第12章

Those，then，whomaintainthisviewaredriventothisconclusion，

andtothefurtherconclusionthatitisnotnecessaryeitherto

assertortodeny。Forifitistruethatathingisamananda

not-man，evidentlyalsoitwillbeneitheramannoranot-man。Forto

thetwoassertionsthereanswertwonegations，andiftheformeris

treatedasasinglepropositioncompoundedoutoftwo，thelatteralso

isasinglepropositionoppositetotheformer。

Again，eitherthetheoryistrueinallcases，andathingisboth

whiteandnot-white，andexistentandnon-existent，andallother

assertionsandnegationsaresimilarlycompatibleorthetheoryis

trueofsomestatementsandnotofothers。Andifnotofall，the

exceptionswillbecontradictoriesofwhichadmittedlyonlyoneis

true；butifofall，againeitherthenegationwillbetruewherever

theassertionis，andtheassertiontruewhereverthenegationis，

orthenegationwillbetruewheretheassertionis，buttheassertion

notalwaystruewherethenegationis。And(a)inthelattercase

therewillbesomethingwhichfixedlyisnot，andthiswillbean

indisputablebelief；andifnon-beingissomethingindisputableand

knowable，theoppositeassertionwillbemoreknowable。But(b)if

itisequallypossiblealsotoassertallthatitispossibletodeny，

onemusteitherbesayingwhatistruewhenoneseparatesthe

predicates(andsays，forinstance，thatathingiswhite，andagain

thatitisnot-white)，ornot。Andif(i)itisnottruetoapply

thepredicatesseparately，ouropponentisnotsayingwhathe

professestosay，andalsonothingatallexists；buthowcould

non-existentthingsspeakorwalk，ashedoes？Alsoallthingswould

onthisviewbeone，ashasbeenalreadysaid，andmanandGodand

triremeandtheircontradictorieswillbethesame。Forif

contradictoriescanbepredicatedalikeofeachsubject，onething

willinnowisedifferfromanother；forifitdiffer，thisdifference

willbesomethingtrueandpeculiartoit。And(ii)ifonemaywith

truthapplythepredicatesseparately，theabove-mentionedresult

followsnonetheless，and，further，itfollowsthatallwouldthenbe

rightandallwouldbeinerror，andouropponenthimselfconfesses

himselftobeinerror-Andatthesametimeourdiscussionwithhim

isevidentlyaboutnothingatall；forhesaysnothing。Forhesays

neither’yes’nor’no’，but’yesandno’；andagainhedeniesboth

oftheseandsays’neitheryesnorno’；forotherwisetherewould

alreadybesomethingdefinite。

Againifwhentheassertionistrue，thenegationisfalse，and

whenthisistrue，theaffirmationisfalse，itwillnotbepossible

toassertanddenythesamethingtrulyatthesametime。But

perhapstheymightsaythiswastheveryquestionatissue。

Again，isheinerrorwhojudgeseitherthatthethingissoor

thatitisnotso，andisherightwhojudgesboth？Ifheisright，

whatcantheymeanbysayingthatthenatureofexistingthingsis

ofthiskind？Andifheisnotright，butmorerightthanhewho

judgesintheotherway，beingwillalreadybeofadefinitenature，

andthiswillbetrue，andnotatthesametimealsonottrue。But

ifallarealikebothwrongandright，onewhoisinthiscondition

willnotbeableeithertospeakortosayanythingintelligible；

forhesaysatthesametimeboth’yes’and’no。’Andifhemakesno

judgementbut’thinks’and’doesnotthink’，indifferently，what

differencewilltherebebetweenhimandavegetable？-Thus，then，it

isinthehighestdegreeevidentthatneitheranyoneofthosewho

maintainthisviewnoranyoneelseisreallyinthisposition。For

whydoesamanwalktoMegaraandnotstayathome，whenhethinks

heoughttobewalkingthere？Whydoeshenotwalkearlysome

morningintoawelloroveraprecipice，ifonehappenstobeinhis

way？Whydoweobservehimguardingagainstthis，evidentlybecausehe

doesnotthinkthatfallinginisalikegoodandnotgood？

Evidently，then，hejudgesonethingtobebetterandanotherworse。

Andifthisisso，hemustalsojudgeonethingtobeamanand

anothertobenot-a-man，onethingtobesweetandanothertobe

not-sweet。Forhedoesnotaimatandjudgeallthingsalike，when，

thinkingitdesirabletodrinkwaterortoseeaman，heproceedsto

aimatthesethings；yetheought，ifthesamethingwerealikea

manandnot-a-man。But，aswassaid，thereisnoonewhodoesnot

obviouslyavoidsomethingsandnotothers。Therefore，asitseems，

allmenmakeunqualifiedjudgements，ifnotaboutallthings，still

aboutwhatisbetterandworse。Andifthisisnotknowledgebut

opinion，theyshouldbeallthemoreanxiousaboutthetruth，asa

sickmanshouldbemoreanxiousabouthishealththanonewhois

healthy；forhewhohasopinionsis，incomparisonwiththemanwho

knows，notinahealthystateasfarasthetruthisconcerned。

Again，howevermuchallthingsmaybe’soandnotso’，stillthere

isamoreandalessinthenatureofthings；forweshouldnotsay

thattwoandthreeareequallyeven，norishewhothinksfour

thingsarefiveequallywrongwithhimwhothinkstheyareathousand。

Ifthentheyarenotequallywrong，obviouslyoneislesswrongand

thereforemoreright。Ifthenthatwhichhasmoreofanyqualityis

nearerthenorm，theremustbesometruthtowhichthemoretrueis

nearer。Andevenifthereisnot，stillthereisalreadysomething

betterfoundedandlikerthetruth，andweshallhavegotridofthe

unqualifieddoctrinewhichwouldpreventusfromdetermining

anythinginourthought。

FromthesameopinionproceedsthedoctrineofProtagoras，and

bothdoctrinesmustbealiketrueoralikeuntrue。Forontheone

hand，ifallopinionsandappearancesaretrue，allstatementsmustbe

atthesametimetrueandfalse。Formanymenholdbeliefsinwhich

theyconflictwithoneanother，andthinkthosemistakenwhohave

notthesameopinionsasthemselves；sothatthesamethingmust

bothbeandnotbe。Andontheotherhand，ifthisisso，allopinions

mustbetrue；forthosewhoaremistakenandthosewhoarerightare

opposedtooneanotherintheiropinions；if，then，realityissuchas

theviewinquestionsupposes，allwillberightintheirbeliefs。

Evidently，then，bothdoctrinesproceedfromthesamewayof

thinking。Butthesamemethodofdiscussionmustnotbeusedwith

allopponents；forsomeneedpersuasion，andotherscompulsion。

Thosewhohavebeendriventothispositionbydifficultiesintheir

thinkingcaneasilybecuredoftheirignorance；foritisnottheir

expressedargumentbuttheirthoughtthatonehastomeet。Butthose

whoargueforthesakeofargumentcanbecuredonlybyrefutingthe

argumentasexpressedinspeechandinwords。

Thosewhoreallyfeelthedifficultieshavebeenledtothis

opinionbyobservationofthesensibleworld。(1)Theythinkthat

contradictoriesorcontrariesaretrueatthesametime，because

theyseecontrariescomingintoexistenceoutofthesamething。If，

then，thatwhichisnotcannotcometobe，thethingmusthaveexisted

beforeasbothcontrariesalike，asAnaxagorassaysallismixedin

all，andDemocritustoo；forhesaysthevoidandthefullexistalike

ineverypart，andyetoneoftheseisbeing，andtheothernon-being。

Tothose，then，whosebeliefrestsonthesegrounds，weshallsaythat

inasensetheyspeakrightlyandinasensetheyerr。For’thatwhich

is’hastwomeanings，sothatinsomesenseathingcancometobeout

ofthatwhichisnot，whileinsomesenseitcannot，andthesame

thingcanatthesametimebeinbeingandnotinbeing-butnotinthe

samerespect。Forthesamethingcanbepotentiallyatthesametime

twocontraries，butitcannotactually。Andagainweshallaskthemto

believethatamongexistingthingsthereisalsoanotherkindof

substancetowhichneithermovementnordestructionnorgeneration

atallbelongs。

And(2)similarlysomehaveinferredfromobservationofthe

sensibleworldthetruthofappearances。Fortheythinkthatthetruth

shouldnotbedeterminedbythelargeorsmallnumberofthosewho

holdabelief，andthatthesamethingisthoughtsweetbysomewhen

theytasteit，andbitterbyothers，sothatifallwereillorall

weremad，andonlytwoorthreewerewellorsane，thesewouldbe

thoughtillandmad，andnottheothers。

Andagain，theysaythatmanyoftheotheranimalsreceive

impressionscontrarytoours；andthateventothesensesofeach

individual，thingsdonotalwaysseemthesame。Which，then，of

theseimpressionsaretrueandwhicharefalseisnotobvious；forthe

onesetisnomoretruethantheother，butbotharealike。Andthis

iswhyDemocritus，atanyrate，saysthateitherthereisnotruth

ortousatleastitisnotevident。

Andingeneralitisbecausethesethinkerssupposeknowledgeto

besensation，andthistobeaphysicalalteration，thattheysaythat

whatappearstooursensesmustbetrue；foritisforthesereasons

thatbothEmpedoclesandDemocritusand，onemayalmostsay，allthe

othershavefallenvictimstoopinionsofthissort。ForEmpedocles

saysthatwhenmenchangetheirconditiontheychangetheirknowledge；

Forwisdomincreasesinmenaccordingtowhatisbeforethem。

Andelsewherehesaysthat:-

Sofarastheirnaturechanged，sofartothemalways

Camechangedthoughtsintomind。

AndParmenidesalsoexpresseshimselfinthesameway:

Forasateachtimethemuch-bentlimbsarecomposed，

Soisthemindofmen；forineachandallmen

’Tisonethingthinks-thesubstanceoftheirlimbs:

Forthatofwhichthereismoreisthought。

AsayingofAnaxagorastosomeofhisfriendsisalso

related，-thatthingswouldbeforthemsuchastheysupposedthemto

be。AndtheysaythatHomeralsoevidentlyhadthisopinion，because

hemadeHector，whenhewasunconsciousfromtheblow，lie’thinking

otherthoughts’，-whichimpliesthateventhosewhoarebereftof

thoughthavethoughts，thoughnotthesamethoughts。Evidently，

then，ifbothareformsofknowledge，therealthingsalsoareat

thesametime’bothsoandnotso’。Anditisinthisdirectionthat

theconsequencesaremostdifficult。Forifthosewhohaveseenmost

ofsuchtruthasispossibleforus(andthesearethosewhoseek

andloveitmost)-ifthesehavesuchopinionsandexpressthese

viewsaboutthetruth，isitnotnaturalthatbeginnersin

philosophyshouldloseheart？Fortoseekthetruthwouldbetofollow

flyinggame。

Butthereasonwhythesethinkersheldthisopinionisthat

whiletheywereinquiringintothetruthofthatwhichis，they

thought，’thatwhichis’wasidenticalwiththesensibleworld；in

this，however，thereislargelypresentthenatureofthe

indeterminate-ofthatwhichexistsinthepeculiarsensewhichwehave

explained；andtherefore，whiletheyspeakplausibly，theydonot

saywhatistrue(foritisfittingtoputthemattersoratherthan

asEpicharmusputitagainstXenophanes)。Andagain，becausethey

sawthatallthisworldofnatureisinmovementandthataboutthat

whichchangesnotruestatementcanbemade，theysaidthatofcourse，

regardingthatwhicheverywhereineveryrespectischanging，

nothingcouldtrulybeaffirmed。Itwasthisbeliefthatblossomed

intothemostextremeoftheviewsabovementioned，thatofthe

professedHeracliteans，suchaswasheldbyCratylus，whofinally

didnotthinkitrighttosayanythingbutonlymovedhisfinger，

andcriticizedHeraclitusforsayingthatitisimpossibletostep

twiceintothesameriver；forhethoughtonecouldnotdoiteven

once。