第6章

Here，then，thequestionofthecausalityistakenoutofpsychologyandgivenovertophysiologyinsteadoftometaphysics，asinthetheorydiscussedbefore。Inreality，however，itisheretoolostinmetaphysicsinattemptingtocrosstophysiology。Forphysiologymust，asanempiricalscience，abandontheattempttogiveacompletecausalexplanationofacomplexvolitionalactfromitsantecedents，notonlyforthepresent，butforalltime，becausethisleadstotheproblemofaninfinitesuccession。Theonlypossiblebasisforsuchatheoryis，therefore，theprincipleofmaterialisticmetaphysics，thattheso-calledmaterialprocessesareallthatmakeuptherealityofthingsandthatpsychicalprocessesmustaccordinglybeexplainedfrommaterialprocesses。Butitisanindispensableprincipleofpsychologyasanempiricalscience，thatitshallinvestigatethefactsofpsychicalprocessesastheyarepresentedinimmediateexperience，andthatitshallnotexaminetheirinterconnectionsfrompointsofviewthatareentirelyforeigntothem(§；1andp。17，sq。)。Itisimpossibletofindouthowavolitionproceedsinanyotherwaythanbyfollowingitexactlyasitispresentedtousinimmediateexperience。Here，however，itisnotpresentedasanabstractconcept，butasaconcretesinglevolition。Ofthisparticularvolition，too，weknownothingexceptwhatisimmediatelyperceptibleintheprocess。Wecanknownothingofanunconsciousor，whatamountstothesamethingforpsychology，amaterialprocesswhichisnotimmediatelyperceivedbutmerelyassumedhypotheticallyonthebasisofmetaphysicalpresuppositions。Suchmetaphysicalassumptionsareobviouslymerelydevicestocoverupanincompleteorentirelywantingpsychologicalobservation。Thepsychologistwhopaysattentiontoonlytheterminationofthewholevolitionalprocess，willveryeasilyhituponthethoughtthattheimmediatecauseofvolitionissomeunconsciousimmaterialormaterialagent。

11。Theexactobservationofvolitionalprocessesis，forthereasonsgivenabove，impossibleinthecaseofvolitional[p。177]actsthatcomenaturallyinthecourseoflife；theonlywayinwhichathoroughpsychologicalinvestigationcanbemade，is，therefore，thatofexperimentalobservation。

Tobesure，wecannotproducevolitionalactsofeverykindatwill，butwemustlimitourselvestotheobservationofcertainprocesseswhichcanbeeasilyinfluencedthroughexternalmeansandwhichterminateinexternalacts。Theexperimentswhichservethispurposearetheso-calledreaction-experiments。Theymaybedescribedintheiressentialsasfollows。Asimpleorcomplexvolitionalprocessisincitedbyanexternalsense-stimulusandthenaftertheoccurrenceofcertainpsychicalprocesseswhichserveinpartasmotives，thevolitionisbroughttoanendbyamotorreaction。

Reaction-experimentshaveasecondandmoregeneralsignificancebesidesthatmentioned。Theyfurnishmeansforthemeasurementoftherateofcertainpsychicalandpsycho-physicalprocesses。Infact，suchmeasurementsarealwaysmadeintheseexperiments。Theprimarysignificanceoftheexperiments，however，consistsinthefactthateachoneincludesavolitionandthatitisthereforepossible，inthisway，bymeansofintrospectiontofollowwithexactnessthesuccessionofpsychicalprocessesinsuchavolition，andatthesametime，bythedeliberatevariationoftheconditions，toinfluencethissuccessioninasystematicmanner。

Thesimplestreaction-experimentthatcanbemadeisasfollows。Ashortinterval(2-3see。)afterasignalthatservestoconcentratetheattention，anexternalstimulusisallowedtoactonsomesense-organ。Atthemomentwhenthestimulusisperceived，amovementthathasbeendetermineduponandpreparedbefore，as，forexample，amovementofthehand，isexecuted。

Thepsychologicalconditionsinthisexperimentcorrespondessentiallytothoseofasimplevolition。Thesensibleimpressionservesasa[p。198]simplemotive，andthisistobefollowedinvariablybyaparticularact。Ifnowwemeasureobjectivelybymeansofeithergraphicorotherchronometricapparatus，theintervalthatelapsesbetweentheactionofthestimulusandtheexecutionofthemovement，itwillbepossible，byfrequentlyrepeatedexperimentsofthesamekind，tobecomethoroughlyacquaintedwiththesubjectiveprocessesthatmakeupthewholereaction，whileatthesametimetheresultsoftheobjectivemeasurementwillfurnishacheekfortheconstancyorpossiblevariationsinthesesubjectiveprocesses。

Thischeekisespeciallyusefulinthosecaseswheresomeconditionintheexperimentandtherebythesubjectivecourseofthevolitionitselfisintentionallymodified。

Suchamodificationmay，indeed，beintroducedeveninthesimpleformoftheexperimentjustdescribed，byvaryingthewayinwhichthereactorprepares，beforetheappearanceofthestimulus，fortheexecutionoftheact。Whentheexpectationisdirectedtowardthestimuluswhichistoserveasthemotive，。theformofreactionknownassensorialresults。When，ontheotherhand，thepreparatoryexpectationisdirectedtowardtheacttobeexecutedinresponsetothemotive，wehavetheso-calledmuscularreaction。Inthefirstcasetheideationalfactoroftheexpectationisapalememory-imageofthefamiliarsense-impression。Whentheperiodofpreparationismoreextended，thisimageoscillatesbetweenalternatingclearnessandobscurity。Theselectiveelementisafeelingofexpectationthatoscillatesinasimilarmannerandisconnectedwithsensationsofstrainfromthesense-organtobeaffected，as，forexample，withtensionofthetympanumoroftheocularmusclesofaccommodationandmovement。Inthesecondcase，ontheotherhand，wherethereactionismuscular，wemayobserveduringtheperiodofpreparatoryexpectationapale，waveringmemory-imageofthemotor[p。199]organthatistoreact(e。g。，thehand)togetherwithstrongsensationsofstraininthesame，andafairlycontinuousfeelingofexpectationconnectedwiththesesensations。Sensorialreaction-timeisontheaverage0。210-0。290sec。

(theshortesttimeisforsound，thelongestforlight)，withameanvariationof0。020sec。forthesingleobservations。Muscularreaction-timeis0。120-0。190

sec。，withameanvariationof0。010see。Thedifferentvaluesofthemeanvariationinthetwocasesarechieflyimportantasobjectivecheeksforthediscriminationoftheseformsofreaction。[1]

12。Byintroducingspecialconditionswemaymakesensorialandmuscularreactionsthestartingpointsforthestudyofthedevelopmentofvolitionsintwodifferentdirections。Sensorialreactionsfurnishthemeansofpassingfromsimpletocomplexvolitionsbecausewecaninthiscaseeasilyinsertdifferentpsychicalprocessesbetweentheperceptionoftheimpressionandtheexecutionofthereaction。Thuswehaveavoluntaryactofrelativelysimplecharacterwhenweallowanactofcognitionordiscriminationtofollowtheperceptionoftheimpressionandthenletthemovementdependonthissecondprocess。Inthiscasenottheimmediateimpressionbuttheideathatresultsfromtheactofcognitionordiscriminationisthemotivefortheacttobeperformed。Thismotiveisonlyoneofagreaterorsmallernumberofequallypossiblemotivesthatcouldhavecomeupinplaceofit；asaresultthereaction-movementtakesonthecharacterofavoluntaryact。Infact，wemay[p。200]observeclearlythefeelingofresolutionantecedenttotheactandalsothefeelingsprecedingthatandconnectedwiththeperceptionoftheimpression。Thisisstillmoreemphaticallythecase，andthesuccessionofideationalandaffectiveprocessesisatthesametimemorecomplicated，whenwebringinstillanotherpsychicalprocess，as，forexample，anassociation，toserveasthedecisivemotivefortheexecutionofthemovement。Finally，thevoluntaryprocessbecomesoneofchoicewhen，insuchexperiments，theactisnotmerelyinfluencedbyapluralityofmotivesinsuchawaythatseveralmustfollowoneanotherbeforeonedeterminestheact，butwhen，inadditiontothat，oneofanumberofpossibledifferentactsisdecideduponaccordingtothemotivepresented。Thistakesplacewhenpreparationsaremadefordifferentmovements，forexample，onewiththeright，anotherwiththelefthand，oronewitheachofthetenfingers，andtheconditionisprescribedforeachmovementthatanimpressionofaparticularqualityshallserveasitsmotive，forexample，theimpressionbluefortherighthand，redfortheleft。

13。Muscularreactions，onthecontrary，maybeusedfollowouttheretrogradationofvolitionalactstoreflexmovement。Inthisformofreactionthepreparatoryexpectationisdirectedentirelytowardstheexternalact，sothatavoluntaryinhibitionorexecutionoftheactinaccordancewiththespecialcharacteroftheimpression，thatis，atransitionfromsimpletocomplexactsofwill，isinthiscaseimpossible。

Ontheotherhand，itiseasybypracticesotohabituateone"sselftotheinvariableconnectionofanimpressionandaparticularmovement，thattheprocessperceptionfadesoutmoreandmoreortakesplacethemotorimpulse，andfinallythemovementbecomeslikeareflexmovement。Thisreductionofvolitionto[p。201]mechanicalprocess，whichinthecaseofsensorialreactionsisneverpossiblefromtheverynatureoftheirconditions，showsitselfintheshorteningoftheobjectivetimetothatobservedforpurereflexes，andinthesubjectivecoincidenceinpointoftimeofimpressionandreaction，whilethecharacteristicfeelingofresolutiongraduallydisappearsentirely。

13a。Thechronometricexperimentsfamiliarinexperimentalpsychologyunderthenameof“reaction-experiments“，areimportantfortworeasons:

first，asaidsintheanalysisofvolitionalprocesses，andsecondly，asmeansfortheinvestigationofthetemporalcourseofpsychicalprocessesingeneral。Thistwofoldimportanceofreaction-experimentsreflectsthecentralimportanceofvolitions。Ontheonehand，thesimplerprocesses，feelings，emotions，andtheirrelatedideas，arecomponentsofacompletevolition；ontheother，allpossibleformsoftheinterconnectionofpsychicalcompoundsmayappearascomponentsofavolition。Volitionalprocessesare，consequently，anappropriatetransitiontotheinterconnectionbetweenpsychicalcompoundstobediscussedinthenextchapter。

Fora“reaction-experiment“whichistobethebasisofananalysisofavolitionalprocessoranyofitscomponentpsychicalprocesses，wemusthavefirstofallexactandsufficientlyfine(readingwithexactnessto1/1000sec。)chronometricapparatus(electricclockorgraphicregister)。Theapparatusmustbesoarrangedthatwecandetermineexactlythemomentatwhichthestimulusactsandthatatwhichthesubjectreacts。

Thiscanbeaccomplishedbyallowingthestimulusitself(sound，light，ortactualstimulus)tocloseanelectriccurrentthatsetsanelectricclockreadingto1/1000sec。，inmotion，andthenallowingtheobserver，bymeansofasimplemovementofthehandwhichraisesatelegraph-key，tobreakthecurrentagainatthemomentinwhichheapprehendsthestimulus。

Inthiswaywemaymeasuresimplereactionsvariedindifferentways(sensorialandmuscularreactions，reactionswithorwithoutprecedingsignals)，orwemaybringintotheprocessvariousotherpsychicalacts(discriminations，cognitions，associations，selectiveprocesses)whichmayberegardedeitherasmotivesforthevolition[p。202]orascomponentsofthegeneralinterconnectionofpsychicalcompounds。Asimplereactionalwaysincludes，alongwiththevolitionalprocess，purelyphysiologicalfactors(conductionofthesensoryexcitationtothebrainandofthemotorexcitationtothemuscle)。If，now，weinsertfurtherpsychicalprocesses(discriminations，cognitions，associations，actsofchoice)，amodificationwhichcanbemadeonlywhensensorialreactionsareemployed，thedurationofclearlydefinablepsychicalprocessesmaybegainedbysubtractingtheintervalfoundforsimplereactionsfromthosefoundforthecompoundreactions。Inthiswayithasbeendeterminedthatthetimerequiredforthecognitionandforthediscriminationofrelativelysimpleimpressions(colors，letters，shortwords)is0。03-

0。05“；thetimeforchoicebetweentwomovements(rightandlefthand)

is0。06“，betweentenmovements，thetenfingers)0。4“，etc。Asalreadyremarked，thevalueofthesefiguresisnottheirabsolutemagnitude，butrathertheirutilityascheeksforintrospection，whileatthesametimewemayapplythisintrospectiveobservationtoprocessessubjecttoconditionswhichareprescribedwithexactnessbymeansofexperimentalmethodsandwhichmaythereforeberepeatedatpleasure。

[1]Thereaction-timesforsensationsoftaste，smell，temperature，andpainarenotreckonedinthefiguresgiven。Theyarealllonger。Thedifferencesare，however，obviouslytobeattributedtopurephysiologicalconditions(slowtransmissionofthestimulationtothenerve-endings，andinthecaseofpainslowercentralconduction)，sothattheyareofnointerestforpsychology。

ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——Wundt(1897)Section15OutlinesofPsychologyWilhelmMaxWundt(1897)TranslatedbyCharlesHubbardJudd(1897)III。INTERCONNECTION

OFPSYCHICALCOMPOUNDS。§；15。CONSCIOUSNESSANDATTENTION

1。Everypsychicalcompoundiscomposedofanumberofpsychicalelementswhichdonotusuallyallbeginorendatexactlythesamemoment。Asaresult，theinterconnectionwhichunitestheelementstoasinglewholealwaysreachesbeyondtheindividualcompounds，sothatdifferentsimultaneousandsuccessivecompoundsareunited，thoughindeedsomewhatmoreloosely。Wecallthisinterconnectionofpsychicalcompoundsconscious。

Consciousness，accordingly，doesnotmeananythingthatexistsapartfrompsychicalprocesses，nordoesitrefermerelytothesumoftheseprocesseswithoutreferencetohowtheyarerelatedtooneanother。Itexpressesthegeneralsynthesisofpsychicalprocesses，inwhichthesinglecompoundsaremarkedoffasmoreintimatecombinations。Astateinwhichthisinterconnectionisinterrupted，asdeepsleeporafaint，iscalledanunconsciousstate；andwespeakof“disturbancesofconsciousness“whenabnormalchangesinthecombinationofpsychicalcompoundsarise，eventhoughthesecompoundsthemselvesshownochangeswhatever。

Consciousnessinthissense，asacomprehensiveinterconnectionofsimultaneousandsuccessivepsychicalprocesses，showsitselfinexperiencefirstofallinthepsychicallifeof[p。204]theindividualasindividualconsciousness。Butwehaveanalogousinterconnectioninthecombinationofindividuals，althoughitislimitedtocertainsidesofmentallife，sothatwemayfurtherincludeunderthemoregeneralconceptconsciousnesstheconceptsofcollectiveconsciousness，ofsocialconsciousness，etc。Forallthesebroaderforms，however，thefoundationistheindividualconsciousness，anditistothisthatwewillfirstturnourattention。

(Forcollectiveconsciousnesssee§；21，14。)

Individualconsciousnessstandsunderthesameexternalconditionsaspsychicalphenomenaingeneral，forwhichitis，indeed，merelyanotherexpression，referringmoreparticularlytothemutualrelationsofthecomponentsofthesephenomenatooneanother。Asthesubstratumforthemanifestationsofanindividualconsciousnesswehaveineverycaseanindividualanimalorganism。Inthecaseofmenandsimilarhigheranimalsthecerebralcortex，inthecellsandfibresofwhichalltheorgansthatstandinrelationtopsychicalprocessesarerepresented，appearsastheimmediateorganofthisconsciousness。Thecompleteinterconnectionofthecorticalelementsmaybelookeduponasthephysiologicalcorrelateoftheinterconnectionofpsychicalprocessesinconsciousness，andthedifferentiationinthefunctionsofdifferentcorticalregionsasthephysiologicalcorrelateofthegreatvarietyofsingleconsciousprocesses。Thedifferentiationoffunctionsinthecentralorganis，indeed，alwaysmerelyrelative；everypsychicalcompoundrequiresthecooperationofnumerouselementsandmanycentralregions。Whenthedestructionofcertaincorticalregionsproducesdefinitedisturbancesinvoluntarymovements，orinsensations，orwhenitinterfereswhichtheformationofcertainclassesofideas，itisperfectlyjustifiabletoconcludethatthisregionfurnishescertainlinksinthechainofpsychical[p。

205]elementsthatareindispensablefortheprocessesinquestion。Theassumptionsoftenmadeonthebasisofthesephenomena，thatthereisinthebrainaspecialorganforthefacultiesofspeechandwriting，orthatvisual，tonal，andverbalideasarestoredinspecialcorticalcells，arenotonlytheresultsofthegrossestphysiologicalmisconceptions，buttheyareabsolutelyirreconcilablewiththepsychologicalanalysisofthesefunctions。Psychologicallyregarded，theseassumptionsarenothingbutmodernrevivalsofthatmostunfortunateformoffaculty-psychologyknownasphrenology。

2a。Thefactsthathavebeendiscoveredinregardtothelocalizationofcertainpsycho-physicalfunctionsinthecortex，arederivedpartlyfrompathologicalandanatomicalobservationsonmenandpartlyfromexperimentsonanimals。Theymaybesummedupasfollows:1)Certaincorticalregionscorrespondtocertainperipheralsensoryandmuscularregions。Thus，thecortexoftheoccipitallobeisconnectedwiththeretina，apartoftheparietallobewiththetactualsurface，andapartofthetemporalwiththeauditoryorgan。Thecentralgangliaofspecialgroupsofmusclesgenerallyliedirectlynexttoorbetweenthesensorycentresfunctionallyrelatedtothem。2)Certaincomplexdisturbanceshavebeendemonstratedwhencertaincorticalregionswhicharenotdirectlyconnectedwithperipheralorgans，butareinsertedbetweenothercentralregions，failtocarryouttheirfunctions。Theonlyrelationofthiskindwhichhasbeenprovedwithcertainty，isthatofacertainregionofthetemporallobetothefunctionsofspeech。Thefrontpartofthisregionisconnectedinparticularwiththearticulationofwords(itsdisturbanceresultsininterferencewithmotorcoordination，so-called“ataxicaphasic“)，thepartfurtherbackisconnectedwiththeformationofword-ideas(itsdisturbancehinderssensorialcoordinationandproducesinthiswaytheso-called“amnesicaphasia“)。Itisalsoobservedthatthesefunctionsareasaruleconfinedentirelytothelefttemporallobeandthatgenerallyapoplecticdisturbancesintherightlobedonotinterferewithspeech，whilethoseintheleftlobedo。Furthermore，inallthesecases，inbothsimpleandcomplexdisturbances，there[p。206]isusuallyagradualrestorationofthefunctionsinthecourseoftime。Thisisprobablyeffectedbythevicariousfunctioningofsome，generallyaneighboringcorticalregioninplaceofthatwhichisdisturbed(indisturbancesofspeech，perhapsitistheopposite，beforeuntrained，sidethatcomesintoplay)。Localizationofothercomplexpsychicalfunctions，suchasprocessesofmemoryandassociation，hasnotyetbeendemonstratedwithcertainty。Thename“psychicalcentres“，appliedtocertaincorticalregionsbymanyanatomists，isforthepresentatleastbasedexclusivelyeitherontheveryquestionableinterpretationofexperimentsonanimals，orelseonthemereanatomicalfactthatnomotororsensoryfibresrunningdirectlytotheseregionscanbefound，andthattheirconnectivefibresingeneralaredevelopedrelativelylate。

Thecortexofthefrontalbrainissucharegion。Inthehumanbrainitisnoticeableforitslargedevelopment。Ithasbeenobservedinmanycasesthatdisturbancesofthispartofthebrainsoonresultinmarkedinabilitytoconcentratetheattentionorinotherintellectualdefectswhicharepossiblyreduceabletothis；andfromtheseobservationsthehypothesishasbeenmadethatthisregionistoberegardedastheseatofthefunctionofapperceptionwhichwillbediscussedlater(4)，andofallthosecomponentsofpsychicalexperienceinwhichasinthefeelings，theunitaryinterconnectionofmentallifefindsitsexpression(comp。p。89)。Thishypothesisrequires，however，afirmerempiricalfoundationthanithasatpresent。Itistobenotedthatthosecaseswhere，incontrastwiththefirstones，mentioned，apartialinjuryofthefrontallobeissustainedwithoutanynoticeabledisturbanceofintelligence，arebynomeansproofsagainstthishypothesis。Thereismuchevidencetoshowthatjusthere，inthehighercentres，localinjuriesmayoccurwithoutanyapparentresults。

Thisisprobablyduetothegreatcomplexityoftheconnectionsandtothevariouswaysinwhichthedifferentelementscan，therefore，taketheplaceofoneanother。Theexpression“centre“inallthesecasesis，ofcourse，employedinthesensethatisjustifiedbythegeneralrelationofpsychicaltophysicalfunctions，thatis，inthesenseofaparallelismbetweenthetwoclassesofelementaryprocesses，theoneregardedfromthepointofviewofthenaturalsciences，theotherfromthatofpsychology(comp。§；1，2and§；22，9)。[p。207]

3。Theinterconnectionofpsychicalprocesses，whichconstituteswhatweunderstandundertheconceptconsciousness，isinpartasimultaneous，inpartasuccessiveinterconnection。Thesumofalltheprocessespresentatagivenmomentisalwaysaunitarywholewhosepartsaremoreorlesscloselyunited。Thisisthesimultaneousinterconnection。

Apresentstateisderiveddirectlyfromthatimmediatelyprecedingeitherthroughthedisappearanceofcertainprocesseswhileotherschangetheircourseandstillothersbegin，or，whenastateofunconsciousnessintervenes，thenewprocessesarebroughtintorelationwiththosethatwerepresentbefore。Thesearesuccessiveinterconnections。Inallthesecasesthescopeofthesinglecombinationsbetweenprecedingandfollowingprocessesdeterminesthestateofconsciousness。Consciousnessgivesplacetounconsciousnesswhenthisinterconnectioniscompletelyinterrupted，anditismoreincompletetheloosertheconnectionoftheprocessesofthemomentwiththosepreceding，Thus，afteraperiodofunconsciousnessthenormalstateofconsciousnessisgenerallyonlyslowlyrecoveredthroughagradualreestablishmentofrelationswithearlierexperiences。

Sowecometodistinguishgradesofconsciousness。Thelowerlimit，orzerograde，isunconsciousness。Thiscondition，whichconsistsinanabsoluteabsenceofallpsychicalinterconnections，isessentiallydifferentfromthedisappearanceofsinglepsychicalcontentsfromconsciousness。Thelatteriscontinuallytakingplaceintheflowofmentalprocesses。Complexideasandfeelingsandevensingleelementsofthesecompoundsmaydisappear，andnewonestaketheirplaces。Thiscontinuousappearanceanddisappearanceofelementaryandcompositeprocessesinconsciousnessiswhatmakesupitssuccessiveinterconnection。

Withoutthischange，suchaninterconnectionwould，ofcourse，beimpossible。

Anypsychicalelementthathasdisappearedfromconsciousness，istobe[p。208]calledunconsciousinthesensethatweassumethepossibilityofitsrenewal，thatinitsreappearanceintheactualinterconnectionofpsychicalprocesses。Ourknowledgeofanelementthathasbecomeunconsciousdoesnotextendbeyondthispossibilityofitsrenewal。Forpsychology，therefore，ithasnomeaningexceptasadispositionfortheriseoffuturecomponentsofpsychicalprocesseswhichareconnectedwithothersbeforepresent。Assumptionsastothestateofthe“unconscious“orasto“unconsciousprocesses“ofanykindwhicharethoughtofasexistingalongwiththeconsciousprocessesofexperience，areentirelyunproductiveforpsychology。Thereare，ofcourse，physicalconcomitantsofthepsychicaldispositionsmentioned，ofwhichsomecanbedirectlydemonstrated，someinferredfromvariousexperiences。Thesephysicalconcomitantsaretheeffectswhichpracticeproducesonallorgans，especiallythoseofthenervoussystem。Asauniversalresultofpracticeweobserveafacilitationofactionwhichrendersarepetitionoftheprocesseasier。Tobesure，wedonotknowanydetailsinregardtothechangesthatareeffectedinthestructureofthenervouselementsthroughpractice，butwecanrepresentthemtoourselvesthroughverynaturalanalogieswithmechanicalprocesses，such，forexample，asthereductionoffrictionresultingfromtherubbingoftwosurfacesagainsteachother。

Itwasnotedinthecaseoftemporalideas，thatthememberofaseriesofsuccessiveideaswhichisimmediately，presentinourperception，hasthemostfavorableposition。Similarlyinthesimultaneousinterconnectionofconsciousness，forexampleinacompoundclangorinaseriesofnewobjects，certainsinglecomponentsarefavoredabovetheothers。Inbothcaseswedesignatethedifferencesinperceptionasdifferencesincleannessanddistinctness。Clearness，isthe，relativelyfavorablecomprehensionoftheobjectinitself[p。209]distinctnessthesharpdiscriminationfromotherobjects，whichisgenerallyconnectedwithclearness。Thestatewhichaccompaniesthecleargraspofanypsychical。

contentandischaracterizedbyaspecialfeeling，wecallattention。Theprocessthroughwhichanysuchcontentisbroughttoclearcomprehensionwecallapperception。Incontrastwiththis，perceptionwhichisnotaccompaniedbyastateofattention，wedesignateapprehension。Thosecontentsofconsciousnessuponwhichtheattentionisconcentratedarespokenof，aftertheanalogyoftheexternalopticalfixationpoint，asthefixation-pointofconsciousness，ortheinnerfixation-point。Ontheotherhand，thewholecontentofconsciousnessatanygivenmomentiscalledthefieldofconscious。Whenapsychicalprocesspassesintoanunconsciousstatewespeakofitssinkingbelowthethresholdofconsciousnessandwhensuchaprocessariseswesayitappearsabovethethresholdofconsciousness。Theseareallfigurativeexpressionsandmustnotbeunderstoodliterally。Theyareuseful，however，becauseofthebrevityandclearnesstheypermitinthedescriptionofconsciousprocesses。

5。Ifwetrytodescribethetrainofpsychicalcompoundsintheirinterconnectionwiththeaidofthesefigurativeexpressions，wemaysaythatitismadeupofacontinualcomingandgoing。Atfirstsomecompoundcomesintothefieldofconsciousnessandthenadvancesintotheinnerfixation-point，fromwhichitreturnstothefieldofconsciousnessbeforedisappearingentirely。Besidesthistrainofpsychicalcompoundswhichareapperceived，thereisalsoacomingandgoingofotherswhicharemerelyapprehended，thatis，enterthefieldofconsciousnessandpassoutagainwithoutreachingtheinnerfixation-point。Boththeapperceivedandtheapprehendedcompoundsmayhavedifferentgradesofclearness。Inthecaseofthefirstclassthisappearsin[p。210]thefactthattheclearnessanddistinctnessofapperceptioningeneralisvariableaccordingtothestateofconsciousness。Toillustrate:itcaneasilybeshownthatwhenoneandthesameimpressionisapperceivedseveraltimesinsuccessioniftheotherconditionsremainthesame，thesuccessiveapperceptionsareusuallyclearerandmoredistinct。The，differentdegreesofclearnessinthecaseofcompoundsthat，merelyapprehended，maybeobservedmosteasilywhentheimpressionsarecomposite。Itisthenfound，especiallywhentheimpressionslastbutaninstant，thatevenhere，:whereallthecomponentsareobscurefromthefirst，thattherearestilldifferentgradations。

Someseemtorisemoreabovethethresholdofconsciousness，someless。

6。Theserelationscannotbedeterminedthroughchanceintrospections，butonlybysystematicexperimentalobservations。

Thebestkindsofconsciouscontentstouseforsuchobservationsareideasbecausetheycanbeeasilyproducedatanytimethroughexternalimpressions。

Now，inanytemporalidea，asalreadyremarked(§；11，p。155)，thosecomponentswhichbelongtothepresentmomentareinthefixation-pointofconsciousness。Thoseoftheprecedingimpressionswhichwerepresentshortlybefore，arestillinthefieldofconsciousness，whilethosewhichwerepresentlongerbefore，haveappearedfromconsciousnessentirely。

Aspacialidea，onthe，otherhand，whenithasonlyalimitedextent，maybeapperceivedatonceinitstotality。Ifitismorecomposite，thenitspartstoomustpasssuccessivelythroughtheinnerfixation-pointiftheyaretobeclearlyapprehended。Itfollows，therefore，thatcompositespacialideas(especiallymomentaryvisualimpressions)arepeculiarlywellsuitedtofurnishameasureoftheamountofcontentthatcanbeapperceivedinasingleact，orofthescopeofattention；while，compositetemporalideas(forexample，rhythmicalauditoryimpressions，[p。

211]hammer-strokes)maybeusedformeasuringtheamountofallthecontentsthatcanenterintoconsciousnessatagivenmoment，orthescopeofconsciousness。Experimentsmadeinthiswaygive，underdifferentconditions，ascopeoffrom6to12simpleimpressionsforattentionandof16to40

suchimpressionsforconsciousness。Thesmallerfiguresareforthoseimpressionswhichdonotuniteatalltoideationalcombinations，oratmostveryincompletely，thelargerforthoseinwhichtheelementscombineasfaraspossibletocompositeideas。

6a。Themostaccuratewayofdeterminingthescopeofattentionistousespacialimpressionsofsight，forinsuchcasesitisveryeasy，bymeansofanelectricspark，orthefallofascreenmadewithanopeninginthecentre，toexposetheobjectsforandistantandinsuchawaythattheyalllieintheregionofclearestvision。Thisgivesusphysiologicalconditionsthatdonotpreventtheapperceptionofagreaternumberofimpressionsthanitispossibletoapperceivebecauseofthelimitedscopeofattention。Intheseexperimentstheremustbeapointforfixationinthemiddleofthesurfaceonwhichtheimpressionslie，beforethemomentaryillumination。Immediatelyaftertheexperiment，ifitisproperlyarranged，theobserverknowsthatthenumberofobjectswhichwereclearlyseeninaphysiologicalsense，isgreaterthanthenumberincludedwithinthescopeofattention。When，forexample，amomentaryimpressionismadeupofletters，itispossible，bycallingupamemory-imageoftheimpression，toreadafterwardssomeofthelettersthatwereonlyindistinctlyapprehendedatthemomentofillumination。Thismemory-image，however，isclearlydistinguishedintimefromtheimpressionitself，sothatthedeterminationofthescopeofattentionisnotdisturbedbyit。Carefulintrospectioneasilysucceedsinfixatingthestateofconsciousnessatthemomenttheimpressionarrives，andindistinguishingthisfromthesubsequentactsofmemory，whicharealwaysseparatedfromitbyanoticeableinterval。Experimentsmadeinthiswayshowthatthescopeofattentionisbynomeansaconstantmagnitude，butthat，even[p。212]whentheconcentrationoftheattentionisapproximatelyatitsmaximum，itsscopedependsinpartonthesimplicityorcomplexityoftheimpressions，inpartontheirfamiliarity。Thesimplestspacialimpressionsarearbitrarilydistributedpoints。Oftheseamaximumofsixcanbeapperceivedatonetime。Whentheimpressionsaresomewhatmorecomplexbutofafamiliarcharacter，suchassimplelines，figures，andletters，threeorfourofthemaregenerallyapperceivedsimultaneously，or，underfavorableconditions，evenfive。Thefiguresjustgivenholdforvision；fortouchthesamelimitsseemtoholdonlyinthecaseofpoints。Sixsuchsimpleimpressionscan，underfavorableconditions，beapperceivedinthesameinstant。Whentheimpressionsarefamiliarbutcomplex，evenforvision，thenumberofideasdecreases，whilethatofthesingleelementsincreasesverymarkedly。Thus，wecanapperceivetwooreventhreefamiliarmonosyllabicwords，whichcontaininalltenortwelvesingleletters。Underanycircumstances，then，theassertionoftenmade，thattheattentioncanbeconcentratedononlyoneideaatatime，isfalse。

Then，too，theseobservationsoverthrowtheassumptionsometimesaccepted，thattheattentioncansweepcontinuouslyandwithgreatrapidityoveragreatnumberofsingleideas。Intheexperimentdescribed，iftheattemptismadetofillupfrommemorytheimagewhichisclearlyperceivedaninstantaftertheimpression，averynoticeableintervalisrequiredtobringintoclearconsciousnessanimpressionthatwasnotapperceivedatfirst；andintheprocessthefirstimagealwaysdisappearsfromattention。Thesuccessivemovementofattentionoveranumberofobjectsis，accordingly，adiscontinuousprocess，madeupofanumberofseparateactsofapperceptionfollowingoneanother。Thisdiscontinuityisduetothefactthateverysingleapperceptionismadeupofaperiodofincreasingfollowedofbyaperioddecreasingstrain。Theperiodofmaximaltensionbetweenthetwo，mayvaryconsiderablyinitsduration。

Inthecaseofmomentary，andrapidlychangingimpressions，itisverybrief；when，ontheotherhand，weconcentrateonparticularobjects，itislonger。But，evenwhentheattentionisthusconcentratedonobjectsofaconstantcharacter，aperiodicinterruption，duetothealternatingrelaxationandrenewedconcentration，alwaysappears。Thismaybe[p。213]

easilyobserved，evenintheordinaryactionofattention。Buthere，too，wegainmoredetailedinformationthroughexperiments。Ifweallowaweak，continuousimpressiontoactonasense-organandremovesofaraspossibleallotherstimuli，itwillbeobservedwhentheattentionisconcentrateduponitthatatcertain，generallyirregular，intervalstheimpressionbecomesforashorttimeindistinct，orevenappears。tofadeoutentirely，onlytoappearagainthenextmoment。Thiswaveringbegins，whentheimpressionsareveryweak，after3-6“；whentheyaresomewhatstronger，after18-24“。

Thesevariationsarereadilydistinguishedfromchangesintheintensityoftheimpressionitself，asmaybeeasilydemonstratedwhen，inthecourseoftheexperiment，thestimulusispurposelyweakenedorinterrupted。Thereareessentiallytwocharacteristicsthatdistinguishthesubjectivevariationsfromthoseduetothechangesinthestimulus。First，solongastheimpressionmerelypassesbackandforthfromtheobscurefieldofconsciousnesstotheinnerfixation-point，thereisalwaysanideaofitscontinuance，justastherewasintheexperimentswithmomentaryimpressionsanindefiniteandobscureideaofthecomponentswhichwerenotapperceived。Secondly，theoscillationsofattentionareattendedbycharacteristicfeelingsandsensationswhichareentirelyabsentwhenthechangesareobjective。Thecharacteristicfeelingsarethoseofexpectationandactivity，whichregularlyincreasewiththeconcentrationofattentionanddecreasewithitsrelaxation。

Thesewillbediscussedmorefullylater。Thesensationscomefromthesense-organaffected，oratleastemanateindirectlyfromit。Theyconsistinsensationsoftensioninthetympanum，orinthoseofaccommodationandconvergence，etc。Thesetwoseriesofcharacteristicsdistinguishtheconceptsoftheclearnessanddistinctnessofpsychicalcontentsfromthatoftheintensityoftheirsensationalelements。Astrongimpressionmaybeobscureandaweakoneclear。Theonlycausalrelationbetweenthesetwodifferentconceptsistobefoundinthefactthatingeneralthestrongerimpressionsforcethemselvesmoreupontheapperception。Whetherornottheyarereallymoreclearlyapperceived，dependsontheotherconditionspresentatthemoment。Thesameistrueoftheadvantageswhichthosepartsofavisualimpressionhavethatfallwithintheregionofclearestvision。

Asarule，thefixated[p。214]objectsarealsotheonesapperceived。

But，intheexperimentswithmomentaryimpressionsdescribedabove，itcanbeshownthatthisinterconnectionmaybebrokenup。Thishappenswhenwevoluntarilyconcentrateourattentiononapointintheeccentricregionsofthefieldofvision。Theobjectwhichisobscurelyseenthenbecomestheonewhichisclearlyideated。

6b。Inthesamewaythatmomentaryspacialimpressionsareusedtodeterminethescopeofattention，wemayusethosewhichsucceedoneanotherintime，asameasureforthescopeofconsciousness。Inthiscasewestartwiththeassumptionthataseriesofimpressionscanbeunitedinasingleunitaryideaonlywhentheyarealltogetherinconsciousness，atleastforonemoment。Ifwelistentoaseriesofhammer-strokes，itisobviousthatwhilethepresentsoundisapperceived，thoseimmediatelyprecedingitarestillinthefieldofconsciousness。

Theirclearnessdiminishes，however，justinproportiontotheirdistanceintimefromtheapperceivedimpression，andthoselyingbeyondacertainlimitdisappearfromconsciousnessentirely。Ifwecandeterminethislimit，weshallhaveadirectmeasureforthescopeofconsciousnessunderthespecialconditionsgivenintheexperiment。Asameansforthedeterminationofthislimitwemayusetheabilitytocomparetemporalideasthatfollowoneanotherimmediately。Solongassuchanideaispresentinconsciousnessasasingleunitarywhole，wecancompareasucceedingideawithitanddecidewhetherthetwoarealikeornot。Ontheotherhand，suchacomparisonisabsolutelyimpossiblewhentheprecedingtemporalseriesisnotaunitarywholeforconsciousness，thatis，whenapartofitsconstituentshavepassedintounconsciousnessbeforetheendisreached。If，then，wepresenttwoseriesofstrokes，suchascanbeproduced，forexample，byametronome，oneimmediatelyaftertheother，markingofeachseriesbyasignalatitsbeginning，as，forexample，withabellstroke，wecanjudgedirectlyfromtheimpression，solongastheycanbegraspedassingleunitsinconsciousness，whetherthe，twoseriesarealikeornot。Ofcourse，insuchexperimentscountingofthestrokesmustbestrictlyavoided。judgmentsitmaybenoticedthattheimpressionproducedbytheaffectiveelementsofthetemporalbefore(p。156)。Everystrokeinthesecondseriesispreceded[p。215]byafeelingofexpectationcorrespondingtotheanalogousstrokeofthefirstseries，sothateverystroketoomanyortoofewproducesafeelingofdisappointmentattendingthedisturbanceoftheexpectation。

Itfollowsthatitisnotnecessaryforthetwosuccessiveseriestobepresentinconsciousnessatthesametimeinorderthattheymaybecompared；

butwhatisrequiredistheunionofalltheimpressionsofoneseriestogetherinasingleunitaryidea。Therelativelyfixedboundaryofthescopeofconsciousnessisclearlyshowninthefactthatthelikenessoftwotemporalideasisalwaysrecognizedwithcertaintysolongastheydonotpasstheboundthatholdsfortheconditionsunderwhichtheyaregiven，whilethejudgementbecomesabsolutelyuncertainwhenthislimitisoncecrossed。Theextentofthescopeofconsciousnessasfoundinmeasurementsmadewhentheconditionsofattentionremainthesame，dependspartlyontherateofthesuccessiveimpressionsandpartlyontheirmoreorlesscompleterhythmicalcombination。Whentherateofsuccessionisslowerthanabout4“，itbecomesimpossibletocombinesucessiveimpressionstoatemporalidea；bythetimeanewimpressionarrives，theprecedingonehasalreadydisappearedfromconsciousness。Whentheratepassestheupperlimitofabout0。18“，theformationofdistinctlydefinedtemporalideasisimpossiblebecausetheattentioncannotfollowtheimpressionsanylonger。Themostfavorablerateisasuccessionofstrokesevery0。2-0。3“。

Withthisrate，andwiththesimplestrhythm，whichgenerallyarisesofitselfwhentheperceptionisuninfluencedbyanyspecialobjectiveconditions，the2/8-time8doubleor16singleimpressionscanbejustgraspedtogether。

Thebestmeasurefortheapprehensionofthegreatestpossiblenumberofsingleimpressionsisthe4/4measurewiththestrongaccentonthefirststrokeandthemediumaccentonthefifth。Inthiscaseamaximumoffivefeetorfortysingleimpressionscanbegraspedatonce。Ifthesefiguresarecomparedwiththoseobtainedwhenthescopeofattentionwasmeasured，puttingsimpleandcompoundtemporalimpressionsequaltothecorrespondingspacialimpressions，wefindthatthescopeofconsciousnessisaboutfourtimesasgreatasthatofattention。[p。216]

7。Besidesthepropertiesofclearnessanddistinctness，whichbelongtoconsciouscontentsinthemselvesorintheir，mutualrelationstooneanother，thereareregularlyotherswhichareimmediatelyrecognizedasaccompanyingprocesses。Thesearepartlyaffectiveprocessesthatarecharacteristicforparticularformsofapprehensionandapperception，partly，sensationsofasomewhatvariablecharacter。Especiallythewaysinwhichpsychicalcontentsenterthefieldandfixation-pointofconsciousnessvaryaccordingtothedifferentconditionsunderwhichthisentrancemaytakeplace。Whenanypsychicalprocessrisesabovethethresholdofconsciousness，theaffectiveelements，assoonastheyarestrongenough，arewhatfirstbecomenoticeable。Theybegintoforcethemselvesenergeticallyintothefixation-pointofconsciousnessbeforeanythingisperceivedoftheideationalelements。Thisisthecasewhethertheimpressionsareneworrevivalsofearlierprocesses。Thisiswhatcausesthepeculiarstatesofmindwhichwearenotexactlyabletoaccountfor，some-timesofapleasurableorunpleasurablecharacter，sometimespredominantlystatesofstrainedexpectation。Inthislastcasethesuddenentranceoftheideationalelementsbelongingtothefeelings，intothescopeoftheattention，isaccompaniedbyfeelingsofrelieforsatisfaction。Whenwearetryingtorecallsomethingthathasbeenforgotten，thesameaffectivestatemayarise。Oftenthereisvividlypresentinsuchacase，besidestheregularfeelingofstrain，thespecialaffectivetoneoftheforgottenidea，althoughtheideaitselfstillremainsinthebackgroundofconsciousness。Inasimilarmanner，asweshallseelater(§；16)，theclearapperceptionofideasinactsofcognitionandrecognitionisalwaysprecededbyspecialfeelings。Similaraffectivestatesmaybeproducedexperimentallybythemomentaryilluminationofafieldofvisioninwhichthereareimpressionsofthestrongest[p。217]possibleaffectivetoneintheregionofindirectvision。Alltheseexperiencesseemtoshowthateverycontentofconsciousnesshassomeinfluenceonattention。Itshowsthisregularlyinitsownaffectivecoloring，partlyinthefeelingsregularlyconnectedwithactsofattention。Thewholeeffectoftheseobscurecontentsofconsciousnessontheattentionfuses，accordingtothegenerallawofthesynthesisofaffectivecomponents(p。159)，withthefeelingsattendingtheapperceivedcontentstoformasingletotalfeeling。

8。Whenpsychicalcontententersthefixationpointofconsciousness，newandpeculiaraffectiveprocessesareaddedtothosethathavebeendescribed。Thesenewfeelingsmaybeofavarietyofkinds，accordingtothedifferentconditionsattendingthisentranceintothefixation-point。Theconditionsareoftwoclasses，andareinterconnectedforthemostpartwiththeabovedescribedpreparatoryaffectiveinfluencesofthecontentnotyetapperceived。

First，thenewcontentforcesitselfontheattentionsuddenlyandwithoutpreparatoryaffectiveinfluences；thiswecallpassageapperception。Whilethecontentofconsciousnessisbecomingclearerbothinitsideationalandaffectiveelements，thereisfirstofallaconcomitantfeelingofpassivereceptivity，whichisadepressingfeeling，andgenerallystrongerthemoreintensethepsychicalprocesses，andthemorerapiditsrise。Thisfeelingsoonsinksandthengivesplacetoanantagonistic，excitingfeelingofactivity。Thereareconnectedwithboththesefeelingscharacteristicsensationsinthemusclesofthesense-organfromwhichtheideationalcomponentsoftheprocessproceed。ThefeelingofreceptivityisgenerallyaccompaniedbyatransientsensationOfrelaxation，thatofactivitybyasucceedingsensationofstrain。

Secondly，thenewcontentisprecededbythepreparatory[p。218]affectiveinfluencesmentionedabove(7)，andasaresulttheattentionisconcentrateduponitevenbeforeitarrives；

thiswecallactiveapperception。Insuchacasetheapperceptionofthecontentisprecededbyafeelingofexpectation，sometimesoflonger，sometimesofshorterduration。Thisfeelingisgenerallyoneofstrainandmayatthesametimebeoneofexcitement；itmayalsohavepleasurableorunpleasurablefactors，accordingtoitsideationalelements。

Thisfeelingofexpectationisusuallyaccompaniedbyfairlyintensesensationsoftensioninthemusclesofthesense-organaffected。Atthemomentinwhichthecontentarisesinclearconsciousness，thisfeelinggivesplacetoafeelingoffulfillmentwhichisgenerallyveryshortandalwayshasthecharacterofafeelingofrelief。Undercircumstancesitmayalsobedepressingorexciting，pleasurableorunpleasurable。Afterthisfeelingoffulfillmentwehaveatoncethatofactivity——thesamethatappearedatthecloseofpassiveapperception，andishere，too，unitedwithanincreaseinfeelingsofstrain。

8a。Theexperimentalobservationofthedifferentformsofapperceptioncanbecarriedoutbestwiththeaidofthereaction-experimentsdescribedin§；14，11sq。Passiveapperceptionmaybestudiedbytheuseofunexpected，andactivebytheuseofexpectedimpressions。Atthesametimeitwillbeobservedthatbetweenthesetypicaldifferencesthereareintermediatestages。Eitherthepassiveformwillapproachtheactivebecauseoftheweaknessofthefirststage，ortheactivewillapproachthepassiveformbecauseinthesuddenrelaxationoftheexpectationthecontrastbetweentheexpectationandthereliefanddepressionwhichcomeinthesucceedingfeelingoffulfillment，ismoremarkedthanusual。Inrealitywehaveeverywherecontinuouslyinterconnectedprocesseswhichareoppositecharacteronlyinextremecases。

9。Iftheaffectivesideoftheseprocessesofattentionaxemorecloselyexamined，itisobviousthattheyareexactlythesameastheaffectivecontentofallvolitionalprocesses。[p。

219]

Atthesametimeitisclearthatinitsessentialcharacterpassiveapperceptioncorrespondstoasimpleimpulsiveact，whiletheactiveformcorrespondstoacomplexvoluntaryact。Inthefirstcasewemayevidentlyregardthepsychicalcontentthatforcesitselfuponattentionwithoutpreparation，asthesinglemotivewhich，withoutanyconflictwithothermotives，givesrisetotheactofapperception。

Theactisheretooconnectedwiththefeelingofactivitycharacteristicofallvolitionalacts。Inthecaseofactiveapperception，ontheotherhand，otherpsychicalcontentswiththeiraffectiveelementstendtoforcethemselvesupontheattentionduringthepreparatoryaffectivestages，sothattheactofapperceptionwhenitfinallyisperformedisoftenrecognizedasavoluntaryprocessorevenasaselectiveprocesswhentheconflictbetweendifferentcontentscomesclearlyintoconsciousness。Theexistenceofsuchselectiveactsunderthecircumstancesmentionedwasrecognizedeveninolderpsychologywhere“voluntaryattention“wasspokenof。Butheretoo，asinthecaseofexternalvolitionalacts，willstoodalone；

therewasnoexplanationofitbyitsantecedents，forthecentralpointinthedevelopment，namely，thefactthatso-calledinvoluntaryattentionisonlyasimplerformofinternalvolition，wasentirelyoverlooked。Then，too，infullaccordwiththemethodsoftheoldfaculty-theory“attention“

and“will“wereregardedasdifferent，sometimesasrelated，sometimesasmutuallyexcludingpsychicalforces，whilethetruthevidentlyisthatthesetwoconceptsrefertothesameclassofpsychicalprocesses。Theonlydifferenceisthatprocessesofapperceptionandattentionarethosewhichoccuronlyasso-calledinternalacts，thatis，havenoexternaleffectsexceptindirectlywhentheyleadtootherprocesses。

10。Connectedwiththeseinternalvolitionalacts，whichwecallprocessesofattention，theretakesplaceaformation[p。220]ofcertainconceptsofthehighestimportanceforallpsychical，development。Thisistheformationoftheconceptsubjectandthecorrelatepresuppositionofobjectsasindependentrealitiesstandingoveragainstthesubject。Thiscanbecarriedoutinitslogicalformonlywiththeaidofscientificreflection，stillithasitssubstratumintheprocessesofattention。

Eveninimmediateexperiencethereisadivisionbetweencomponentsofthisexperience。Ontheonehandarethosewhicharearrangedinspacewithrelationtothepointoforientationmentionedabove(p。131)，andarecalledeitherobjects，thatis，somethingoutsidetheperceivingsubject，or，whenweattendtothemodeoftheirriseinconsciousness，ideas，thatissomethingwhichthesubjectperceives。

Ontheotherhand，therearethosecontentsofexperiencewhichdonotbelongtothisspacialorder，thoughtheyarecontinuallybroughtintorelationwithitthroughtheirqualityandintensity。Theselattercontents，aswesawin§；12-14，areintimatelyinterconnected。Feelingsarepartsofemotionsandemotionsaretobeconsideredascomponentsofvolitionalprocesses。Theprocess，mayendbeforeitisfullycompleted，asoftenwhenafeelinggivesrisetononoticeableemotion，orwhenanemotionfadesoutwithoutreallycausingthevolitionalactforwhichpreparedtheway。Alltheseaffectiveprocessesmay，accordingly，besubsumedunderthegeneralconceptvolitionalprocess。Thisisthecompleteprocessofwhichthetwoothersaremerelycomponentsofsimplerormorecomplexcharacter。Fromthispointofviewwecaneasilyunderstandhowitisthatevensimplefeelingscontain，intheextremesbetheyvary，avolitionaldirection；andexpress，inthesamewaytheamountofvolitionalenergypresentatagivenmoment；andfinally，correspondtocertainparticularphasesofthevolitionalprocessitself。Thedirectionofvolitionisobviouslyindicatedbythepleasurableorunpleasurabledirectionsof[p。221]feelings，whichcorresponddirectlytosomesortofefforttoreachsomethingortoavoidit。Theenergyofvolitionfindsitsexpressioninthearousingandsubduingdirectionsoffeelings，whiletheoppositephasesofavolitionalprocessarerelatedtothedirectionsofstrainandrelaxation。

11。Thus，volitionprovestobethefundamentalfactfromwhichallthoseprocessesarisewhicharemadeupoffeelings。Then，too，intheprocessofapperception，whichisfoundthroughpsychologicalanalysistohaveallthecharacteristicsofavolitionalact，wehaveadirectrelationbetweenthisfundamentalfactandtheideationalcontentsofexperiencewhicharisefromthespacialarrangementofsensations。Now，volitionalprocessesareapprehendedasunitaryprocessesandasbeinguniformincharacterinthemidstofallthevariationsintheircomponents。Asaresulttherearisesanimmediatefeelingofthisunitaryinterconnection，whichismostintimatelyconnectedwiththefeelingofactivitythataccompaniesallvolition，andtheniscarriedovertoallconsciouscontentsbecauseoftheirrelationtowill，asmentionedabove。Thisfeelingoftheinterconnectionofallsinglepsychicalexperiencesiscalledthe“ego“。Itisafeeling，notanideaasitisoftencalled。Likeallfeelings，however，itisconnectedwithcertainsensationsandideas。Theideationalcomponentsmostcloselyrelatedtotheegoarethecommonsensationsandtheideaofone"sownbody。

Thatpartoftheaffectiveandideationalcontentswhichseparatesofffromthetotalityofconsciousnessandfusescloselywiththefeelingoftheego，iscalledself-consciousness。Itisnomoreareality，apartfromtheprocessesofwhichitismadeup，thanisconsciousnessingeneral，butmerelyPointsouttheinterconnectionoftheseprocesses，whichfurthermore，especiallyintheirideationalcomponents，canneverbesharplydistinguishedfromtherestofconsciousness。This[p。222]showsitselfmostofallinthefactthattheideaofone"sownbodysometimesfuseswiththefeelingoftheego，sometimesisdistinctfromitastheideaofanobject，andthatingeneralself-consciousnessinitsdevelopmentalwaystendstoreduceitselftoitsaffectivebasis。

12。Thisseparationofself-consciousnessfromtheothercontentsofconsciousnessalsogivesrisetothediscriminationofsubjectandobjects。Thisdiscriminationwaspreparedfor，tobesure，bythecharacteristicdifferencesamongtheoriginalcontentsofconsciousness，butisfullycarriedoutonlyasaconsequenceofthisseparation。Theconceptsubjecthasaccordinglyasaresultofitspsychologicaldevelopmentthreedifferentmeaningsofdifferentscope，eachofwhichmayatdifferenttimesbetheoneemployed。Initsnarrowestsensethesubjectistheinterconnectionofvolitionalprocesseswhichfindsexpressioninthefeelingoftheego。Inthenextwidersenseitincludestherealcontentofthesevolitionalprocessestogetherwiththefeelingsandemotionsthatpreparetheirway。Finally，initswidestsignificanceitembracestheconstantideationalsubstratumofthesesubjectiveprocesses，thatis，thebodyoftheindividualastheseatofthecommonsensations。

Inthelineofdevelopmentthewidestsignificanceistheoldest，andinactualpsychicalexperiencethenarrowestiscontinuallygivingwaytoareturnofoneoftheothersbecauseitcanbefullyattainedonlythroughconceptualabstraction。Thishighestformis，then，inrealitymerelyakindoflimitstowardswhichtheself-consciousnessmayapproachmoreorlessclosely。

12a。Thisdiscriminationofsubjectandobjects，ortheegoandtheouterworldasitiscommonlyexpressedbyreducingfirstconcepttoitsoriginalaffectivesubstratumandthesecondtogetherinageneralconcept——thisdiscriminationofalltheconsiderationsresponsibleforthedualism[p。223]whichfirstgainedcurrencyinthepopularviewofthingsandwasthencarriedoverintothephilosophicalsystems。Itisonthisgroundthatpsychologycomestobesetoveragainsttheothersciences，inparticularthenaturalsciences，asascienceofthesubject(§；1，3a。)Thisviewcouldberightonlyundertheconditionsthatthediscriminationoftheegofromtheouterworldwereafactprecedingallexperienceandthattheconceptssubjectandobjectscouldbeunequivocallydistinguishedonceforall。Butneitheroftheseconditionsisfulfilled。Self-consciousnessdependsonawholeseriesofpsychicalprocessesofwhichitistheproduct，nottheproducer。

Subjectandobjectare，therefore，neitheroriginallynorinlaterdevelopmentabsolutelydifferentcontentsofexperience，buttheyareconceptswhichareduetothereflectionresultingfromtheinterrelationsofthevariouscomponentsoftheabsolutelyunitarycontentofourimmediateexperience。

13。Theinterconnectionofpsychicalprocesseswhichmakesupconsciousness，necessarilyhasitsdeepestspringintheprocessesofcombinationwhicharecontinuallytakingplacebetweentheelementsofthesinglecontentsofexperience。Suchprocessesareoperativeintheformationofsinglepsychicalcompoundsandtheyarewhatgiverisetothesimultaneousunityofthestateofconsciousnesspresentatagivenmomentandalsotothecontinuityofsuccessivestates。Theseprocessesofcombinationareofthemostvariouskinds；eachonehasitsindividualcoloring，whichisneverexactlyreproducedinanysecondcase。Still，themostgeneraldifferencesarethoseexhibitedbytheattentioninthepassivereceptionofimpressionsandtheactiveapperceptionofthesame。

Asshortnamesforthesedifferencesweusethetermassociationtoindicateaprocessofcombinationinapassivestateofattention，andapperceptivecombinationtoindicateacombinationinwhichtheattentionisactive。

ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——Wundt(1897)Section16OutlinesofPsychologyWilhelmMaxWundt(1897)TranslatedbyCharlesHubbardJudd(1897)III。INTERCONNECTION

OFPSYCHICALCOMPOUNDS。§；16。ASSOCIATIONS。

1。Theconceptassociationhasundergone，inthedevelopmentofpsychology，anecessaryandveryradicalchangeinmeaning。Tobesure，thischangehasnotbeenacceptedeverywhere，andtheoriginalmeaningisstillretained，especiallybythosepsychologistswhosupport，eventoday，thefundamentalpositionsonwhichtheassociation-psychologygrewup(§；2，p。13sq。)。Thispsychologyispredominantlyintellectualistic，paysattentiontonothingbuttheideationalcontentsofconsciousnessand，accordinglimitstheconceptofassociationtothecombinationsofideas。HartleyandHume，thetwofoundersofassociation-psychology，spokeof“associationofideas“inthislimitedsense。[1]Ideaswereregardedasobjects，oratleastasprocessesthatcouldberepeatedinconsciousnesswithexactlysamecharacterasthatinwhichtheywerepresentatfirst(p。13，8)。Thisledtotheviewthatassociationwasaprinciplefortheexplanationoftheso-called“reproduction“ofideas。

Furthermore，itwasnotconsiderednecessarytoaccountfortheriseofcompositeideaswiththeaidofpsychologicalanalysis，sinceitwasassumedthatthephysicalunionofimpressionsinsense-perceptionwassufficienttoexplainthepsychologicalcompositionandsotheconceptofassociationwaslimitedtothoseformsofso-calledreproductioninwhichtheassociatedideassucceedoneanotherintime。ForthediscriminationofthechiefformsofsuccessiveassociationsAristotle"slogicalschemeforthememory-processeswasaccepted，andinaccordancewiththeprincipleclassificationbyoppositesthefollowingformswerediscriminated:[p。

225]associationbysimilarityandcontrast，andassociationbysimultaneityandsuccession。Theseclass-conceptsgainedbyalogicaldichotomicprocessweredignifiedwiththenameof“lawofassociations“。Modernpsychologyhasgenerallysoughttoreducethenumberoftheselaws。Contrastisasaspecialformofsimilarity，foronlythoseconceptsareassociatedwhichbelongtothesameclass；andassociationsbysimultaneityandsuccessionincludedundercontiguity。Contiguityisthenregardedasouterassociationandcontrastedwithinnerassociationbysimilarity。Somepsychologistsbelieveitpossibletoreducetwoformstoasingle，stillmorefundamental，“lawofassociation“bymakingassociationbycontiguityaspecialformofsimilaritywhatisstillmorecommon，byexplainingsimilarityasaresultofassociationbycontiguity。Inbothcasesassociationisgenerallybroughtunderthemoregeneralideaofpracticeorhabituation。

2。Thewholefoundationforthiskindoftheorizingisdestroyedbytwofactswhichforcethemselvesirresistiblyuponusassoonaswebegintostudythematterexperimentally。

Thefirstofthesefactsisthegeneralresultofthepsychologicalanalysisofsense-perceptions，thatcompositeideas，whichassociation-psychologyregardsasirreduciblepsychicalunits，areinfacttheresultsofsyntheticprocesseswhichareobviouslyincloseinterconnectionwiththeprocessescommonlycalledassociations。Thesecondfactcomesfromtheexperimentalinvestigationofmemory-processes。Itisfoundthatthereproductionofideasinthestrictsenseofarenewalinitsunchangedformofanearlieridea，takesplaceatall，butthatwhatreallydoeshappenofmemoryistheriseofanewideainconsciousness，alwaysdifferingfromtheearlierideatowhichitisreferred，andderivingitselementsasarulefromvariousprecedingideas。[p。226]

Itfollowsfromthefirstfactthatthereareelementaryprocessesofassociationbetweenthecomponentsofideasprecedingtheassociationsofcompositeideaswithoneanotherwhichthenameisgenerallylimited。Thesecondfactprovesthatordinaryassociationscanbenothingbutcomplexproductsofsuchelementaryassociations。Thesecanshowtheutterunjustifiablenessofexcludingtheelementaryprocesseswhoseproductsaresimultaneousideasratherthansuccessive，fromtheconceptassociation。Then，too，therenoreasonforlimitingtheconcepttoideationalprocesses。Theexistenceofcompositefeelings，emotions，etc。，shows，onthecontrary，thataffectiveelementsalsoenterintoregularcombinations，whichmayinturnunitewithassociationsofsensationalelementstoformcomplexproducts，aswesawintheriseoftemporalideas(§；11，p。156sq。)。Theintimaterelationbetweenthevariousordersofcombiningprocessesandthenecessityofelementaryassociationsasantecedentstoallcomplexcombinations，furnishesfurthersupportfortheobservationmadeonthegeneralmodeoftheoccurrenceofconsciousprocesses，thatitisneverpossibletodrawasharpboundarylinebetweenthecombinationsoftheelementsthatcomposepsychicalcompounds，andtheinterconnectionofthevariouspsychicalcompounds，inconsciousness(p。203)。

3。Itfollowsthattheconceptofassociationcangainafixed，andinanyparticularcaseunequivocal，significance，onlyassociationisregardedasanelementaryprocesswhichnevershowsitselfintheactualpsychicalprocessesexceptinandorlesscomplexform，sothattheonlywaytofindoutcharacterofelementaryassociationistosubjectitscomplexproductstoapsychologicalanalysis。Theordinarilyso-calledassociations(thesuccessiveassociations)areonlyone，andloosestatthat，ofalltheformsofcombination。Incontrastwiththesewehavetheclosercombinationsfromwhichthe[p。227]differentkindsofpsychicalcompoundsariseandtowhichweapplythegeneralnamefusions，becauseoftheclosenessoftheunion(p。94，sq。)。Theelementaryprocessesfromwhichthecompounds，theintensive，spacial，andtemporalideas，compositefeelings，theemotions，andthevolitionalprocessesarise，are，accordingly，tobeconsideredasassociativeprocesses。Forthepurposeofpracticaldiscrimination，however，itwillbewelltolimittheword“association“tothosecombiningprocesseswhichtakeplacebetweenelementsofdifferentcompounds。Thisnarrowermeaningwhichwegivethetermincontrastwithfusion，isinonerespectanapproachtothemeaningthatithadinolderpsychologyforitrefersexclusivelytotheinterconnectionofcompoundsinconsciousness。Itdiffersfromtheolderconcept，however，intwoimportantcharacteristics。Firstitishereregardedasanelementaryprocess，or，whenwearedealingwithcomplexphenomena，asaproductofsuchelementaryprocesses。Secondly，werecognize，justasinthefusions，simultaneousassociationsaswellassuccessive。Infact，theformeraretobelookeduponastheearlier。A。SIMULTANEOUSASSOCIATIONS。

4。Simultaneousassociationsmadeupofelementsfrompsychicalcompoundsmaybedividedintotwoclasses:

intoassimilations，orassociationsbetweentheelementsoflikecompounds，andcomplications，orassociationselementsofunlikecompounds。Bothmaytakeplace，inaccordancewithourlimitationoftheconceptassociation，betweenthosecompoundsonlywhicharethemselvessimultaneouscombinations，thatis，betweenintensiveandspacialideasbetweencompositefeelings。[p。228]a。Assimilations5。Assimilationsareaformofassociationthatiscontinuallymetwith，especiallyinthecaseofintensivespacialideas。Itisanessentialsupplementtotheprocessofformationofideasbyfusion。Inthecaseofcompositefeelingsthisformofcombinationneverseemstoappearexceptwherewehaveatthesametimeanassimilationofideationalelements。Itismostclearlydemonstrablewithcertainsinglecomponentsoftheproductofanassimilationgiventhroughexternalsense-impressions，whileothersbelievetoearlierideas。Insuchacasetheassimilationmaybedemonstratedbythefactthatcertaincomponentsofideaswhicharewantingintheobjectiveimpressionorarethererepresentedbycomponentsotherthanthoseactuallypresentintheideaitself，canbeshowntoarisefromideas。Experienceshowsthatofthesereproducedcomponentsarethosearemostfavoredwhichareveryfrequentlypresent。Still，certainsingleelementsoftheimpressionareusuallyofmoreimportanceindeterminingtheassociationthanothersare，sothatwhenthesedominatingelementsarealtered，asmaybethecaseespeciallywithassimilationofthevisualsense，theproductoftheassimilationundergoesacorrespondingchange。

6。Amongintensivecompoundsitisespeciallytheauditoryideaswhichareveryoftentheresultsofassimilation。Theyalsofurnishthemoststrikingexamplesfortheprincipleoffrequencymentionedabove。Ofalltheauditoryideasthemostfamiliararethereadilyavailableideasofwords，fortheseareattendedtomorethanothersound-impressions。Asaresultthehearingofwordsiscontinuallyaccompaniedbyassimilations；thesound-impressionisincomplete，butisentirelyfilledoutbyearlierimpressions，sothatwedonot[p。229]noticetheincompleteness。Soitcomesthatnotthecorrecthearingofwords，butthemisunderstandingofthem，thatis，theerroneousfillingoutofincompleteimpressionsthroughincorrectassimilations，iswhatgenerallyleadsustonoticetheprocess。

Wemayfindanexpressionofthesamefactintheeasewithwhichanysoundwhatever，as，forexample，thecryofananimal，thenoiseofwater，wind，machinery，etc。，canbetosoundlikewordsalmostatwill。

7。Inthecaseofintensivefeelingswenotethepresenceofassimilationsinthefactthatimpressionswhichareaccompaniedbysense-feelingsandelementaryaestheticfeelings，veryexerciseaseconddirectaffectiveinfluenceforwhichaccountonlywhenwerecallcertainideasofwhichweareremindedbytheimpressions。Insuchcasestheassociationisusuallyatfirstonlyaformofaffectiveassociationandonlysolongasthisistrueistheassimilationsimultaneous。

Theideationalassociationwhichexplainsthesis，onthecontrary，alaterprocessbelongingtotheformsofsuccessiveassociation。Forthisreasonitishardlypossible，whenwehaveclang-impressionsorcolor-impressionsaccompaniedbyparticularfeelings，orwhenwehavesimplespacialideas，todecidewhattheimmediateaffectiveinfluenceimpressionofitselfisandwhatisthatoftheassociation。Asarule，insuchcasestheaffectiveprocessistobelookeduponastheresultantofanimmediateandanassociativefactorwhichunitetoformasingle，unitarytotalfeelinginaccordancewiththegenerallawsofaffectivefusion(p。159)。

8。Associationinthecaseofspacialideasisofthemostcomprehensivecharacter。Itisnotverynoticeableinthesphereoftouchwhenvisionispresent，onaccountoftheimportanceoftactualideasingeneralandespeciallyformemory。Fortheblind，ontheotherhand，itisthemeansfortherapidorientationinspacewhichis[p。230]necessary，forexample，intherapidreadingoftheblind-alphabet。Theeffectsofassimilationaremoststrikinglyevidentwhenseveraltactualsurfacesareconcerned，becauseinsuchcasesitspresenceiseasilybetrayedbytheillusionswhichariseinconsequenceofsomedisturbanceintheusualrelationofthesensations。Thus，forexample，whenwetouchasmall，ballwiththeindexandmiddlefingerscrossed，wehavetheideaoftwoballs。Theexplanationisobvious。

Intheordinarypositionofthefingerstheexternalimpressionheregivenactuallycorrespondstotwoballs，andthemanyperceptionsofthiskindthathavebeenreceivedbeforeexerciseanassimilativeactiononthenewimpression。

9。Invisualsense-perceptionsassimilativeprocessesplayaverylargepart。Heretheyaidintheformationofideasofmagnitude，distance，andthree-dimensionalcharacterofvisualobjects。

Inthislastrespecttheyareessentialsupplementsofimmediatebinocularmotivesforprojectionintodepth。Thus，thecorrelationthatexistsbetweentheideasofthedistanceandmagnitudeofobjects，as，forexample，theapparentdifferingthesizeofthesunormoononthehorizonandatthezenith，istobeexplainedasaneffectofassimilation。Theperspectiveofdrawingandpaintingalsodependsontheseinfluences。Apicturedrawnorpaintedonaplanesurfacecanappearthree-dimensionalonlyonconditionthattheimpressionarousesearlierthree-dimensionalideaswhicharealwayswiththenewimpression。Theinfluenceoftheseassimilationmostevidentinthecaseofunshadeddrawingsthatcanbeeitherinrelieforinintaglio。

Observationshowsthatthesedifferencesinappearancearebynomeansaccidentalordependupontheso-called“powerofimagination“，butthattherearealwayselementsintheimmediateimpressionwhichdeterminecompletelytheassimilativeprocess。Theelementsthatthusoperativeare，aboveall，thesensationsarisingfromthe[p。231]positionandmovementsoftheeye。Thus，forexample，adesignwhichcanbeinterpretedaseitherasolidorahollowprism，isseenalternatelyinreliefandinintaglioaccordingaswefixateinthetwocasesthepartsofthewhichcorrespondordinarilytoasolidortoahollowobject。Asolidanglerepresentedbythreelinesinthesameappearsinreliefwhenthefixation-pointismovedalongofthelines，startingfromtheapex，itappearsinintagliowhenthemovementisintheoppositedirection，fromtheofthelinetowardstheapex。Intheseandalllikecasesassimilationisdeterminedbytherulethatinitsmovementthefixation-linesofobjectstheeyealwayspassesfromnearertomoredistantpoints。

Inothercasesthegeometricopticalillusions(§；10，19and20)whichareduetothelawsofocularmovements，producecertainideasofdistance，andthesenotinfrequentlyeliminatethecontradictionsbroughtaboutinthebytheillusions。Thus，toillustrate，aninterruptedstraightlineappearslongerthananequaluninterruptedline(p。125)；asaresultwetendtoprojectthefirsttoagreaterdepththanthelatter。Herebothlinescoverjustthesamedistancesontheretinainspiteofthefactthattheirlengthisperceivedasdifferent，becauseofthedifferentmotorenergyconnectedwiththeirestimation。Aneliminationofthiscontradictioniseffectedbymeansofthedifferentideasofdistance，forwhenoneoftwolineswhoseretinalimagesareappearslongerthantheother，itmust，undertheordinaryconditionsofvision，belongtoamoredistantobject。

Again，onestraightlineisintersectedatanacuteanglebyanother，theresultisanoverestimationoftheacuteangle，sometimesgivesrise，whenthelineislong，toanapparentbendingnearthepointofintersection(p。125)。Herecontradictionbetweenthecourseofthelineandthe[p。

232]increaseinthesizeoftheangleofintersection，isofteneliminatedbytheapparentextensionofthelineinthethirddimension。

Inallthesecasestheperspectivecanbeexplainedonlyastheassimilativeeffectofearlierideasofcorrespendingcharacter。

10。Innoneoftheassimilationsdiscussedisitpossibletoshowthatanyformerideahasactedasawholethenewimpression。Generallythisisimpossiblebecausewemustattributetheassimilativeinfluencetoalargenumberofideas，differinginmanyrespectsfromoneanother。Thus，forexample，astraightlinewhichintersectsaverticalatanacuteangle，correspondstoinnumerablecasesinwhichaninclinationofthelinewithitsaccompanyingincreaseofangleappearedasacomponentofathree-dimensionalidea。Butallthesecasesmayhavebeenverydifferentinregardtothesizeoftheangle，thelengthofthelines，andotherattendingcircumstances。Wemust，accordingly，thinkofassimilativeprocessasaprocessinwhichnotasingledefiniteideaorevenadefinitecombinationofelementsfromideas，butasaruleagreatnumberofsuchcombinationsareoperative。Theseneedagreeonlyapproximatelywiththenewimpressioninordertoaffectconsciousness。

Wemaygainsomenotionofthewayinwhichthiseffectisproducedfromtheimportantpartthatcertainelementsconnectedwiththeimpressionplayintheprocess，forexample，thesensationsofocularpositionandmovementsinvisualideas。Obviouslyitistheseimmediatesensationalelementsthatservetopickoutfromthemassofideationalelementswhichreactupontheimpression，certainparticularonesthatcorrespondtothemselves，thenbringtheseselectedfactorsintoaformagreeingwiththatoftherestofthecomponentsoftheimmediateimpression。Atthesametimeitappearsthatnotmerelythe[p。233]elementsofourmemory-imagesarerelativelyindefiniteandthereforevariable，butthateventheperceptionofindefiniteimpressionmayvaryunderspecialconditionsfairlywidelimits。Inthiswaytheassimilativeprocessstartsprimarilyfromelementsoftheimmediateimpression，chieflyfromparticularoneswhichareofpreeminentimportancefortheformationoftheidea，as，forexample，thesensationsofocularpositionandmovementinvisualideas。Theseelementscallupcertainparticularmemory-elementscorrespondingtothemselves。Thesememoriesthenexerciseaneffectontheimmediateimpression，andtheimpressioninturnreactsinthesamewayonthereproducedmoments。Theseseparateactsare，likethewholeprocess，notsuccessive，but，atleastforourconsciousness，simultaneous。Forthisreasontheproductoftheassimilationisapperceivedimmediate，unitaryidea。Thetwodistinguishingcharacteristicsofassimilationare，accordingly，1)

thatitismadeupofaseriesofelementaryprocessesofcombination，thatis，processesthathavetodowiththecomponentsofideas，notwiththewholeideasthemselves，and2)thattheunitedcomponentsmodifyoneanotherthroughreciprocalassimilations。

11。Onthisbasiswecanexplainwithoutdifficultythedifferencesbetweencomplexassimilativeprocesses，bytheverydifferentpartsthatthevariousfactorsnecessarytosuchaprocessplayinthevariousconcretecases。Inordinarysense-perceptionsthedirectelementsaresopredominantthatthereproducedelementsareasaruleentirelyoverlooked，althoughinrealitytheyareneverabsentandareoftenveryimportantfortheperceptionoftheobjects。Thesereproducedelementsaremuchmorenoticeablewhentheassimilativeeffectofthedirectelementsishinderedthroughexternalorinternalinfluences，suchasindistinctness[p。234]oftheimpressionoraffectiveandemotionalexcitement。Inallcaseswherethedifferencebetweentheimpressiontheideabecomes，inthisway，sogreatthatitisapparentonceoncloserexamination，wecalltheproductofassimilationanillusion。

Theuniversalityofassimilationmakesitcertainthatsuchprocessesoccuralsobetweenreproducedelements，insuchawaythatanymemory-ideawhicharisesinourmindisimmediatelymodifiedbyitsinteractionwithothermemory-elements。Still，insuchacasewehave，ofcourse，nomeansofdemonstration。Al1thatcanbeestablishedasprobableisthateveninthecaseofso-called“purememory-processes“

directelementsintheformofsensationsandsense-feearousedbyperipheralstimuli，areneverentirelyabsent。reproducedvisualimages，forexample，suchelementspresentintheformofsensationsofocularpositionandmovement。b。Complications。

12。Complications，orthecombinationsbetweenupsychicalcompounds，arenolessregularcomponentsofconsciousnessthanareassimilations。Justasthereishardlyintensiveorextensiveideaorcompositefeelingwhichimodifiedinsomewaythroughtheprocessesofreciprocalassimilationwithmemory-elements，soalmosteveryoneofthesecompoundsisatthesametimeconnectedwithother，dissimilarcompounds，withwhichithassomeconstantrelations。Inallcases，however，complicationsaredifferentfromassimilationsinthefactthattheunlikenessofthecompamakestheconnectionlooser，howeverregularitmaybe，sothatwhenonecomponentisdirectandtheotherreproduced，thelattercanbereadilydistinguishedatonce。Still，isanotherreasonwhichmakestheproductofacomplication[p。235]unitaryinspiteoftheeasilyrecognizeddifferencebetweenitscomponents。Thiscauseisthepredominanceofoneofthecompounds，whichpushestheothercomponentsintotheobscurerfieldofconsciousness。

Ifthecomplicationunitesadirectimpressionwithmemory-elementsofdisparatecharacter，thedirectimpressionassimilationsisregularlythepredominantcomponentwhilethereproducedelementssometimeshaveanotice-ableinfluenceonlythroughtheiraffectivetone。Thus，whenwespeak，theauditoryword-ideasarethepredominantcomponents，andinadditionwehaveasobscuredirectmotorsensationsandreproductionsofimagesofthewords。Inreading，ontheotherhand，thevisualimagescometothefrontwhiletherestbecomeweaker。Ingeneralitmaybesaidthattheexistenceimplicationisfrequentlynoticeableonlythroughthecoloringofthetotalfeelingthataccompaniesthelentidea。Thisisduetotheabilityofobscureideastohavearelativelyintenseeffectontheattentionthroughbctivetones(p。216)。Thus，forexample，theicimpressionofaroughsurface，adagger-point，arisesfromacomplicationofvisualandtactuals，andinthelastcaseofauditoryimpressionsastasarulesuchcomplicationsarenoticeableonlythefeelingstheyexcite。B。SUCCESSIVEASSOCIATIONS。