第6章

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXICHAPTERXI。OFTREASONAGAINSTTHEUNITEDSTATES。THEimportanceofthissubjectmeritsaseparatechapter。

Itwashighlyproper，perhapsabsolutelynecessary，thatacrime，thecommissionofwhichmustoweitsexistencetotheformationofthegovernment，shouldbebothrecognisedanddefinedintheConstitution。

Althoughitisageneralprinciplethatallgovernmentsmustbeunderstoodtocontainwithinthemselvesthematerialsfortheirownpreservation，anditcouldnotbesupposedthatthenationalgovernmentnowcreatedwastodependontheindividualstatesforprotectionagainsttraitors，yettohaveleftthepowerofself-defencetoinferenceandtoargument，wouldhavebeenunwise。

Theunityofthegovernmentinitslimitedcharacterrequiredfromthejudicialauthority，whichappertainedtoit，aconcurrentaid，simpleanduniforminitsnature，andadequateinitseffect。Toleavethisoffenceliabletoprosecutioninthestatecourtsonly，wouldhavebeentohazardtheconsequencesofavarietyofopinionsanddiscordancesofadjudication，and，perhaps，occasionally，totheinconvenienceofencounteringsomepoliticalreluctanceordissatisfactiononthepartofthestates。Foralthough，aswillbehereaftermorefullyshown，thejudicialpoweris，initsnature，superiortothebiasofpartyorpersonalmotives；yetitisprudent，wheneveritispracticable，toguardagainstthepossiblerelaxationofthisexaltedprinciple。Itwasalsorecollectedthatintheproceedingspreparatorytothetrial，muchistobedonebyinferiorofficers，amongwhomsuchindependenceisnotalwaystobefound。

TheUnitedStates，therefore，justlyreservedtothemselvestherighttopunishthishighoffence，andthestatecourts，sincetheadoptionoftheConstitution，haveabstainedfromintermeddlingwithprosecutionsonaccountofit。1

Butsomething。morethantherecognitionofthecrime，andtheprovisionofexclusivetribunalsforitspunishment，wasrequisiteforthesecurityofthepeople。Itisofalloffencesthatwhichitisthemostnecessarytodefinewithprecision。

Thenaturalinclinationofthosewhopossesspower，istoincreaseit。

Historyshowsthattoenlargethedescriptionoftreasonhasoftenbeenresortedtoasoneofthemeansofincreasingpower。Tohavelefttothelegislatureanunlimitedrighttodeclarewhatshouldamounttothiscrimewouldhavebeenlessconsistentwithpublicsafety，thantofix，bycommonconsent，itsplaindefinitionandexactlimits。Itis，sofar，withheldfromthepowerofthosewho，undertheinfluenceofsuddenresentmentorambitiousviews，mightunreasonablyextenditscharacter；while，ontheotherhand，exceptbythevoiceofthepeopleatlarge，actingthroughthemediumofachangeoftheConstitutionitself，itcannotbecontractedtoanarrowercompass，whichmightweakenthesafeguardsofthegeneralsystem。

Ingivingthedefinition，generalprinciplesonlycanbeadopted；itrestswiththejudicialpowertodeterminewhethertheactsthatmaybecommitted，fallwithintheseprinciples。

Treasonistheattemptofoneormoreindividuals，whoarecitizensorsubjectsofagovernment，tosubvertanddestroyit。Theintentionmustbethatthisendshallbeeffectedbyforce，insomestageoftheproceeding，buttheoffencemaybecompletebeforeanyforceisactuallyused。

Itisoneofthosecrimeswhichmaynotbeaccomplishedbyasingleact；but，onthecontrary，isinitsverynatureprogressiveyetcontinuous。

Robbery，murder，andmanyothercrimes，areormaybeeffectuatedinashortspaceoftime；andwhenthebodyisdeprivedoflifeorthegoodsaretakenfromthespot，theperpetrationoftheguiltisfullandentire:

buttheattempttosubvertagovernmentisnotamomentaryact；combinationsareformed，unlawfulschemesdevisedandpursued；oppositioniscommencedandcarriedon，andthecrimeiseverthesame；theprotractionoftimemayincreasetheterrorandtheinjury，butinalegalviewtheydonotenhancetheguilt:initsoutsetitisdeemedthehighestcrimethatcanbecommitted，andofcourse，nosubsequentcircumstancescanraiseithigher。

But，fromthedifferentnatureofgovernments，thereisadifferenceinthemanifestationsoftreasoninamonarchyandinarepublic。Intheformer，itisconsideredasanoffenceagainstthesupremeexecutivemagistrate；

inthelatteritisanoffenceagainstthebodyofthepeople。Hence，toslayortoendeavourtoslaytheking，is，initself，high-treason，althoughitmaybetheuncounselledthoughtandunassistedactofasingleindividual；

butinarepublic，notthelifeofamonarch，butthelifeoftherepublicisatstake。Theremustinthelattercasebeacombinationwithothers；

fornomancouldbesupposedcapableofintendingsinglyandalonetosubvertagovernmentformedontheauthorityofthepeople。Butthosewithwhomhecombinesmaynot，themselves，beguiltyoftreason。Thecitizenwhouniteshimselfwithahostilenation，wagingwaragainsthiscountry，isguiltyofacrimeofwhichtheforeignarmyisinnocent；withhimitistreason，withhisassociatesitis，inthecodeofnations，legitimatewarfare。Ifheshouldbemadeprisonerandproceededagainstasatraitor，itisagainsttheusageofnationsforthosewhohaveacceptedhisco-operationtoobjecttothecoursewhichthelawsofhisowncountryimposeonhim。

TreasonisdeclaredtoconsistonlyinlevyingwaragainsttheUnitedStates，orinadheringtotheirenemies，givingthemaidandcomfort。

ThetermlevyingwarisunderstoodtohavebeentakenfromtheEnglishstatuteof25thEdwardIII。，andreceivesthesameconstructionwithuswhichisgiventoitinthatcountry。

Thewarwhichisspokenofembraces，asbeforeobserved，bothhostilitiesfromabroadandinternalrebellion。

Allinsurrection，theobjectofwhichwastosuppressanofficeofexciseestablishedunderalawoftheUnitedStates，andthemarchingwithapartyinarmstothehouseoftheexciseofficer，andcommittingactsofviolenceandoutragethere，withaviewbyforceandintimidationtopreventtheexecutionofthelaw，hasbeenheldtoamounttoalevyingofwaragainsttheUnitedStates。2AconspiracytosubvertbyforcethegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，violentlytodismembertheUnion，tocoercerepealofagenerallaw，ortorevolutionizeaterritorialgovernmentbyforce，ifcarriedintoeffect，byembodyingandassemblingamilitarybodyinamilitaryposture，isanovertactoflevyingwar；

andnotonlythosewhobeararms，butthosewhoperformthevariousandessentialpartswhichmustbeassignedtodifferentpersons，forthepurposeofprosecutingthewar，areguiltyofthecrime。3

Similaractscommittedagainstthelawsorgovernmentofaparticularstate，arepunishableaccordingtothelawsofthatstate，butdonotamounttotreasonagainsttheUnitedStates；andontheotherhand，incaseofawarbetweentheUnitedStatesandaforeignnation，adheringtosuchforeignnation，andgivingthemaidandcomfortintheprosecutionofthewar，amountstotreasonagainsttheUnitedStates，andnotagainstthestateofwhichthepartyisacitizen。4

Therestrictionsaredictatedbyaspiritofhumanity。Nopersonshallbeconvictedofthiscrime，unlessonthetestimonyoftwowitnessestothesameovertact，oronconfessioninopencourt。Aconfessionoutofcourt，althoughbeforeamagistrate，isnotsufficient；butaftertheovertactoftreasonisprovedbytwowitnesses，itmaybegiveninevidencebywayofcorroboration。5Thetestimonyofthetwowitnessesmustbetothesameovertact，andnot，asinEnglanditmaybe，totwodifferentactsofthesamespeciesoftreason。

Itisnotwithinthescopeofthisworktonoticeallthelegislativeprovisionswhichhavesincebeenmadeinrespecttotrialsfortreason；

itissufficienttosay，thattheypursuethesameliberalandhumanespiritforthepurposeofaffordingtotheaccusedtheutmostlatitudeofdefence，butincaseofhisconviction，congress，whichhasthepowertodeclarethepunishmentshasimposedthatofdeath。Buttheforfeitureoflifeisnot，withus，aggravatedbyrefinedanduselesscruelty。WhocanreadwithouthorrorthepunishmentsofRavaillacandDamiens，orthesentences，inmoderntimesdeemedtoobarbaroustobeenforced，againsttraitorsinEngland?

Therestrictiononcongressinrespecttothepunishmentis，thatnoattainderoftreasonshallworkcorruptionofblood，orforfeiture，exceptduringthelifeofthepersonattainted。

CorruptionofbloodisderivedfromthecommonlawofEngland，andsignifiesthatanattaintedpersoncanneitherinheritlandfromhisancestors，norretainwhatheisinpossessionof，nortransmititbydescenttohisheirs，norshallanypersonmaketitlebydescentthroughhim，thoughfromamoreremoteancestor。

Inrespecttotheforfeiture，themeaningseemstobe，thatcongressshallnotimposeaforfeiturebeyondthetermoftheoffender"slife，butitmaybeabolishedaltogether，andinthissense，ithasbeenunderstoodandactedoninthelaw，forthepunishmentofcertaincrimesagainsttheUnitedStates，passedonthe30thofApril，1790，thelanguageofwhichisasfollows:?noconvictionorjudgmentforanyoftheoffencesaforesaid，(inwhichareincludedtreason，murder，robbery，piracy，andothercrimes，)shallworkcorruptionofbloodoranyforfeitureofestate。

Butafuturelegislatureisneitherboundtoenforcethishumanepartoftheact，nortocontinueotherpartswhichbearthecastofsomeseverity。

Theimmediateforfeitureofthepossessionsofanoffender，althoughitshardshipincapitalcasesisfelt，notbyhimself，butbyhisfamilyreducedtowant，hasbeenvindicatedonthesupposition，thatitwouldtendtosetthepaternalfeelingsinmotiononthesideofthecommonwealth；acerbum，saysCiceroinalettertoBrutus，parentumscelerafiliorumpoenislui，sedhocpreclarelegibuscomparatumest，utcaritasliberorumamicitioresparentesreipublicæ；redderet。

Andsuchconsiderationsmayhavesomeeffect；butthedepravitythatleadstothehazardoflife，seldomrefrainsfromthecommissionofcrimebyadvertingtothesufferingsofchildren。Thebadcitizenismostcommonlyabadparent。

Theafflictionfeltbysuchnearrelations，bothfortheguiltandthelossoftheparent，isunreasonablyaggravatedbytheirbeingthussubjectedtopartake，thoughinadifferentform，ofthepunishmentinflicted，when，incommonwiththeirfellowcitizens，theymayhavesincerelyabhorredthecrime。

Butwhileinthisparticular，opinionhasbeendivided，allseemtohavecondemned，andmanytohavebeenatalosstoaccountfortheextensionofthispenalprincipletothedestructionofthepowertoinheritthroughthepersonattainted。

Wecannotbereconciledtoit，bybeingtoldthatpropertybeingthecreatureofsociety，wehavenorighttocomplainofthemannerinwhichitisregulated，6for，onsuchgrounds，themostunjustlawsmightbedefended。

Butwemayaccountforitsoriginfromaformerstateofsociety，whichhasbeengreatlyalteredinmoderntimes。Itisanancientfeudalprinciple，thatwherethereisnoinheritableblood，thelandshallescheattothelordofthefee。Applying，orratherpervertingthedoctrineofpresentforfeituretotheincapacityoftakingbydescent，wasthefirstandveryeasystepinaprocess，bywhichallthatwouldhavevestedinthecriminal，becamethepropertyofthelord。Theavidityofthelord，whichwasthusgratified，castaboutforstillmorepreyandastheattainderoftheoffenderremovedhimfrombeingtheimmediateobjectofadescent，theprinciple，itwasfound，couldalsobesuccessfullyappliedtohisbeingthechannelthroughwhichothersmightinherit。Ifthegrandfather，aftertheattainderofthesonfortreasonorfelony，diedseizedoflandandintestate，thegrandsoncouldnotinherit，becausehecouldnotbehisheir，ashewasnottheheirofhisownfather。Byafictionengraftedonthesubstantialpunishmentofthefather，thegrandfatherwasconsideredasdyingwithoutheirs，andhislandsalsoescheatedtothelord。

Thusthedoctrineisresolvedintoanodiousfiction，foundedonacompoundofcrueltyandavarice，springingfromaperversionofthesystemoftenures，andatvariancewiththeliberalprinciplesofmoderntimesandtheveryelementsofjustice。

HaditbeenprohibitedbytheConstitutioninregardtoalloffenceswhatever，itwouldhavemeritedpublicapprobation。

1。Ifthisprovisionhadnotbeenmade，thestatecourtswouldnothaverefusedtosustainsuchprosecutions。Seepostch。xxix。

2。UnitedStatesv。Vigol，2Dallas，346。UnitedStatesv。Mitchell，ib。348。

3。4Cranch，470。Unitedstatesv。

Burretal。

4。Lynch"scaseinNewYork，11

Johnson，553。

5。UnitedStatesv。Fries，printedreportofthetrial，p。171。

6。Considerationsonthelawofforfeitures，attributedtoCharlesYorke。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXIICHAPTERXII。OFTHEEXECUTIVEPOWER。INtheformationofarepublicthereisperhapsnopartmoredifficultthantherightconstitutionoftheexecutiveauthority。Thethreequalitiesofpromptness，vigour，andresponsibility，oughttobecombinedinit。Inthetwootherbranches，moredeliberationisnecessary。Whethertomakelawsortoexpoundthem，themotionsshould，ingeneral，beslowandcautious。Theactsofeither，whenconstitutionallyconsummate，areobligatoryonthose，whoseduty，itistoenforcethem。Theofficeofexecutingalaw，excludestherighttojudgeofit，andofcoursedoesnotrequirethattheexecutivepowershouldconcurinopiniononitsutility。Whenthemeaningandintentionofthelegislatureareascertained，andthelawitselfisconstitutional，delayintheexecutionofitisculpable。Thepublic，whichmayblamethelegislator，requiresoftheexecutiveofficertocarryitintoeffect，becausetosubverttheorderofgovernment，isoneofthegreatestevilsthatcanbefallit。Everyindividualisboundtoobeythelaw，howeverobjectionableitmayappeartohim:theexecutivepowerisboundnotonlytoobey，buttoexecuteit。Tohesitate，todelay，perhapstolosethepropermomentofaction，wouldapproachtoentiredisobedience。Apromptsubmissiontothelaw，andanimmediatepreparationtoenforceit，arethereforeabsolutelynecessaryinrelationtotheauthorityfromwhichthelawhasemanated。Butwemustalsoconsiderthisqualityinrespecttoitseffect。Theoperationofalaw，wheneverthetimeofactinguponithasarrived，shouldbeimmediateanddecisive。Thelawisapowerofwhichtheforceandexistenceshouldneverbeunfeltorforgotten。LikethepillarwhichledtheIsraelitesthroughthewilderness，itshouldalwaysbeinsight。Thecommonwealthinwhichitspre-eminenceisnotconstantlypresenttothemind，isindanger。Butthesensationofitscontinuedpresence，anduncontrollablepower，willbegreatlyweakened，iftimeissufferedtoelapsewithoutnecessity，afteritsactionoughttotakeplace。

Ongeneralpoliticalprinciplestherefore，asdelayisreprehensible，promptnessisaduty，thenon-performanceofwhichmayenabletransgressorstoescape。Forthisreason，itisbothwiseandhumanethattheexecutionoflawsshouldbespeedy；thatis，thatnounreasonableintervalshouldbeallowedbetweentheviolationofthelawandtheadoptionofsuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoenforceit。

Forthispurposetheexecutivemustalsobeendowedwithsufficientenergy。Ithasbeenjustlysaidthatafeebleexecutiveimpliesafeebleexecutionofthegovernment。Afeebleexecutionisbutanotherphraseforabadexecution；andagovernmentillexecuted，whateveritmaybeintheory，mustinpractice，beabadgovernment。1ItisinfactonlybytheexecutionoftheConstitutionandthelaws，thatthetruevalueofeitherisknown。Iftheyareleftasdeadletters，theyconfernobenefit，andavertnoevil。Principleswithoutpracticeareliketheintentionsofanindividualwithoutacts。Anenergyofaction，dulyproportionedtotheexigenciesthatarise，mustbeseatedintheexecutivepower。Theproportionofthepowertotheoccasionsthatareexpectedtorequireitsuse，shouldbeasexactaspossible。Ifitfallsshort，theevilswehavealreadyadvertedtowillensue；ifitexceedsthem，thelibertyofthepeopleisendangered。Itisdifficulttoadoptgeneralexpressionsexactlydescriptiveoftheproperextentandlimitationofthispower。

PerhapsthosewefindintheConstitutionareascompetentasanythatcouldbeapplied。"Thepresidentshalltakecarethatthelawsshallbefaithfullyexecuted。"Thesimplicityofthelanguageaccordswiththegeneralcharacteroftheinstrument。Itdeclareswhatishisduty，anditgiveshimnopowerbeyondit。TheConstitution，treaties，andactsofcongress，aredeclaredtobethesupremelawoftheland。Heisboundtoenforcethem；ifheattemptstocarryhispowerfurther，heviolatestheConstitution。

Butalthoughanexactspecificationofthemannerinwhichtheexecutivepowershallbeexercised，isnot，andcouldnotbeintroducedinto，theConstitution，althoughitwouldbeatonceunnecessaryandimpossibletodefineallthemodesinwhichitmaybeexecuted，yettheauxiliarymeansarenotwhollyomitted，andwillbenoticedafterwehaveconsideredthecompositionoftheexecutive。

Insomerepublics，thefearofevilfromasinglehead，hasledtothecreationofcouncilsandothersubdivisionsoftheexecutivepower，andtheconsequentimbecilityanddistractionsofthosegovernmentshaveprobablycontributedtoleadmostofthenationsofEuropetothepreferencegiventomonarchies。Itwasfalselyconceivedthattovesttheexecutivepowerinasingleperson，wasinconsistentwiththenatureofarepublic，oritwassupposedthatarepublicsoconstitutedcouldnotlongretainitsfreedom，againsttheambitiousviews，andalarmingdominationofasinglemagistrate。ButinAmerica，neitherthefervourofrepublicanprinciples，northeodiumofmonarchy，theninhostilearrayagainstus，overpoweredthecalmanddeliberateexerciseofasoundjudgmentinthisrespect，andineverystatebutone，theunityoftheexecutivepowerwasadoptedasaprinciple。Pennsylvaniaalone，whoseoriginalconstitutionhassincebeenalteredbythepeople，createdanexecutivecouncil，formedofamemberfromeachcounty，andwehaveheretoforenoticeditsfeeblenessandinefficiencyonadistressingoccasion。2

Theexperienceofnearlyhalfacenturyinrespecttothesestategovernments；

theexperienceofupwardsofathirdofacenturyinrespecttotheUnitedStatesgovernment，evincethatunderproperregulationsnoabuseofsuchpowersistobefeared。Limitedandrestrainedasthepresidentis，creatureofthepeople，andsubjecttothelaw，withallpowertodoright，hepossessesnonetodowrong；hisgeneralresponsibilitybybeingundivided，iscomplete，hisliabilitytoimpeachment，byaccusers，inwhoseappointmenthehasnoshare，beforeacourtwhichhedoesnotcreate，bothemanatingfromthesamesourcetowhichheoweshisownexistence；histermofofficeexactlylimited，hisofficialpowerentirelygonethemomentthatofhissuccessorcommences，orthemomentwhenthesenateshallpassonhimasentenceofdeprivationofoffice；hisonlysafetyconsistsindoingwhatisright；hisspeedyandcertaindestitutionwouldfollowacontraryconduct。

1。Fed。No。70。

2。P。108。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXIIICHAPTERXIII。OFTHEMEANSPROVIDEDFORTHEPERFORMANCEOFTHEEXECUTIVEDUTIES。AMONGthemeansprovidedtoenablethepresidenttoperformhispublicduties，thecommandofthemilitaryforcewillfirstbeconsidered。

TheprincipalclausesintheConstitutionwhichaffectthesubjectarethefollowing:?

TheCongressshallhavepowertoraiseandsupportarmies，toprovideandmaintainanavy，tomakerulesforthegovernmentandregulationofthearmy，thenavy，andalsoofthemilitia，whenthelatterareintheserviceoftheUnitedStates。

Thepresidentshallbecommanderinchiefofthearmyandnavy，andofthemilitiaoftheseveralstateswhencalledintotheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates。

Thesearethemodesofactionexpresslyprovidedfortheexecutivemagistrate，wheneverhisfunctionsassumeamilitarycast。Inrelationtothoseofanaturemerelycivil，theConstitutionissilent，becauseparticulardescriptionwouldnotbeequallypracticable，andhenceasbeforeobserved，congressisempoweredtopasssuchlawsasmayberequisiteandproperforcarryingintoexecutionthepowersvestedintheofficersofgovernment。

Subordinateofficesarethereforecreatedbycongresswhennecessary，whosefunctionsareeitherexpresslydefined，orimpliedfromthenatureoftheoffice，orleftwhollyorinparttothedirectionofthepresident。

Butthemilitarypowerisatpresenttobeconsidered，andthis，itappears，consistsoftwoclasses；first，thosewhoareregularlyretainedonstipulatedcompensationstoserveinthearmyornavy，andsecondly，themilitiawhoarecalledforthasoccasionmayrequire，butwheninservicearesubjecttothesameregulationsasregulartroops。

Onthenatureandcharacterofthefirst，littleneedsatpresenttobesaid。Thecautionthatnoappropriationofmoneyforthesupportofanarmyforalongertermthantwoyearshasbeenmentioned。Themannerofemploymentmaybedirectedbycongress，orconfidedtothepresident。

Congress，whichmaydirectwhenandwherefortsshallbebuilt，mayalsoprescribethattheyshallbegarrisonedeitherwithspecificnumbers，orwithsuchanumberasthepresidentmaythinkproper。Sointimesofpeace，troopsmaybestationedbycongressinparticularpartsoftheUnitedStates，havingavieweithertotheirhealthandeasysubsistence，ortothesecurityofdistantandfrontierstations；butduringtheemergenciesofawar，whenthedefenceofthecountryiscastonthepresident，anddangersnotforeseenmayrequiremeasuresofdefencenotprovidedfor，thepresidentwouldcertainlybejustifiedinpreferringtheexecutionofhisconstitutionalduties，totheliteralobedienceofalaw，theoriginalobjectofwhichwasoflessvitalimportancethanthatcreatedbysubsequentexigencies，andtherecanbenodoubt，thatthisnecessarypowerwouldextendtotheerectingofnewfortresses，andtotheabandoningofthoseerectedbyorderofcongress，aswellastotheconcentration，divisionorotherlocalemploymentofthetroops，whichinhisjudgmentorthatoftheofficersunderhiscommand，becameexpedientfromcircumstances。Thiswouldnotbeaviolationoftheruleslaiddownintheprecedingpages，sincetheobligationofthelawislostinthesuccessionofcausesthatpreventitsoperation，andtheConstitutionitselfmaybeconsideredasthussupersedingit。

Thepowerofthepresidentoverthemilitiadependsonthesameprinciple；

thenecessarysupplyofthemeanstoenablehimtoperformhisexecutiveduties。

Inapeoplepermittedandaccustomedtobeararms，wehavetherudimentsofamilitia，whichproperlyconsistsofarmedcitizens，dividedintomilitarybands，andinstructedatleastinpartintheuseofarmsforthepurposesofwar。Theirciviloccupationsarenotrelinquished，exceptwhiletheyareactuallyinthefield，andtheinconvenienceofwithdrawingthemfromtheiraccustomedlabours，abridgesthetimerequiredformilitaryinstruction。

Militiathereforeneveramounttoperfectsoldiers，unlessthepublicexigenciesshallhavekeptthemsolongtogetherastoabsorbthecivil，inthemilitarycharacter。

Thehumanmindisofanaturesoflexible，thatitmaybyperseverance，bedisciplinedtoresults，whichatfirstviewwouldbedeemedalmostimpossible。

Thefearofdeathiscertainlyoneoftheearliest，andmostnaturalpassions；

yetinawellregulatedarmy，itgiveswaytothefearofdisgrace；andthesoldierbecomesmoreapprehensiveofthedispleasureofhiscommanders，thanofthefireoftheenemy。Anothersortofmechanismalsocontributestoactuateadisciplinedarmy；itisthevoluntaryandentiresurrenderofitsownjudgmenttothatofthecommander。Obediencewouldbeslowanduncertain，ifthesoldierwastoallowhimselftoreflectontheproprietyoftheordersgiven:heishabituatedtodeemthemright，merelybecausetheyareorders，andfromthecommonsoldiertothehighestsubordinateofficer，nootherruleisknownthanthatofimplicitobedience。Theconfidencethusreposedisnotofapersonalnature；itdoesnotdependmerelyonthecharacteroftheindividualincommand。Ifthecommandershouldfallduringanengagement，itisimmediatelytransferredtohissuccessor，whoonhispart，atonceassumesthesuspendedfacultyofdecidingwhatispropertobedone，inlieuoftheimplicitobediencewithoutinquiry，underwhichtillthatmomenthehadacted。Thisatfirstviewappearsinconsistentwithindividualfreedomandindependence，andhenceitisthatmilitiaaresystematicallylesstractablethanregulartroops。Devotedpatriotismandpersonalcourage，althoughtheyfrequentlyproducefeatsofexaltedmen，areinsufficientforthecombinationsofanarmy。TheconquestsoftheMacedonianAlexandermayeasilybeaccountedforonthisground；hehadreceivedfromhisfatherPhilipthefirstregulararmyofwhichwehaveanaccountinhistory，andwiththesehefearlesslyadvancedintodistantcountries，andsuccessivelydefeatedimmensemultitudesofthePersianandIndianmilitia，amongwhomthereweredoubtlessmuchindividualbravery，andstrongdesiresofdefendingtheircountry。1

Butnotwithstandingtheirinferioritytosoldiersschooledandpractisedinthefield，gallantactionshavebeenperformedbyourmilitiacollectively。

ThecaptureofanentirearmyunderGeneralBurgoynein1777，andthecelebrateddefenceofNewOrleansin1814，werechieflyeffectedbymilitia。

Buthoweverinferiorinmilitaryestimatetoarmiesregularlytrained，themilitiaconstitutesoneofthegreatbulwarksofthenation，andnothingwhichtendstoimproveandsupportitshouldbeneglected。

Thepowergiventocongressoveritisfromitsnatureexclusive，totheextentthatitiscarriedintheConstitution。

Duringthelatewar，aconstructionofthispartoftheConstitutionwasgiveninahighlyrespectablestate，whichexcitednosmalluneasinessatthetime，andoughtnottobepassedoverinsilence。Theactofcongressdeclaringwartookplaceonthe18thofJune，1812，andthepresidentwasexpresslyauthorizedbytheacttousethewholelandandnavalforcestocarryitintoeffect。Ordersweresoonafterwardsissuedbyhimforcallingoutcertainportionsofthemilitiafromeachstate。TheopinionsofthejudgesofthesupremejudicialcourtofMassachusettswererequiredbythegovernor，andthreeofthemintheabsenceoftheothers，declaredtheirsentimentsthatthecommanderinchiefofthemilitiaofastatehadarighttodecidewhetherornottheexigenciestowarrantthecallexisted。Ofcourse，thatwhateverwerethedeclarationsofcongress，orthecoursepursuedbythepresident，ifthegovernorofastatethoughtdifferently；ifhethoughttherewasnowar，noinsurrection，noinvasion，hewasnotobligedtoobeysuchrequisitions。Thegovernorexpressedthesameopinioninamessagetothelegislature；andalineofconductwasadopted，greatlytendingtoimpairtheenergiesofthecountry，andencouragethehopesoftheenemy。

Theapprehensionprofessedwas，thatifcongressbydeterminingthatthosespecialcasesexisted，couldatanytimecallforththewholeofthemilitiaandsubjectthemtothecommandofthepresident，itmightproducea"militaryconsolidationofthestates，"withoutanyconstitutionalremedy。AndthatundertheactofFebruary28th，1795，themilitiaoftheseveralstateswouldbeinfactathiscommandatanytimewhenhethoughtproper，whethertheexigencyexistedornot。2

ButwhateverweightmighthavebeenfoundinsuchobjectionsagainstadoptingtheConstitution，theyceasedwhenitwasadopted。Itwasthenthechoiceofthepeopletoreposethisconfidenceincongresstoenablethemtoprovideforthecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare。Ifithadbeenthoughtnecessarytoimposeanycheckorcontrol；ifinoppositiontothewholespiritoftheinstrument，ithadbeendeemedexpedienttodisunitethesystem，byrequiringtheconcurrenceofthestates，itcouldundoubtedlyhavebeensoexpressed，andinthisrespectatleastweshouldnothaveadvancedastepbeyondtheimbecilityoftheoldgovernment。NothingwouldbemorelikelytoenfeebletheUnionthantohavesubjectedtherightofexercisingthesepowerstothegovernors，oreventhelegislaturesofthedifferentstates，someofwhichmightholdoneopinion，andsomeinsistuponanother；anditisbynomeansclearthatthepeopledidnotapprehendagreaterdangerofabuseofconfidencefromthegovernorandlegislatureofastate，thanfromthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。

TheactofFebruary28th，1795，certainlyvestsinthepresidentalonethepowertocalloutandemploythemilitia，withoutwaitingfor，orpointingoutanyparticularmodebywhichtheevidenceofthenecessityforitshallbefurnished。Theformeracthadrequiredthatbeforethemilitiawascalledouttosuppressaninsurrection，acertificateshouldbegiventothepresidentbyanassociatejudgeofthesupremecourt，orthejudgeofthedistrictcourt，thatthelawsoftheUnitedStateswereopposedbycombinationstoopowerfultobesuppressedbytheordinarycourseofjudicialproceedings，&；c。Butbesidestheincongruityofthusrequiringmembersofthejudicialauthoritytodecideinthismanneruponfacts，itwasshiftingaresponsibilityfromtheproperofficer，thepresident，andthrowingituponthosewhowerelessamenable，ifamenableatall，insuchacase。Thesecondact，therefore，veryproperlyleavesitwiththepresidenttodetermineontheexigencywhichshallauthorizethemeasure。Powersoseriousandimportant，itwasbelievedwouldnotbelightlyorprematurelyexercisedbyhim。HewhoischargedwithexecutingthelawsoftheUnion，isnaturallythebestapprizedofresistancetothem，andforhisownjustificationhewilltakecaretobepreparedwithadequateproofofthefact。

Inrespecttoforeigninvasion，itspublicnotoriety，whenitactuallytakesplace，rendersnoformofevidencenecessary，andhispoweronsuchanoccasiontocallforththemilitia，notmerelyofthestateinvaded，butfromotherparts，toassistinrepellinganenemy，who，bythetermsandspiritofourConstitution，istheenemyofthewhole，issurelytoosalutarytobedenied。Ofthedangerofaninvasionbeforeithappens，noonecanbeabetterjudgethanhe，who，beingchargedwithallourforeignrelations，mustbethebestinformedoftheproceedingsofforeignpowers。

Butinthecaseofwaractuallydeclaredbylaw，itisdifficulttoconceiveevenaplausibledoubt。Thelawitselfconstitutesthefact，andunlessitshouldbeseriouslycontendedthatcongresswasbound，beforeitdeclaredwar，toobtaintheconsentoftheseveralstates，therecanbenopretenceforsayingthatthecommandersinchiefofthemilitiaintheseveralstateswerenotrequiredorauthorizedbytheConstitutiontoobeyhismilitaryorders。

Itfortunatelyhappenedthatnomilitaryoperationsofaseriouscharacteroccurredinthatpartofthecountryduringthewar。Ifaninvasioninmuchforcehadtakenplace，theprobabilityis，thatwithapaternaldisregardoftheseunconstitutionalopinions，thepresidentwouldhaveemployedtheforceoftheUniontorepelit，andthetemporaryexhibitionoflocaljealousy，wouldhavebeenlostinthesenseofthenecessityofacommonexertion，andthegratitudefortheaidwhichproducedasuccessfuldefence。

Asitistheonlyinstanceinwhichaconstructionhostiletothefullexerciseofthepresident"sauthorityhasbeendistinctlyavowed，andasitpresentstheopportunityofshortlyelucidatingthispartoftheConstitution，theauthorhasfeltitadutytotakesomenoticeofit，thoughwithoutthesmallestintentiontoreviveheats，nowhappilyextinguished。

Thegovernorsoftheseveralstatesarecommandersinchiefoftheirmilitia，exceptwhentheyshallbecalledintotheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates。Infixingthemomentwhenthispoweroverthemceases，andthatofthepresidentcommences，thelanguageusedinsomeofthestateconstitutions，andintheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，isthesame。

Thecallingintoactualservice，andnottheactualcommencementoftheservice，istheperiodalludedto，anditwouldinsomedegreeimpairtheenergeticpower，whichintimesofpublicdangeristobeexercisedbythepresident，ifhepossessednorighttoenforceobediencetothecall。

Itmaythereforebedoubted，whetheranactofCongresspostponingthecommencementofthepresident"sauthoritytillthemilitiashallhaveobeyedthecall，isperfectlyconsistentwiththeConstitution。Thelegislaturecannomoreabridge，thanitcanenlargetheexecutivepowers，undertheConstitution。Thisquestionwasdiscussed，butnotdirectlydecidedinthecaseofHoustonv。Moore。3

ThepresidentduringthewarhadcalleduponthestateofPennsylvania，(aswellasonotherstates，)foraportionofthemilitia。Apersonwhowasdraughtedforthatpurpose，disobeyedthesummonsandwasfinedbyacourtmartialheldundertheauthorityofanactofassemblyofPennsylvania。

Themainquestionwas，whetherthecourtmartialoughttohavebeenconvenedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，orofthestate。Theactsofcongressof28thFebruary，1776，andofthe10thApril，1814，weremuchconsidered。Itwasheldthatcongressnothavinglegislatedonthesubjectofholdingcourtsmartialinsuchcases，anactofthestatelegislaturetothateffectwasconstitutional。The10thsectionofthelatterprovidesfortheexpenseofmarchingthemilitiatotheplaceofrendezvous。Immediatelyonarrivingthere，theyareundoubtedlyinactualservice，andifintheirwaytoittheyareunderanymilitarycommandwhatever，itmustbethatofthepresident。

Circumstancesmayrenderitnecessaryforthepresidenttoappointanotherplaceofrendezvous，beforethatpreviouslyappointedhasbeenreached，andmilitaryoperationsmay，fromachangeoftheenemy"sposition，becomenecessaryevenonthemarch；surelyinanysuchcase，themilitarypowerofthepresidentaloneoughttobeexercisedoverthem。Considerationsofeconomyinrespecttotheirpayoughtinsuchcasestobedisregarded。

Acasewhichin1818wasdecidedinthesupremecourtofPennsylvania，supportsmostoftheseprinciples，andisnotatvariancewithanyofthem。

ThathighlyrespectablecourtadoptedthefollowingconstructionoftheConstitutionandthepowersofcongressunderit。Thepresidenthasarighttoissuehisordersforcallingoutthemilitia，notthroughthemediumofthegovernoronly，butdirectlytoanyofficerhethinksproper。Ifhemakesarequisitiononthegovernorinthefirstinstance，andthelatterdeclinestocomplywithit，thepresidentmayissuehiscommandtoanyofficerofthemilitia。Thegovernorisnotjustifiedindisobeyingtherequisition，becausehediffersinopinionastothenecessityofcallingforththemilitia。Thegovernorwithouttheauthorityofcongress，orofthestatelegislature，hasnorighttodirectcourtsmartialaffectingthosewhodisobeythecallofthepresident。Apersonenrolled，draughted，andregularlynotifiedwhenandwheretoattendformusterandinspection，isliabletoapenaltyonthejudgmentofacourtmartialconstitutedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates?althoughsuchperson，beforeheappearsattheplaceofrendezvous，maynotbejustlyconsideredasinactualservice。Thecallingforthmustprecedetheactualservice。ItwouldrendertheConstitutionadeadletter，tosupposethathewhoisenrolledanddraughted，butrefusestoappear，shallbeexemptedfrompunishmentbecausehehasrefused。Itisnoinfringementoftherightsofcitizenstoproceedtothetrialofdelinquentmilitia-menbycourtsmartial。4TheregulartroopsoftheUnitedStatesareundertheimmediatecommandofthepresidentfromthetimeoftheirenlistment；theymaybemarchedto，orstationedatanypartoftheUnitedStates，athisdiscretion，unlesspreventedbysomespeciallegislativeact:Andalthoughthegeniusofarepublicandthepeculiarcharacterofourcountrywouldindicatethattheiremploymentshouldbeonlyinitsdefence，yetsinceadefensivewarissometimesbestcarriedonbyinvadingtheterritoryoftheaggressor，thepresidentmaycausethemtobemarchedoutoftheUnitedStatestoeffectthispurpose，andtherecanbenodoubt，thatinsuchacase，hewouldpossessthesamepoweroverthemilitia。

Itmayperhapsbemadeaquestion，whetherforthesuppressionofinsurrection，andincasesofasimilarnature，thepresidentcanemploytheregulartroopsinaidofthecivilauthority。Theactsofcongressaresilentonthesubject，andnopowergivenbythemwouldbevalidunlessitcouldbesupportedbytheprinciplesoftheConstitution。Itmustbeadmittedtobeaquestionofgreatdelicacyandimportance。Nopowerissolikelytobeabusedasthecommandofaregulararmy?nomeasurewouldbe，moredangeroustocivillibertythananhabitualrecurrencetomilitaryforceinothercasesthanactualwar；yetontheotherhand，intimesofdangerouscommotion，whenlawisprostratedandthecivilpowerisfelttobeinadequate，thepublicgoodwouldappeartojustifythemostpromptandefficientremedy。

Soldiersdonotceasetobecitizensbybeingincorporatedintoaregulararmy，anditisthedutyofeverycitizenincasesofthissort，torenderhisbestservicestohiscountry。Itcanbenoobjectiontothefulfilmentofthisduty，thatitisrenderedmoreefficaciousbypreviousdiscipline，andbybeingperformedinaregularandnotadesultorymanner。Itis，however，alwaystobekeptinmind，thatthemilitaryshouldbesubordinatetothecivilpower。Theordersfortheemploymentofthisforceonsuchoccasionsmustemanatefromthepresidentinhiscivilcapacity，orfromcivilofficersoftheUnitedStates，possessingtheauthorityofconservatorsofthepeace，ifanysuchtherebe。

Thattheexerciseofthispowershouldbeattendedwithgreatcaution，noonewilldeny；realnecessityalonewilljustifyitsbeingexercisedatall。Therecanbenodoubtthat，ifitoccasionedthelossofhumanlife，thewholemeasurewouldbeliabletoseverejudicialscrutiny。

1。HowwellthisisexplainedbyAdamSmithinhisWealthofNations，vol。3。p。56。

2。See8Mass。Reports，551。Niles"Reg。

vol。3，116。

3。8Wheaton，p。1，and3Serg。&；

Rawle，169。

4。3Sergeant&；Rawle，590。Duffieldv。Smith。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXIVCHAPTERXIV。OFTHEAPPOINTMENTTOOFFICES。INadditiontothepoweroverthearmy，navy，andmilitia，alreadynoticed，thepresidenthasaqualifiedpowerofappointingtheexecutiveandjudicialofficers。Theformeroftheseareheldduringhispleasure；thelatterduringgoodbehaviour。Inrespecttoboth，thecommissionsaregrantedbythepresident，buttheyspecifythatitisbyandwiththeadviceandconsentofthesenate。Itwasdeemedexpedientthattheapprobationofthesenateshouldbegiven，unlessavacancyhappenedduringitsrecess，inwhichcasecommissionsaregrantedwhichexpireattheendofthenextsession。

Itmay，however，bequestioned，whetherthisrestraintonthepowerofthepresidentfullycorrespondswiththeconfidencewhichisotherwisereposedinhim，andwhetheritdoesnotinsomedegreeaffecttheresponsibilitytopublicopinionwhichwouldaccompanyanunlimitedpowerofappointments。

Ifitwereleftentirelytohimselftoselectsuchagentsashemightdeemqualifiedforpublicduties，hewouldofcoursebescrupulousinhischoice；butifasenate，eitheractuatedbypartymotives，orforwantofinformationofthefitnessoftheindividual，rejectsthenomination，notonlymaythepublicinterestssufferintheimmediatecase，butthepresidentbeimpelledtoinadequatesubstitutions。Itistrue，thattheconverseofthispropositionmayalsobeadmitted。Impropernominations，proceedingfrompersonalorpartyinfluence，maybeproperlyrejectedbyavirtuousandinflexiblesenate；butinthelattercase，ifitevershouldbeourmisfortunetohaveamansoactuated，inpossessionofthishighoffice，wemayseehimimmediatelyaftertherisingofthesenate，dismisstheincumbent，orincaseoftheirrejectingonenomination，withholdinganother，andavailinghimselfofthepowertoappointduringtherecess。

Itwould，therefore，appearuponthewhole，thatwiththepossibilityofanevasionwhichwouldrendertheconstitutionalprovisionsoentirelynugatory，itwouldhavebeenmorebeneficialtohaveleftthispowerinthepresidentwithoutrestraint，andthemoreso，astheconsentofthesenateisnotrequiredforthedismissionoftheofficer。

Itwouldbeimpropertopassovertheconstructiongivenbythesenatetothepowerofappointingduringtheirrecess。Ithasbeenheldbythatvenerablebody，thatifnewofficesarecreatedbycongress，thepresidentcannotaftertheadjournmentofthesenate，makeappointmentstofillthem。

Thevacanciesdonothappenduringtherecessofthesenate。1

Thetextisnotveryexplicitastotheofficerswhoseappointmentsrequiretheconsentofthesenate:itenumeratesambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls，judgesofthesupremecourt，andallotherofficersoftheUnitedStates，whoseappointmentsarenotthereinotherwiseprovidedfor，andwhichshallbeestablishedbylaw；butthecongressmaybylawvesttheappointmentofsuchinferiorofficersastheythinkproperinthepresidentalone，inthecourtsoflaw，orintheheadsofdepartments。

Theterm"inferior"issomewhatvague，anditisperhapslefttocongresstodeterminehowtoapplyit；iftheydonototherwisedirect，theconsentofthesenateisnecessaryunderthequalificationsdescribed。

Aproperselectionandappointmentofsubordinateofficers，isoneofthestrongestmarksofapowerfulmind。Itisadutyofthepresidenttoacquire，asfaraspossible，anintimateknowledgeofthecapacitiesandcharactersofhisfellowcitizens；todisregardtheimportunitiesoffriends；

thehintsormenacesofenemies；thebiasofparty，andthehopeofpopularity。

Thelatterissometimestherefugeoffeeble-mindedmen，butitsgleamistransientifitisobtainedbyaderelictionofhonestdutyandsounddiscretion。Popularfavourisbestsecuredbycarefullyascertainingandstrictlypursuingthetrueinterestsofthepeople。Thepresidenthimselfiselectedonthesuppositionthatheisthemostcapablecitizentounderstandandpromotethoseinterests，andineveryappointmentheoughttoconsiderhimselfasexecutingapublictrustofthesamenature。

Neithershouldthefearofgivingoffencetothepublic，orpaintotheindividual，deterhimfromtheimmediateexerciseofhispowerofremovalonproofofincapacityorinfidelityinthesubordinateofficer。Thepublic，uninformedofthenecessity，maybesurprised，andatfirstdissatisfied；

butpublicapprobationultimatelyaccompaniesthefearlessanduprightdischargeofduty。Ontheotherhand，hastyandcapriciousdismissionsfromofficeareequallyreprehensible。Althoughtheofficermaybedependentonthepleasureofthepresident，asounddiscretionisexpectedtoregulatethatpleasure。Themotivestoattainadegreeofexcellenceintheknowledgeandperformanceofofficialdutiesaregreatlyabated，ifthetenureisrenderedaltogetheruncertain；andifhewhobyindustry，capacity，andfidelity，hasprovedhimselfausefulservantofthepublic，iscauselesslyremoved，thepublicwillhavemuchreasontocomplain。

Amodeofproceedingisinterwovenwiththemilitaryorganizationofgreatbenefittothesoundconstitutionofthearmy。Althoughthepresidentisunquestionablyauthorizedtodepriveanymilitaryofficerofhiscommissionatpleasure，yettheestablishedpracticeis，toallowtheindividual，whoseconducthasgivendissatisfaction，anopportunityofexplainingandvindicatingit，bymeansofaregulartribunal，beforehe，isdismissed，suspended，orevenreproved。Thesameusageprevailsinthenavy。Thusasort，oftenureduringgoodbehavourisproduced，theeffectofwhich，withmenofintegrity，iseminentlyuseful。Inthediversifiedemploymentsofcivillife，nosimilarinstitutioncouldbesystematicallyadopted，andafullanalogy，therefore，cannotexist；butifwesometimesseeintherevolutionsofparty，aswellinothercountriesasinthis，wholehostsofmeritoriousofficerssuddenlysweptaway，andtheirplacesfilledbymenwithoutsuperiorqualifications，wemayregretthattheprincipleislostsightof，andthatnoremedycanbeapplied。

Fourexecutivedepartmentshavebeencreatedbycongressatdifferenttimes。Thedepartmentofstate?ofthetreasury?ofwar?andofthenavy?overeachofwhichaprincipalofficer，denominatedthesecretary，presides。Throughoneoftheseorgans，thedirectionsofthepresidentarecommunicated，inallmattersrelativetotheirrespectivedepartments。

Butithasbeendecidedthatthepresidentisnotconfinedinhisexecutivefunctionstotheuseofaparticulardepartment。Thusinacasewhereitwasobjectedthatanorderfromthesecretaryofstateoughtnottobeconsideredasanactofthepresident；itwasheldthatreferencemustbehadtothisdepartmentfortheofficialactsofthepresidentwhicharenotmoreimmediatelyconnectedwiththedutiesofsomeotherdepartment，but，nevertheless，thepresident，forthemoreeasyandexpeditiousdischargeofhisexecutiveduties，maydirectsomeotherdepartmenttomakeknownthemeasureswhichhemaythinkpropertotake。Theyareequallyhisacts，whethertheyemanatefromthedepartmentofstate，oranyotherdepartment。

Hisimmediatemandatetoaninferiorofficerisinnocasenecessary。2

Allcommissionstoofficersissuefrom，andaresignedbythepresident。

Whenthepresidenthasnominated，thesenateapproved，andthecommissionissigned，theappointmentiscomplete。Iftheofficerberemovableatthepleasureofthepresident，thecommissionmaybearrestedbyhim，ifitisintheofficeofthesecretaryofstate，but，ifitisanofficeduringgoodbehaviour，theappointmentisnotrevocable，and，afterithasreceivedtheapprobationofthesenate，cannotbeannulled。

Deliveryisnotessentialtothevalidityofacommission，norisitaffectedbydetentionafterithasbeensignedbythepresident，iftheofficerisnotremovableatpleasure。Ifinsuchcase，thesecretaryofstatebeingpossessedofthecommission，shouldrefusetodeliverit，thejudicialofficermayneverthelesslawfullyexercisehisfunctions，andwillbeentitledtohislegalcompensations。3

Sickness，absence，ordeath，mightdelaytheexecutingacommission，andthepublicinterestsinsomecases，(asforinstancethejudgeofadistrictcourt，)suffergreatinjuryduringthevacancyoftheoffice。

Thecommissionisnottheexclusiveevidenceoftheappointment。

Theappointmentsmade，andcommissionsissuedduringtherecessofthesenate，areinforceonlytilltheendoftheensuingsessionwhentheiradviceandconsentaregiven，itistobeconsiderednotasaconfirmationoftheprecedingappointmentmadeduringtherecess，butstrictlyasanewone；anewofficialoathmustbetaken；andifitisanofficeinwhichsecurityisrequired，anewsecuritymustbegiven。