandthesametime,andthatthingswillthemselvesbecontrarytothemselves。Forithappensattimesthatthesamethingisbothsmallandgreat。Forthesamethingmaybesmallincomparisonwithonething,andgreatincomparisonwithanother,sothatthesamethingcomestobebothsmallandgreatatoneandthesametime,andisofsuchanatureastoadmitcontraryqualitiesatoneandthesamemoment。Yetitwasagreed,whensubstancewasbeingdiscussed,thatnothingadmitscontraryqualitiesatoneandthesamemoment。Forthoughsubstanceiscapableofadmittingcontraryqualities,yetnooneisatthesametimebothsickandhealthy,nothingisatthesametimebothwhiteandblack。Noristhereanythingwhichisqualifiedincontrarywaysatoneandthesametime。
Moreover,ifthesewerecontraries,theywouldthemselvesbecontrarytothemselves。Forif"great"isthecontraryof"small",andthesamethingisbothgreatandsmallatthesametime,then"small"or"great"isthecontraryofitself。Butthisisimpossible。Theterm"great",therefore,isnotthecontraryoftheterm"small",nor"much"of"little"。Andeventhoughamanshouldcallthesetermsnotrelativebutquantitative,theywouldnothavecontraries。
Itisinthecaseofspacethatquantitymostplausiblyappearstoadmitofacontrary。Formendefinetheterm"above"asthecontraryof"below",whenitistheregionatthecentretheymeanby"below";andthisisso,becausenothingisfartherfromtheextremitiesoftheuniversethantheregionatthecentre。Indeed,itseemsthatindefiningcontrariesofeverykindmenhaverecoursetoaspatialmetaphor,fortheysaythatthosethingsarecontrarieswhich,withinthesameclass,areseparatedbythegreatestpossibledistance。
Quantitydoesnot,itappears,admitofvariationofdegree。Onethingcannotbetwocubitslonginagreaterdegreethananother。
Similarlywithregardtonumber:whatis"three"isnotmoretrulythreethanwhatis"five"isfive;norisonesetofthreemoretrulythreethananotherset。Again,oneperiodoftimeisnotsaidtobemoretrulytimethananother。Noristhereanyotherkindofquantity,ofallthathavebeenmentioned,withregardtowhichvariationofdegreecanbepredicated。Thecategoryofquantity,therefore,doesnotadmitofvariationofdegree。
Themostdistinctivemarkofquantityisthatequalityandinequalityarepredicatedofit。Eachoftheaforesaidquantitiesissaidtobeequalorunequal。Forinstance,onesolidissaidtobeequalorunequaltoanother;number,too,andtimecanhavethesetermsappliedtothem,indeedcanallthosekindsofquantitythathavebeenmentioned。
Thatwhichisnotaquantitycanbynomeans,itwouldseem,betermedequalorunequaltoanythingelse。Oneparticulardispositionoroneparticularquality,suchaswhiteness,isbynomeanscomparedwithanotherintermsofequalityandinequalitybutratherintermsofsimilarity。Thusitisthedistinctivemarkofquantitythatitcanbecalledequalandunequal。
7
Thosethingsarecalledrelative,which,beingeithersaidtobeofsomethingelseorrelatedtosomethingelse,areexplainedbyreferencetothatotherthing。Forinstance,theword"superior"isexplainedbyreferencetosomethingelse,foritissuperiorityoversomethingelsethatismeant。Similarly,theexpression"double"hasthisexternalreference,foritisthedoubleofsomethingelsethatismeant。Soitiswitheverythingelseofthiskind。Thereare,moreover,otherrelatives,e。g。habit,disposition,perception,knowledge,andattitude。Thesignificanceofalltheseisexplainedbyareferencetosomethingelseandinnootherway。Thus,ahabitisahabitofsomething,knowledgeisknowledgeofsomething,attitudeistheattitudeofsomething。Soitiswithallotherrelativesthathavebeenmentioned。Thoseterms,then,arecalledrelative,thenatureofwhichisexplainedbyreferencetosomethingelse,thepreposition"of"orsomeotherprepositionbeingusedtoindicatetherelation。Thus,onemountainiscalledgreatincomparisonwithsonwithanother;forthemountainclaimsthisattributebycomparisonwithsomething。Again,thatwhichiscalledsimilarmustbesimilartosomethingelse,andallothersuchattributeshavethisexternalreference。Itistobenotedthatlyingandstandingandsittingareparticularattitudes,butattitudeisitselfarelativeterm。Tolie,tostand,tobeseated,arenotthemselvesattitudes,buttaketheirnamefromtheaforesaidattitudes。
Itispossibleforrelativestohavecontraries。Thusvirtuehasacontrary,vice,thesebothbeingrelatives;knowledge,too,hasacontrary,ignorance。Butthisisnotthemarkofallrelatives;
"double"and"triple"havenocontrary,norindeedhasanysuchterm。
Italsoappearsthatrelativescanadmitofvariationofdegree。For"like"and"unlike","equal"and"unequal",havethemodifications"more"and"less"appliedtothem,andeachoftheseisrelativeincharacter:fortheterms"like"and"unequal"bear"unequal"bearareferencetosomethingexternal。Yet,again,itisnoteveryrelativetermthatadmitsofvariationofdegree。Notermsuchas"double"admitsofthismodification。Allrelativeshavecorrelatives:
bytheterm"slave"wemeantheslaveofamaster,bytheterm"master",themasterofaslave;by"double",thedoubleofitshall;by"half",thehalfofitsdouble;by"greater",greaterthanthatwhichisless;by"less,"lessthanthatwhichisgreater。
Soitiswitheveryotherrelativeterm;butthecaseweusetoexpressthecorrelationdiffersinsomeinstances。Thus,byknowledgewemeanknowledgetheknowable;bytheknowable,thatwhichistobeapprehendedbyknowledge;byperception,perceptionoftheperceptible;bytheperceptible,thatwhichisapprehendedbyperception。
Sometimes,however,reciprocityofcorrelationdoesnotappeartoexist。Thiscomesaboutwhenablunderismade,andthattowhichtherelativeisrelatedisnotaccuratelystated。Ifamanstatesthatawingisnecessarilyrelativetoabird,theconnexionbetweenthesetwowillnotbereciprocal,foritwillnotbepossibletosaythatabirdisabirdbyreasonofitswings。Thereasonisthattheoriginalstatementwasinaccurate,forthewingisnotsaidtoberelativetothebirdquabird,sincemanycreaturesbesidesbirdshavewings,butquawingedcreature。If,then,thestatementismadeaccurate,theconnexionwillbereciprocal,forwecanspeakofawing,havingreferencenecessarilytoawingedcreature,andofawingedcreatureasbeingsuchbecauseofitswings。
Occasionally,perhaps,itisnecessarytocoinwords,ifnowordexistsbywhichacorrelationcanadequatelybeexplained。Ifwedefinearudderasnecessarilyhavingreferencetoaboat,ourdefinitionwillnotbeappropriate,fortherudderdoesnothavethisreferencetoaboatquaboat,asthereareboatswhichhavenorudders。Thuswecannotusethetermsreciprocally,fortheword"boat"cannotbesaidtofinditsexplanationintheword"rudder"。Asthereisnoexistingword,ourdefinitionwouldperhapsbemoreaccurateifwecoinedsomewordlike"ruddered"asthecorrelativeof"rudder"。Ifweexpressourselvesthusaccurately,atanyratethetermsarereciprocallyconnected,forthe"ruddered"thingis"ruddered"invirtueofitsrudder。Soitisinallothercases。A
headwillbemoreaccuratelydefinedasthecorrelativeofthatwhichis"headed",thanasthatofananimal,fortheanimaldoesnothaveaheadquaanimal,sincemanyanimalshavenohead。
Thuswemayperhapsmosteasilycomprehendthattowhichathingisrelated,whenanamedoesnotexist,if,fromthatwhichhasaname,wederiveanewname,andapplyittothatwithwhichthefirstisreciprocallyconnected,asintheaforesaidinstances,whenwederivedtheword"winged"from"wing"andfrom"rudder"。
Allrelatives,then,ifproperlydefined,haveacorrelative。I
addthisconditionbecause,ifthattowhichtheyarerelatedisstatedashaphazardandnotaccurately,thetwoarenotfoundtobeinterdependent。LetmestatewhatImeanmoreclearly。Eveninthecaseofacknowledgedcorrelatives,andwherenamesexistforeach,therewillbenointerdependenceifoneofthetwoisdenoted,notbythatnamewhichexpressesthecorrelativenotion,butbyoneofirrelevantsignificance。Theterm"slave,"ifdefinedasrelated,nottoamaster,buttoaman,orabiped,oranythingofthatsort,isnotreciprocallyconnectedwiththatinrelationtowhichitisdefined,forthestatementisnotexact。Further,ifonethingissaidtobecorrelativewithanother,andtheterminologyusediscorrect,then,thoughallirrelevantattributesshouldberemoved,andonlythatoneattributeleftinvirtueofwhichitwascorrectlystatedtobecorrelativewiththatother,thestatedcorrelationwillstillexist。Ifthecorrelativeof"theslave"issaidtobe"themaster",then,thoughallirrelevantattributesofthesaid"master",suchas"biped","receptiveofknowledge","human",shouldberemoved,andtheattribute"master"aloneleft,thestatedcorrelationexistingbetweenhimandtheslavewillremainthesame,foritisofamasterthataslaveissaidtobetheslave。Ontheotherhand,if,oftwocorrelatives,oneisnotcorrectlytermed,then,whenallotherattributesareremovedandthataloneisleftinvirtueofwhichitwasstatedtobecorrelative,thestatedcorrelationwillbefoundtohavedisappeared。
Forsupposethecorrelativeof"theslave"shouldbesaidtobe"theman",orthecorrelativeof"thewing"thebird";iftheattribute"master"bewithdrawnfrom"theman",thecorrelationbetween"theman"and"theslave"willceasetoexist,forifthemanisnotamaster,theslaveisnotaslave。Similarly,iftheattribute"winged"
bewithdrawnfrom"thebird","thewing"willnolongerberelative;
foriftheso-calledcorrelativeisnotwinged,itfollowsthat"thewing"hasnocorrelative。
Thusitisessentialthatthecorrelatedtermsshouldbeexactlydesignated;ifthereisanameexisting,thestatementwillbeeasy;
ifnot,itisdoubtlessourdutytoconstructnames。Whentheterminologyisthuscorrect,itisevidentthatallcorrelativesareinterdependent。
Correlativesarethoughttocomeintoexistencesimultaneously。Thisisforthemostparttrue,asinthecaseofthedoubleandthehalf。Theexistenceofthehalfnecessitatestheexistenceofthatofwhichitisahalf。Similarlytheexistenceofamasternecessitatestheexistenceofaslave,andthatofaslaveimpliesthatofamaster;thesearemerelyinstancesofageneralrule。
Moreover,theycanceloneanother;forifthereisnodoubleitfollowsthatthereisnohalf,andviceversa;thisrulealsoappliestoallsuchcorrelatives。Yetitdoesnotappeartobetrueinallcasesthatcorrelativescomeintoexistencesimultaneously。Theobjectofknowledgewouldappeartoexistbeforeknowledgeitself,foritisusuallythecasethatweacquireknowledgeofobjectsalreadyexisting;itwouldbedifficult,ifnotimpossible,tofindabranchofknowledgethebeginningoftheexistenceofwhichwascontemporaneouswiththatofitsobject。
Again,whiletheobjectofknowledge,ifitceasestoexist,cancelsatthesametimetheknowledgewhichwasitscorrelative,theconverseofthisisnottrue。Itistruethatiftheobjectofknowledgedoesnotexisttherecanbenoknowledge:fortherewillnolongerbeanythingtoknow。Yetitisequallytruethat,ifknowledgeofacertainobjectdoesnotexist,theobjectmayneverthelessquitewellexist。Thus,inthecaseofthesquaringofthecircle,ifindeedthatprocessisanobjectofknowledge,thoughititselfexistsasanobjectofknowledge,yettheknowledgeofithasnotyetcomeintoexistence。Again,ifallanimalsceasedtoexist,therewouldbenoknowledge,buttheremightyetbemanyobjectsofknowledge。
Thisislikewisethecasewithregardtoperception:fortheobjectofperceptionis,itappears,priortotheactofperception。
Iftheperceptibleisannihilated,perceptionalsowillceasetoexist;buttheannihilationofperceptiondoesnotcanceltheexistenceoftheperceptible。Forperceptionimpliesabodyperceivedandabodyinwhichperceptiontakesplace。Nowifthatwhichisperceptibleisannihilated,itfollowsthatthebodyisannihilated,forthebodyisaperceptiblething;andifthebodydoesnotexist,itfollowsthatperceptionalsoceasestoexist。Thustheannihilationoftheperceptibleinvolvesthatofperception。
Buttheannihilationofperceptiondoesnotinvolvethatoftheperceptible。Foriftheanimalisannihilated,itfollowsthatperceptionalsoisannihilated,butperceptiblessuchasbody,heat,sweetness,bitterness,andsoon,willremain。
Again,perceptionisgeneratedatthesametimeastheperceivingsubject,foritcomesintoexistenceatthesametimeastheanimal。
Buttheperceptiblesurelyexistsbeforeperception;forfireandwaterandsuchelements,outofwhichtheanimalisitselfcomposed,existbeforetheanimalisananimalatall,andbeforeperception。
Thusitwouldseemthattheperceptibleexistsbeforeperception。