第12章

"Theapprobationwithwhichweviewatender，delicate，andhumanesentiment，isquitedifferentfromthatwithwhichwearestruckbyonethatappearsgreat，daring，andmagnanimous。Ourapprobationofbothmay，upondifferentoccasions，beperfectandentire；butwearesoftenedbytheoneandweareelevatedbytheother，andthereisnosortofresemblancebetweentheemotionswhichtheyexciteinus。And，inthesameway，ourhorrorforcrueltyhasnoresemblancetoourcontemptformeannessofspirit。

ByhisowntheoryAdamSmiththinksthatthisdifferenceinthecharacterofapprobationismoreeasilyexplained。Itisbecausetheemotionsofthepersonwhomweapproveofaredifferentwhentheyarehumaneanddelicatefromwhattheyarewhentheyaregreatanddaring，andbecauseourapprobationarisesfromsympathywiththesedifferentemotions，thatourfeelingofapprobationwithregardtotheonesentimentissodifferentfromwhatitiswithregardtotheother。

Moreover，notonlyarethedifferentpassionsandaffectionsofthehumanmindapprovedordisapprovedasmorallygoodorevil，buttheapprobationordisapprobationitselfismarkedwiththesamemoralattributes。Themoralsensetheorycannotaccountforthisfact；andtheonlyexplanationpossibleis，that，inthisinstanceatleast，thecoincidenceoroppositionofsentimentsbetweenthepersonjudgingandthepersonjudgedconstitutesmoralapprobationorthecontrary。Whentheapprobationwithwhichourneighbourregardstheconductofanotherpersoncoincideswithourown，weapproveofhisapprobationasinsomemeasuremorallygood；andso，onthecontrary，whenhissentimentsdifferfromourown，wedisapproveofthemasmorallywrong。

Ifapeculiarsentiment，distinctfromeveryother，werereallythesourceoftheprincipleofapprobation，itisstrangethatsuchasentiment"shouldhithertohavebeensolittletakennoticeofasnottohavegotanameinanylanguage。Theword`moralsense"isofverylateformation，andcannotyetbeconsideredasmakingpartoftheEnglishtongue……Theword`conscience"doesnotimmediatelydenoteanymoralfacultybywhichweapproveordisapprove。Consciencesupposes，indeed，theexistenceofsomesuchfaculty，andproperlysignifiesourconsciousnessofhavingactedagreeablytoitsdirections。Whenlove，hatred，joy，sorrow，gratitude，resentment，withsomanyotherpassionswhichareallsupposedtobethesubjectsofthisprinciple，havemadethemselvesconsiderableenoughtogetthemtitlestoknowthemby，isitnotsurprisingthatthesovereignofthemallshouldhithertohavebeensolittleheededthatafewphilosophersexceptednobodyhasyetthoughtitworthwhiletobestowanameuponit？"

Inoppositionthentothetheorywhichderivesmoralapprobationfromapeculiarsentiment，AdamSmithreducesithimselftofoursources，insomerespectsdifferentfromoneanother。"First，wesympathizewiththemotivesoftheagent；secondly，weenterintothegratitudeofthosewhoreceivethebenefitofhisactions；thirdly，weobservethathisconducthasbeenagreeabletothegeneralrulesbywhichthosetwosympathiesgenerallyact；andlastofall，whenweconsidersuchactionsasmakingapartofasystemofbehaviourwhichtendstopromotethehappinesseitheroftheindividualorofthesociety，theyappeartoderiveabeautyfromthisutilitynotunlikethatwhichweascribetoanywell-contrivedmachine。"

CHAPTERXIV。REVIEWOFTHEPRINCIPALCRITICISMSOFADAMSMITH"S

THEORY。

Theresultoftheprecedingchapter，inwhichtherelationofAdamSmith"stheorytootherethicaltheorieshasbeendefined，isthatitisatheoryinwhichallthatistrueinthe"selfish"systemofHobbesorMandeville，inthe"benevolent"systemofHutcheson，orinthe"utilitarian"systemofHume，isadoptedandmadeuseof，toformasystemquitedistinctfromanyoneofthem。Itseekstobridgeovertheirdifferences，byavoidingtheone-sidednessoftheirseveralprinciples，andtakingawiderviewofthefactsofhumannature。Itistherefore，properlyspeaking，anEclectictheory，ifbyeclecticismbeunderstood，notamerecommixtureofdifferentsystems，butadiscriminateselectionoftheelementsoftruthtobefoundinthemseverally。

TheethicalwriterswhomostinfluencedAdamSmithwereundoubtedlyHumeandHutcheson，inthewayofagreementanddifferencethathasbeenalreadyindicated。DugaldStewarthasalsodrawnattentiontohisobligationstoButler。(8)ItwouldbeinterestingtoknowwhetherheeverreadHartley"sObservationsonMan，aworkwhich，publishedin1749thatis，sometenyearsbeforehisownwouldhavemateriallyassistedhisargument。ForAdamSmith"saccountofthegrowthofconscienceofasenseofduty，isinrealitycloselyconnectedwiththetheorywhichexplainsitsoriginbytheworkingofthelawsofassociation。

Fromourexperienceoftheconstantassociationbetweentheactsofothersandpleasurableorpainfulfeelingsofourown，accordingaswesympathizeornotwiththem，comesthedesireofourselvescausinginotherssimilarpleasurable，andavoidingsimilarpainful，emotionsorinotherwords，thatdesireofpraiseandaversiontoblamewhich，refinedandpurifiedbyreferencetoanimaginaryandidealspectatorofourconduct，growstobeaconscientiousanddisinterestedloveofvirtueanddetestationofvice。Therulesofmoralconduct，formedastheyarebygeneralizationfromparticularjudgmentsofthesympatheticinstinct，orfromanumberofparticularassociationsofpleasurableandpainfulfeelingswithparticularacts，arethemselvesdirectlyassociatedwiththatloveofpraiseorpraise-worthinesswhichoriginatesinourlongingforthesamesympathyfromothermenwithregardtoourselvesthatweknowtobepleasurableintheconverserelation。Theword"association"isneveronceusedbyAdamSmith，butitisimpliedateverystepofhistheory，andformsreallyasfundamentalafeatureinhisreasoningasitdoesinthatofthephilosopherwhowasthefirsttoinvestigateitslawsintheirapplicationtothefactsofmorality。

Thisis，perhaps，internalevidenceenoughthatAdamSmithneversawHartley"swork。(9)

Butthewriterwho，perhaps，asmuchasanyothercontributedtotheformationofAdamSmith"sideas，seemstohavebeenPope，whoinhisEveryonMananticipatedmanyoftheleadingthoughtsintheTheoryofMoralSentiments。Thepointsofresemblancebetweenthepoetandthephilosopherarefrequentandobvious。Thereisinboththesameconstantappealtonature，andtothewisdomdisplayedinherlaws；thesamereferencetoself-loveasthebasisofthesocialvirtuesandbenevolence；thesameidentificationofvirtuewithhappiness；andthesamedepreciationofgreatnessandambitionasconducivetohumanfelicity。

AdamSmith"ssimpletheoryofhappiness，forinstance，readslikeacommentaryonthetextsuppliedbyPopeinthelines，"Reason"swholepleasure，allthejoysofsense，LieinthreewordsHealth，Peace，andCompetence。"

Saidinprose，thesameteachingisconveyedbythephilosopher:"Whatcanbeaddedtothehappinessofthemanwhoisinhealth，whoisoutofdebt，andhasaclearconscience？"

Or，totakeanotherinstance。AdamSmith"saccountoftheorderinwhichindividualsarerecommendedbynaturetoourcareispreciselythesameasthatgivenbyPope。Saystheformer:"Everymanisfirstandprincipallyrecommendedtohisowncare，"and，afterhimself，hisfriends，hiscountry，ormankindbecomebydegreestheobjectofhissympathiesSosaidPopebeforehim"Godlovesfromwholetoparts:buthumansoulMustrisefromindividualtothewhole。

Self-lovebutservesthevirtuousmindtowake，Asthesmallpebblestirsthepeacefullake；

Thecentremoved，acirclestraightsucceedsAnotherstill，andstillanotherspreads；

Friend，parent，neighbour，firstitwillembrace；

Hiscountrynext；andnextallhumanrace。"

Toturnnowfromthetheoryitselftothecriticismsuponit:itmayperhapsbesaid，thatiftheimportanceofanethicaltheoryinthehistoryofmoralphilosophymaybemeasuredbytheamountofcriticismexpendeduponit，AdamSmith"sTheoryofMoralSentimentsmusttakeitsplaceimmediatelyafterHume"sEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals。

TheshorterobservationsonitbyLordKamesandSirJamesMackintoshbearwitnesstothegreatinterestthatattachedtoit，nolessthanthelongercriticismsofDr。Brown，DugaldStewart，orJouffroy，theFrenchmoralphilosopher。Thevariousobjectionsraisedbythesewriters，allofwhomhaveapproacheditwiththatimpartialacutenesssocharacteristicofphilosophersinregardtotheoriesnottheirown，willbestservetoillustratewhathavebeenconsideredtheweakpointsinthegeneraltheoryproposedbyAdamSmith。Butinfollowingthemaincurrentofsuchcriticism，itisonlyfairthatweshouldtryinsomemeasuretoholdthescalesbetweenthecriticsandtheirauthor，andtoweighthevalueoftheargumentsthathavebeenactuallyadvancedontheonesideandthatseemcapableofbeingadvancedontheother。

Firstofall，itissaidthattheresolutionofallmoralapprobationintosympathyreallymakesmoralitydependentonthementalconstitutionofeachindividual，andsosetsupavariablestandard，atthemercyofpersonalinfluencesandlocalcustom。AdamSmithsaysexpresslyindeed，thatthereisnoothermeasureofmoralconductthanthesympatheticapprobationofeachindividual。"Everyfacultyinonemanisthemeasurebywhichhejudgesofthelikefacultyiuanother；"andashejudgesofothermen"spowerofsightorhearingbyreferencetohisown，sohejudgesoftheirlove，resentment，orothermoralstates，byreferencetohisownconsciousnessofthoseseveralaffections。

Isnotthistodestroythefixedcharacterofmorality，andtodepriveitasProtagoras，theGreeksophist，depriveditlongagoinhissimilarteachingthatmanwasthemeasureofallthingsofitsmostennoblingqualities，itseternityandimmutability？Isitnottoreducetherulesofmoralitytothelevelmerelyoftherulesofetiquette？Isitnottomakeourstandardofconductdependentmerelyontheideasandpassionsofthosewehappentolivewith？DoesitnotjustifyBrown"schiefobjectiontothesystemofsympathy，thatitfixesmorality"onabasisnotsufficientlyfirm"？

AdamSmith"sanswertothismighthavebeen，thattheconsiderationofthebasisofmoralitylaybeyondthescopeofhisinquiry，andthat，ifheexplainedtheprincipleofmoralapprobationbythelawsofsympathyheappealedto，thefactscommandedacceptance，whatevertheconsequencesmightbe。Hewouldhavereassertedconfidently，thatnocaseofapprobationoccurredwithoutatacitreferencetothesympathyoftheapprover；andthatthefeelingofapprobationorthecontraryalwaysvariedexactlywiththedegreeofsympathyorantipathyfeltfortheagent。Therefore，ifasamatteroffacteverycaseofsuchapprobationimpliedareferencetothefeelingsoftheindividualpersonapproving，thenthosefeelingswerethesourceofmoraljudgment，howevervariableorrelativemoralitymightthusbemadetoappear。

Hewouldalsohavedeniedthattheconsequenceofhistheorydidreallyinanywayweakenthebasisofmorality，ordepriveitofitsobligatorypoweroverourconduct。Theassertionofsuchaconsequencehasbeenperhapsthemostpersistentobjectionraisedagainsthissystem。SirJamesMackintosh，forinstance，makesthecriticism，that"thesympathieshavenothingmoreofanimperativecharacterthananyotheremotions。Theyattractorrepel，likeotherfeelings，accordingtotheirintensity。If，then，thesympathiescontinueinmaturemindstoconstitutethewholeofconscience，itbecomesutterlyimpossibletoexplainthecharacterofcommandandsupremacy，whichisattestedbytheunanimousvoiceofmankindto

belongtothatfaculty，andtoformitsessentialdistinction。"(10)Butas，ofallAdamSmith"scritics，Jouffroyhasbeentheonewhohasurgedthisargumentwiththegreatestforce，itwillbebesttofollowhisreasoning，beforeconsideringtheforceoftheobjection。

Accordingtohim，nomoremoralauthoritycanattachtotheinstinctofsympathythancanattachtoanyotherinstinctofournature。Thedesireofsympathy，beingsimplyaninstinct，canhavenoclaimtoprevailovertheimpulsesofourotherinstincts，whenevertheyhappentocomeintoconflict，thansuchasisfoundedonitspossiblegreaterstrength。Forinstance，theinstinctofself-loveoftencomesintoconflictwith，andoftenprevailsover，theinstinctofsympathy，themotiveofself-interestwell-understoodbeingthussuperiortooursympatheticimpulsesbothinfactandbyright。Ifthenthereisasuperiorityintheinstinctofsympathyaboveallourotherinstincts，itmustcomefromajudgmentofreason，decisiveofitstitle；butsincesuchdecisionofreasonimpliesareferencetosomeruleotherandhigherthaninstinct，ourmotiveinpreferringtheinspirationsofinstinctivesympathytoallotherimpulsesmustbederivedfromthishighermotive，or，inotherwords，fromreasonandnotfrominstinct。

Hence，sincethesympatheticinstinctbearsnosignsofanauthoritysuperiortothatofotherinstincts，thereisnorealauthorityinthemotivewhich，accordingtoAdamSmith，impelsustorightconduct。Insteadofprovingthattheinstinctofsympathyisthetruemoralmotive，AdamSmithdescribestrulyandbeautifullythecharacteristicsofthismoralmotive，andthengratuitouslyattributesthemtotheinstinctofsympathy。Buthefailstoapplytorulesofconductfoundeduponsuchaninstinct，thatwhichisthespecialcharacteristicofthemoralmotive，namely，thatitaloneisobligatoryalonepresentsus，asanendtobepursued，anendwhichoughttobepursued，asdistinctfromotherendssuggestedbyothermotives，whichmaybepursuedornotasweplease。"Amongallpossiblemotives，themoralmotivealoneappearstousasonethatoughttogovernourconduct。"

JouffroyappliesthesamereasoningtoAdamSmith"sexplanationofourmoralideas，those，forexample，ofRightandDuty。Forifthemotiveofsympathybearswithitnoauthority，itisevidentthatitcannotexplainideasbothofwhichimplyandinvolveamotiveofobligation。

Ifdutyisobediencetorulesofconductthathavebeenproducedbysympathy，andtheserulesareonlygeneralizationsofparticularjudgmentsofinstinctivesympathy，itisplainthattheauthorityoftheserulescanbenogreaterthanthatofthejudgmentswhichoriginallygaverisetothem。Ifitisequallyadutytoobeytheinstinctastoobeytherulesitgivesriseto，itissuperfluoustoexplaindutyasasenseoftheauthorityoftheserules，seeingthatitisalreadyinvolvedintheprocessoftheirformation。

Andifagainitcanneverbeadutytoobeytheinstinct，becauseneitheritsdirectionnorthedesireofsympathywhichimpelsustofollowitcaneverbeobligatory，itcannonethemorebeadutytoobeytheruleswhicharefoundedupontheinstinct。Theauthorityofthemoralrulesorprinciplesofconductstandsorfallswiththeauthorityoftheinstinct；forifthelattercanenforceobligationtoacertaindegree，itcanenforceitinalldegrees；andifitcannotenforceittothisdegree，thenitcannotinany。ItisthereforeJouffroy"sconclusion，that"thereisnot，inthesystemofSmith，anysuchthingasamorallaw；anditisincompetenttoexplainourideasofduty，ofright，andofallothersuchideasasimplythefactofobligation。"(11)

Thequestionthenis，Howfarissuchcriticismwell-founded？Howfarisitrelevanttothesubject-matterofAdamSmith"streatise？

AdamSmithmighthaverepliedtoJouffroy"sobjectionsbyaskingwhether，puttingasidethequestionofthesoundnessofhistheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobation，anytheorythataccountedfortheapprobationdidnotipsofactoaccountfortheobligation。Hemighthavesaidthat，ifheshowedwhyonecourseofconductwasregardedasgoodandanotherasbad，heimplicitlyshowedwhyonecoursewasfelttoberightandtheothertobewrongwhyitwasfelt，thatonecourseoughttobefollowedandtheothercourseoughttobeavoided。Forthefeelingofauthorityandobligationisinvolvedinthefactofapprobation。AsithasbeenwellputbyBrown，"Theveryconceptionsoftherectitude，theobligation，theapprovableness(ofcertainactions)areinvolvedinthefeelingoftheapprobationitself。

Itisimpossibleforustohavethefeeling，andnottohavethese……

Toknowthatweshouldfeelourselvesunworthyofself-esteem，andobjectsratherofself-abhorrence，ifwedidnotactinacertainmanner，istofeelthemoralobligationtoactinacertainmanner，asitistofeelthemoralrectitudeoftheactionitself。Wearesoconstitutedthatitisimpossibleforus，incertaincircumstances，nottohavethisfeeling；

andhavingthefeeling，wemusthavethenotionsofvirtue，obligation，merit。"(12)

Moreover，AdamSmithexpresslypointedoutthatthedifferencebetweenmoralapprobationandapprobationofallotherkindslayintheimpossibilityofourbeingasindifferentaboutconductasaboutotherthings，becauseconduct，eitherdirectlyorbyourimagination，affectedourselves；sothattheadditionalstrengththusconferredonthefeelingofmoralapprobationwasquitesufficienttoaccountforthatfeelingoftheimperativeandobligatoryforcewhichinculcatesobediencetomoralrules。Ifthereisnoauthorityinaninstinctperse，itmayneverthelessbesoconstitutedandmaysooperatethatthestrictestsenseofdutymayultimatelygrowfromitanduponit。Theobligationisnonethelessrealbecauseitcanbeaccountedfor；noraretheclaimsofdutyanythelesssubstantialbecausetheyarecapableofbeingtracedtosohumbleabeginningasaninstinctivedesireforthesympathyofourfellows。

Itmaythereforebesaid，onbehalfofAdamSmith，thatitisnottoweakenthebasisofmorality，northeauthorityofconscience，totraceeitherofthemtotheirsourcesinsentimentsofsympathy，originallyinfluencedbypleasureandpain。Theobligatorynatureofmoralrulesremainsafact，whichnotheoryoftheirorigincanalterormodify；justasbenevolentaffectionsremainfactsofourmoralbeing，irrespectiveoftheirpossiblesuperstructureoninstinctsofself-interest。Ifcon-scienceisexplicableasakindofgeneralizationorsummaryofmoralsympathies，formedbytheobservationofthedistributionofpraiseorblameinanumberofparticularinstancesandbypersonalexperienceofmanyyears，itsinfluenceneedbenonethelessgreatnoritscontrolanythelessauthoritativethanifitwereprovedtodemonstrationtobeaprimaryprincipleofourmoralconsciousness。

ItisalsonecessarytorememberthatAdamSmithcarefullyrestrictedthefeelingofobligationtotheonesinglevirtueofjustice，andthroughouthistreatiseavoidedgenerallytheuseofwordswhich，like"right"and"wrong，"seemtosuggesttheideaofobligation。Bytheuseofthewords"proper"and"improper，"or"meritorious，"asappliedtosentimentsandconduct，heseemstohavewishedtoconveytheideathathedidregardmoralityasrelativetotime，place，andcircumstance，astoacertainextentduetocustomandconvention，andnotasabsolute，eternal，orimmutable。

Properlyspeaking，justice，ortheabstinencefrominjurytoothers，was，heheld，theonlyvirtuewhich，asmenhadarighttoexactitfromus，itwasourdutytopractisetowardsthem。Theconsciousnessthatforcemightbeemployedtomakeusactaccordingtotherulesofjustice，butnotaccordingtotherulesofanyothervirtues，suchasfriendship，charity，orgenerosity，wasthesourceofthestricterobligationfeltbyusinreferencetothevirtueofjustice。"Wefeelourselves，"hesaid，"tobeinapeculiarmannertied，bound，andobligedtotheobservationofjustice，"whilstthepracticeoftheothervirtues"seemstobeleftinsomemeasuretoourownchoice。""Inthepracticeoftheothervirtues，ourconductshouldratherbedirectedbyacertainkindofpropriety，byacertaintasteforaparticulartenorofconduct，thanbyanyregardtoapreciseruleormaxim；"butitisotherwisewithregardtojustice，alltherulesofwhichareprecise，definite，andcertain，andaloneadmitofnoexception。