第4章

Those，then，whosaytheuniverseisoneandpositonekindof

thingasmatter，andascorporealmatterwhichhasspatial

magnitude，evidentlygoastrayinmanyways。Fortheypositthe

elementsofbodiesonly，notofincorporealthings，thoughthereare

alsoincorporealthings。Andintryingtostatethecausesof

generationanddestruction，andingivingaphysicalaccountofall

things，theydoawaywiththecauseofmovement。Further，theyerr

innotpositingthesubstance，i。e。theessence，asthecauseof

anything，andbesidesthisinlightlycallinganyofthesimplebodies

exceptearththefirstprinciple，withoutinquiringhowtheyare

producedoutofoneanothers-Imeanfire，water，earth，andair。For

somethingsareproducedoutofeachotherbycombination，othersby

separation，andthismakesthegreatestdifferencetotheirpriority

andposteriority。For(1)inawaythepropertyofbeingmost

elementaryofallwouldseemtobelongtothefirstthingfromwhich

theyareproducedbycombination，andthispropertywouldbelongto

themostfine-grainedandsubtleofbodies。Forthisreasonthose

whomakefiretheprinciplewouldbemostinagreementwiththis

argument。Buteachoftheotherthinkersagreesthattheelementof

corporealthingsisofthissort。Atleastnoneofthosewhonamedone

elementclaimedthatearthwastheelement，evidentlybecauseofthe

coarsenessofitsgrain。(Oftheotherthreeelementseachhasfound

somejudgeonitsside；forsomemaintainthatfire，othersthat

water，othersthatairistheelement。Yetwhy，afterall，dotheynot

nameearthalso，asmostmendo？Forpeoplesayallthingsareearth

Hesiodsaysearthwasproducedfirstofcorporealthings；soprimitive

andpopularhastheopinionbeen。)Accordingtothisargument，then，

noonewouldberightwhoeithersaysthefirstprincipleisanyof

theelementsotherthanfire，orsupposesittobedenserthanairbut

rarerthanwater。But(2)ifthatwhichislateringenerationis

priorinnature，andthatwhichisconcoctedandcompoundedislater

ingeneration，thecontraryofwhatwehavebeensayingmustbe

true，-watermustbepriortoair，andearthtowater。

Somuch，then，forthosewhopositonecausesuchaswementioned；

butthesameistrueifonesupposesmoreofthese，asEmpedoclessays

matterofthingsisfourbodies。Forhetooisconfrontedby

consequencessomeofwhicharethesameashavebeenmentioned，

whileothersarepeculiartohim。Forweseethesebodiesproduced

fromoneanother，whichimpliesthatthesamebodydoesnotalways

remainfireorearth(wehavespokenaboutthisinourworkson

nature)；andregardingthecauseofmovementandthequestion

whetherwemustpositoneortwo，hemustbethoughttohavespoken

neithercorrectlynoraltogetherplausibly。Andingeneral，change

ofqualityisnecessarilydoneawaywithforthosewhospeakthus，for

ontheirviewcoldwillnotcomefromhotnorhotfromcold。Forifit

didtherewouldbesomethingthatacceptedthecontraries

themselves，andtherewouldbesomeoneentitythatbecamefireand

water，whichEmpedoclesdenies。

AsregardsAnaxagoras，ifoneweretosupposethathesaidthere

weretwoelements，thesuppositionwouldaccordthoroughlywithan

argumentwhichAnaxagorashimselfdidnotstatearticulately，but

whichhemusthaveacceptedifanyonehadledhimontoit。True，

tosaythatinthebeginningallthingsweremixedisabsurdbothon

othergroundsandbecauseitfollowsthattheymusthaveexisted

beforeinanunmixedform，andbecausenaturedoesnotallowany

chancethingtobemixedwithanychancething，andalsobecauseon

thisviewmodificationsandaccidentscouldbeseparatedfrom

substances(forthesamethingswhicharemixedcanbeseparated)；yet

ifoneweretofollowhimup，piecingtogetherwhathemeans，hewould

perhapsbeseentobesomewhatmoderninhisviews。Forwhennothing

wasseparatedout，evidentlynothingcouldbetrulyassertedofthe

substancethatthenexisted。Imean，e。g。thatitwasneitherwhite

norblack，norgreynoranyothercolour，butofnecessitycolourless；

forifithadbeencoloured，itwouldhavehadoneofthesecolours。

Andsimilarly，bythissameargument，itwasflavourless，norhadit

anysimilarattribute；foritcouldnotbeeitherofanyqualityorof

anysize，norcoulditbeanydefinitekindofthing。Forifit

were，oneoftheparticularformswouldhavebelongedtoit，and

thisisimpossible，sinceallweremixedtogether；forthe

particularformwouldnecessarilyhavebeenalreadyseparatedout，but

heallweremixedexceptreason，andthisalonewasunmixedand

pure。Fromthisitfollows，then，thathemustsaytheprinciples

aretheOne(forthisissimpleandunmixed)andtheOther，whichis

ofsuchanatureaswesupposetheindefinitetobebeforeitis

definedandpartakesofsomeform。Therefore，whileexpressinghimself

neitherrightlynorclearly，hemeanssomethinglikewhatthelater

thinkerssayandwhatisnowmoreclearlyseentobethecase。

Butthesethinkersare，afterall，athomeonlyinargumentsabout

generationanddestructionandmovement；foritispracticallyonlyof

thissortofsubstancethattheyseektheprinciplesandthecauses。

Butthosewhoextendtheirvisiontoallthingsthatexist，andof

existingthingssupposesometobeperceptibleandothersnot

perceptible，evidentlystudybothclasses，whichisallthemore

reasonwhyoneshoulddevotesometimetoseeingwhatisgoodintheir

viewsandwhatbadfromthestandpointoftheinquirywehavenow

beforeus。

The’Pythagoreans’treatofprinciplesandelementsstranger

thanthoseofthephysicalphilosophers(thereasonisthattheygot

theprinciplesfromnon-sensiblethings，fortheobjectsof

mathematics，exceptthoseofastronomy，areoftheclassofthings

withoutmovement)；yettheirdiscussionsandinvestigationsareall

aboutnature；fortheygeneratetheheavens，andwithregardto

theirpartsandattributesandfunctionstheyobservethephenomena，

anduseuptheprinciplesandthecausesinexplainingthese，which

impliesthattheyagreewiththeothers，thephysicalphilosophers，

thattherealisjustallthatwhichisperceptibleandcontainedby

theso-called’heavens’。Butthecausesandtheprincipleswhich

theymentionare，aswesaid，sufficienttoactasstepsevenupto

thehigherrealmsofreality，andaremoresuitedtothesethanto

theoriesaboutnature。Theydonottellusatall，however，how

therecanbemovementiflimitandunlimitedandoddandevenare

theonlythingsassumed，orhowwithoutmovementandchangethere

canbegenerationanddestruction，orthebodiesthatmovethroughthe

heavenscandowhattheydo。

Further，ifoneeithergrantedthemthatspatialmagnitude

consistsoftheseelements，orthiswereproved，stillhowwould

somebodiesbelightandothershaveweight？Tojudgefromwhatthey

assumeandmaintaintheyarespeakingnomoreofmathematicalbodies

thanofperceptible；hencetheyhavesaidnothingwhateverabout

fireorearthortheotherbodiesofthissort，Isupposebecausethey

havenothingtosaywhichappliespeculiarlytoperceptiblethings。

Further，howarewetocombinethebeliefsthattheattributes

ofnumber，andnumberitself，arecausesofwhatexistsandhappensin

theheavensbothfromthebeginningandnow，andthatthereisno

othernumberthanthisnumberoutofwhichtheworldiscomposed？When

inoneparticularregiontheyplaceopinionandopportunity，and，a

littleaboveorbelow，injusticeanddecisionormixture，and

allege，asproof，thateachoftheseisanumber，andthatthere

happenstobealreadyinthisplaceapluralityoftheextendedbodies

composedofnumbers，becausetheseattributesofnumberattachto

thevariousplaces，-thisbeingso，isthisnumber，whichwemust

supposeeachoftheseabstractionstobe，thesamenumberwhichis

exhibitedinthematerialuniverse，orisitanotherthanthis？

Platosaysitisdifferent；yetevenhethinksthatboththese

bodiesandtheircausesarenumbers，butthattheintelligiblenumbers

arecauses，whiletheothersaresensible。

LetusleavethePythagoreansforthepresent；foritisenoughto

havetouchedonthemasmuchaswehavedone。Butasforthosewho

posittheIdeasascauses，firstly，inseekingtograspthecauses

ofthethingsaroundus，theyintroducedothersequalinnumberto

these，asifamanwhowantedtocountthingsthoughthewouldnot

beabletodoitwhiletheywerefew，buttriedtocountthemwhen

hehadaddedtotheirnumber。FortheFormsarepracticallyequal

to-ornotfewerthan-thethings，intryingtoexplainwhichthese

thinkersproceededfromthemtotheForms。Fortoeachthingthere

answersanentitywhichhasthesamenameandexistsapartfromthe

substances，andsoalsointhecaseofallothergroupsthereisaone

overmany，whetherthemanyareinthisworldorareeternal。

Further，ofthewaysinwhichweprovethattheFormsexist，

noneisconvincing；forfromsomenoinferencenecessarilyfollows，

andfromsomeariseFormsevenofthingsofwhichwethinkthereare

noForms。Foraccordingtotheargumentsfromtheexistenceofthe

sciencestherewillbeFormsofallthingsofwhichtherearesciences

andaccordingtothe’oneovermany’argumenttherewillbeFormseven

ofnegations，andaccordingtotheargumentthatthereisanobject

forthoughtevenwhenthethinghasperished，therewillbeFormsof

perishablethings；forwehaveanimageofthese。Further，ofthemore

accuratearguments，someleadtoIdeasofrelations，ofwhichwesay

thereisnoindependentclass，andothersintroducethe’thirdman’。

AndingeneraltheargumentsfortheFormsdestroythethings

forwhoseexistencewearemorezealousthanfortheexistenceof

theIdeas；foritfollowsthatnotthedyadbutnumberisfirst，

i。e。thattherelativeispriortotheabsolute，-besidesalltheother

pointsonwhichcertainpeoplebyfollowingouttheopinionsheld

abouttheIdeashavecomeintoconflictwiththeprinciplesofthe

theory。

Further，accordingtotheassumptiononwhichourbeliefinthe

Ideasrests，therewillbeFormsnotonlyofsubstancesbutalsoof

manyotherthings(fortheconceptissinglenotonlyinthecaseof

substancesbutalsointheothercases，andtherearesciencesnot

onlyofsubstancebutalsoofotherthings，andathousandother

suchdifficultiesconfrontthem)。Butaccordingtothenecessities

ofthecaseandtheopinionsheldabouttheForms，ifFormscanbe

sharedintheremustbeIdeasofsubstancesonly。Fortheyarenot

sharedinincidentally，butathingmustshareinitsFormasin

somethingnotpredicatedofasubject(by’beingsharedin

incidentally’Imeanthate。g。ifathingsharesin’doubleitself’，

itsharesalsoin’eternal’，butincidentally；for’eternal’happens

tobepredicableofthe’double’)。ThereforetheFormswillbe

substance；butthesametermsindicatesubstanceinthisandinthe

idealworld(orwhatwillbethemeaningofsayingthatthereis

somethingapartfromtheparticulars-theoneovermany？)。Andifthe

Ideasandtheparticularsthatshareinthemhavethesameform，there

willbesomethingcommontothese；forwhyshould’2’beoneandthe

sameintheperishable2’sorinthosewhicharemanybuteternal，and

notthesameinthe’2’itself’asintheparticular2？Butifthey

havenotthesameform，theymusthaveonlythenameincommon，andit

isasifoneweretocallbothCalliasandawoodenimagea’man’，

withoutobservinganycommunitybetweenthem。

AboveallonemightdiscussthequestionwhatonearththeForms

contributetosensiblethings，eithertothosethatareeternalor

tothosethatcomeintobeingandceasetobe。Fortheycause

neithermovementnoranychangeinthem。Butagaintheyhelpinno

wiseeithertowardstheknowledgeoftheotherthings(fortheyare

noteventhesubstanceofthese，elsetheywouldhavebeeninthem)，

ortowardstheirbeing，iftheyarenotintheparticularswhichshare

inthem；thoughiftheywere，theymightbethoughttobecauses，as

whitecauseswhitenessinawhiteobjectbyenteringintoits

composition。Butthisargument，whichfirstAnaxagorasandlater

Eudoxusandcertainothersused，isveryeasilyupset；foritisnot

difficulttocollectmanyinsuperableobjectionstosuchaview。

But，further，allotherthingscannotcomefromtheFormsinany

oftheusualsensesof’from’。Andtosaythattheyarepatternsand

theotherthingsshareinthemistouseemptywordsandpoetical

metaphors。Forwhatisitthatworks，lookingtotheIdeas？And

anythingcaneitherbe，orbecome，likeanotherwithoutbeingcopied

fromit，sothatwhetherSocratesornotamanSocrateslikemight

cometobe；andevidentlythismightbesoevenifSocrateswere

eternal。Andtherewillbeseveralpatternsofthesamething，and

thereforeseveralForms；e。g。’animal’and’two-footed’andalso

’manhimself’willbeFormsofman。Again，theFormsarepatterns

notonlysensiblethings，butofFormsthemselvesalso；i。e。the

genus，asgenusofvariousspecies，willbeso；thereforethesame

thingwillbepatternandcopy。