第3章

IftheConstitution，asoriginallyproposed，hadcontainedadirectprovisionthatthepresidentandvicepresidentshouldbechosenbyamajorityofthetwohousesofcongress，itisnotprobablethatthispartofitwouldhavebeenadopted。

Thatthechiefexecutivemagistrateshouldbethecreatureofthelegislature；

thatbeshouldviewinthemthesourcefromwhichhesprung，andbywhichhewastobecontinued，wouldatoncedestroythedignityandindependenceofhisstation，andrenderhimnolongerwhattheConstitutionintended，animpartialandinflexibleadministratorofthepublicinterests。Tothepeoplealonehewouldnolongerconsiderhimselfresponsible，buthewouldbeledtorespect，andwouldbefearfultooffend，apowerhigherthanthepeople。

SuchprinciplescannotbefoundintheConstitution；anditiswhollyinconsistentwithitsspiritanditsessence，toeffectuateindirectly，thatwhichdirectlyisnotavowedorintended。TheseinstancesfullyprovethatthesafetyofthepeoplegreatlydependsonacloseadherencetotheletterandspiritoftheirexcellentConstitution；butitisprobablethatalatefailurewillpreventarenewalofthelastmentionedattempt。Andinreferencetotheelectionof1828，ithasnotbeenrenewed，but，withastrictadherencetotheformsprescribed，thevoiceofagreatmajorityofthepeoplehasdecidedthechoice。

Beforeweclosethesubject，itispropertoaddthat，inonerespect，thecautionoftheConstitutioncannotbeviolated?nosenatororrepresentativeorpersonholdinganofficeoftrustorprofitundertheUnitedStatescanbeanelector，andthereforethevoteofeverysuchpersonwouldbevoid。

1。Therearenow(1829)buttwostates，viz。DelawareandSouthCarolinaintheelectorsareappointedbythelegislature。

2。Fed。No。8。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterVICHAPTERVI。OFTHEMANNEROFEXERCISINGTHELEGISLATIVEPOWER。THEtwohousespossessco-equalpowersinregardtooriginatinglaws，exceptthoseforraisingrevenue。

whichoriginateonlyinthehouseofrepresentatives，butthesenatemayproposeorconcurwithamendmentsasinotherbills。Somedoubtshaveexistedastothepolicy，oratleastthenecessityofthisexception。Itisintroduced，however，intomostofthestateconstitutions，andmaybefoundedontheutilityofkeepingthisfrequentsubjectoflegislationinaregularsystem，inorderthatpubliccreditmaynotbeimpairedbythesuggestionofdiscordantplans，orneedlessinnovations。Inadditiontowhich，itwasprobablysupposedthatthemembersofthehouseofrepresentatives，comingmorefrequentlyfromthebodyofthepeople，andfromtheirnumberscombiningagreatervarietyofcharacterandemployment，wouldbebetterqualifiedtojudgenotonlyofthenecessity，butalsoofthemethodsofraisingrevenue。

Onallothersubjects，abillmayoriginateineitherhouse，andafterhavingbeenfullyconsidered，itissenttotheother。Ifamendmentsareproposed，thebillissentbackforconcurrence。Ifthetwohousesdisagree，eithertothebill，asoriginallytrained，orasamended，aconferenceusuallytakesplace，andifneitherhousewillrecede，thebillislost。

Itisnotusualtobringforwardanotherbillonthesamesubjectduringthesamesession，butitmaybedone，asitisamerematterofparliamentaryregulation，andnotprohibitedbytheConstitution。

Whenabillhaspassedbothhouses，itispresentedtothepresident，andhisshareofthelegislativedutycommences，butitiswiselyandprudentlyguarded。Ifhepossessedtherightofimposinganabsolutenegative，itwouldvestinhimtoogreatapower。Ifhesentbackthebill，withorwithoutitsreasonsforrefusinghisassent，andthesamenumbersthatoriginallypassedit，werestillsufficienttogiveittheeffectofalaw，thereferencetohimwouldbeanemptyform。Itisthereforemostjudiciouslyprovided，thatnotonlyeverybillwhichhaspassedbothhouses，buteveryorder，resolution，orvote，onwhichtheconcurrenceofbothisnecessary，exceptonquestionsofadjournment，may，ifnotapprovedbyhim，bereturnedwithhisobjectionstothehouseinwhichitoriginated。

Theseobjectionsaretobeenteredatlargeontheirjournal，andthehouseisthentoproceedtoreconsiderthebillorresolution；ifaftersuchreconsideration，two-thirdsofthathouseshallagreetopassthebillorresolution，itshallbesent，togetherwiththeobjections，totheotherhouse，bywhichitshalllikewisebereconsidered，andifapprovedbytwo-thirdsofthathousealso，thebillbecomesalaw，andtheresolutionbecomesabsolute。Butinallsuchcases，thevotesofbothhousesshallbedeterminedbyyeasandnays，andenteredonthejournals。Whilethisgreatshareofthelegislativepowerisgiventothepresident，itwouldbeimpropertoleaveittohimindefinitelytoexerciseit，withoutsomecontrolinpointoftime，andthereforeitisprovidedthatifsuchbillorresolution，arenotreturnedbyhimwithintendays，(Sundaysexcepted，)theresolutionshalltakeeffect，orthebillshallbecomealaw，unlesscongressbytheiradjournmentpreventit；aconsiderationwhichoughttoinducethetwohouses，wheneveritifpossible，topreparemattersofimportanceineithershape，fortheconsiderationofthepresident，atleasttendaysbeforethetimeoftheiradjournment，otherwise，andparticularlywhenthedurationofthesessionislimited，measuresofhighinterestmaybefrustratedforaseason。

WemightheredrawacomparisonmuchtoouradvantagebetweenoursystemandthoseoftheEuropeanmonarchies，wheretheabsolutenegativeofthekingdependssolelyonhisownwillandpleasure，orontheotherhand，withthoseancientrepublicsinwhichthechiefexecutivemagistratesdidnotinthesmallestdegreeparticipateinthelegislativepower。Ourschemejudiciouslysteersamiddlecourse。Lawsdonotoriginatewiththepresident，althoughitishisdutytorecommendsubjectsforconsiderationwhenthepublicgoodrequiresit；butaslawsmaybeunadvisedlyandtooprecipitatelypassedevenbyadoublelegislature，itmaybeoftensalutarytocallthemtoareconsiderationoftheirmeasures，andbyrequiringtheobjectionstobeenteredonthejournal，andtheyeasandnaystoberecorded，thepeople，whoaretheultimatejudges，areenabledtodecideonthesoundnessofconductonthepartofall。Theremedytakesplaceatthenextelection。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterVIICHAPTERVII。OFTHETREATYMAKINGPOWER。WEwillnowproceedtoconsiderthelegislativepowersvestedinthesebodies。

Treatiesbeing，nexttotheConstitution，thesupremelawoftheland，properlyfallintothisclass。Theyarelaws，inmakingwhichthehouseofrepresentativeshasnooriginalshare；whethertheirsubsequentconcurrenceinanyshapeisnecessarywillhereafterbeexamined。

ThelanguageoftheConstitutionis，thathe[thepresident，]shallhavepowerbyandwiththeadviceandconsentofthesenatetomaketreaties，providedtwo-thirdsofthesenatorspresentconcur。

This，atfirstview，wouldimplythatatreaty，likeanactofcongress，shouldinitsprogressbethesubjectofjointdeliberation，butthepracticehasnecessarilybeenotherwise。

Treaties，ifmadeabroad，areeffectedthroughthemediumofourministerstoforeigncourtsunderinstructionsfromthepresident。Ifmadehere，thebusinessistransactedbythesecretaryofstate，underlikeinstructions，withtheministersfromforeigncourts。Thesenateisnotconsultedinthefirstprocess:whenthetreatyisagreedon，thepresidentsubmitsittothesenate，inwhosedeliberationshetakesnopart，butherenderstothem，fromtimetotime，suchinformationrelativetoitastheymayrequire。Thesenatemaywhollyrejectit，ortheymayratifyitinpart，orrecommendadditionalorexplanatoryarticles，which，ifthepresidentapprovesofthem，againbecomethesubjectofnegotiationbetweenhimandtheforeignpower；andfinally，whenthewholereceivestheconsentofthesenate，andtheratificationsareexchangedbetweentherespectivegovernments，thetreatybecomesobligatoryonbothnations。

Theproceedingsofthesenateduringthisprocessarewithcloseddoors，andthecontentsofthetreatyandtheinformationconnectedwithitoughtingoodpolicytobekeptsecret。ButtheConstitutiondoesnotinexpresstermsrequireit，and，inoneparticularinstance，whenthepublicmindwasgreatlyagitated，disclosures，notonlyofthecontentsofthetreatyitself，butofsomeoftheproceedingsofthesenateinregardtoittookplace，theproprietyofdoingwhichwasadmittedordeniedaccordingtotheopposingopinionsoftheday。1

Thenatureandextentofthisconstitutionalpowerunderwentfullexaminations2inthestateconventions。ThemostgeneraltermsareusedintheConstitution。Thepowersofcongressinrespecttomakinglawsweshallfindarelaidunderseveralrestrictions。Therearenoneinrespecttotreaties。Althoughtheactsofpublicministers，lessimmediatelydelegatedbythepeoplethanthehouseofrepresentatives；

thepresidentconstitutionallyandthesenatebothconstitutionallyandpractically，tworemovesfromthepeople，arebythetreatymakingpower，investedwiththehighandsolecontroloverallthosesubjectswhichproperlyarisefromintercoursewithforeignnations，andmayeventuallyaffectimportantinterestsathome。TodefinethemintheConstitutionwouldhavebeenimpossible，andthereforeageneraltermcouldalonebemadeuseof，whichis，however，tobescrupulouslyconfinedtoitslegitimateinterpretation。

Whateveriswantinginanauthorityexpressed，mustbesoughtforinprinciple，andtoascertainwhethertheexecutionofthetreatymakingpowercanbesupported，wemustcarefullyapplytoittheprinciplesoftheConstitutionfromwhichalonethepowerproceeds。

Initsgeneralsense，wecanbeatnolosstounderstandthemeaningofthewordtreaty。Itisacompactenteredintowithaforeignpower，anditextendstoallthosematterswhicharegenerallythesubjectsofcompactbetweenindependentnations。Suchsubjectsarepeace，alliance，commerce，neutrality，andothersofasimilarnature。Tomaketreatiesisanessentialattributeofanation。Onewhichdisableditselffromthepowerofmaking，andthecapacityofobservingandenforcingthemwhenmade，wouldexcludeitselffromtheinternationalequalitywhichitsowninterestsrequireittopreserve，andthusinmanyrespectscommitaninjuryonitself。Inmoderntimesandamongcivilizednations，wehavenoinstancesofsuchabsurdity。Thepowermustthenresidesomewhere。Underthearticlesofconfederationitwasgivenwithsomerestrictions，proceedingfromthenatureofthatimperfectcompact，tocongress，whichthennominallyexercisedboththelegislativeandexecutivepowersofgeneralgovernment。InourpresentConstitutionnolimitationswereheldnecessary。Theonlyquestionwaswheretodepositit。Nowthismustbeeitherincongressgenerally，inthetwohousesexclusiveofthepresident，inthepresidentconjunctlywiththemoroneofthem，orinthepresidentalone。

Theformationofatreatyoftenrequiressecrecyanddispatch，neitherofwhichcouldbefoundinthefirstorsecondmode，andacontraryplanwouldbeinconsistentwiththeusagesofmostnations。Itremainedtheneithertovestitinthepresidentsingly，ortouniteoneoftheotherbodieswithhim。Thelatterwasobviouslypreferable，andallthatremainedwastoselectthatonewhoseconformationappearedmostcongenialtothetask。Thesenateisasmallerbody，andthereforewheneverceleritywasnecessary，themostlikelyto，promoteit?itwasapermanentbody；itsmembers，electedforalongertime，weremostlikelytobeconversantinthegreatpoliticalinterestswhichwouldbeagitated，andperhapsitwassupposed，thatasrepresentativesinonepointofview，ratherofthestatesthanofthepeople，afederativequalityappertainedtothemnotwhollyunconnectedwiththenatureofaforeigncompact。

Fromtheseandotherconsiderations，thepowerwasvestedwherewefindit；andwheneverobjectionsareraisedagainsttheextensiveoperationsofatreaty，onaccountofthesourcefromwhichitsprings，wemustrememberthatitwasthewillofthewholebodyofthepeopletoplaceitthere。

Thelegaleffectofatreatyconstitutionallymadeis，thatnexttotheConstitutionitself，itprevailsoverallstatelaws，stateconstitutions，andactsofcongress。

Thisisexpressedinthefollowingwords?

ThisConstitutionandthelawsoftheUnitedStateswhichshallbemadeinpursuancethereof，andalltreatiesmadeorwhichshallbemadeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，shallbethesupremelawoftheland，andthejudgesineverystateshallbeboundthereby，anythingintheConstitutionorlawsofanystatetothecontrarynotwithstanding。

Thereisavarianceinthewordsdescriptiveoflawsandthoseoftreaties?intheformeritissaidthosewhichshallbemadeinpursuanceoftheConstitution，buttreatiesaredescribedashavingbeenmade，orwhichshallbemadeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。

Theexplanationis，thatatthetimeofadoptingtheConstitution，certaintreatiesexisted，whichhadbeenmadebycongressundertheconfederation，3thecontinuingobligationsofwhichitwaspropertodeclare。Thewords"undertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，"wereconsideredasextendingequallytothosepreviouslymade，andtothosewhichshouldsubsequentlybeeffected。ButalthoughtheformercouldnotbeconsideredasmadepursuanttoaConstitutionwhichwasnottheninexistence，thelatterwouldnotbe"undertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，"unlesstheyareconformabletoitsConstitution。

Ithasbeenobserved，thatitisnotdistinctlydeclaredwhethertreatiesaretobeheldsuperiortoactsofcongress，orwhetherthelatteraretobeco-equalwithorsuperiortotheformer。Themerecollocationofthewordswouldtendtogivethesuperioritytothelaws，buthighergroundmustbetakenforthedecisionofthequestion。

Havingfeltthenecessityofthetreatymakingpower，andhavingfixedonthedepartmentinwitchitshallbevested，thepeopleofcourseexcludedfromallinterferencewithit，thosepartsofthegovernmentwhicharenotdescribedaspartakingofit。TherepresentationheldoutbyourConstitutiontoforeignpowers，was，thatthepresidentwiththeadviceandconsentofthesenate，couldbindthenationinalllegitimatecompacts:butifpre-existentacts，contrarytothetreaty，couldonlyberemovedbyCongress，thisrepresentationwouldbefallacious；itwouldbeajustsubjectofreproach，andwoulddestroyallfutureconfidenceinourpublicstipulations。

Theimmediateoperationofthetreatymustthereforebetooverruleallexistinglegislativeactsinconsistentwithitsprovisions。

Butthisisnotinconsistentwithapowertopasssubsequentlaws，qualifying，altering，orevenwhollyannullingatreaty。Suchapowermaybesupportedonanotherground。Congressalonepossessestherighttodeclarewar；andtherighttoqualify，alter，orannulatreatybeingofatendencytoproducewarisanincidenttotherightofdeclaringwar。Suchmeasuresmaybeessentialtotheinterestsofthenation，anditisimpossibletofindtheminanyotherpartoftheConstitutionthaninthegeneralpowersheldbyCongress。Butintheseprocedures，thesenatemustnecessarily，andthepresidentmayeventuallybeparties，andtheyareessentiallydifferentfromlawstocarryatreatyintoeffect，whichsupposethetreatyimperfect，tilltheyarepassed。Theformerlawsonthecontrary，considerthetreatyascompleteandeffective，andarepassedastheonlymeansofcounteractingitunderachangeofcircumstances，atthehazardindeedofexcitingthecomplaints，resentment，orhostilitiesoftheforeignpower。

Intheyears1795and1796，thehouseofrepresentativeswasmuchagitatedonaccountofthetreatyofNovember19th，1794，betweentheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain。Aresolutionwaspassedrequestingthepresidenttolaybeforethemacopyofhisinstructionstotheministerwhonegotiatedthetreaty，withthecorrespondenceandotherdocumentsrelativetothattreaty，exceptingsuchpapersasanyexistingnegotiationsmayrenderitimpropertodisclose。

Theillustriousindividualwhothenheldtheoffice，answered，thathehadneverhadbutoneopiniononthesubject，andthathisconducthadalwaysconformedtoit。Hisopinionwas，thatthepowerofmakingtreatiesisexclusivelyvestedinthepresident，byandwiththeadviceandconsentofthesenate，providedtwo-thirdsofthesenatorspresentconcur，andthatanytreatysomadeandpromulgated。thenceforwardbecomesthelawoftheland。

Itisthus，headded，thatthetreatymakingpowerhasbeenunderstoodbyforeignnations；andinallthetreatiesmadewiththem，wehavedeclared，andtheyhavebelieved，that，whenratifiedbythepresident，withtheadviceandconsentofthesenate，theybecomeobligatory。InthisconstructionoftheConstitutioneveryhouseofrepresentativeshadacquiesced，anduntilthepresenttime，notadoubtorsuspicionhadappeared，tohisknowledge，thatthisconstructionwasnotthetrueone。

Withsomefurtherremarks，beconcludedbyobserving，thatasitwasperfectlycleartohisunderstandingthattheconsentofthehouseofrepresentativesisnotnecessarytothevalidityofatreaty，asthetreatywithGreatBritainexhibitedinitselfalltheobjectsrequiringlegislativeprovision，andonthesethepaperscalledforcouldthrownolight；andasitisessentialtothedueadministrationofagovernment，thattheboundariesfixedbytheConstitutionbetweenthedifferentdepartmentsshouldbepreserved，ajustregardtotheConstitutionandtothedutiesofhisofficeforbadeacompliancewiththeirrequest。4

Theprinciplesthuslaiddownweresofaracquiescedinbythehouse，thattheypassedaresolutiondisclaimingapowertointerfereinmakingtreaties，butassertingtherightofthehouseofrepresentatives，wheneverstipulationsaremadeonsubjectscommittedbytheConstitutiontocongress，todeliberateontheexpediencyofcarryingthemintoeffect。Andsubsequently，thoughnotwithoutmuchacrimoniousdebate，andbyasmallmajority，itwasdeclaredtobeexpedienttopassthelawsnecessarytocarrythetreatyintoeffect。

Fromthattime，thequestionremainedundisturbed，untilthesessionof1815-16，wheninrelationtoanothertreatywithGreatBritain，thehouseofrepresentatives，aftermuchdebate，passedabillparticularlyenactingthesamestipulationsononesubjectasthosewhichwerecontainedinthetreaty。This，asadangerousinnovationonthetreatymakingpower，waswarmlyopposedbytheminority，anddisagreedtobythesenate。Butafterconferencesbetweenthetwohouses，itterminatedinasortofcompromise，whichitisdifficulttoreconcilewithasoundconstructionoftheConstitution。

Theact，(whichwaspassedonthe1stofMarch，1816，)shortlydeclares，thatsomuchofanyactasimposesadutyontonnage，contrarytotheprovisionsofaconventionbetweentheUnitedStatesandhisBritannicMajesty，shallfromandafterthedateofthatinstrument，andduringitscontinuance，beofnoforceoreffect。

Thusaprecedentwasset，whichadissatisfiedhouseofrepresentativesmayhereafterresortto；andalthoughthejudicialtribunalswouldprobablyconsiderthelawasbeingwhollyunnecessary，andanullityinitself，itmaybethecauseoffuturelegislativeattemptsproducingmoredifficulty。

Yethowevermanifesttheseprinciplesmayappear，itmustbeconfessedthatanotherpartoftheConstitutionpresentsanapparentdifficultywhichrequiresexamination。

Bythe9thsect。ofthe1starticle，itisexpresslydeclared，thatnomoneyshallbedrawnfromthetreasurybutinconsequenceofappropriationsmadebylaw。

Atreatymaybemade，bywhichasumofmoneyisengagedtobepaidtoaforeignpower，onconsiderationsbeneficialtotheUnion；cansuchacontractbefulfilledwithoutanactofcongress?Threeeventualcasesmaybestated:Wherethereisasufficientsumofmoneyinthetreasury，notunderanyspecificappropriation。Wherethereisasufficientsum，butactuallyappropriatedtodifferentobjects。Wherethereisnomoneyinthetreasury，butasufficientsummustberaisedinsomemannertofulfilthecontract。Inthesecondandthirdofthesesupposedcases，itwouldseemthatthetreatycouldnotbecarriedintoeffectbyitsownpower。Taxation，directorindirect，canonlybetheworkofcongress。

ByArt。1。§；viii。thecongressshallhavepowertolayandcollecttaxes，duties，imposts，andexcises。

Nosuchpowerisgiventothepresidentandsenateindirectterms。

Byanothersection，(the7th，)ofthesamearticle，Allbillsforraisingrevenueshalloriginateinthehouseofrepresentatives。A

nicedisquisitionmightherebeintroduced，whetherthefulfilmentofacontractwithaforeignpower，wastobeconsideredasraisingrevenue。

Thetermoughttobeinterpretedinitsbroadandgeneralsense，andinreferencetothespiritandmeaningofthewholeConstitution。Byrevenuewemustunderstandwhateverisproducedbytaxes，duties，imposts，andexcises，forpublicuse。Themoneyssoraisedmaybeappliedtodefraytheexpensesofgovernment，topaytheprincipalorinterestofthepublicdebt，tomaintainanarmyandnavy，topayforacquisitionsofterritory，(asintherecentinstanceofthepurchaseofFloridafromSpain，whenbytreatyweassumedthepaymentofthemoneytowhichourowncitizenswerejustlyentitled，byreasonoftheinjuriesinflictedonthembythatcountry，)topreservepeaceandharmonywithforeignpowers，asthebarbarousstatesofAfrica，andavarietyofothercases。Itisstillrevenue，andcongressalonecanraiseit。andthebillcanonlyoriginateinthehouseofrepresentatives。If，therefore，anewtaxmustbelaid，oraspecificappropriationalreadymadebycongresssuperseded，itseemsobviousthatitcannotbedonebythepresidentandsenate。

Thefirstofthethreecasessupposedwillseldomhappen，butshoulditevertakeplace，andasum，whichbytreatytheUnitedStateswereboundtopaytoaforeignpower，couldbedischargedoutofmoneyslyinginthetreasury，unfetteredbyappropriation，thedifficultywouldnotyetbesubdued。Ifthesurplusinthetreasuryarosefromatax，laidwithaviewtothefulfilmentoftreatieswhichwerethereaftertobeconcluded，greatdoubtsmightbeentertainedwhethersuchalawwouldbeconstitutional。

Toextractmoneyfromthepeopleforapurposesoindefinite，andtoplacethosemoneysatthedisposalofthetreatymakingpower，mightpossiblybesupportedbytheauthoritygiventocongresstoprovideforthecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare。Buteventhis，asitwouldamounttoaconcurrenceofcongressineffectuatingthetreaty，wouldleavethequestionunresolved。

Theoriginaldifficultyremains，ifthemoneysthusfoundinthetreasury，consistedofasurplusunappropriatedbycongressinanymanner，ortoanyobjectwhatever。Nowwemustkeepinview，thatatreatywithaforeignpower，isnotofitselfanappropriationofmoneysinthetreasuryoftheUnitedStates，anymorethanitwouldbeanappropriationofmoneysinthetreasuryoftheforeignpower。Itisevidentlynotanappropriationinaconstitutionalsense，foritcanonlybemade(sofarasrelatestoothersubjects)astheactofbothhouses，andinthesolemnformofalaw。Howeverstrong，therefore，theobligationofgoodfaithmaybeonthenationtofulfilthetreaty，itdoesnotseemthatithasinvestedinthepresidentandsenateafulleffectuatingpower。Andifthepresidentalone，orconjunctlywiththesenate，weretodrawonthetreasuryforthesumnecessarytofulfilit，suchdraughtwouldnotappeartobewithinthedirectionoftheConstitution。5

Onthewhole，theconclusionseemstobe，thatinthissingleinstance，thepaymentofmoney，theconcurrenceofthehouseofrepresentativesisnecessarytogiveeffecttothetreaty。Butanengagementtopayasumofmoneywouldnotbe，liketheengagementtocedeapartoftheterritoryoftheUnitedStates，unconstitutionalandvoid。Whenitshouldreceivethesanctionofcongress，andthemeansareprovided，thetreatymaybeeffected。Itisreservedforcongressalone"todisposeoftheterritoryoftheUnitedStates，"ifbythisgeneralexpressionwearetounderstandthealienationofanypartoftheterritory，whichweshallhereafterconsider。

Inanothershapethesamequestionwasagitatedintheyear1798。Partiesatthattimeranhigh；thehouseofrepresentativeswasmuchdivided。Itwasconceivedoralleged，thattheexpensesincurredbythemultitudeofourforeignministers，weregreaterthannecessary。Thepracticealwayshadbeen，andstillcontinues，tomakeanannualappropriationofagrosssumfortheexpensesofforeignintercourse，withoutfurtherinterferencethantolimitthecompensationtoministersofdifferentgrades，butleavingitimplicitlytothepresident，withtheconcurrenceofthesenate，tosendministerstosuchcourtsasthey，whowerebestacquaintedwiththesubject，shoulddeemexpedient。Aneffortwasmadetoconfinethehigherrateofcompensationtotheministersofthreespecifiedcourts，andtoallowalltheothersonlyhalfthesameamount。Itwaswarmlycontendedthatcongress，byhavingtheexclusivepowertoraiseandappropriate，wasauthorizedtograntonlysomuchmoneyastheyshouldthinknecessary。

Happilyfortheinterestsandcharacterofourcountry，theeffortfailed，anditishopedwillneverberenewed。

TherecanbenodoubtofthespiritandtrueintentoftheConstitution，inrespecttoallpecuniarysuppliesrequiredtosupporttheexerciseofthetreatymakingpower。Itisincumbentoncongresstofurnishthosesupplies。

TheConstitutionhasvestedexclusivelyinthepresidentandsenatethedutyofforeignintercourse。Theinterferenceofcongressinanyshapeisnotwarrantedfurtherthantoaffordthemeansofcarryingonthatintercoursetotheextentwhichthepresidentandsenateholdtoberequisiteforthenationalinterest，andoffurnishingthemeansofeffectuatingtreatiesconstitutionallymade，when，ashasbeenseen，theirinterventionisabsolutelynecessary。Itistruethatthereisnoexpressdirectiontothiseffect，neitheristhereastomanyotherapplicationsofthepublicrevenue。Butwhereverthereisadutypointedoutingeneralterms，andadequatepowersgiventoanydepartmentofgovernmentforperformingit，commonsenseindicatesthecoursetobepursued，andthosewhoarethusauthorized，mustbeconsideredasboundtoperformtheduty。Ifitberefused，thegeneraloperationsofgovernmentwillbeaffectedwithgreaterorlessinjuryaccordingtocircumstances；andtheremediescanonlybesubsequentlyandperhapstardilyapplied。Theseremediesmustbeaconstitutionalchangeofthepublicagents。

ButthisisnotpeculiartotheAmericanConstitution。Shortofactualviolence，itneveriseffectedbutbythemild，yetfirm，exhibitionofthesovereignpower，if，aswithus，itstillremainsinthepeople，bythesubstitutionofothersforthosewhoseconducthasoccasionedadiminutionofpublicconfidence。

Theeffectofatreatyonstateconstitutionsandstatelawscannotbequestioned。Withoutconsideringwhetheritoperatesdirectlyasarepealofthem，wearewarrantedinsayingthatanactdoneunderastatelaw，inoppositiontoatreaty，cannotbesetupasalegalbartoaproceedingfoundedonatreaty。

TheinabilityoftheConfederationtoenforcethetreatiesmadebythemwasseverelyfelt。Manystatelawswhichhadbeenpassed，during，orshortlyafterthewaroftherevolution，wereinconsistentwithsomeofthearticlesofthetreatyofpeacewithGreatBritain，andthatpower，complainingofinjuriessustainedinconsequencethereof，postponedthefulfilmentofthetreatyinsomepointsontheirpart。Theinadequacyofthepowersofcongresstoenforceitwerethensensiblyfelt，andaseriousdeclarationthatatreaty，invirtueoftheconfederation，waspartofthelawofthelandandobligatoryontheseverallegislatures，wastransmittedtoallthestates，withanurgentrecommendationthatthestatesthemselveswouldrepealallthoseactsandpartsofactsthatwererepugnanttothetreaty。6Inthisrespectthewantofajudicialpowerwasstronglyperceived。

AftertheadoptionoftheConstitution，itsretrospectiveeffectupontheopposinglawsofastate，passedevenbeforethetreaty，wasspeedilyandfullyestablishedbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates。7

Asalaw，thepresidentenforcesatreatybyhisexecutivepowerwhennecessary。ThistookplaceinseveralinstancesduringthewarbetweenFranceandGreatBritain，afterthepresident，inalegitimateexecutionofthedutiesofhishighoffice，hadissuedaproclamationofneutrality。

Someofthebelligerentcapturesandotheracts，sofarastheyoccasionallyinterferedwiththeobligationsofourtreatieswitheithernation，wereratifiedbyhisinterventions。8

Thewisdom，impartiality，andfirmnessmanifestedonthepartofourgovernment，duringthewholeofthatdifficultperiod，entitledittothehighestapplause，andtherecouldbenobetterproofofitsmerits，thanthedissatisfactionalternatelyexpressedbyeachofthegreatcontendingpowers。Itisalsoduetotheexecutivesoftheseveralstatestodeclarethatalthoughtherewereatthetimestrongpopularimpressionsinfavourofone，andtotheprejudiceoftheothernation，allconsiderationsofthatkindweresuppressedinapromptandefficientcompliancewiththedirectionsemanatingfromthepresident。Anaccurateandcomprehensivecollectionoftheactsofourgovernmentduringthewholeofthatwarwouldbeanusefuladditiontothestockofpublicinformation，andwouldaffordprecedentswhichnoforeigncabinetcouldjustlydisdaintofollow。

1。RelativetotheBritishtreatyof1794。

2。SeeparticularlythedebatesoftheVirginiaconvention。

3。WithFrance，theUnitedNetherlands，andparticularlythetreatyofpeacewithGreatBritain。

4。Message，Match30，1796，andseeMarshall"sLifeofWashington，vol5。

5。WhenlandsarepurchasedoftheIndiantribesthroughtreatiesmadewiththem，themoneyisalwayspaidunderappropriationsbyactsofcongress。

6。Seethejournalofcongress，March21，andApril13，1787。TheletterfromcongresspreparedbyMr。Jay，thensecretaryforforeignaffairs，isadmirableinstyleandreasoning。SeetheAppendix。

7。Calderv。Bull，3dDallas，386，andBrailsfordv。Meade，ib。1。TheSupremeCourtofPennsylvania，inthecaseofGordon，affirmedthesameprinciples1Dall。

233。

8。SeeSergeantonConstitutionalLaw，p。216。397。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterVIIICHAPTERVIII。OFLAWSENACTEDBYCONGRESS。LAWSenactedbycongressformthethirdruleofobligation。

Thepoweroflegislationvestedincongress，isconformabletothehighobjectsofitsformation，someofwhichareexpresslyenumerated，andsomeincludedintheextensiveauthoritytoprovideforthecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare；butthisbroaddeclarationhasbeenconsideredbysomeasrestrainedbyanamendmentwhichhassincebecomeapartoftheConstitutiontothefollowingeffect:ThepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheConstitution，norprohibitedbyittothestates，arereservedtothestatesrespectivelyortothepeople。

Thequestionisnotcompletelysettledbythisarticle。"Thenatureofaconstitutionrequiresthatonlyitsgreatoutlinesshouldbemarked，itsimportantobjectsdesignated，andtheminoringredients，whichcomposethoseobjects，bededucedfromthenatureoftheobjectsthemselves。Ifitcontainedanaccuratedetailofallthesubdivisionsofwhichitsgreatpowerswilladmit，andofallthemeansbywhichtheymaybecarriedintoexecution，itwouldpartakeoftheprolixityofalegalcode，andrathertendtoembarrassthantoelucidate。Whetheranyparticularpowerisdelegatedtothegeneralgovernmentorprohibitedtothestates，mustdependonafairconstructionofthewholeinstrument。"1Theamendmentdoesnotspeakofpowersexpresslydelegated，andisinfacttobe，consideredratherinthelightofacautiousandspecialreservationofwhatisnotgranted，conceivedintermsasgeneralasthegrantitselfbutwhateverisalreadygranted，eithergenerallyorbyexpresswords，isnotintendedtobeabridged，andtherefore，ineffect，thisclausehasnooperationonthegrantitself。

Inavarietyofinstances，thelegislativepowerisnotlefttodependongeneralinferences。Expressenumerationremovesthedifficultyastothesubject，anditisonlyinrespecttowhatmaybetermedtheexcessofpracticallegislation，beyondthesubjectexpressed，thatanydoubtcanarise。

Thestyleandcompositionofstatutesinmoderntimes，havefrequentlybeencomplainedof；ithasbeenobservedthattheysometimesobscurethesensebyamultiplicityofwordsintendedtoproducetheoppositeeffect，andthebrevityandsimplicityofancienttimeshavebeenheldupasexamplestobefollowed。Butperhapsthepeculiarcharacterofourgovernmentmayjustifymoreminutenessinitslegislativeacts，thaninthoseofagovernmentnotundersimilarlimitations。Althoughverboseness，productiveofperplexity，shouldbescrupulouslyavoided，yettheenactmentsofalawframedunderalimitedauthority，shouldclearlyappeartobeconfinedtothatauthority，andaslittleaspossiblebeleftforgeneralconstruction。Theactshithertopassedbycongresshavenotoftencreateddoubtsastotheirtruemeaning。

1。SeeMcCullochv。Maryland，4Wh。316。Andersonv。Dunn，6Wh。225。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterIXCHAPTERIX。OFTHEENUMERATEDPOWERSOFCONGRESS。THEenumeratedpowers，whichwenowproceedtoconsider，willbeallfoundtorelateto，andbeconsistentwith，themainprinciple；thecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare。

Thefirstistolayandcollecttaxes，duties，imposts，andexcises。

ThethreelattermustbeuniformthroughouttheUnitedStates；butthereisnodescriptionofthesubjectstobetaxednoranylimitationoftheamounttoberaised。

Thenecessityofvestingthispowerintheunion，seemstobetooobvioustorequiremuchargument。Nogovernmentcanbesupportedwithoutthemeansofraisinganadequaterevenue。Itmustpossessthispowerinitself，andmustnotbedependentonothersfortheirconcurrence。Wehaveseeninourownhistorytheinefficientconditiontowhichwewerereduced，whenthenecessaryincomeforthemostimportantnationalobjects，couldonlybeobtainedbyrequisitionsoftheseveralstates。

Oftheamountnecessarytoberaised，thegovernmentitselfcanbetheonlyjudge。Ingovernmentsunderasinglehead，whenaseparatepursemaybekept，inwhichthepeoplehavenoshare，restrictions，ifpracticable，maybeuseful。Here，wheretheonlytreasuryisthatofthepeople，wherecompensationstopublicofficersarescrupulouslyfixed，andasevereaccountabilityisapermanentprinciple，nosuchlimitationsarenecessary。Andifthemoneyshouldbefaithlesslyinterceptedinitswaytothetreasury，orfraudulentlywithdrawnfromitafterwards，thedefaulterisalwaysliabletolegalcoercion。

Itwasnotthoughtnecessarytodefinewhatshallbetheexclusivesubjectsoftaxation，althoughinsomeinstancesapartoftherevenueofastatemaybeinterferedwith，bytheexerciseofthepower；foritisbetterthataparticularstateshouldsustainaninconveniencethanthatthegeneralwantsshouldfailofsupply。Itwasmanifestlyintendedthatcongressshouldpossessfullpowerovereveryspeciesoftaxableproperty，exceptexports。

Thetermtaxesisgenetical，andwasmadeuseoftoconferaplenaryauthorityinallcasesoftaxation。Thegeneraldivisionoftaxesisintodirectandindirect；thelattertermisnottobefoundintheConstitution，buttheformernecessarilyimpliesit。Indirectisopposedtodirect。Theremaypossiblybeanindirecttaxonaparticulararticlethatcannotbecomprehendedwithinthedescriptionofduties，imposts，orexcises，butifsuchcasecanarise，itwillbecomprehendedwithinthegeneraldenominationoftaxes。Thetermtaxincludes，1st。directtaxes，whichareproperlycapitationtaxesandtaxesonland，althoughdirecttaxesmayperhapsbelaidonotherthingsthatgenerallypervadeallthestatesintheunion。

2dly。duties，imposts，andexcises。And3dly。allotherclassesofanindirectkind。Indirecttaxesaffect

expenseorconsumption，thosewhoreducetheirconsumptionofanarticlesotaxed，reducetheamountoftheirtax。1Adirecttaxisindependentofconsumptionorexpense，andistobeapportionedamongtheseveralstates，accordingtotheirrespectivenumbers，whichistobedeterminedbythesamerulethat，asalreadyobserved，isappliedtorepresentation。Indirecttaxesdonotadmitofthisapportionment，buttheyaretobeuniformthroughouttheUnitedStatesonthesubjecttaxed。

Thus，ifCongressthinkpropertoraiseasumofmoneybydirecttaxation，thequotaofeachstateistobefixedaccordingtoitscensus。Ifindirecttaxationispreferred，thesamedutymustbeimposedonthearticlewhetheritsquantityorconsumptionisgreaterorlessintherespectivestates。

Whetherdirectorindirecttaxationismostconsistentwiththegeniusandinterestsofourrepublic，hasbeenmuchdiscussed，butitisaquestionnowoflittlemomenttous，sinceaConstitutionauthorizingbothhasbeenformed。

ThenextenumeratedpoweristhatofborrowingmoneyonthecreditoftheUnitedStates。

WhenthisConstitutionwasformed，theUnitedStateswereconsiderablyindebtedtoforeignnations，fortheexpensesofthewar，anditsowncitizenshadheavyclaims，aswellontheUnionasonindividualstates，forservicesandsuppliesduringthesameeventfulperiod。Tocombineandconsolidatethesedebts，todischargesomeandsecuretherest，wasnecessaryforthepublicfaithandinterestbothabroadandathome。Buttoavailitselfofthepoweroftaxation，inordertoaccomplishsuchextensiveobjectsatonce，wouldhavebeeninjurioustothecommunity。Itwasforeseenthatmanypubliccreditors，whetherdistantordomestic，wouldbesatisfiedwiththeassumptionorrecognitionoftheprincipalandthepaymentoftheinterest。Bythetermsthusintroduced，congressreceivedpowertomakethenecessaryprovisionsforsuchobjects。Incaseoffutureexigencies，theexpensesofwarorthefailureofpartoftheusualrevenue；asimilarmeanofcontinuingtheoperationsandthecharacterofgovernmentisalsothusprovided。

Toregulatecommercewithforeignnations，amongtheseveralstates，andwiththeIndiantribes，isthethirdpower。This，fromitsnature，mustbeconsideredasexclusive。Ifeachstateretainedapowertoregulateitsowncommercewithforeigncountries，eachwouldprobablypursueadifferentsystem。Heavydutiesortotalprohibitionsinrespecttosomearticles，irregularandchangeablecodesofcommerce，mutualrivalries，andotherobviousinconvenienceswouldnaturallyensue。Acommonheadcanalonecuretheseevils。Acommonheadcanaloneformcommercialtreatieswithforeignpowers，fortonootherwouldaforeignpowergivesufficientcredence。

Inlikemannerthecommercebetweenthedifferentstatesisthepropersubjectofageneralregulation。

Inthetermcommerceareincludednotmerelytheactofbuyingandsellingorexchangingmerchandise，butalsothenavigationofvessels，andcommercialintercourseinallitsbranches:itextendstovessels，bywhateverforcetheyarepropelledorgoverned，whetherwind，orsteam，oroars；towhateverpurposestheyareapplied，whetherthecarryingofgoodsorofpassengers，orproceedinginballastonly。Ageneral，unconfinedpowertoregulateasubject，isinitsnatureexclusiveoftheactionofothersonthesamesubject。

TheseprinciplesaresofullyandclearlyexplainedbyChiefJusticeMarshallinarecentcase，2thatweshallmakenoapologyforinsertingalargeextractfromhisopinion。"Commerce，asthewordisusedintheConstitution，isaunit，everypartofwhichisindicatedbytheterm。

"Ifthisbetheadmittedmeaningoftheword，initsapplicationtoforeignnations，itmustcarrythesamemeaningthroughoutthesentence，andremainaunit，unlesstherebesomeplain，intelligiblecausewhichaltersit。

"Thesubjecttowhichthepowerisnextappliedistocommerce"amongtheseveralstates。"Commerceamongthestatescannotstopattheexternalboundarylineofeachstate，butmaybeintroducedintotheinterior。

"Thesewordsdonot，however，comprehendthatcommercewhichiscompletelyinternal，whichiscarriedonbetweenmanandmaninastate，orbetweendifferentpartsofthesamestate，andwhichdoesnotextendto，oraffectotherstates。

"Comprehensiveastheword"among"is，itmayveryproperlyberestrictedtothatcommercewhichconcernsmorestatesthanone。Thephrasewouldprobablynothavebeenselectedtoindicatethecompletelyinteriortrafficofastate，becauseitisnotanaptphraseforthatpurpose；andtheenumerationoftheparticularclassesofcommercetowhichthepowerwastobeextended，wouldnothavebeenmadehadtheintentionbeentoextendthepowertoeverydescription。Theenumerationpresupposessomethingnotenumerated；

andthatsomething，ifweregardthelanguageorthesubjectofthesentence，mustbetheexclusivelyinternalcommerceofastate。Thegeniusandcharacterofthewholegovernmentseemtobe，thatitsactionistobeappliedtoalltheexternalcommercialconcernsofthenation，andtothoseinternalconcernswhichaffectthestatesgenerally；butnottothosewhicharecompletelywithinaparticularstate，whichdonotaffectotherstates，andwithwhichitisnotnecessarytointerfereforthepurposeofexecutingsomeofthegeneralpowersofthegovernment。Thecompletelyinternalcommerceofastatemaybeconsideredasreservedforthestateitself。

"Butinregulatingcommercewithforeignnationsthepowerofcongressdoesnotstopatthejurisdictionallinesoftheseveralstates。Itwouldbeaveryuselesspowerifitdid。ThecommerceoftheUnitedStateswithforeignnationsisthatofthewholeUnitedStates。Everydistricthasarighttoparticipateinit。Ifcongresshasthepowertoregulateit，thatpowermustbeexercisedwhereverthesubjectexists。Ifitexistswithinthestates，ifaforeignvoyagemaycommenceorterminateataportwithinastate，thenthepowerofcongressmaybeexercisedwithinastate。

"Thisprincipleis，ifpossible，stillmoreclearwhenappliedtocommerce"amongtheseveralstates。"Theyeitherjoineachother，inwhichcasetheyareseparatedbyamathematicalline；ortheyareremotefromeachother，inwhichcaseotherstatesliebetweenthem。Whatiscommerce"among"

them，andhowisittobeconducted?Canatradingexpeditionbetweentwoadjoiningstatescommenceandterminateoutsideofeach?Andifthetradingintercoursebebetweentwostatesremotefromeachother，mustitnotcommenceinone，terminateintheother，andprobablypassthroughathird?Commerceamongthestatesmust，ofnecessity，becommercewithinthestates。IntheregulationoftradewiththeIndiantribes，theactionofthelaw，especiallywhentheConstitutionwasmade，waschieflywithinastate。

Thepowerofcongress，then，maybeexercisedwithintheterritorialjurisdictionoftheseveralstates。"InrespecttocommercewiththeIndiantribes，wearetoadoptthesamebroadinterpretation；butitisapplicableonlytoindependenttribes。

Itisimmaterialwhethersuchtribescontinueseatedwithintheboundariesofastate，inhabitpartofaterritory，orroamatlargeoverlandstowhichtheUnitedStateshavenoclaim；thetradewiththemisinallitsforms，subjectexclusivelytotheregulationofcongress，andinthisparticularalsowetracethewisdomoftheConstitution。TheIndians，notdistractedbythediscordantregulationsofdifferentstates，aretaughttotrustonegreatbody，whosejusticetheyrespect，andwhosepowertheyfear。

Thepowertoestablishanuniformsystemofnaturalizationisalsoanexclusiveone。

Inthesecondsectionofthefourtharticleitisprovidedthatthecitizensofeachstate，shallbeentitledtoallprivilegesandimmunitiesofcitizensintheseveralstates，andthesamerulehadbeenambiguouslylaiddowninthearticlesofconfederation。Ifthisclauseisretained，anditsutilityandproprietycannotbequestioned，theconsequencewouldbe，thatifeachstateretainedthepowerofnaturalization，itmightimposeonalltheotherstates，suchcitizensasitmightthinkproper。Inonestate，residenceforashorttime，withaslightdeclarationofallegiance，aswasthecaseundertheformerconstitutionofPennsylvania，mightconfertherightsofcitizenship:inanother，qualificationsofgreaterimportancenightberequired:analien，desirousofeludingthelatter，mightbycomplyingwiththerequisitesoftheformer，becomeacitizenofastateinoppositiontoitsownregulations，andthusinfact，thelawsofonestatebecomeparamounttothatofanother。Theevilcouldnotbebetterremediedthanbyvestingtheexclusivepowerincongress。

Itcannotescapenotice，thatnodefinitionofthenatureandrightsofcitizensappearsintheConstitution。Thedescriptivetermisused，withaplainindicationthatitsmeaningisunderstoodbyall，andthisindeedisthegeneralcharacterofthewholeinstrument。Exceptinoneinstance，itgivesnodefinitions，butitactsinallitsparts，onqualifiesandrelationssupposedtobealreadyknown。Thusitdeclares，thatnoperson，exceptanaturalborncitizen，oracitizenoftheUnitedStatesatthetimeoftheadoptionofthisConstitution，shallbeeligibletotheofficeofpresident?thatnopersonshallbeasenatorwhoshallnothavebeennineyearsacitizenoftheUnitedStates，norarepresentativewhohasnotbeensuchacitizensevenyears，anditwillthereforebenotinconsistentwiththescopeandtendencyofthepresentessay，toentershortlyintothenatureofcitizenship。

Inarepublicthesovereigntyresidesessentially，andentirelyinthepeople。Thoseonlywhocomposethepeople，andpartakeofthissovereigntyarecitizens，theyalonecanelect，andarecapableofbeingelectedtopublicoffices，andofcoursetheyalonecanexerciseauthoritywithinthecommunity:theypossessanunqualifiedrighttotheenjoymentofpropertyandpersonalimmunity，theyareboundtoadheretoitinpeace，todefenditinwar，andtopostponetheinterestsofallothercountriestotheaffectionwhichtheyoughttobearfortheirown。

ThecitizensofeachstateconstitutedthecitizensoftheUnitedStateswhentheConstitutionwasadopted。Therightswhichappertainedtothemascitizensofthoserespectivecommonwealths，accompaniedthemintheformationofthegreat，compoundcommonwealthwhichensued。Theybecamecitizensofthelatter，withoutceasingtobecitizensoftheformer，andhewhowassubsequentlybornacitizenofastate，becameatthemomentofhisbirthacitizenoftheUnitedStates。ThereforeeverypersonbornwithintheUnitedStates，itsterritoriesordistricts，whethertheparentsarecitizensoraliens，isanaturalborncitizeninthesenseoftheConstitution，andentitledtoalltherightsandprivilegesappertainingtothatcapacity。

Itisanerrortosuppose，assome(andevensogreatamindasLocke)

havedone，thatachildisbornacitizenofnocountryandsubjectofnogovernment，andthatbesocontinuestilltheageofdiscretion，whenheisatlibertytoputhimselfunderwhatgovernmenthepleases。Howfartheadultpossessesthispowerwillhereafterbeconsidered，butsurelyitwouldbeunjustbothtothestateandtotheinfant，towithholdthequalityofthecitizenuntilthoseyearsofdiscretionwereattained。UnderourConstitutionthequestionissettledbyitsexpresslanguage，andwhenweareinformedthat，exceptingthosewhowerecitizens，(howeverthecapacitywasacquired，)atthetimetheConstitutionwasadopted，nopersoniseligibletotheofficeofpresidentunlessheisanaturalborncitizen，theprinciplethattheplaceofbirthcreatestherelativequalityisestablishedastous。

Themodebywhichanalienmaybecomeacitizen，hasaspecificappellationwhichreferstothesameprinciple。Itisdescriptiveoftheoperationoflawasanalogoustobirth，andthealien，receivedintothecommunitybynaturalization，enjoysallthebenefitswhichbirthhasconferredontheotherclass。

Untiltheserightsareattained，thealienresidentisundersomedisadvantageswhicharenotexactlythesamethroughouttheUnion。TheUnitedStatesdonotintermeddlewiththelocalregulationsofthestatesinthoserespects。

Thusanalienmaybeadmittedtoholdlandsinsomestates，andbeincapableofdoingsoinothers。Ontheotherhand，therearecertainincidentstothecharacterofacitizenoftheUnitedStates，withwhichtheseparatestatescannotinterfere。Thenature，extent，anddurationoftheallegianceduetotheUnitedStates，therighttothegeneralprotectionandtocommercialbenefitsathomeandabroad，derivedeitherfromtreatiesorfromtheactsofcongress，arebeyondthecontrolofthestates，norcantheyincreaseordiminishthedisadvantagestowhichaliensmay，bysuchmeasuresonthepartofthegeneralgovernment，besubjected。

ThusifwarshouldbreakoutbetweentheUnitedStatesandthecountryofwhichthealienresidentamongusisacitizenorsubject，hebecomesongeneralprinciplesanalienenemy，andisliabletobesentoutofthecountryatthepleasureofthegeneralgovernment，orlaidunderreasonablerestraintswithinit，andin。theserespectsnostatecaninterferetoprotecthim。

Thedurationofthequalityofcitizen，bothinthenativeandinhimwhoisnaturalized，isasubjectofconsiderableinterest。

ThedoctrineofindefeasibleallegiancehasadeeperrootinEnglandthaninanyothercountryinEurope:thetermisindeedalmostpeculiartotheEnglishlaw，andindiscussingtheextenttowhichtheycarryit，weshallfinditusefultoascendtothesourceoftheirgovernment，andthefoundationonwhichthisdoctrineisplaced。

Whateverrepugnancemayoccasionallybefeltattheavowal，thepresentgovernmentofEnglandmustbeconsideredasfoundedonconquest，andperhapsitisjustlyobservedbysomeoftheirhistorians，thatinscarcelyanyinstancehasconquestbyforeignarmsbeenpushedtoagreaterextentthanwiththem。

Thereluctancewithwhichabraveandgenerousnationsubmittedtotheyoke，increasedtheexasperation，andthetyrannyoftheirconqueror。Theirpropertywasalmostcompletelytransferredtohismilitaryfollowers，theirancientlawsweresoondisregarded，althoughsometimespromisedtoberestored，andthepurefeudalsystemoftenurewassubstitutedtotheancientallodialestates，orperhapstheimperfectfeudsoftheSaxons。

WiththissystemtheNormandoctrineofallegianceisconsideredbysometohavebeenintroduced，althoughotherstraceituptoantecedentperiods，3butwhetherthesolemndeclarationofallegiancewaspractisedinthetimeofArthurorofAlfred，whetheritwerethecustomoftheBritonsortheAngles，theSaxonsortheDanes，wehavesufficientgroundforbelievingthataftertheconquest，itwasunderstoodtobedueonlytothekingortherulingchieftain，andnottothenation。