第3章

§114。

Therightofthemoralwillinvolvesthreeaspects:

(a)Theabstractorformalrightofaction，therightthatthecontentoftheactionascarriedoutinimmediateexistence，shallbeinprinciplemine，thatthustheactionshallbethePurposeofthesubjectivewill。

(b)Theparticularaspectoftheactionisitsinnercontent[a]asIamawareofitinitsgeneralcharacter；myawarenessofthisgeneralcharacterconstitutestheworthoftheactionandthereasonIthinkgoodtodoit-inshortmyIntention。[b]Itscontentismyspecialaim，theaimofmyparticular，merelyindividual，existence，i。e。Welfare。

(c)Thiscontent(assomethingwhichisinwardandwhichyetatthesametimeisraisedtoitsuniversalityastoabsoluteobjectivity)istheabsoluteendofthewill，theGood—withtheoppositioninthesphereofreflection，ofsubjectiveuniversality，whichisnowwickednessandnowconscience。

Addition:Ifanactionistobemoral，itmustinthefirstplacecorrespondwithmypurpose，sincethemoralwillhastherighttorefusetorecogniseintheresultingstateofaffairswhatwasnotpresentinwardlyaspurpose。Purposeconcernsonlytheformalprinciplethattheexternalwillshallbewithinmeassomethinginward。Ontheotherhand，inthesecondmomentofthemoralsphere，questionsmaybeaskedabouttheintentionbehindtheaction，i。e。abouttherelativeworthoftheactioninrelationtome。Thethirdandlastmomentisnottherelativeworthoftheactionbutitsuniversalworth，thegood。

Inamoralaction，then，theremaybeabreachfirstbetweenwhatispurposedandwhatisreallyeffectedandachieved；secondly，betweenwhatisthereexternallyasauniversalwillandtheparticularinnerdeterminationwhichIgivetoit。Thethirdandlastpointisthattheintentionshouldbeinadditiontheuniversalcontentoftheaction。Thegoodistheintentionraisedtobetheconceptofthewill。

iPurpose&Responsibility§115。

Thefinitudeofthesubjectivewillintheimmediacyofactingconsistsdirectlyinthis，thatitsactionpresupposesanexternalobjectwithacomplexenvironment。

Thedeedsetsupanalterationinthisstateofaffairsconfrontingthewill，andmywillhasresponsibilityingeneralforitsdeedinsofarastheabstractpredicate"mine"belongstothestateofaffairssoaltered。

Remark:Anevent，asituationwhichhasbeenproduced，isaconcreteexternalactualitywhichbecauseofitsconcretenesshasinitanindeterminablemultiplicityoffactors。Anyandeverysingleelementwhichappearsasthecondition，ground，orcauseofonesuchfactor，andsohascontributeditssharetotheeventinquestion，maybelookeduponasresponsiblefortheevent，oratleastassharingtheresponsibilityforit。Hence，inthecaseofacomplexevent(e。g。theFrenchRevolution)itisopentotheabstractUnderstandingtochoosewhichofanendlessnumberoffactorsitwillmaintaintoberesponsibleforit。

Addition:Iamchargeablewithwhatlayinmypurposeandthisisthemostimportantpointinconnectionwithcrime。ButresponsibilitycontainsonlythequiteexternaljudgementwhetherIhaveorhavenotdonesomething。Itdoesnotfollowthat，becauseIamresponsible，thethingdonemaybeimputedtome。

§116。

Itis，ofcourse，notmyowndoingifdamageiscausedtoothersbythingswhoseownerIamandwhichasexternalobjectsstandandareeffectiveinmanifoldconnectionswithotherthings(asmayalsobethecasewithmyselfasabodilymechanismorasalivingthing)。Thisdamage，however，istosomeextentchargeabletomebecausethethingsthatcauseitareinprinciplemine，althoughitistruethattheyaresubjecttomycontrol，vigilance，&c。，onlytoanextentvaryingwiththeirspecialcharacter。

§117。

Thefreelyactingwill，indirectingitsaimonthestateofaffairsconfrontingit，hasanideaoftheattendantcircumstances。Butbecausethewillisfinite，sincethisstateofaffairsispresupposed，theobjectivephenomenoniscontingentsofarasthewillisconcerned，andmaycontainsomethingotherthanwhatthewill"sideaofitcontains。Thewill"sright，however，istorecogniseasitsaction，andtoacceptresponsibilityfor，onlythosepresuppositionsofthedeedofwhichitwasconsciousinitsaimandthoseaspectsofthedeedwhichwerecontainedinitspurpose。Thedeedcanbeimputedtomeonlyifmywillisresponsibleforit-thisistherighttoknow。

Addition:Thewillhasconfrontingitastateofaffairsuponwhichitacts。ButinordertoknowwhatthisstateofaffairsisImusthaveanideaofit，andtheresponsibilityistrulymineonlyinsofarasIhadknowledgeofthesituationconfrontingme。Suchasituationisapresuppositionofmyvolitionandmywillisthereforefinite，orrather，sincemywillisfinite，ithasapresuppositionofthiskind。Assoonasmythinkingandwillingisrational，Iamnolongeratthisleveloffinitude，sincetheobjectonwhichIactisnolongeran"other"tome。Finitude，however，impliesfixedlimitsandrestrictions。Ihaveconfrontingmean"other"whichisonlycontingent，somethingnecessaryinapurelyexternalway；itspathandminemaymeetordiverge。Nevertheless，Iamnothingexceptinrelationtomyfreedom，andmywillisresponsibleforthedeedonlyinsofarasIknowwhatIamdoing。Oedipus，whokilledhisfatherwithoutknowingit，cannotbeaccusedofparricide。Theancientpenalcodes，however，attachedlessweighttothesubjectivesideofaction，toimputability，thanwedonowadays。Thatiswhysanctuarieswereinstitutedinancienttimesforharbouringandprotectingthefugitivefromvengeance。

§118。

Further，actionistranslatedintoexternalfact，andexternalfacthasconnectionsinthefieldofexternalnecessitythroughwhichitdevelopsitselfinalldirections。

Henceactionhasamultitudeofconsequences。Theseconsequencesaretheoutwardformwhoseinnersoulistheaimoftheaction，andthustheyaretheconsequencesoftheaction，theybelongtotheaction。Atthesametime，however，theaction，astheaimpositedintheexternalworld，hasbecomethepreyofexternalforceswhichattachtoitsomethingtotallydifferentfromwhatitisexplicitlyanddriveitonintoalienanddistantconsequences。Thusthewillhastherighttorepudiatetheimputationofallconsequencesexceptthefirst，sinceitalonewaspurposed。

Remark:Todeterminewhichresultsareaccidentalandwhichnecessaryisimpossible，becausethenecessityimplicitinthefinitecomesintodeterminateexistenceasanexternalnecessity，asarelationofsinglethingstooneanother，thingswhichasself-subsistentareconjoinedinindifferencetooneanotherandexternally。Themaxim:"Ignoretheconsequencesofactions"andtheother:

"Judgeactionsbytheirconsequencesandmakethesethecriterionofrightandgood"arebothalikemaximsoftheabstractUnderstanding。Theconsequences，astheshapepropertotheactionandimmanentwithinit，exhibitnothingbutitsnatureandaresimplytheactionitself；thereforetheactioncanneitherdisavownorignorethem。Ontheotherhand，however，amongtheconsequencesthereisalsocomprisedsomethinginterposedfromwithoutandintroducedbychance，andthisisquiteunrelatedtothenatureoftheactionitself。

Thedevelopmentintheexternalworldofthecontradictioninvolvedinthenecessityofthefiniteisjusttheconversionofnecessityintocontingencyandviceversa。Fromthispointofview，therefore，actingmeanssurrenderingoneselftothislaw。Itisbecauseofthisthatitistotheadvantageofthecriminalifhisactionhascomparativelyfewbadconsequences(whileagoodactionmustbecontenttohavehadnoconsequencesorveryfew)，andthatthefulldevelopedconsequencesofacrimearecountedaspartofthecrime。

Theself-consciousnessofheroes(likethatofOedipusandothersinGreektragedy)hadnotadvancedoutofitsprimitivesimplicityeithertoreflectiononthedistinctionbetweenactandaction，betweentheexternaleventandthepurposeandknowledgeofthecircumstances，ortothesubdivisionofconsequences。Onthecontrary，theyacceptedresponsibilityforthewholecompassofthedeed。

Addition:ThetransitiontointentiondependsonthefactthatIacceptresponsibilityonlyforwhatmyideaofthesituationwas。Thatistosay，therecanbeimputedtomeonlywhatIknewofthecircumstances。Ontheotherhand，thereareinevitableconsequenceslinkedwitheveryaction，evenifIamonlybringingaboutsomesingle，immediate，stateofaffairs。Theconsequencesinsuchacaserepresenttheuniversalimplicitwithinthatstateofaffairs。OfcourseIcannotforeseetheconsequences-theymightbepreventable-butImustbeawareoftheuniversalcharacterofanyisolatedact。Theimportantpointhereisnottheisolatedthingbutthewhole，andthatdependsnotonthedifferentiaoftheparticularaction，butonitsuniversalnature。NowthetransitionfrompurposetointentionliesinthefactthatIoughttobeawarenotsimplyofmysingleactionbutalsooftheuniversalwhichisconjoinedwithit。TheuniversalwhichcomesonthescenehereinthiswayiswhatIhavewilled，myintention。

iiIntention&Welfare§119。

Anactionasanexternalevent。isacomplexofconnectedpartswhichmayberegardedasdividedintounitsadinfinitum，andtheactionmaybetreatedashavingtouchedinthefirstinstanceonlyoneoftheseunits。Thetruthofthesingle，however，istheuniversal；andwhatexplicitlygivesactionitsspecificcharacterisnotanisolatedcontentlimitedtoanexternalunit，butauniversalcontent，comprisinginitselfthecomplexofconnectedparts。Purpose，asissuingfromathinker，comprisesmorethanthemereunit；essentiallyitcomprisesthatuniversalsideoftheaction，i。e。theintention。

Remark:Etymologically，Absicht(intention)impliesabstraction，eithertheformofuniversalityortheextractionofaparticularaspectoftheconcretething。Theendeavourtojustifyanactionbytheintentionbehinditinvolvestheisolationofoneorotherofitssingleaspectswhichisallegedtobetheessenceoftheactiononitssubjectiveside。

Tojudgeanactionasanexternaldeedwithoutyetdeterminingitsrightnessorwrongnessissimplytobestowonitauniversalpredicate，i。e。todescribeitasburning，killing，&c。

Thediscretecharacteroftheexternalworldshowswhatthenatureofthatworldis，namelyachainofexternalrelations。Actualityistouchedinthefirstinstanceonlyatasinglepoint(arson，forinstance，directlyconcernsonlyatinysectionofthefirewood，i。e。isdescribableinaproposition，notajudgment)，buttheuniversalnatureofthispointentailsitsexpansion。Inalivingthing，thesinglepartisthereinitsimmediacynotasamerepart，butasanorganinwhichtheuniversalisreallypresentastheuniversal；henceinmurder，itisnotapieceofflesh，assomethingisolated，whichisinjured，butlifeitselfwhichisinjuredinthatpieceofflesh。Itissubjectivereflection，ignorantofthelogicalnatureofthesingleandtheuniversal，whichindulgesadlibituminthesubdivisionofsinglepartsandconsequences；andyetitisthenatureofthefinitedeeditselftocontainsuchseparablecontingencies。Thedeviceofdolusindirectushasitsbasisintheseconsiderations。

Addition:Ithappensofcoursethatcircumstancesmaymakeanactionmiscarrytoagreaterorlesserdegree。Inacaseofarson，forinstance，thefiremaynotcatchoralternativelyitmaytakeholdfurtherthantheincendiaryintended。Inspiteofthis，however，wemustnotmakethisadistinctionbetweengoodandbadluck，sinceinactingamanmustlayhisaccountwithexternality。

TheoldProverbiscorrect:"Aflungstoneisthedevil"s。"Toactistoexposeoneselftobadluck。

Thusbadluckhasarightovermeandisanembodimentofmyownwilling。

§120。

Therightofintentionisthattheuniversalqualityoftheactionshallnotmerelybeimplicitbutshallbeknownbytheagent，andsoshallhavelainfromthestartinhissubjectivewill。Viceversa，whatmaybecalledtherightoftheobjectivityofactionistherightoftheactiontoevinceitselfasknownandwilledbythesubjectasathinker。

Remark:Thisrighttoinsightofthiskindentailsthecomplete，oralmostcomplete，irresponsibilityofchildren，imbeciles，lunatics，&c。，fortheiractions。Butjustasactionsontheirexternalsideaseventsincludeaccidentalconsequences，sothereisinvolvedinthesubjectiveagentanindeterminacywhosedegreedependsonthestrengthandforceofhisself-consciousnessandcircumspection。Thisindeterminacy，however，maynotbetakenintoaccountexceptinconnectionwithchildhoodorimbecility，lunacy，&c。，sinceitisonlysuchwellmarkedstatesofmindthatnullifythetraitofthoughtandfreedomofwill，andpermitustotreattheagentasdevoidofthedignityofbeingathinkerandawill。

§121。

Theuniversalqualityoftheactionisthemanifoldcontentoftheactionassuch，reducedtothesimpleformofuniversality。Butthesubject，anentityreflectedintohimselfandsoparticularincorrelationwiththeparticularityofhisobject，hasinhisendhisownparticularcontent，andthiscontentisthesouloftheactionanddeterminesitscharacter。Thefactthatthismomentoftheparticularityoftheagentiscontainedandrealisedintheactionconstitutessubjectivefreedominitsmoreconcretesense，therightofthesubjecttofindhissatisfactionintheaction。

Addition:Inmyowneyes，reflectedintomyself，Iamaparticularincorrelationwiththeexternalityofmyaction。Myendconstitutesthecontentoftheaction，thecontentdeterminantoftheaction。Murderandarson，forexample，areuniversalsandsoarenotthepositivecontentofmyactionquatheactionofasubject。Ifoneofthesecrimeshasbeencommitted，itsperpetratormaybeaskedwhyhecommittedit。Themurderwasnotdoneforthesakeofmurdering；themurdererhadinViewsomeparticularpositiveend。Butifweweretosaythathemurderedforthemerepleasureofmurdering，thenthepurelypositivecontentofthesubjectwouldsurelybepleasure，andifthatisthecasethenthedeedisthesatisfactionofthesubject"swill。Thusthemotiveofanactis，moreparticularly，whatiscalledthe"moral"factor，andthishasinthatcasethedoublemeaningoftheuniversalimplicitinthepurposeandtheparticularaspectoftheintention。

Itisastrikingmodeminnovationtoinquirecontinuallyaboutthemotivesofmen"sactions。

Formerly，thequestionwassimply:"Isheanhonestman?Doeshedohisduty?"Nowadaysweinsistonlookingintomen"sheartsandsowepresupposeagulfbetweentheobjectivityofactionsandtheirinnerside，thesubjectivemotives。Tobesure，thesubject"svolitionmustbeconsidered；

hewillssomethingandthereasonforwhathewillslieswithinhimself；hewillsthesatisfactionofhisdesire，thegratificationofhispassion。Nonetheless，thegoodandtherightarealsoacontentofaction，acontentnotpurelynaturalbutputtherebymyrationality。TomakemyfreedomthecontentofwhatIwillisaplaingoalofmyfreedomitself。Thereforeitistotakehighermoralgroundtofindsatisfactionintheactionandtoadvancebeyondthegulfbetweentheself-consciousnessofamanandtheobjectivityofhisdeed，eventhoughtotreatactionasifitinvolvedsuchagulfisawayoflookingatthemattercharacteristicofcertainepochsinworldhistoryandinindividualbiography。

§122。

Itisonthestrengthofthisparticularaspectthattheactionhassubjectiveworthorinterestforme。Incontrastwiththisend-thecontentoftheintention-thedirectcharacteroftheactioninitsfurthercontentisreducedtoameans。Insofarassuchanendissomethingfinite，itmayinitsturnbereducedtoameanstosomefurtherintentionandsoonadinfinitum。

§123。

Forthecontentoftheseendsnothingisavailableatthispointexcept[a]pureactivityitself，i。e。theactivitypresentowingtothefactthatthesubjectputshimselfintowhateverheistolookuponandpromoteashisend。Menarewillingtobeactiveinpursuitofwhatintereststhem，orshouldinterestthem，assomethingwhichistheirown。[b]Amoredeterminatecontent，however，thestillabstractandformalfreedomofsubjectivitypossessesonlyinits。natural。

subjectiveembodiment，i。e。inneeds，inclinations，passions，opinions，fancies，&c。

Thesatisfactionoftheseiswelfareorhappiness，bothingeneralandinitsparticularspecies-theendsofthewholesphereoffinitude。

Remark:Here-thestandpointofrelation(see§108)，whenthesubjectischaracterisedbyhisself-differenceandsocountsasaparticular-istheplacewherethecontentofthenaturalwill(see§11)。comesonthescene。Butthewillhereisnotasitisinitsimmediacy；onthecontrary，thiscontentnowbelongstoawillreflectedintoitselfandsoiselevatedtobecomeauniversalend，theendofwelfareorhappiness；thishappensatthelevelofthethinkingwhichdoesnotyetapprehendthewillinitsfreedombutreflectsonitscontentasononenaturalandgiven-thelevel，forexample，ofthetimeofCroesusandSolon。

Addition:Sincethespecificationsofhappinessaregiven，theyarenottruespecificationsoffreedom，becausefreedomisnotgenuinelyfreeinitsowneyesexceptinthegood，i。e。exceptwhenitisitsownend。Consequentlywemayraisethequestionwhetheramanhastherighttosetbeforehimselfendsnotfreelychosenbutrestingsolelyonthefactthatthesubjectisalivingbeing。

Thefactthatmanisalivingbeing，however，isnotfortuitous，butinconformitywithreason，andtothatextenthehasarighttomakehisneedshisend。Thereisnothingdegradinginbeingalive，andthereisnomodeofintelligentbeinghigherthanlifeinwhichexistencewouldbepossible。Itisonlytheraisingofthegiventosomethingself-createdwhichyieldsthehigherorbitofthegood，althoughthisdistinctionimpliesnoincompatibilitybetweenthetwolevels。

§124。

Sincethesubjectivesatisfactionoftheindividualhimself(includingtherecognitionwhichhereceivesbywayofhonourandfame)isalsopartandparceloftheachievementofendsofabsoluteworth，itfollowsthatthedemandthatsuchanendaloneshallappearaswilledandattained，liketheviewthat，inwilling，objectiveandsubjectiveendsaremutuallyexclusive，isanemptydogmatismoftheabstractUnderstanding。Andthisdogmatismismorethanempty，itisperniciousifitpassesintotheassertionthatbecausesubjectivesatisfactionispresent，asitalwaysiswhenanytaskisbroughttocompletion，itiswhattheagentintendedinessencetosecureandthattheobjectiveendwasinhiseyesonlyameanstothat。—Whatthesubjectis，istheseriesofhisactions。If，theseareaseriesofworthlessproductions，thenthesubjectivityofhiswillingisjustasworthless。Butiftheseriesofhisdeedsisofasubstantivenature，thenthesameistruealsooftheindividual"sinnerwill。

Remark:Therightofthesubject"sparticularity，hisrighttobesatisfied，orinotherwordstherightofsubjectivefreedom，isthepivotandcentreofthedifferencebetweenantiquityandmoderntimes。ThisrightinitsinfinityisgivenexpressioninChristianityandithasbecometheuniversaleffectiveprincipleofanewformofcivilisation。Amongsttheprimaryshapeswhichthisrightassumesarelove，romanticism，thequestfortheeternalsalvationoftheindividual，&c。；nextcomemoralconvictionsandconscience；and，finally，theotherforms，someofwhichcomeintoprominenceinwhatfollowsastheprincipleofcivilsocietyandasmomentsintheconstitutionofthestate，whileothersappearinthecourseofhistory，particularlythehistoryofart，science，andphilosophy。

Nowthisprincipleofparticularityis，tobesure，onemomentoftheantithesis，andinthefirstplaceatleastitisjustasmuchidenticalwiththeuniversalasdistinctfromit。Abstractreflection，however，fixesthismomentinitsdistinctionfromandoppositiontotheuniversalandsoproducesaviewofmoralityasnothingbutabitter，unending，struggleagainstself-satisfaction，asthecommand:"Dowithabhorrencewhatdutyenjoins。"

Itisjustthistypeofratiocinationwhichadducesthatfamiliarpsychologicalviewofhistorywhichunderstandshowtobelittleanddisparageallgreatdeedsandgreatmenbytransformingintothemainintentionandoperativemotiveofactionstheinclinationsandpassionswhichlikewisefoundtheirsatisfactionfromtheachievementofsomethingsubstantive，thefameandhonour，&c。，consequentialonsuchactions，inawordtheirparticularaspect，theaspectwhichithasdecreedinadvancetobesomethinginitselfpernicious。Suchratiocinationassuresusthat，whilegreatactionsandtheefficiencywhichhassubsistedthroughaseriesofthemhaveproducedgreatnessintheworldandhavehadastheirconsequencesfortheindividualagentpower，honour，andfame，stillwhatbelongstotheindividualisnotthegreatnessitselfbutwhathasaccruedtohimfromit，thispurelyparticularandexternalresult；becausethisresultisaconsequence，itisthereforesupposedtohavebeentheagent"sendandevenhissoleend。Reflectionofthissortstopsshortatthesubjectivesideofgreatmen，sinceititselfstandsonpurelysubjectiveground，andconsequentlyitoverlookswhatissubstantiveinthisemptinessofitsownmaking。Thisistheviewofthosevaletpsychologists"forwhomtherearenoheroes，notbecausetherearenoheroes，butbecausethesepsychologistsareonlyvalets"。

Addition:Inmagnis……voluissesatest[Ingreatthingstohavewilledisenough]isrightinthesensethatweoughttowillsomethinggreat。Butwemustalsobeabletoachieveit，otherwisethewillingisnugatory。Thelaurelsofmerewillingaredryleavesthatneverweregreen。

§125。

Thesubjectiveelementofthewill，withitsparticularcontent-welfare，isreflectedintoitselfandinfiniteandsostandsrelatedtotheuniversalelement，totheprincipleofthewill。Thismomentofuniversality，positedfirstofallwithinthisparticularcontentitself，isthewelfareofothersalso，or，specifiedcompletely，thoughquiteemptily，thewelfareofall。Thewelfareofmanyotherunspecifiedparticularsisthusalsoanessentialendandrightofsubjectivity。Butsincetheabsolutelyuniversal，indistinctionfromsuchaparticularcontent，hasnotsofarbeenfurtherdeterminedthanas"theright"，itfollowsthattheseendsofparticularity，differingastheydofromtheuniversal，maybeinconformitywithit，buttheyalsomaynot。

§126。

Myparticularity，however，likethatofothers，isonlyarightatallinsofarasI

amafreeentity。Thereforeitmaynotmakeclaimsforitselfincontradictiontothisitssubstantivebasis，andanintentiontosecuremywelfareorthatofothers(anditisparticularlyinthislattercasethatsuchanintentioniscalledmoral")

cannotjustifyanactionwhichiswrong。

Remark:Itisoneofthemostprominentofthecorruptmaximsofourtimetoenterapleafortheso-called"moral"intentionbehindwrongactionsandtoimaginebadmenwithwell-meaninghearts，i。e。heartswillingtheirownwelfareandperhapsthatofothersalso。Thisdoctrineisrootedinthe"benevolence"(gutenHerzens)ofthepre-Kantianphilosophersandconstitutes，e。g。，thequintessenceofwell-knowntouchingdramaticproductions；buttodayithasbeenresuscitatedinamoreextravagantform，andinnerenthusiasmandtheheart，i。e。theformofparticularityassuch，havebeenmadethecriterionofright，rationality，andexcellence。Theresultisthatcrimeandthethoughtsthatleadtoit，betheyfancieshowevertriteandempty，oropinionshoweverwild，aretoberegardedasright，rational，andexcellent，simplybecausetheyissuefrommen"sheartsandenthusiasms。(SeetheRemarkto§140，wheremoredetailsaregiven。)，Incidentally，however，attentionmustbepaidtothepointofviewfromwhichrightandwelfarearebeingtreatedhere。

Weareconsideringrightasabstractrightandwelfareastheparticularwelfareofthesingleagent。

Theso-called"generalgood"，thewelfareofthestate，i。e。therightofmindactualandconcrete，isquiteadifferentsphere，asphereinwhichabstractrightisasubordinatemomentlikeparticularwelfareandthehappinessoftheindividual。Aswasremarkedabove，itisoneofthecommonestblundersofabstractthinkingtomakeprivaterightsandprivatewelfarecountasabsoluteinoppositiontotheuniversalityofthestate。

Addition:Thefamousanswer:Jen"envoispaslanécessité，given[byRichelieu]tothelampoonerwhoexcusedhimselfwiththewords:Ilfautdoncquejevive，isappositeatthispoint。

Lifeceasestobenecessaryinfaceofthehigherrealmoffreedom。WhenSt。Crispinstoleleathertomakeshoesforthepoor，hisactionwasmoralbutwrongandsoinadmissible。

§127。

Theparticularityoftheinterestsofthenaturalwill，takenintheirentiretyasasinglewhole，ispersonalexistenceorlife。Inextremedangerandinconflictwiththerightfulpropertyofsomeoneelse，thislifemayclaim(asaright，notamercy)

arightofdistress，becauseinsuchasituationthereisontheonehandaninfiniteinjurytoaman"sexistenceandtheconsequentlossofrightsaltogether，andontheotherhandonlyaninjurytoasinglerestrictedembodimentoffreedom，andthisimpliesarecognitionbothofrightassuchandalsooftheinjuredman"scapacityforrights，becausetheinjuryaffectsonlythispropertyofhis。

Remark:Therightofdistressisthebasisofbeneficiumcompetentiaewherebyadebtorisallowedtoretainofhistools，farmingimplements，clothes，or，inshort，ofhisresources，i。e。ofhiscreditor"sproperty，somuchasisregardedasindispensableifheistocontinuetosupportlife-tosupportit，ofcourse，onhisownsociallevel。

Addition:Lifeasthesumofendshasarightagainstabstractright。Ifforexampleitisonlybystealingbreadthatthewolfcanbekeptfromthedoor，theactionisofcourseanencroachmentonsomeone"sproperty，butitwouldbewrongtotreatthisactionasanordinarytheft。Torefusetoallowamaninjeopardyofhislifetotakesuchstepsforself-preservationwouldbetostigmatisehimaswithoutrights，andsincehewouldbedeprivedofhislife，hisfreedomwouldbeannulledaltogether。Manydiversedetailshaveabearingonthepreservationoflife，andwhenwehaveoureyesonthefuturewehavetoengageourselvesinthesedetails。Buttheonlythingthatisnecessaryistolivenow，thefutureisnotabsolutebuteverexposedtoaccident。Henceitisonlythenecessityoftheimmediatepresentwhichcanjustifyawrongaction，becausenottodotheactionwouldinturnbetocommitanoffence，indeedthemostwrongofalloffences，namelythecompletedestructionoftheembodimentoffreedom。Beneficiumcompetentiaeisrelevanthere，becausekinshipandothercloserelationshipsimplytherighttodemandthatnooneshallbesacrificedaltogetheronthealtarofright。

§128。

Thisdistressrevealsthefinitudeandthereforethecontingencyofbothrightandwelfareofrightastheabstractembodimentoffreedomwithoutembodyingtheparticularperson，andofwelfareasthesphereoftheparticularwillwithouttheuniversalityofright。Inthiswaytheyareestablishedasone-sidedandideal，thecharacterwhichinconceptiontheyalreadypossessed。Righthasalready(see§

106)determineditsembodimentastheparticularwill；andsubjectivity，initsparticularityasacomprehensivewhole，isitselftheembodimentoffreedom(see§127)，whileastheinfiniterelationofthewilltoitself，itisimplicitlytheuniversalelementinfreedom。Thetwomomentspresentinrightandsubjectivity，thusintegratedandattainingtheirtruth，theiridentity，thoughinthefirstinstancestillremainingrelativetooneanother，are(a)thegood(astheconcrete，absolutelydeterminate，universal)，and(b)conscience(asinfinitesubjectivityinwardlyconsciousandinwardlydeterminingitscontent)。

iiiGood&Conscience§129。

ThegoodistheIdeaastheunityoftheconceptofthewillwiththeparticularwill。Inthisunity，abstractright，welfare，thesubjectivityofknowingandthecontingencyofexternalfact，havetheirindependentself-subsistencesuperseded，thoughatthesametimetheyarestillcontainedandretainedwithinitintheiressence。Thegoodisthusfreedomrealised，theabsoluteendandaimoftheworld。

Addition:EverystageisreallytheIdea，buttheearlierstagescontainitonlyinratheranabstractform。Thusforexample，eventheego，aspersonality，isalreadytheIdea，thoughinitsmostabstractshape。Thegood，therefore，istheIdeafurtherdetermined，theunityoftheconceptofthewillwiththeparticularwill。Itisnotsomethingabstractlyright，butsomethingconcretewhosecontentsaremadeupofbothrightandwelfarealike。

§130。

InthisIdea，welfarehasnoindependentvalidityastheembodimentofasingleparticularwillbutonlyasuniversalwelfareandessentiallyasuniversalinprinciple，i。e。asaccordingwithfreedom。Welfarewithoutrightisnotagood。

Similarly，rightwithoutwelfareisnotthegood；fiatjustitiashouldnotbefollowedbypereatmundus。Consequently，sincethegoodmustofnecessitybeactualisedthroughtheparticularwillandisatthesametimeitssubstance，ithasabsoluterightincontrastwiththeabstractrightofpropertyandtheparticularaimsofwelfare。Ifeitherofthesemomentsbecomesdistinguishedfromthegood，ithasvalidityonlyinsofarasitaccordswiththegoodandissubordinatedtoit。

§131。

Forthesubjectivewill，thegoodandthegoodaloneistheessential，andthesubjectivewillhasvalueanddignityonlyinsofarasitsinsightandintentionaccordwiththegood。InasmuchasthegoodisatthispointstillonlythisabstractIdeaofgood，thesubjectivewillhasnotyetbeencaughtupintoitandestablishedasaccordingwithit。Consequently，itstandsinarelationtothegood，andtherelationisthatthegoodoughttobesubstantiveforit，i。e。itoughttomakethegooditsaimandrealiseitcompletely，whilethegoodonitssidehasinthesubjectivewillitsonlymeansofsteppingintoactuality。

Addition:Thegoodisthetruthoftheparticularwill，butthewillisonlythatintowhichitputsitself；itisnotgoodbynaturebutcanbecomewhatitisonlybyitsownlabour。Ontheotherhand，thegooditself，apartfromthesubjectivewill，isonlyanabstractionwithoutthatrealexistencewhichitistoacquireforthefirsttimethroughtheeffortsofthatwill。Accordingly，thedevelopmentofthegoodhasthreestages:(i)ThegoodshouldpresentitselftomyvolitionasaparticularwillandIshouldknowit。(ii)Ishouldmyselfsaywhatisgoodandshoulddevelopitsparticularspecifications。(iii)Finally，thespecificationofthegoodonitsownaccount，theparticularisationofthegoodasinfinitesubjectivityawareofitself。Thisinwardspecifyingofwhatgoodis，isconscience。

§132。

Therightofthesubjectivewillisthatwhateveritistorecogniseasvalidshallbeseenbyitasgood，andthatanaction，asitsaimenteringuponexternalobjectivity，shallbeimputedtoitasrightorwrong，goodorevil，legalorillegal，inaccordancewithitsknowledgeoftheworthwhichtheactionhasinthisobjectivity。

Remark:Thegoodisinprincipletheessenceofthewillinitssubstantialityanduniversality，i。e。

ofthewillinitstruth，andthereforeitexistssimplyandsolelyinthinkingandbymeansofthinking。

Henceassertionssuchas"mancannotknowthetruthbuthastodoonlywithphenomena"，or"thinkinginjuresthegoodwill"aredogmasdeprivingmindnotonlyofintellectualbutalsoofallethicalworthanddignity。

Therightofgivingrecognitiononlytowhatmyinsightseesasrationalisthehighestrightofthesubject，althoughowingtoitssubjectivecharacteritremainsaformalright；againstittherightwhichreasonquatheobjectivepossessesoverthesubjectremainsfirmlyestablished。

Onaccountofitsformalcharacter，insightiscapableequallyofbeingtrueandofbeingmereopinionanderror。Theindividual"sacquisitionofthisrightofinsightis，ontheprinciplesofthespherewhichisstillmoralonly，partandparcelofhisparticularsubjectiveeducation。Imaydemandfrommyself，andregarditasoneofmysubjectiverights，thatmyinsightintoanobligationshallbebasedongoodreasons，thatIshallbeconvincedoftheobligationandeventhatIshallapprehenditfromitsconceptandfundamentalnature。ButwhateverImayclaimforthesatisfactionofmyconvictionaboutthecharacterofanactionasgood，permitted，orforbidden，andsoaboutitsimputabilityinrespectofthischaracter，thisinnowaydetractsfromtherightofobjectivity。

Thisrightofinsightintothegoodisdistinctfromtherightofinsightinrespectofactionassuch(see§117)；theformoftherightofobjectivitywhichcorrespondstothelatteristhis，thatsinceactionisanalterationwhichistotakeplaceinanactualworldandsowillhaverecognitioninit，itmustingeneralaccordwithwhathasvaliditythere。Whoeverwillstoactinthisworldofactualityhaseoipsosubmittedhimselftoitslawsandrecognisedtherightofobjectivity。

Similarly，inthestateastheobjectivityoftheconceptofreason，legalresponsibilitycannotbetieddowntowhatanindividualmayholdtobeornottobeinaccordancewithhisreason，ortohissubjectiveinsightintowhatisrightorwrong，goodorevil，ortothedemandswhichhemakesforthesatisfactionofhisconviction。Inthisobjectivefield，therightofinsightisvalidasinsightintothelegalorillegal，quaintowhatisrecognisedasright，anditisrestrictedtoitselementarymeaning，i。e。toknowledgeinthesenseofacquaintancewithwhatislegalandtothatextentobligatory。Bymeansofthepublicityofthelawsandtheuniversalityofmanners，thestateremovesfromtherightofinsightitsformalaspectandthecontingencywhichitstillretainsforthesubjectatthelevelofmorality。Thesubject"srighttoknowactioninitsspecificcharacterasgoodorevil，legalorillegal，hastheresultofdiminishingorcancellinginthisrespecttootheresponsibilityofchildren，imbeciles，andlunatics，althoughitisimpossibletodelimitpreciselyeitherchildhood，imbecility，&c。，ortheirdegreeofirresponsibility。Buttoturnmomentaryblindness，thegoadofpassion，intoxication，or，inaword，whatiscalledthestrengthofsensualimpulse(excludingimpulseswhicharethebasisoftherightofdistress-see§127)intoreasonswhentheimputation，specificcharacter，andculpabilityofacrimeareinquestion，andtolook。uponsuchcircumstancesasiftheytookawaythecriminal"sguilt，againmeans(compare§100andtheRemarkto§120)failingtotreatthecriminal。inaccordancewiththerightandhonourduetohimasaman；forthenatureofmanconsistspreciselyinthefactthatheisessentiallysomethinguniversal，notabeingwhoseknowledgeisanabstractlymomentaryandpiecemealaffair。

Justaswhattheincendiaryreallysetsonfireisnottheisolatedsquareinchofwoodensurfacetowhichheapplieshistorch，buttheuniversalinthatsquareinch，e。g。thehouseasawhole，so，assubject，heisneitherthesingleexistentofthismomentoftimenorthisisolatedhotfeelingofrevenge。Ifhewere，hewouldbeananimalwhichwouldhavetobeknockedontheheadasdangerousandunsafebecauseofitsliabilitytofitsofmadness。

Theclaimismadethatthecriminalinthemomentofhisactionmusthavehada"clearidea"ofthewronganditsculpabilitybeforeitcanbeimputedtohimasacrime。Atfirstsight，thisclaimseemstopreservetherightofhissubjectivity，butthetruthisthatitdepriveshimofhisindwellingnatureasintelligent，anaturewhoseeffectivepresenceisnotconfinedtothe"clearideas"ofWolff"spsychology，andonlyincasesoflunacyisitsoderangedastobedivorcedfromtheknowinganddoingofisolatedthings。

Thesphereinwhichtheseextenuatingcircumstancescomeintoconsiderationasgroundsforthemitigationofpunishmentisasphereotherthanthatofrights，thesphereofpardon。

§133。

Theparticularsubjectisrelatedtothegoodastotheessenceofhiswill，andhencehiswill"sobligationarisesdirectlyinthisrelation。Sinceparticularityisdistinctfromthegoodandfallswithinthesubjectivewill，thegoodischaracterisedtobeginwithonlyastheuniversalabstractessentialityofthewill，i。e。asduty。Sincedutyisthusabstractanduniversalincharacter，itshouldbedoneforduty"ssake。

Addition:Frommypointofviewtheessenceofthewillisduty。Nowifmyknowledgestopsatthefactthatthegoodismyduty，Iamstillgoingnofurtherthantheabstractcharacterofduty。I

shoulddomydutyforduty"ssake，andwhenIdomydutyitisinatruesensemyownobjectivitywhichIambringingtorealisation。Indoingmyduty，Iambymyselfandfree。TohaveemphasisedthismeaningofdutyhasconstitutedthemeritofKant"smoralphilosophyanditsloftinessofoutlook。

§134。

Becauseeveryactionexplicitlycallsforaparticularcontentandaspecificend，whiledutyasanabstractionentailsnothingofthekind，thequestionarises:whatismyduty?Asananswernothingissofaravailableexcept:(a)todotheright，and(b)tostriveafterwelfare，one"sownwelfare，andwelfareinuniversalterms，thewelfareofothers(see§119)。

Addition:ThisisthesamequestionaswasputtoJesuswhensomeonewishedtolearnfromhimwhatheshoulddotoinheriteternallife。Goodasauniversalisabstractandcannotbeaccomplishedsolongasitremainsabstract。Tobeaccomplisheditmustacquireinadditionthecharacterofparticularity。

§135。

Thesespecificduties，however，arenotcontainedinthedefinitionofdutyitself；

butsincebothofthemareconditionedandrestricted，theyeoipsobringaboutthetransitiontothehighersphereoftheunconditioned，thesphereofduty。Dutyitselfinthemoralself-consciousnessistheessenceortheuniversalityofthatconsciousness，thewayinwhichitisinwardlyrelatedtoitselfalone；allthatislefttoit，therefore，isabstractuniversality，andforitsdeterminatecharacterithasidentitywithoutcontent，ortheabstractlypositive，theindeterminate。

Remark:Howeveressentialitistogiveprominencetothepureunconditionedself-determinationofthewillastherootofduty，andtothewayinwhichknowledgeofthewill，thankstoKant"sphilosophy，haswonitsfirmfoundationandstarting-pointforthefirsttimeowingtothethoughtofitsinfiniteautonomy，stilltoadheretotheexclusivelymoralposition，withoutmakingthetransitiontotheconceptionofethics，istoreducethisgaintoanemptyformalism，andthescienceofmoralstothepreachingofdutyforduty"ssake。Fromthispointofview，noimmanentdoctrineofdutiesispossible；ofcourse，materialmaybebroughtinfromoutsideandparticulardutiesmaybearrivedataccordingly，butffthedefinitionofdutyistakentobetheabsenceofcontradiction，formalcorrespondencewithitself-whichisnothingbutabstractindeterminacystabilised-thennotransitionispossibletothespecificationofparticulardutiesnor，ifsomesuchparticularcontentforactingcomesunderconsideration，isthereanycriterioninthatprinciplefordecidingwhetheritisorisnotaduty。Onthecontrary，bythismeansanywrongorimmorallineofconductmaybejustified。

Kant"sfurtherformulationsthepossibilityofvisualisinganactionasauniversalmaxim，doesleadtothemoreconcretevisualisationofasituation，butinitselfitcontainsnoprinciplebeyondabstractidentityandthe"absenceofcontradiction"alreadymentioned。

Theabsenceofpropertycontainsinitselfjustaslittlecontradictionasthenon-existenceofthisorthatnation，family，&c。，orthedeathofthewholehumanrace。Butifitisalreadyestablishedonothergroundsandpresupposedthatpropertyandhumanlifearetoexistandberespected，thenindeeditisacontradictiontocommittheftormurder；acontradictionmustbeacontradictionofsomething，i。e。ofsomecontentpresupposedfromthestartasafixedprinciple。Itistoaprincipleofthatkindalone，therefore，thatanactioncanberelatedeitherbycorrespondenceorcontradiction。Butifdutyistobewilledsimplyforduty"ssakeandnotforthesakeofsomecontent，itisonlyaformalidentitywhosenatureitistoexcludeallcontentandspecification。

Thefurtherantinomiesandconfigurationsofthisnever-endingought-to-be，inwhichtheexclusivelymoralwayofthinking-thinkingintermsofrelation-justwanderstoandfrowithoutbeingabletoresolvethemandgetbeyondtheought-to-be，IhavedevelopedinmyPhenomenologyofMind。

Addition:WhilewelaidemphasisaboveonthefactthattheoutlookofKant"sphilosophyisahighoneinthatitpropoundsacorrespondencebetweendutyandrationality，stillwemustnoticeherethatthispointofviewisdefectiveinlackingallarticulation。Theproposition:"Actasifthemaximofthineactioncouldbelaiddownasauniversalprinciple"，wouldbeadmirableifwealreadyhaddeterminateprinciplesofconduct。Thatistosay，todemandofaprinciplethatitshallbeabletoserveinadditionasadeterminantofuniversallegislationistopresupposethatitalreadypossessesacontent。Giventhecontent，thenofcoursetheapplicationoftheprinciplewouldbeasimplematter。InKant"scase，however，theprincipleitselfisstillnotavailableandhiscriterionofnon-contradictionisproductiveofnothing，sincewherethereisnothing，therecanbenocontradictioneither。

§136。

Becauseoftheabstractcharacterisationofthegood，theothermomentoftheIdea-particularityingeneral-fallswithinsubjectivity。Subjectivityinitsuniversalityreflectedintoitselfisthesubject"sabsoluteinwardcertainty(Gewissheit)ofhimself，thatwhichestablishestheparticularandisthedetermininganddecisiveelementinhim，hisconscience(Gewissen)。

Addition:Wemayspeakinaveryloftystrainaboutduty，andtalkofthekindisupliftingandbroadenshumansympathies，butifitnevercomestoanythingspecificitendsinbeingwearisome。

Minddemandsparticularityandisentitledtoit。Butconscienceisthisdeepestinwardsolitudewithoneselfwhereeverythingexternalandeveryrestrictionhasdisappeared-thiscompletewithdrawalintooneself。Asconscience，manisnolongershackledbytheaimsofparticularity，andconsequentlyinattainingthatpositionhehasrisentohigherground，thegroundofthemodernworld，whichforthefirsttimehasreachedthisconsciousness，reachedthissinkingintooneself。

Themoresensuousconsciousness[Forthedistinctionbetweensense-consciousnessand"morehighlydevelopedtypesofconsciousness"，seeRemarksto§§21and35。]ofearlierepochshadsomethingexternalandgivenconfrontingit，eitherreligionorlaw。ButconscienceknowsitselfasthinkingandknowsthatwhatalonehasobligatoryforceformeisthisthatIthink。

§137。

Trueconscienceisthedispositiontowillwhatisabsolutelygood。Itthereforehasfixedprinciplesanditisawareoftheseasitsexplicitlyobjectivedeterminantsandduties。Indistinctionfromthisitscontent(i。e。truth)，conscienceisonlytheformalsideoftheactivityofthewill，whichasthiswillhasnospecialcontentofitsown。Buttheobjectivesystemoftheseprinciplesandduties，andtheunionofsubjectiveknowingwiththissystem，isnotpresentuntilwecometothestandpointofethicallife。Hereattheabstractstandpointofmorality，consciencelacksthisobjectivecontentandsoitsexplicitcharacteristhatofinfiniteabstractself-certainty，whichatthesametimeisforthisveryreasontheself-certaintyofthissubject。

Remark:Conscienceistheexpressionoftheabsolutetitleofsubjectiveself-consciousnesstoknowinitselfandfromwithinitselfwhatisrightandobligatory，togiverecognitiononlytowhatitthusknowsasgood，andatthesametimetomaintainthatwhateverinthiswayitknowsandwillsisintruthrightandobligatory。Conscienceasthisunityofsubjectiveknowingwithwhatisabsoluteisasanctuarywhichitwouldbesacrilegetoviolate。ButwhethertheconscienceofaspecificindividualcorrespondswiththisIdeaofconscience，orwhetherwhatittakesordeclarestobegoodisactuallyso，isascertainableonlyfromthecontentofthegooditseekstorealise。Whatisrightandobligatoryistheabsolutelyrationalelementinthewill"svolitionsandthereforeitisnotinessencetheparticularpropertyofanindividual，anditsformisnotthatoffeelingoranyotherprivate(i。e。sensuous)typeofknowing，butessentiallythatofuniversalsdeterminedbythought，i。e。theformoflawsandprinciples。Conscienceisthereforesubjecttothejudgementofitstruthorfalsity，andwhenitappealsonlytoitselfforadecision，itisdirectlyatvariancewithwhatitwishestobe，namelytheruleforamodeofconductwhichisrational，absolutelyvalid，anduniversal。Forthisreason，thestatecannotgiverecognitiontoconscienceinitsprivateformassubjectiveknowing，anymorethansciencecangrantvaliditytosubjectiveopinion，dogmatism，andtheappealtoasubjectiveopinion。Intrueconscience，itselementsarenotdifferent，buttheymaybecomeso，anditisthedeterminingelement，thesubjectivityofwillingandknowing，whichcanseveritselffromthetruecontentofconscience，establishitsownindependence，andreducethatcontenttoaformandashow。Theambiguityinconnectionwithconscienceliesthereforeinthis:itispresupposedtomeantheidentityofsubjectiveknowingandwillingwiththetruegood，andsoisclaimedandrecognisedtobesomethingsacrosanct；andyetatthesametime，asthemeresubjectivereflectionofself-consciousnessintoitself，itstillclaimsforitselfthetitledue，solelyonthestrengthofitsabsolutelyvalidrationalcontent，tothatidentityalone。

Atthelevelofmorality，distinguishedasitisinthisbookfromthelevelofethics，itisonlyformalconsciencethatistobefound。Trueconsciencehasbeenmentionedonlytoindicateitsdistinctionfromtheotherandtoobviatethepossiblemisunderstandingthathere，whereitisonlyformalconsciencethatisunderconsideration，theargumentisabouttrueconscience。Thelatterispartoftheethicaldispositionwhichcomesbeforeusforthefirsttimeinthefollowingsection。Thereligiousconscience，however，doesnotbelongtothissphereatall。

Addition:Whenwespeakofconscience，itmayeasilybethoughtthat，invirtueofitsform，whichisabstractinwardness，conscienceisattiespointwithoutmoreadotrueconscience。Buttrueconsciencedeterminesitselftowillwhatisabsolutelygoodandobligatoryandisthisself-determination。Sofar，however，itisonlywithgoodintheabstractthatwehavetodoandconscienceisstillwithoutthisobjectivecontentandisbuttheinfinitecertaintyofoneself。

§138。

Thissubjectivity，quaabstractself-determinationandpurecertaintyofoneselfalone，asreadilyevaporatesintoitselfthewholedeterminatecharacterofright，duty，andexistence，asitremainsboththepowertojudge，todeterminefromwithinitselfalone，whatisgoodinrespectofanycontent，andalsothepowertowhichthegood，atfirstonlyanidealandanought-to-be，owesitsactuality。

Remark:Theself-consciousnesswhichhasattainedthisabsolutereflectionintoitselfknowsitselfinthisreflectiontobethekindofconsciousnesswhichisandshouldbebeyondthereachofeveryexistentandgivenspecificdetermination。Asoneofthecommonerfeaturesofhistory(e。g。inSocrates，40theStoics，andothers)，thetendencytolookdeeperintooneselfandtoknowanddeterminefromwithinoneselfwhatisrightandgoodappearsinageswhenwhatisrecognisedasrightandgoodincontemporarymannerscannotsatisfythewillofbettermen。Whentheexistingworldoffreedomhasbecomefaithlesstothewillofbettermen，thatwillfailstofinditselfinthedutiesthererecognisedandmusttrytofindintheidealworldoftheinnerlifealonetheharmonywhichactualityhaslost。Onceself-consciousnesshasgraspedandsecureditsformalrightinthisway，everythingdependsonthecharacterofthecontentwhichitgivestoitself。

Addition:Ifwelookmorecloselyatthisprocessofevaporationandseehowallspecificdeterminationsdisappearintothissimpleconceptandthenhavetobecondensedoutofitagain，whatwefindisthatitisprimarilyduetothefactthateverythingrecognisedasrightanddutymaybeprovedbydiscursivethinkingtobenugatory，restricted，andinallrespectsnotabsolute。Ontheotherhand，justassubjectivityevaporateseverycontentintoitself，soitmaydevelopitoutofitselfoncemore。Everythingwhicharisesintheethicalsphereisproducedbythisactivityofmind。Themoralpointofview，however，isdefectivebecauseitispurelyabstract。WhenIamawareofmyfreedomasthesubstanceofmybeing，Iaminactiveanddonothing。ButifIproceedtoactandlookforprinciplesonwhichtoact，Igropeforsomethingdeterminateandthendemanditsdeductionfromtheconceptofthefreewill。While，therefore，itisrightenoughtoevaporaterightanddutyintosubjectivity，itiswrongifthisabstractgroundworkisnotthencondensedoutagain。

Itisonlyintimeswhentheworldofactualityishollow，spiritless，andunstable，thatanindividualmaybeallowedtotakerefugefromactualityinhisinnerlife。SocrateslivedatthetimeoftheruinoftheAtheniandemocracy。Histhoughtvaporisedtheworldaroundhimandhewithdrewintohimselftosearchtherefortherightandthegood。Eveninourdaytherearecaseswhenreverencefortheestablishedorderismoreorlesslacking；maninsistsonhavingtheauthoritativeashiswill，asthattowhichhehasgrantedrecognition。

§139。

Onceself-consciousnesshasreducedallotherwisevaliddutiestoemptinessanditselftothesheerinwardnessofthewill，ithasbecomethepotentialityofeithermakingtheabsolutelyuniversalitsprinciple，orequallywellofelevatingabovetheuniversaltheself-willofprivateparticularity，takingthatasitsprincipleandrealisingitthroughitsactions，i。e。ithasbecomepotentiallyevil。

Remark:Tohaveaconscience，ifconscienceisonlyformalsubjectivity，issimplytobeonthevergeofslippingintoevil；inindependentself-certainty，withitsindependenceofknowledgeanddecision，bothmoralityandevilhavetheircommonroot。

Theoriginofevilingeneralistobefoundinthemysteryoffreedom(i。e。inthespeculativeaspectoffreedom)，themysterywherebyfreedomofnecessityarisesoutofthenaturallevelofthewillandissomethinginwardincomparisonwiththatlevel。Itisthisnaturallevelofthewillwhichcomesintoexistenceasaself-contradiction，asincompatiblewithitselfinthisopposition，andsoitisjustthisparticularityofthewillwhichlatermakesitselfevil。Thatistosay，particularityisalwaysduality；hereitistheoppositionofthenaturallevelandtheinwardnessofthewill。Inthisopposition，thelatterisonlyarelativeandabstractsubjectivitywhichcandrawitscontentonlyfromthedeterminatecontentofthenaturalwill，fromdesire，impulse，inclination，&c。Nowitissaidofthesedesires，impulses，&c。，thattheymaybeeithergoodorevil。Butsincethewillheremakesintoadeterminantofitscontentboththeseimpulsesinthiscontingentcharacterwhichtheypossessasnatural，andalso，therefore，theformwhichithasatthispoint，theformofparticularityitself，itfollowsthatitissetinoppositiontotheuniversalasinnerobjectivity，tothegood，whichcomesonthesceneastheoppositeextremetoimmediateobjectivity，thenaturalpureandsimple，assoonasthewillisreflectedintoitselfandconsciousnessisaknowingconsciousness。Itisinthisoppositionthatthisinwardnessofthewillisevil。Manisthereforeevilbyaconjunctionbetweenhisnaturalorundevelopedcharacterandhisreflectionintohimself；andthereforeevilbelongsneithertonatureassuchbyitself-unlessnatureweresupposedtobethenaturalcharacterofthewillwhichrestsinitsparticularcontent-nortointrovertedreflectionbyitself，i。e。cognitioningeneral，unlessthisweretomaintainitselfinthatoppositiontotheuniversal。

Withthisfacetofevil，itsnecessity，thereisinevitablycombinedthefactthatthissameeviliscondemnedtobethatwhichofnecessityoughtnottobe，i。e。thefactthateviloughttobeannulled。Itisnotthatthereoughtnevertobeadiremptionofanysortinthewill-onthecontrary，itisjustthislevelofdiremptionwhichdistinguishesmanfromtheunreasoninganimal；thepointisthatthewillshouldnotrestatthatlevelandclingtotheparticularasifthatandnottheuniversalweretheessentialthing；itshouldovercomethediremptionasanullity。Further，astothisnecessityofevil，itissubjectivity，asinfiniteself-reflection，whichispresentinandconfrontedbythisoppositionofuniversalandparticular；ifitrestsinthisopposition，i。e。ifitisevil，thenitiseoipsoindependent，regardingitselfasisolated，andisitselfthisSelf-Will。Thereforeiftheindividualsubjectassuchdoesevil，theevilispurelyandsimplyhisownresponsibility。

Addition:Theabstractself-certaintywhichknowsitselfasthebasisofeverythinghasinitthepotentialityeitherofwillingtheuniversalityoftheconceptoralternativelyoftakingaparticularcontentasaprincipleandrealisingthat。Thesecondalternativeisevil，whichthereforealwaysincludestheabstractionofself-certainty。Itisonlymanwhoisgood，andheisgoodonlybecausehecanalsobeevil。Goodandevilareinseparable，andtheirinseparabilityisrootedinthefactthattheconceptbecomesanobjecttoitself，andasobjectiteoipsoacquiresthecharacterofdifference。Theevilwillwillssomethingopposedtotheuniversalityofthewill，whilethegoodwillactsinaccordancewithitstrueconcept。

Thedifficultyofthequestionastohowthewillcanbeevilaswellasgoodusuallyarisesbecausewethinkofthewillasrelatedtoitselfpurelypositivelyandbecausewerepresentitsvolitionassomethingdeterminateconfrontingit，asthegood。Buttheproblemoftheoriginofevilmaybemorepreciselyputintheform:"Howdoesthenegativecomeintothepositive?"IfwebeginbypresupposingthatinthecreationoftheworldGodistheabsolutelypositive，then，turnwherewewill，weshallneverdiscoverthenegativewithinthatpositive，sincetotalkofGod"s"Permitting"evilistoascribetohimapassiverelationtoevilwhichisunsatisfactoryandmeaningless。Intherepresentativethinkingofreligiousmythologythereisnocomprehensionoftheoriginofevil；i。e。

thepositiveandthenegativearenotdiscoveredinoneanother，thereisonlyarepresentationoftheirsuccessionandjuxtaposition，sothatitisfromoutsidethatthenegativecomestothepositive。

Butthiscannotsatisfythought，whichdemandsareasonandanecessityandinsistsonapprehendingthenegativeasitselfrootedinthepositive。Nowthesolutionoftheproblem，thewaytheconcepttreatsthematter，isalreadycontainedintheconcept，sincetheconcept，ortospeakmoreconcretely，theIdea，hasitinitsessencetodifferentiateitselfandtoposititselfnegatively。Ifweadheretothepurelypositive，i。e。ifwerestintheunmixedgoodwhichissupposedtobegoodatitssource，thenweareacceptinganemptycategoryoftheUnderstandingwhichclingstoabstractionsandone-sidedcategoriesofthiskindandbytheveryaskingofthisquestionmakesitadifficultone。Ifwebeginwiththestandpointoftheconcept，however，weapprehendthepositiveasactivityandasself-distinction。Evilandgoodalikehavetheirorigininthewillandthewillinitsconceptisbothgoodandevil。

Thenaturalwillisimplicitlythecontradictionofself-distinction，ofbeingbothinwardnessandalsoself-awareness。Tomaintainthenthatevilimpliesthefurtherpointthatmanisevilinsofarashiswillisnaturalwouldbetocontradicttheusualideathatitisjustthenaturalwillwhichisguiltlessandgood。Butthenaturalwillstandsinoppositiontothecontentoffreedom，andthechildandtheuneducatedman，whosewillsareonlynatural，areforthatveryreasonliabletobecalledtoaccountfortheiractionsonlyinalessdegree。Nowwhenwespeakofman，wemeannotthechildbuttheself-consciousadult，andwhenwespeakofgood，wemeantheknowledgeofit。Itisdoubtlesstruethatthenaturalisinherentlyinnocent，neithergoodnorbad，butwhenitisdrawnintotheorbitofthewillwhichisfreeandknowsthatitisfree，itacquiresthecharacterofnotbeingfreeandisthereforeevil。Whenmanwillsthenatural，itisnolongermerelynatural，butthenegativeopposedtothegood，i。e。totheconceptofthewill。

Ontheotherhand，ifitisnowobjectedthatsinceevilisrootedintheconceptandinevitable，manwouldbeguiltlessifhecommittedit，ourreplymustbethataman"sdecisionishisownact，andhisownactisfreelychosenandhisownresponsibility。InthereligiouslegenditissaidthatmanisasGodwhenheknowsgoodandevil；anditistruethatthislikenesstoGodispresentinsuchknowledgeinthattheinevitabilityhereisnonaturalinevitabilitysinceonthecontrarythedecisionisreallythetranscendenceofthisdualityofgoodandevil。Whenbothgoodandevilareplacedbeforeme，Ihaveachoicebetweenthetwo；Icandecidebetweenthemandendowmysubjectivecharacterwitheither。Thusthenatureofevilisthatmanmaywillitbutneednot。

§140。

Ineveryendofaself-conscioussubject，thereisapositiveaspect(see§135)

necessarilypresentbecausetheendiswhatispurposedinanactualconcreteaction。Thisaspectheknowshowtoelicitandemphasise，andhemaythenproceedtoregarditasadutyorafineintention。Bysointerpretingit，heisenabledtopassoffhisactionasgoodintheeyesbothofhimselfandothers，despitethefactthat，owingtohisreflectivecharacterandhisknowledgeoftheuniversalaspectofthewill，heisawareofthecontrastbetweenthisaspectandtheessentiallynegativecontentofhisaction。Toimposeinthiswayonothersishypocrisy；whiletoimposeononeselfisastagebeyondhypocrisy，astageatwhichsubjectivityclaimstobeabsolute。

Remark:Thisfinal，mostabstruse，formofevil，wherebyevilispervertedintogoodandgoodintoevil，andconsciousness，inbeingawareofitspowertoeffectthisperversion，isalsomadeawareofitselfasabsolute，isthehigh-watermarkofsubjectivityatthelevelofmorality；itistheformintowhichevilhasblossomedinourpresentepoch，aresultduetophilosophy，i。e。toashallownessofthoughtwhichhastwistedaprofoundconceptintothisshapeandusurpedthenameofphilosophy，justasithasarrogatedtoevilthenameofgood。

InthisRemark，Iwillindicatebrieflythechiefformsofthissubjectivitywhichhavebecomecurrent。

(a)Inhypocrisythefollowingmomentsarecontained:

[a]knowledgeofthetrueuniversal，whetherknowledgeintheformmerelyofafeelingforrightandduty，orofadeepercognitionandapprehensionofthem；

[b]volitionoftheparticularwhichconflictswiththisuniversal；

[c]consciouscomparisonofbothmoments[a]and[b]，sothattheconscioussubjectisawareinwillingthathisparticularvolitionisevilincharacter。

Thesepointsaredescriptiveofactingwithabadconscience；hypocrisyproperinvolvessomethingmore。

Atonetimegreatimportancewasattachedtothequestionwhetheranactionwasevilonlyinsofarasitwasdonewithabadconscience，i。e。withexplicitknowledgeofthethreemomentsjustspecified。TheinferencefromanaffirmativeanswerisadmirablydrawnbyPascal:Ilsseronttousdamnéscesdemi-pécheurs，quiontquelqueamourpourlavertu。Maispourcesfranc-pécheurs，pécheursendurcis，pécheurssansmélange，pleinsetachevés，1"enfernelestientpas；ilsonttrompélediableàforcedes"yabandonner。

Footnote:Lettresprovinciales，iv。Inthesamecontext，PascalalsoquotesChrist"sintercessionontheCrossforhisenemies:"Father，forgivethem，fortheyknownotwhattheydo"-asuperfluousprayerifthefactthattheydidnotknowwhattheydidmadetheiractioninnocentandsotookawaytheneedofforgiveness。

PascalquotestheretooAristotle"sdistinctionbetweenthemanwhoactsoukeidosandtheonewhoactsagnoon；intheformertypeofignorance，hisactionisnotfreelywilled(heretheignorancedependsonexternalcircumstances，seeabove，§117)andhisactionisnotimputabletohim。ButofthelatterAristotlesays:"Everywickedmanisignorantofwhatheoughttodoandwhatheoughttorefrainfromdoing；anditisthiskindoffailurewhichmakesmenunjustandingeneralbad……Anignorantchoice"betweengoodandevil"isthecausenotoftheaction"sbeinginvoluntary"(ofbeingnon-imputable)"butonlyofitsbeingwicked"。Aristotleevidentlyhadadeeperinsightintotheconnectionbetweenknowingandwillingthanhasbecomecommoninasuperficialphilosophywhichteachesthattheoppositeofknowledge，theheartandenthusiasm，arethetrueprinciplesofethicalaction。

Thesubjectiverightofself-consciousnesstoknowwhetheranactionistrulygoodorevilincharactermustnotbethoughtofassocollidingwiththeabsoluterightoftheobjectivityofthischaracterthatthetworightsarerepresentedasseparable，indifferenttooneanother，andrelatedonlyaccidentally。Itwassuchaconceptionoftheirrelationthatlayinparticularattherootoftheoldquestionsaboutefficaciousgrace。Onitsformalside，evilismostpeculiarlytheindividual"sown，since(a)itispreciselyhissubjectivityestablishingitselfpurelyandsimplyforitself，andforthatreasonitispurelyandsimplytheindividual"sownresponsibility(see§139andtheRemarkthereto)；(b)onhisobjectivesidemanaccordswithhisconceptinasmuchasheismind，inawordarationalentity，andhasinhisownnatureassuchthecharacterofself-knowinguniversality。

Thereforeitmeansfailingtotreathimwiththerespectduetohisconceptifhisgoodsideisdivorcedfromhim，sothatthecharacterofhisevilactionasevilisdivorcedfromhimtooandisnotimputedtohimasevil。Howdeterminateistheconsciousnessofthesemomentsindistinctionfromoneanother，ortowhatextentithasdevelopedorfailedtodevelopinclaritysoastobecomearecognitionofthem，andtowhatdegreeanevilactionhasbeendonewithaconsciencemoreorlessdownrightevil-allthesequestionsarethemoretrivialaspectofthematter，theaspectmainlyconcernedwiththeempirical。

(b)Evilanddoingevilwithabadconscience，however，isnotquitehypocrisy。Intohypocrisythereentersinadditiontheformalcharacteroffalsity，firstthefalsityofholdingupevilasgoodintheeyesofothers，ofsettingoneselfuptoallappearanceasgood，conscientious，pious，andsoon-conductwhichinthesecircumstancesisonlyatricktodeceiveothers。Secondly，however，thehadmanmayfindinhisgoodconductonotheroccasions，orinhispiety，or，inaword，ingoodreasons，ajustificationinhisowneyesfortheevilhedoes，becausehecanusethesereasonstopervertitsapparentcharacterfromevilintogood。Hisabilitytodothisdependsonthesubjectivitywhich，asabstractnegativity，knowsthatalldeterminationsaresubordinatetoitselfandissuefromitsownwill。

(c)InthisperversionofevilintogoodwemayprimafacieincludetheformofsubjectivismknownasProbabilism。Itsguidingprincipleisthatanactionispermissible，andmaybedonewithaneasyconscience，providedthattheagentcanhuntoutanysinglegoodreasonforit，beitonlytheauthorityofasingletheologian，andevenifothertheologiansareknownbytheagenttodissenteversowidelyfromthatauthority。Eveninthisideathereisstillpresentthecorrectapprehensionthatauthorityandareasonbasedonauthoritygivesprobabilityonly，althoughthisissupposedtobeenoughtoproduceaneasyconscience；itisgrantedinProbabilismthatagoodreasonisinevitablyofsuchacharacterthattheremayexistalongwithitdifferentreasonsatleastasgood。

Evenherewemustrecogniseavestigeofobjectivityintheadmissionthatitisareasonwhichshouldbethedeterminingfactor。Butsincethediscriminationbetweengoodandevilismadetodependonallthosegoodreasons，includingtheologicalauthoritiestoo，despitethefactthattheyaresonumerousandcontradictory，theimplicationisthatitisnotthisobjectivityofthething，butsubjectivity，whichhasthelastword。Thismeansthatcapriceandself-willaremadethearbitersofgoodandevil，andtheresultisthatethicsaswellasreligiousfeelingisundermined。ButthefactthatitisprivatesubjectivitytowhichthedecisionfallsisonewhichProbabilismdoesnotopenlyavowasitsprinciple；onthecontrary，ashasalreadybeenstated，itgivesoutthatitissomereasonorotherwhichisdecisive，andProbabilismistothatextentstillaformofhypocrisy。

(d)Inthestagesofsubjectivism，thenextinascendingorderistheviewthatthegoodnessofthewillconsistsinitswillingthegood；thiswillingoftheabstractgoodissupposedtosuffice，infacttobethesolerequisite，tomakeitsactiongood。Asthewillingofsomethingdeterminate，actionhasacontent，butgoodintheabstractdeterminesnothing，andhenceitdevolvesonparticularsubjectivitytogivethiscontentitscharacterandconstituents。justasinProbabilismanyonewhoisnothimselfalearnedRévérendPèremayhavethesubsumptionofadeterminatecontentundertheuniversalpredicate"good"effectedforhimbythesoleauthorityofonesuchtheologian，sohereeverysubject，withoutanyfurtherqualification，isinvestedwiththishonourofgivingacontenttogoodintheabstract，orinotherwordssubsumingacontentunderauniversal。Thiscontentisonlyoneofthemanyelementsinanactionasaconcretewhole，andtheothersmayperhapsentailitsdescriptionas"criminal"and"bad"。Thatdeterminatecontentwhich1，assubject，givetothegood，however，isthegoodknowntomeintheaction，i。e。itismygoodintention(see§114)。Thustherearisesacontradictionbetweendescriptions:accordingtoonetheactionisgood，accordingtotheotheritiscriminal。Hencealsothereseemstoarise，inconnectionwithaconcreteaction，thequestionwhetherinsuchcircumstancestheintentionbehinditisactuallygood。Itmaygenerallybethecasethatthegoodiswhatisactuallyintended；butthisinfactmustalwaysbethecaseifitisheldthatgoodintheabstractisthesubject"sdeterminingmotive。Wherewrongisdonethroughanactionwhichiswellintentionedbutinotherrespectscriminalandbad，thewrongsodonemust，ofcourse，alsobegood，andtheimportantquestionwouldseemtobe:whichofthesesidesoftheactionisreallytheessentialone?Thisobjectivequestion，however，ishereoutofplace，orratheritisthesubjectiveconsciousnessalonewhosedecisionconstitutesobjectivityatthispoint。Besides，"essential"and"good"meanthesamething；oneisjustasmuchanabstractionastheother。Goodisthatwhichisessentialinrespectofthewill；andtheessentialinthisrespectshouldbepreciselythis，thatmyactionbecharacterisedasgoodinmyeyes。Butthesubsumptionunderthegoodofanycontentonepleasesisthedirectandexplicitresultofthefactthatthisabstractgoodistotallydevoidofcontentandsoissimplyreducedtomeaninganythingpositive，i。e。tosomethingwhichisvalidfromsomesinglepointofviewandwhichinitsimmediatecharactermayevenbevalidasanessentialend，asforexampletodogoodtothepoor，totakethoughtformyself，mylife，myfamily，andsoforth。Further，justasthegoodistheabstract，sothebadtoomustbewithoutcontentandderiveitsspecificationfrommysubjectivity；anditisinthiswayalsothattherearisesthemoralendofhatinganduprootingthebad，thenatureofthebadbeingleftunspecified。

Theft，cowardice，murder，andsoforth，asactions，i。e。asachievementsofasubjectivewill，havetheimmediatecharacterofbeingsatisfactionsofsuchawillandthereforeofbeingsomethingpositive。Inordertomaketheactionagoodone，itisonlyaquestionofrecognisingthispositiveaspectoftheactionasmyintention，andthisthenbecomestheessentialaspectinvirtueofwhichtheactionismadegood，simplybecauseIrecogniseitasthegoodinmyintention。Theftinordertodogoodtothepoor，theftorflightfrombattleforthesakeoffulfillingone"sdutytocareforone"slifeorone"sfamily(apoorfamilyperhapsintothebargain)，murderoutofhateorrevenge(i。e。inordertosatisfyone"ssenseofone"sownrightsorofrightingeneral，orone"ssenseofanother"swickedness，ofwrongdonebyhimtooneselfortoothersortotheworldorthenationatlarge，byextirpatingthiswickedindividualwhoiswickednessincarnate，andtherebycontributingatleastone"squotatotheprojectofuprootingthebad)-alltheseactionsaremadewellintentionedandthereforegoodbythismethodoftakingaccountofthepositiveaspectoftheircontent。Onlythebareminimumofintelligenceisrequiredtodiscoverinanyaction，asthoselearnedtheologianscan，apositivesideandsoagoodreasonforitandagoodintentionbehindit。

Henceithasbeensaidthatinthestrictsensetherearenowickedmen，sincenoonewillsevilforthesakeofevil，i。e。noonewillsapurenegativeassuch。Onthecontrary，everyonealwayswillssomethingpositive，andtherefore，ontheviewweareconsidering，somethinggood。Inthisabstractgoodthedistinctionbetweengoodandevilhasvanishedtogetherwithallconcreteduties；

forthisreason，simplytowillthegoodandtohaveagoodintentioninactingismorelikeevilthangood，becausethegoodwilledisonlythisabstractformofgoodandthereforetomakeitconcretedevolvesonthearbitraryWillofthesubject。

Tothiscontexttherealsobelongsthenotoriousmaxim:"Theendjustifiesthemeans。"Initselfandprimafaciethisexpressionistrivialandpointless。Quiteso，onemayretortintermsequallygeneral，ajustendofcoursejustifiesthemeans，whileanunjustenddoesnot。Thephrase:so"Iftheendisright，soisthemeans"isatautology，sincethemeansispreciselythatwhichisnothinginitselfbutisforthesakeofsomethingelse，andtherein，i。e。intheend，hasitspurposeandworth-

providedofcourseitbetrulyameans。

Butwhensomeonesaysthattheendjustifiesthemeans，hispurportisnotconfinedtothisbaretautology；heunderstandsbythewordssomethingmorespecific，namelythattouseasmeanstoagoodendsomethingwhichinitselfissimplynotameansatall，toviolatesomethinginitselfsacrosanct，inshorttocommitacrimeasameanstoagoodend，ispermissibleandevenone"sboundenduty。(i)Therefloatsbeforethemindsofthosewhosaythattheendjustifiesthemeansavagueconsciousnessofthedialecticoftheaforesaid"positive"elementinisolatedlegalorethicalprinciples，orofsuchequallyvaguegeneralmaximsas:"Thoushaltnotkill"，or"Thoushalttakethoughtforthywelfareandthewelfareofthyfamily"。Executionersandsoldiershavenotmerelytherightbutthedutytokillmen，thoughthereithasbeenpreciselylaiddownwhatkindofmenandwhatcircumstancesmakethekillingpermissibleandobligatory。Soalsomywelfareandthewelfareofmyfamilymustbesubordinatedtohigherendsandsoreducedtomeanstotheirattainment。(ii)Andyetwhatbearsthemarkofcrimeisnotageneralmaximofthatkind，leftvagueandstillsubjecttoadialectic；onthecontrary，itsspecificcharacterisalreadyobjectivelyfixed。Nowwhatissetupagainstsuchadeterminatecrime，whatissupposedtohavedeprivedthecrimeofitscriminalnature，isthejustifyingend，andthisissimplysubjectiveopinionaboutwhatisgoodandbetter。Whathappenshereisthesameaswhathappenswhenthewillstopsatwillinggoodintheabstract，i。e。theabsoluteandvaliddeterminatecharacterassignedtogoodandevil，rightandwrong，isentirelysweptawayandthedeterminationofthemisascribedinsteadtotheindividual"sfeeling，imagination，andcaprice。