第13章

Butweshallsayinanswertothisargumentalsothatwhile

thereissomejustificationfortheirthinkingthatthechanging，when

itischanging，doesnotexist，yetitisafteralldisputable；for

thatwhichislosingaqualityhassomethingofthatwhichisbeing

lost，andofthatwhichiscomingtobe，somethingmustalreadybe。

Andingeneralifathingisperishing，willbepresentsomethingthat

exists；andifathingiscomingtobe，theremustbesomethingfrom

whichitcomestobeandsomethingbywhichitisgenerated，and

thisprocesscannotgoonadinfinitum-But，leavingthese

arguments，letusinsistonthis，thatitisnotthesamethingto

changeinquantityandinquality。Grantthatinquantityathingis

notconstant；stillitisinrespectofitsformthatweknoweach

thing-Andagain，itwouldbefairtocriticizethosewhoholdthis

viewforassertingaboutthewholematerialuniversewhattheysaw

onlyinaminorityevenofsensiblethings。Foronlythatregionof

thesensibleworldwhichimmediatelysurroundsusisalwaysinprocess

ofdestructionandgeneration；butthisis-sotospeak-notevena

fractionofthewhole，sothatitwouldhavebeenjustertoacquit

thispartoftheworldbecauseoftheotherpart，thantocondemn

theotherbecauseofthis-Andagain，obviouslyweshallmaketo

themalsothesamereplythatwemadelongago；wemustshowthem

andpersuadethemthatthereissomethingwhosenatureis

changeless。Indeed，thosewhosaythatthingsatthesametimeareand

arenot，shouldinconsequencesaythatallthingsareatrest

ratherthanthattheyareinmovement；forthereisnothingintowhich

theycanchange，sinceallattributesbelongalreadytoallsubjects。

Regardingthenatureoftruth，wemustmaintainthatnot

everythingwhichappearsistrue；firstly，becauseevenif

sensation-atleastoftheobjectpeculiartothesensein

question-isnotfalse，stillappearanceisnotthesameas

sensation-Again，itisfairtoexpresssurpriseatouropponents’

raisingthequestionwhethermagnitudesareasgreat，andcolours

areofsuchanature，astheyappeartopeopleatadistance，oras

theyappeartothosecloseathand，andwhethertheyaresuchas

theyappeartothehealthyortothesick，andwhetherthosethings

areheavywhichappearsototheweakorthosewhichappearsoto

thestrong，andthosethingstruewhichappeartothesleeingorto

thewaking。Forobviouslytheydonotthinkthesetobeopen

questions；noone，atleast，ifwhenheisinLibyahehasfanciedone

nightthatheisinAthens，startsfortheconcerthall-Andagain

withregardtothefuture，asPlatosays，surelytheopinionofthe

physicianandthatoftheignorantmanarenotequallyweighty，for

instance，onthequestionwhetheramanwillgetwellornot-And

again，amongsensationsthemselvesthesensationofaforeignobject

andthatoftheappropriateobject，orthatofakindredobjectand

thatoftheobjectofthesenseinquestion，arenotequally

authoritative，butinthecaseofcoloursight，nottaste，hasthe

authority，andinthecaseofflavourtaste，notsight；eachof

whichsensesneversaysatthesametimeofthesameobjectthatit

simultaneouslyis’soandnotso’-Butnotevenatdifferenttimes

doesonesensedisagreeaboutthequality，butonlyaboutthatto

whichthequalitybelongs。Imean，forinstance，thatthesamewine

mightseem，ifeitheritorone’sbodychanged，atonetimesweet

andatanothertimenotsweet；butatleastthesweet，suchasitis

whenitexists，hasneveryetchanged，butoneisalwaysrightabout

it，andthatwhichistobesweetisofnecessityofsuchandsucha

nature。Yetalltheseviewsdestroythisnecessity，leavingnothingto

beofnecessity，astheyleavenoessenceofanything；forthe

necessarycannotbeinthiswayandalsointhat，sothatif

anythingisofnecessity，itwillnotbe’bothsoandnotso’。

And，ingeneral，ifonlythesensibleexists，therewouldbe

nothingifanimatethingswerenot；fortherewouldbenofacultyof

sense。Nowtheviewthatneitherthesensiblequalitiesnorthe

sensationswouldexistisdoubtlesstrue(fortheyareaffectionsof

theperceiver)，butthatthesubstratawhichcausethesensation

shouldnotexistevenapartfromsensationisimpossible。For

sensationissurelynotthesensationofitself，butthereis

somethingbeyondthesensation，whichmustbepriortothe

sensation；forthatwhichmovesispriorinnaturetothatwhichis

moved，andiftheyarecorrelativeterms，thisisnolessthecase。

Thereare，bothamongthosewhohavetheseconvictionsandamong

thosewhomerelyprofesstheseviews，somewhoraiseadifficultyby

asking，whoistobethejudgeofthehealthyman，andingeneral

whoislikelytojudgerightlyoneachclassofquestions。Butsuch

inquiriesarelikepuzzlingoverthequestionwhetherwearenow

asleeporawake。Andallsuchquestionshavethesamemeaning。These

peopledemandthatareasonshallbegivenforeverything；forthey

seekastarting-point，andtheyseektogetthisbydemonstration，whileitisobviousfromtheiractionsthattheyhavenoconviction。

Buttheirmistakeiswhatwehavestatedittobe；theyseeka

reasonforthingsforwhichnoreasoncanbegiven；forthe

starting-pointofdemonstrationisnotdemonstration。

These，then，mightbeeasilypersuadedofthistruth，foritis

notdifficulttograsp；butthosewhoseekmerelycompulsionin

argumentseekwhatisimpossible；fortheydemandtobeallowedto

contradictthemselves-aclaimwhichcontradictsitselffromthevery

first-Butifnotallthingsarerelative，butsomeareself-existent，

noteverythingthatappearswillbetrue；forthatwhichappearsis

apparenttosomeone；sothathewhosaysallthingsthatappearare

true，makesallthingsrelative。And，therefore，thosewhoaskfor

anirresistibleargument，andatthesametimedemandtobecalled

toaccountfortheirviews，mustguardthemselvesbysayingthatthe

truthisnotthatwhatappearsexists，butthatwhatappearsexists

forhimtowhomitappears，andwhen，andtothesensetowhich，and

undertheconditionsunderwhichitappears。Andiftheygivean

accountoftheirview，butdonotgiveitinthisway，theywill

soonfindthemselvescontradictingthemselves。Foritispossiblethat

thesamethingmayappeartobehoneytothesight，butnottothe

taste，andthat，sincewehavetwoeyes，thingsmaynotappearthe

sametoeach，iftheirsightisunlike。Fortothosewhoforthe

reasonsnamedsometimeagosaythatwhatappearsistrue，and

thereforethatallthingsarealikefalseandtrue，forthingsdo

notappeareitherthesametoallmenoralwaysthesametothesame

man，butoftenhavecontraryappearancesatthesametime(fortouch

saystherearetwoobjectswhenwecrossourfingers，whilesightsays

thereisone)-totheseweshallsay’yes，butnottothesamesense

andinthesamepartofitandunderthesameconditionsandatthe

sametime’，sothatwhatappearswillbewiththesequalifications

true。Butperhapsforthisreasonthosewhoarguethusnotbecause

theyfeeladifficultybutforthesakeofargument，shouldsaythat

thisisnottrue，buttrueforthisman。Andashasbeensaid

before，theymustmakeeverythingrelative-relativetoopinionand

perception，sothatnothingeitherhascometobeorwillbewithout

someone’sfirstthinkingso。Butifthingshavecometobeorwill

be，evidentlynotallthingswillberelativetoopinion-Again，if

athingisone，itisinrelationtoonethingortoadefinitenumber

ofthings；andifthesamethingisbothhalfandequal，itisnot

tothedoublethattheequaliscorrelative。If，then，inrelation

tothatwhichthinks，manandthatwhichisthoughtarethesame，

manwillnotbethatwhichthinks，butonlythatwhichisthought。And

ifeachthingistoberelativetothatwhichthinks，thatwhich

thinkswillberelativetoaninfinityofspecificallydifferent

things。

Letthis，then，sufficetoshow(1)thatthemostindisputable

ofallbeliefsisthatcontradictorystatementsarenotatthesame

timetrue，and(2)whatconsequencesfollowfromtheassertionthat

theyare，and(3)whypeopledoassertthis。Nowsinceitis

impossiblethatcontradictoriesshouldbeatthesametimetrueofthe

samething，obviouslycontrariesalsocannotbelongatthesametime

tothesamething。Forofcontraries，oneisaprivationnoless

thanitisacontrary-andaprivationoftheessentialnature；and

privationisthedenialofapredicatetoadeterminategenus。If，

then，itisimpossibletoaffirmanddenytrulyatthesametime，it

isalsoimpossiblethatcontrariesshouldbelongtoasubjectatthe

sametime，unlessbothbelongtoitinparticularrelations，oronein

aparticularrelationandonewithoutqualification。

Butontheotherhandtherecannotbeanintermediatebetween

contradictories，butofonesubjectwemusteitheraffirmordeny

anyonepredicate。Thisisclear，inthefirstplace，ifwedefine

whatthetrueandthefalseare。Tosayofwhatisthatitisnot，

orofwhatisnotthatitis，isfalse，whiletosayofwhatisthat

itis，andofwhatisnotthatitisnot，istrue；sothathewhosays

ofanythingthatitis，orthatitisnot，willsayeitherwhatis

trueorwhatisfalse；butneitherwhatisnorwhatisnotissaid

tobeornottobe-Again，theintermediatebetweenthe

contradictorieswillbesoeitherinthewayinwhichgreyis

betweenblackandwhite，orasthatwhichisneithermannorhorse

isbetweenmanandhorse。(a)Ifitwereofthelatterkind，it

couldnotchangeintotheextremes(forchangeisfromnot-goodto

good，orfromgoodtonot-good)，butasamatteroffactwhenthereis

anintermediateitisalwaysobservedtochangeintotheextremes。For

thereisnochangeexcepttooppositesandtotheirintermediates。(b)

Butifitisreallyintermediate，inthiswaytootherewouldhave

tobeachangetowhite，whichwasnotfromnot-white；butasitis，

thisisneverseen-Again，everyobjectofunderstandingorreasonthe

understandingeitheraffirmsordenies-thisisobviousfromthe

definition-wheneveritsayswhatistrueorfalse。Whenitconnectsin

onewaybyassertionornegation，itsayswhatistrue，andwhenit

doessoinanotherway，whatisfalse-Again，theremustbean

intermediatebetweenallcontradictories，ifoneisnotarguingmerely

forthesakeofargument；sothatitwillbepossibleforamantosay

whatisneithertruenoruntrue，andtherewillbeamiddlebetween

thatwhichisandthatwhichisnot，sothattherewillalsobeakind

ofchangeintermediatebetweengenerationanddestruction-Again，in

allclassesinwhichthenegationofanattributeinvolvesthe

assertionofitscontrary，eveninthesetherewillbean

intermediate；forinstance，inthesphereofnumberstherewillbe

numberwhichisneitheroddnornot-odd。Butthisisimpossible，asis

obviousfromthedefinition-Again，theprocesswillgoonad

infinitum，andthenumberofrealitieswillbenotonlyhalfas

greatagain，butevengreater。Foragainitwillbepossibletodeny

thisintermediatewithreferencebothtoitsassertionandtoits

negation，andthisnewtermwillbesomedefinitething；forits

essenceissomethingdifferent-Again，whenaman，onbeingasked

whetherathingiswhite，says’no’，hehasdeniednothingexceptthat

itis；anditsnotbeingisanegation。

Somepeoplehaveacquiredthisopinionasotherparadoxical

opinionshavebeenacquired；whenmencannotrefuteeristical

arguments，theygiveintotheargumentandagreethatthe

conclusionistrue。This，then，iswhysomeexpressthisview；

othersdosobecausetheydemandareasonforeverything。Andthe

starting-pointindealingwithallsuchpeopleisdefinition。Now

thedefinitionrestsonthenecessityoftheirmeaningsomething；

fortheformofwordsofwhichthewordisasignwillbeits

definition-WhilethedoctrineofHeraclitus，thatallthingsare

andarenot，seemstomakeeverythingtrue，thatofAnaxagoras，that

thereisanintermediatebetweenthetermsofacontradiction，seems

tomakeeverythingfalse；forwhenthingsaremixed，themixtureis

neithergoodnornot-good，sothatonecannotsayanythingthatis

true。