第8章

Besidesthis，evenifthegeneraareinthehighestdegree

principles，shouldoneregardthefirstofthegeneraasprinciples，

orthosewhicharepredicateddirectlyoftheindividuals？Thisalso

admitsofdispute。Foriftheuniversalsarealwaysmoreofthenature

ofprinciples，evidentlytheuppermostofthegeneraarethe

principles；forthesearepredicatedofallthings。Therewill，

then，beasmanyprinciplesofthingsasthereareprimarygenera，

sothatbothbeingandunitywillbeprinciplesandsubstances；for

thesearemostofallpredicatedofallexistingthings。Butitisnot

possiblethateitherunityorbeingshouldbeasinglegenusof

things；forthedifferentiaeofanygenusmusteachofthemboth

havebeingandbeone，butitisnotpossibleforthegenustaken

apartfromitsspecies(anymorethanforthespeciesofthegenus)to

bepredicatedofitsproperdifferentiae；sothatifunityorbeingis

agenus，nodifferentiawilleitherhavebeingorbeone。Butifunity

andbeingarenotgenera，neitherwilltheybeprinciples，ifthe

generaaretheprinciples。Again，theintermediatekinds，inwhose

naturethedifferentiaeareincluded，willonthistheorybegenera，

downtotheindivisiblespecies；butasitis，somearethoughtto

begeneraandothersarenotthoughttobeso。Besidesthis，the

differentiaeareprinciplesevenmorethanthegenera；andifthese

alsoareprinciples，therecomestobepracticallyaninfinite

numberofprinciples，especiallyifwesupposethehighestgenustobe

aprinciple-Butagain，ifunityismoreofthenatureofaprinciple，

andtheindivisibleisone，andeverythingindivisibleissoeitherin

quantityorinspecies，andthatwhichissoinspeciesisthe

prior，andgeneraaredivisibleintospeciesformanisnotthe

genusofindividualmen)，thatwhichispredicateddirectlyofthe

individualswillhavemoreunity-Further，inthecaseofthingsin

whichthedistinctionofpriorandposteriorispresent，thatwhichis

predicableofthesethingscannotbesomethingapartfromthem(e。g。

iftwoisthefirstofnumbers，therewillnotbeaNumberapart

fromthekindsofnumbers；andsimilarlytherewillnotbeaFigure

apartfromthekindsoffigures；andifthegeneraofthesethings

donotexistapartfromthespecies，thegeneraofotherthingswill

scarcelydoso；forgeneraofthesethingsarethoughttoexistifany

do)。Butamongtheindividualsoneisnotpriorandanotherposterior。

Further，whereonethingisbetterandanotherworse，thebetteris

alwaysprior；sothatofthesealsonogenuscanexist。Fromthese

considerations，then，thespeciespredicatedofindividualsseemtobe

principlesratherthanthegenera。Butagain，itisnoteasytosayin

whatsensethesearetobetakenasprinciples。Fortheprincipleor

causemustexistalongsideofthethingsofwhichitistheprinciple，

andmustbecapableofexistinginseparationfromthem；butfor

whatreasonshouldwesupposeanysuchthingtoexistalongsideofthe

individual，exceptthatitispredicateduniversallyandofall？But

ifthisisthereason，thethingsthataremoreuniversalmustbe

supposedtobemoreofthenatureofprinciples；sothatthehighest

generawouldbetheprinciples。

(8)Thereisadifficultyconnectedwiththese，thehardestofall

andthemostnecessarytoexamine，andofthisthediscussionnow

awaitsus。If，ontheonehand，thereisnothingapartfromindividual

things，andtheindividualsareinfiniteinnumber，howthenisit

possibletogetknowledgeoftheinfiniteindividuals？Forall

thingsthatwecometoknow，wecometoknowinsofarastheyhave

someunityandidentity，andinsofarassomeattributebelongsto

themuniversally。

Butifthisisnecessary，andtheremustbesomethingapartfrom

theindividuals，itwillbenecessarythatthegeneraexistapartfrom

theindividuals，eitherthelowestorthehighestgenera；butwefound

bydiscussionjustnowthatthisisimpossible。

Further，ifweadmitinthefullestsensethatsomethingexists

apartfromtheconcretething，wheneversomethingispredicatedofthe

matter，mustthere，ifthereissomethingapart，besomethingapart

fromeachsetofindividuals，orfromsomeandnotfromothers，or

fromnone？(A)Ifthereisnothingapartfromindividuals，there

willbenoobjectofthought，butallthingswillbeobjectsofsense，

andtherewillnotbeknowledgeofanything，unlesswesaythat

sensationisknowledge。Further，nothingwillbeeternalorunmovable；

forallperceptiblethingsperishandareinmovement。Butifthereis

nothingeternal，neithercantherebeaprocessofcomingtobe；for

theremustbesomethingthatcomestobe，i。e。fromwhichsomething

comestobe，andtheultimateterminthisseriescannothavecome

tobe，sincetheserieshasalimitandsincenothingcancometobe

outofthatwhichisnot。Further，ifgenerationandmovementexist

theremustalsobealimit；fornomovementisinfinite，butevery

movementhasanend，andthatwhichisincapableofcompletingits

comingtobecannotbeinprocessofcomingtobe；andthatwhich

hascompleteditscomingtobemustheassoonasithascometobe。

Further，sincethematterexists，becauseitisungenerated，itisa

fortiorireasonablethatthesubstanceoressence，thatwhichthe

matterisatanytimecomingtobe，shouldexist；forifneither

essencenormatteristobe，nothingwillbeatall，andsincethisis

impossibletheremustbesomethingbesidestheconcretething，viz。

theshapeorform。

Butagain(B)ifwearetosupposethis，itishardtosayin

whichcaseswearetosupposeitandinwhichnot。Forevidentlyitis

notpossibletosupposeitinallcases；wecouldnotsupposethat

thereisahousebesidestheparticularhouses-Besidesthis，willthe

substanceofalltheindividuals，e。g。ofallmen，beone？Thisis

paradoxical，forallthethingswhosesubstanceisoneareone。But

arethesubstancesmanyanddifferent？Thisalsoisunreasonable-At

thesametime，howdoesthematterbecomeeachoftheindividuals，and

howistheconcretethingthesetwoelements？

(9)Again，onemightaskthefollowingquestionalsoaboutthe

firstprinciples。Iftheyareoneinkindonly，nothingwillbe

numericallyone，notevenunity-itselfandbeing-itself；andhow

willknowingexist，ifthereisnottobesomethingcommontoa

wholesetofindividuals？

Butifthereisacommonelementwhichisnumericallyone，and

eachoftheprinciplesisone，andtheprinciplesarenotasinthe

caseofperceptiblethingsdifferentfordifferentthings(e。g。

sincethisparticularsyllableisthesameinkindwheneveritoccurs，

theelementsitarealsothesameinkind；onlyinkind，forthese

also，likethesyllable，arenumericallydifferentindifferent

contexts)，-ifitisnotlikethisbuttheprinciplesofthingsare

numericallyone，therewillbenothingelsebesidestheelements

(forthereisnodifferenceofmeaningbetween’numericallyone’and

’individual’；forthisisjustwhatwemeanbytheindividual-the

numericallyone，andbytheuniversalwemeanthatwhichispredicable

oftheindividuals)。Thereforeitwillbejustasiftheelementsof

articulatesoundwerelimitedinnumber；allthelanguageintheworld

wouldbeconfinedtotheABC，sincetherecouldnotbetwoormore

lettersofthesamekind。

(10)Onedifficultywhichisasgreatasanyhasbeenneglected

bothbymodernphilosophersandbytheirpredecessors-whetherthe

principlesofperishableandthoseofimperishablethingsarethesame

ordifferent。Iftheyarethesame，howaresomethingsperishableand

othersimperishable，andforwhatreason？TheschoolofHesiodandall

thetheologiansthoughtonlyofwhatwasplausibletothemselves，

andhadnoregardtous。For，assertingthefirstprinciplestobe

godsandbornofgods，theysaythatthebeingswhichdidnottasteof

nectarandambrosiabecamemortal；andclearlytheyareusingwords

whicharefamiliartothemselves，yetwhattheyhavesaidaboutthe

veryapplicationofthesecausesisaboveourcomprehension。Forif

thegodstasteofnectarandambrosiafortheirpleasure，thesearein

nowisethecausesoftheirexistence；andiftheytastethemto

maintaintheirexistence，howcangodswhoneedfoodbeeternal？-But

intothesubtletiesofthemythologistsitisnotworthourwhileto

inquireseriously；those，however，whousethelanguageofproofwe

mustcross-examineandaskwhy，afterall，thingswhichconsistofthe

sameelementsare，someofthem，eternalinnature，whileothers

perish。Sincethesephilosophersmentionnocause，anditis

unreasonablethatthingsshouldbeastheysay，evidentlythe

principlesorcausesofthingscannotbethesame。Eventhemanwhom

onemightsupposetospeakmostconsistently-Empedocles，evenhehas

madethesamemistake；forhemaintainsthatstrifeisaprinciple

thatcausesdestruction，butevenstrifewouldseemnolesstoproduce

everything，excepttheOne；forallthingsexceptingGodproceed

fromstrife。Atleasthesays:-

Fromwhichallthatwasandisandwillbehereafter-

Trees，andmenandwomen，tooktheirgrowth，

Andbeastsandbirdsandwater-nourishedfish，

Andlong-agedgods。

Theimplicationisevidentevenapartfromthesewords；forif

strifehadnotbeenpresentinthings，allthingswouldhavebeenone，

accordingtohim；forwhentheyhavecometogether，’thenstrifestood

outermost。’HenceitalsofollowsonhistheorythatGodmost

blessedislesswisethanallothers；forhedoesnotknowallthe

elements；forhehasinhimnostrife，andknowledgeisofthelikeby

thelike。’Forbyearth，’hesays，

weseeearth，bywaterwater，

Byethergodlikeether，byfirewastingfire，

Lovebylove，andstrifebygloomystrife。

But-andthisisthepointwestartedfromthisatleastis

evident，thatonhistheoryitfollowsthatstrifeisasmuchthe

causeofexistenceasofdestruction。Andsimilarlyloveisnot

speciallythecauseofexistence；forincollectingthingsintothe

Oneitdestroysallotherthings。AndatthesametimeEmpedocles

mentionsnocauseofthechangeitself，exceptthatthingsaresoby

nature。

Butwhenstrifeatlastwaxedgreatinthelimbsofthe

Sphere，

Andsprangtoassertitsrightsasthetimewasfulfilled

Whichisfixedfortheminturnbyamightyoath。

Thisimpliesthatchangewasnecessary；butheshowsnocauseof

thenecessity。Butyetsofaratleasthealonespeaksconsistently；

forhedoesnotmakesomethingsperishableandothersimperishable，

butmakesallperishableexcepttheelements。Thedifficultyweare

speakingofnowis，whysomethingsareperishableandothersarenot，

iftheyconsistofthesameprinciples。

Letthissufficeasproofofthefactthattheprinciplescannot

bethesame。Butiftherearedifferentprinciples，onedifficulty

iswhetherthesealsowillbeimperishableorperishable。Forif

theyareperishable，evidentlythesealsomustconsistofcertain

elements(forallthingsthatperish，perishbybeingresolvedinto

theelementsofwhichtheyconsist)；sothatitfollowsthatprior

totheprinciplesthereareotherprinciples。Butthisis

impossible，whethertheprocesshasalimitorproceedstoinfinity。

Further，howwillperishablethingsexist，iftheirprinciplesare

tobeannulled？Butiftheprinciplesareimperishable，whywill

thingscomposedofsomeimperishableprinciplesbeperishable，while

thosecomposedoftheothersareimperishable？Thisisnotprobable，

butiseitherimpossibleorneedsmuchproof。Further，noonehaseven

triedtomaintaindifferentprinciples；theymaintainthesame

principlesforallthings。Buttheyswallowthedifficultywestated

firstasiftheytookittobesomethingtrifling。

(11)Theinquirythatisboththehardestofallandthemost

necessaryforknowledgeofthetruthiswhetherbeingandunityare

thesubstancesofthings，andwhethereachofthem，withoutbeing

anythingelse，isbeingorunityrespectively，orwemustinquirewhat

beingandunityare，withtheimplicationthattheyhavesomeother

underlyingnature。Forsomepeoplethinktheyareoftheformer，