第8章

Theproclamationissuedin1792，whenthewarbrokeoutbetweenEnglandandFrance，wasanexamplewhich，insimilarcases，deservestobefollowed。

Thepresentstateofthiscountryinregardtothepiraticaldepredationscommittedonitscommerce，presentsanotherstrikingfeatureofdifficultyin，regardtoexecutiveduty。

ThewretcheswhosallyoutfromtheportsofaSpanishisland，seizethedefencelessmerchantvessel，andafterremovingordestroyingthecargo，frequentlygluttheircrueltybythemostbarbarousdestructionofhumanlife，canbeeffectuallysuppressedbynoexertion，howevervigorous，ofthemarineforceunderthecommandofthepresident。Itcanonlybeeffectedbypursuingthemonshore，byassuming，insomedegree，thetemporarycommandofacountry，inwhichthelocalgovernmentiseithertoofeebleortoocorruptto。punishthem。Howeverstronglythevoiceofhumanityandtheinterestsofthecountrymighturgethepresidenttotakesuchenergeticbutjustifiablemeasures，itwouldinvolvehimingreatresponsibilitytodoso?andyetitwouldbedifficultforhimwhollytorestrainthezealandindignationoftheofficersemployedonthedistantservice，orontheotherhand，byhisownmereauthority，topunishforanactcommittedfromthebestmotives。Ifprovidedbycongresswithsufficientauthority，thesedifficultieswouldberemoved。

Butnotwithstandingalleffortstothecontrary，wemaybeinvolvedinwar，bymisconstructionsofhisacts，howeverjustlyintendedandcarefullyregulated。

Insuchacase，whetherimmediateinvasionensues，orstrongdefensivemeasuresbecomenecessary，itisstillthepresidentwhoistoactonhisownjudgment，tillcongresscanbeconvened。Ineveryaspectdirectlyorindirectlyconnectedwithforeignnationshisdutiesareserious，andhisresponsibilitygreat。

ItwashappyforthisnationthatatthetimeofadoptingtheConstitution，anindividualwasselectedtopreside，whosejudgmentneverfailed，andwhosefirmnessneverforsookhim:whoseconductprovedthattheexcellenciesoftheConstitutionconsistednot，merelyintheoryandcontemplation，butcouldberealizedinpractice；thatwithinitsproperspherenorightwasunprotected，andnoevilunredressed。ItoughttosatisfythepeopleiftheprinciplesofGeorgeWashington"sadministrationarefaithfullyfollowedbyallhissuccessors。

1。3Wheaton，643。ThesameruleprevailsinEngland。

2。7Cranch，382。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXICHAPTERXXI。OFTHEJUDICIALPOWER。NOformofgovernmentiscompleteunlessitbeaccompaniedwithajudicialpower。

Tomakelawsandtoexecutethemarethetwogreatoperationsofgovernment；

buttheycannotbefullyandcorrectlyexecutedunlessthereissomewhereresidentapowertoexpoundandapplythem。Thispowerisauxiliarytotheexecutiveauthority，andinsomedegreepartakesofitsnature。Butitisalsorequiredattimestocontroltheexecutive，andwhatitdecidestobeunlawful，theexecutivecannotperform。Itmayalsoinsomedegreebesaidtoparticipateinthelegislativepower。Itsconstructionoftheactsofthelegislatureisreceivedasbindingandconclusive，althoughitdoesnotpreventthelegislaturefromrepairingitsowndefects，orclearingupitsownambiguitiesbysubsequentlaws，operatingonsubsequentcases。AhighfunctionalsoappertainstothejudiciaryintheexclusiverighttoexpoundtheConstitution，andtherebytotestthevalidityofalltheactsofthelegislature。

Tothepeopleatlarge，therefore，thisinstitutionispeculiarlyvaluable，andoughttobeeminentlycherishedbythem。Onitsfirmandindependentstructuretheyreposewithsafety，whiletheyperceiveinitafacultywhichisonlysetinmotionwhenappliedto，butwhichwhenthusbroughtintoaction，proceedswithcompetentpowerifrequired，tocorrecttheerrororsubduetheoppressionofbothoreitherofthetwootherbranches。

AConstitutioninwhichtherewasanomissiontoprovideanadequatejudiciarycouldnotbesuccessfullycarriedintoeffect；andifinsteadofbeingseparateandindependent，thispowerwereeitherblendedwiththeothertwo，orthosewhoadministeritweredependentonthewillandpleasureofothers，itslustrewouldbetarnishedanditsutilitydestroyed。

TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，therefore，requiredajudicialpower，notasanadjunct，butasanecessarycomponentpart。TheextraordinarycomplicationsoftheauthorityoftheUnitedStateswiththatoftheseveralstates，whichseematfirstviewtothrowsomanydifficultiesintheway，fullyproveitsnecessity。ThestatetribunalsarenopartofthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。TorenderthegovernmentoftheUnitedStatesdependentonthem，wouldbeasolecismalmostasgreatastoleaveoutanexecutivepowerentirely，andtocallonthestatesalonetoenforcethelawsoftheUnion。ButitisnotinconsistentwiththisprinciplethattheUnitedStatesmay，wheneveritisfoundexpedient，electtomakeuseofastatetribunaltothesameextentasanyforeignpowermay，ifitthinkspropertoinstitutesuitsinthecourtsofothercountries，whichisincivilcasesonly。

Thejudicialpowerisgeneralorlimited，accordingtothescopeandobjectsofthegovernment。Inaword，itmustbefullyandexactlycommensuratewiththatofthelegislature。Itcannotbyanytermsoflanguage，bemadetoexceedthelegislativepower，forsuchexcesswouldbeinconsistentwithitsnature。Ifbyexpresswordsitshould，ontheotherband，berestrainedsoastoembraceonlyapartofthesubjectsoflegislation，itwouldimpairtheintegrityofthewholesystem。Theprotectionwhichitwasintendedtoafford，inregardtotheotherbranchesofgovernment，beingconfinedtopartsoftheirconduct，insteadofembracingthewhole，wouldproducetheincongruousmixtureofatheoretic，generalpowerwithpartialdebilityandimpotence。Ifgeneraltermsareusedindescribingit，thereisnodifficultyindefiningitsproperextent。

IntheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesweperceive，nottheexpresscreationofajudicialpower，buttherecognitionofitasanecessarypartofthegovernment，inwhichlightitwasjustlyconsideredandhasbeenuniversallyaccepted。Itspowerextendstothegreatselectedobjectsalreadynoticed，anditisthedutyofthosewhohavetoadministerit，tocarryittothatfullextent，butnevertoexceedit。Experiencehasalreadyshownthatfromawiseandtemperateadministration，theapprehensionofinconveniencefromseriouscollisionsbetweenthestatejudicaturesandthoseoftheUnitedStateswasunfounded。ItmustbeconfessedthatthemeritsofourConstitutionhavereceivedamplesupportfromtheprudenceandjudgmentwithwhichithasbeenadministered，andinnorespecthasasounderdiscretionbeenexhibitedthaninthejudicatory。Ifanyobjectioncouldbesustainedtotheproceduresofthejudgesofthesupremeandcircuitcourts，itwouldbethatofexcessivecaution，arisingfromasystematicanxietynottoexceedtheirjurisdiction。Anditisastrongargumentinfavourofanelectivegovernment，thatthosemeninwhomthepowerofappointmentisvestedbythechoiceofthepeople，have，inregardtothesejudicialofficers，exerciseditwithsomuchcaution，judgment，andsuccess。

Butitissaidthatthereisgenerallyapropensityinpublicfunctionariestoextendtheirpowerbeyonditsproperlimits，andthatthismayatsomefuturetimebethecasewiththecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Theinstancesmaybethoseinwhichthecaseisplain，andtheencroachmentuponstateauthoritytooobvioustobedenied；asifacourtoftheUnitedStatesshouldentertainacivilpleabetweentwocitizensofthesamestateinacasenotauthorizedbytheConstitution，orcriminalproceedingsonaccountofanoffencemerelyagainstastate。Insuchanextreme，andthereforeimprobablecase，astherewouldbenocolourofjurisdiction，thewholeproceedingswouldbevoid。If，however，undertheexistingcircumstances，itweredoubtfulandambiguous，orifitwereblendedwithmattersinwhichtheyhadjurisdiction，therulecommonlyadoptedamongdifferentcourts，sittingpreciselyunderthesameauthority，wouldprobablyberesortedto，-andthatwhichfirstobtainedpossessionofthecausewouldbeexclusivelyentitledtoproceed。

WherethejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatescourtandofastatecourtisconcurrent，thesentenceofeither，whetherofconvictionoracquittal，maybepleadedinbartoaprosecutionintheother，withthesameeffectasajudgmentofastatecourtinacivilcasemaybepleadedinbartoanactionforthesamecauseinacircuitcourt。1

Ajurisdictionexclusiveofthestatecourts，isnotexpresslygivenbytheConstitutiontoanyofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，butitisinseveralinstancesclearlyimplied。Casesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdictionandcontroversiesbetweentwoormorestates，must，bynecessaryconstruction，exclusivelyappertaintothecourtsoftheUnitedStates:thefirst，becausethewholesystemofmaritimeaffairswithitsconnexionsanddependenciesiswithdrawnfromtheseveralstatesbytheirownconsent，andvestedinthegeneralgovernment；thesecond，becausetherecanexistnootherthanthecommontribunal，thesupremecourtoftheUnitedStates，toentertainsuchsuits。IndeedthejurisdictionitselfiscreatedbytheConstitution，andvestedinthesupremecourtoftheUnitedStatesalone，thusrenderingthedignityofthetribunalcorrespondenttothedignityoftheparties。

Casesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministersandconsuls，arealsoenumeratedasfallingwithinthejurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates；reasonshavebeengivenfornotconsideringthisjurisdictionasentirelyexclusive。Itistruethatanactofcongresshasdeclaredthatthejurisdictionisexclusive，andthepracticeisunderstoodtohavebeeninconformitytoit，butthemainquestionhasneverbeenbroughttoajudicialtest。ThesamesentenceextendsthejudicialpowertoallcasesinlawandequityarisingundertheConstitution，thelawsoftheUnitedStates，andtreatiesmade，orwhichshallbemadeundertheirauthority；

tocontroversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty；tocontroversiesbetweenastateandcitizensofanotherstate；betweencitizensofdifferentstates；betweencitizensofthesamestateclaiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates，andbetweenastateorthecitizensthereofandforeignstates，citizensorsubjects。Insomeofthesecases，itmaybedoubtedwhetheritwasintended，andwhetheritwouldbebeneficialtotheUnitedStates，thatthejurisdictionshould，beexclusive；itmayconducetoitsbestinterestsattimestohaverecourse，nottothelegislativeorexecutivepowersofastate，ofwhichitshouldeverbeindependent，buttoastatejudicature，whichifrightlyconstituted，canbeinfluencedbynolocalpartialitiesorpoliticaljealousies，andwhichcannomorewithholdjusticefromtheUnitedStatesthanfromthemeanestindividual。

CircumstancesmayrenderitexpedientfortheUnitedStatestoinstitutecivilsuitsfortherecoveryofdebts，ordamagesforthebreachofcontractsduetothemselvesinthestatecourts。ThereisnothingintheConstitutiontorestrainthemfromsodoing，nortojustifyarefusalonthepartofthestatecourttotakecognizanceofthem。Suchsuits，indeed，areoccasionallybrought，andtheUnitedStates，receivedasaplaintiffintheordinaryform，pursuesthemintheordinarycoursetojudgmentandexecution。Butalthoughtheword"party"indicatesadefendantaswellasaplaintiff，itisnottobeunderstoodthatsuitscanbebroughtinanycourtagainsttheUnitedStates。SupremeheadoftheUnion；centreofthegeneralpower；

itcannotbeamenabletoajudicialtribunal，unlessbyitsownexpressconsent，andthepowertogivethisconsentmustappearintheConstitutionitselftohavebeengrantedbythepeople。Anultimateandcompletesovereigntyforthepracticalpurposesofagovernment，extendingoverall，protectingall，andbindingall，isvestedinthem，bytheconfidenceofthepeople，forthehighestandmostsalutarypurposes。

Insomeconstitutionsapowerisgiventothelegislaturetodirectmodesbywhichsuitsmaybebroughtagainstthecommonwealth。NopowerisgiventocongresstoauthorizesuitsagainsttheUnitedStatesinanycase。

Acitizenofonestateisnotprecludedfromsuingacitizenofanotherstateinthecourtsofthelatter，noraforeignerfromasuitinthestatecourtagainstacitizenoftheUnitedStates，noristhereanythingtopreventonealienfromsuinganotherinastatecourt，oracitizenofonestatefromsuingthecitizenofanotherinthecourtsofathirdstate。

Astatemaymaintainasuitagainstanindividualinitsowncourtsorinthoseofanotherstate。Iftwocitizensofthesamestateclaimlandundergrantsofdifferentstates，thestatecourtsarenotprecludedfromjurisdictioninthefirstinstance；noraretheyprecludedfromholdingcognizanceofarightclaimedunderatreatyorstatuteoftheUnitedStates，oranauthorityexercisedundertheUnitedStates，orasuitinwhichisdrawninquestiontheconstructionofanyclauseoftheConstitution。InallthesecasesaconcurrentjurisdictionexistssofarasrelatestothelanguageoftheConstitutionitself。

TheConstitutioncontainingagrantofpowersinmanyinstancessimilartothosealreadyexistinginthestategovernments，andsomeofthesebeingofvitalimportancetostateauthorityandstatelegislatures，ameregrantofsuchpowers，inaffirmativetermstocongress，doesnotpersetransferanexclusivesovereigntyonsuchsubjectstothelatter。

Onthecontrary，thepowerssograntedwouldnotbeexclusiveofsimilarpowersexistinginthestates，unlesstheConstitutionhadexpresslygivenanexclusivepowertocongress，ortheexerciseofalikepowerwereprohibitedtothestates，ortherewasadirectrepugnancyorincompatibilityintheexerciseofitbythestates。

Inallothercasesnotfallingwithintheseclassesthestatesretainconcurrentauthority。

Thereisthisreserve，however，thatincasesofconcurrentauthoritywherethelawsofthestatesandoftheUnitedStatesareindirectandmanifestcollisiononthesamesubject，thoseoftheUnitedStatesbeingthesupremelawofthelandareofparamountauthority，andthestatelawssofar，andsofaronly，assuchincompatibilityexistsmustnecessarilyyield。2

Thecorrectgeneralpositionseemstobe，thatincivilcasesthejudicialpoweris，insomeinstances，unavoidablyexclusiveofstateauthority，andinmanyothersitmayberenderedsoattheelectionofcongress。3

Inregardtocriminalcases，thereismoredifficulty。ThesameactmayamounttoanoffencebothagainstthestateandtheUnitedStates。

ResistancetothelawsoftheUnitedStates，maybeaccompaniedwithpersonalinjuriestotheofficers。Robbingthemail，whichbyactofApril13th，1810，ismadehighlypenal，andincaseofasecondoffence，punishablewithdeath，mightbecognizableashighwayrobberyunderthestatelaws。

Wouldtheoffenderbeamenabletobothjurisdictions，ortoonlyone，andwhichofthem?Oneestablishedrulemayberesortedtoaspartlyaffordingananswer。Thegreatercrimeincludesandabsorbstheless。4Butthisruledoesnotaffordacompletesolutionofthedifficulty。A

prosecutionmaybecommencedinthestatecourt，beforeoneisinstitutedintheUnitedStatescourt。If，forinstance，theofficerwhowasbeaten，commencedandpersistedinaprosecutionforthebattery，itwouldseemthattheoffenderwouldnotbeacquitted，becauseitappearedinevidencethathisgeneralobjectwastoresistthelawsoftheUnitedStates。Ifhewereprosecutedatthesametimeforrobbingthecarrierofthemail，andforacommonhighwayrobbery，bothofwhichareoffencesofthesamegrade，andthelatter，accordingtothelawsofthestateinwhichitwascommitted，mightbeas，severelypunishedastheformer；neithercourtwouldbeboundtogivewaytotheother，atleastbytheapplicationoftherulebeforementioned。Apersonconvictedoracquittedinacourtofcompetentjurisdiction，maypleadsuchjudgmentinbarofasecondindictmentforthesameoffence，buthecannotpleadanacquittaloraconvictionofaninferioroffence，inbarofanindictmentforahigheroffence，althougheachwaspartofthesameact。5Where，however，theoffencesdifferonlyinname，theacquittalmaybepleaded，asamanindictedofmurderandacquitted，isnotliableonanindictmentofpetittreasonforthesameact，becausebothoffencesareinsubstancethesame；6butwhentheyaresubstantiallydifferent，thoughofequaldegree，theacquittalinonedoesnotconstituteabartoanindictmentfortheother。

Itremainsthentodiscoversomeotherruleorprincipletorelieveusfromthisembarrassment。Ithasbeenlaiddownthatthestatecourtsretaintheirjurisdictioninallcases，whichintheirnatureexistedbeforetheadoptionoftheConstitution，unlessexpresslyexcluded，orunlesstheexerciseofitwouldbeutterlyincompatiblewiththeauthoritygrantedtotheUnion。7InthecaseofoffenceswhichonlyarisebyreasonoftheUnion，as，forinstance，treasonagainsttheUnitedStates，thestatecourtswouldhavenojurisdiction。Ifinthestatecourtsanindictmentwerepreferredformurderorothercapitalcrime，committedintheperpetrationoftreason，itmustgivewaytothejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatescourt，aswellinrespecttothesuperiorityofjurisdiction，andthegreaterextentofpublicconcernment，astheinteriornatureofthecrime。Butiftheactcommitted，amountingatthesametimetooffencesagainstbothbodies，werestillinregardtoeachofthem，ofthesamedegree，thereseemsnoreasonwhyeachshouldnotsustainitsjurisdiction。

Itwouldnotcontravenethemaximthatnooneshallbetwicepunishedforthesameoffence，fortheoffencesaredifferentintheeyeofthelaw，althoughtheresultofthesameactonthepartoftheculprit。

Wemust，indeed，avoidtoobroadaconstructionofthismaxim，foradoublepunishmentforthesameact，isnotwhollyunknowntothelaw，iftheformsofproceedingandtheobjectsaredifferent；thus，hewhohascommittedanassault，battery，wounding，ormayhem，onthepersonofanother，isliablebothtoanindictment，andtoacivilactionfordamages。Thesatisfactionreceivedbythepublicdoesnotpreventtheinjuredpartyfromobtaininghispeculiarredress。IftheinflictionofpunishmentbythestatecouldimpedetheprosecutionoftheUnitedStatesinsuchacase，apardongrantedbythestatewouldhavethesameeffect，yetitwouldbeabsurdtosupposethatapardongrantedbythestateformurdercommittedintheperpetrationoftreason，wouldbartheprosecutionoftheUnitedStatesforsuchtreason。Onthewhole，thisdifficultquestionmaybefairlyresolvedontheprinciple，thatimmunityforonecrimecannotbeobtainedbyprovingthatindoingtheact，thepartycommittedanother；andfurther，thateachcommunityisentitled，anditspublicofficersarerequired，toprosecuteoffencescommittedagainstit。8

1。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheaton，31。SeealsoOsbornev。BankoftheUnitedStates，9Wheaton，733。

2。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。48。PerStory，J。

3。1Wheaton，337。Buttheauthorpresumestodissentfromtheopinionthatitiscompetentforcongressinallothercasestorenderitexclusive。Surelycongresscannotexcludeastatefromholdingpleaofasuitbyacitizenofanotherstateagainstthecitizenofastateinwhichthesuitwasbrought，norbyoragainstanalien。Manyothercasesmightbeputinwhichthestatecourtscouldnotbedeprivedofjurisdictionbyanyactofcongress。

4。OpinionofJudgeChase，inHall"sJournalofJurisprudence，162。

5。Hawkins，b。2。c。39。§；5。

6。Ibid。

7。Federalist，No。82。4Dallas，Appendix，xxx。

8。SeethediscrepantopinionsofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinHoustonv。Moore。Theauthorofcourseadopts，andtakesthelibertytosaythatinhisownjudgmentheprefers，thoseofthemajority。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXIICHAPTERXXII。OFIMPEACHMENTS。WEarenexttoconsiderwhatcourtsorjudicialtribunalsarecreatedbytheConstitutionitself，andwhathavebeencreatedunderthepowertothateffectgiventocongress。

Thelanguageofthetextis，thatthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinonesupremecourt，andinsuchinteriorcourtsascongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish。

Butnomentionismadeinanypartofthisarticle，otherwisethanbywayofexceptionastothemodeoftrial，ofaveryhightribunal，whichseemsrathertohavebeensupposedtoflowfromtheformationoftheConstitution，thantobeexpresslycreatedbyit。

Thefirstmentionofitiscontainedinthefollowingwords，inaprecedingarticle:Thehouseofrepresentatives?shallhavethesolepowerofimpeachment。

Inthethirdsectionofthesamearticle，itissaid，thatthesenateshallhavethesolepowertotryallimpeachments。Whensittingforthatpurpose，theyshallbeonoathoraffirmation。WhenthepresidentoftheUnitedStatesistried，thechiefjusticeshallpreside，andnopersonshallbeconvictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwo-thirdsofthememberspresent。

Impeachmentsarethusintroducedasaknowndefiniteterm，andwemusthaverecoursetothecommonlawofEnglandforthedefinitionofthem。

InEngland，thepracticeofimpeachmentsbythehouseofcommonsbeforethehouseoflords，hasexistedfromveryancienttimes。Itsfoundationis，thatasubjectentrustedwiththeadministrationofpublicaffairs，maysometimesinfringetherightsofthepeople，andbeguiltyofsuchcrimesastheordinarymagistrateseitherdarenotorcannotpunish。Ofthese，therepresentativesofthepeopleorhouseofcommonscannotjudge，becausetheyandtheirconstituentsarethepersonsinjured，andcanthereforeonlyaccuse。Buttheordinarytribunalswouldnaturallybeswayedbytheauthorityofsopowerfulanaccuser。Thatbranchofthelegislaturewhichrepresentsthepeople，therefore，bringsthechargebeforetheotherbranch，whichconsistsofthenobility，whoaresaidnottohavethesameinterests，orthesamepassionsasthepopularassembly。

SuchistheEnglishtheory，anditwellsuitsagovernmentinwhichtherearethreedistinctandindependentinterests，andinwhichthecrown，possessingthepowerofappointingthehighofficers，whoaremostfrequentlythesubjectsofimpeachments，hasalsothesolepowertocarryonorwithdrawprosecutionsintheordinarycourts。Fornomisconduct，howeverflagrant，committedbysuchmen，couldthepeopleobtainredress，ifthemonarchinclinedtorefuseit，unlessamodeofproceedinghadbeeninventedwhichdidnotrequirehisassent，andwhichhecouldnotcontrol，andtherefore，asheretoforeobserved，hecannotdefeattheinquirybyapreviouspardon，althoughintheexerciseofanotherbranchofhisprerogative，hemaydelayitbyadjourningorproroguingthesessionoftheparliament。

Thedifferencebetweenthetwogovernmentshasnodoubtalreadyoccurredtothereader。Ourordinarytribunalsarenotdependentonthepleasureofhimwhoappointsthejudges，noraretheytobeinfluencedbytheauthorityoftheaccuserinacaseofthissortmorethaninanyother，forwithusthepeopleareconsideredasthe。accusersinallcaseswhatever。InEngland，thekingistheaccuser，(exceptintheinstancenowunderconsideration，)

andalloffencesarechargedtohavebeencommittedagainsthispeace，hiscrownanddignity。

Stilllessaretheweightandinfluenceofanyman，howeverexaltedhisstation，orgreathiswealth，likelytodeterourjudgesfromanimpartialadministrationofjustice。

Yetalthoughthereasonsarenotequallycogent，theywillbefoundonexaminationsufficienttowarranttheintroductionofthesystemintoourcode。

Weshallnowproceedtoconsider?Thenecessityorutilityofimpeachments。Thenecessityorutilityoferectingaseparatetribunalforthetrialofimpeachments。Theproprietyofrenderingthesenatesuchatribunal。Thepersonsliabletobeimpeached。Theconstitutionofthecourt，itsmodeofproceeding，andtheextentandeffectofitsjudgments。1。Thedelegationofimportanttrusts，affectingthehigherinterestsofsociety，isalwaysfromvariouscausesliabletoabuse。Thefondnessfrequentlyfeltfortheinordinateextensionofpower，theinfluenceofpartyandofprejudice，theseductionsofforeignstates，orthebaserappetiteforillegitimateemolument，aresometimesproductiveofwhatarenotunaptlytermedpoliticaloffences，1whichitwouldbedifficulttotakecognizanceofintheordinarycourseofjudicial

roceedings。

2。Theinvolutionsandvarietiesofvicearetoomany，andtooartfultobeanticipatedbypositivelaw，andsometimestoosubtleandmysterioustobefullydetectedinthelimitedperiodofordinaryinvestigation。Asprogressismadeintheinquiry，newfactsarediscoveredwhichmaybeproperlyconnectedwithothersalreadyknown，butwouldnotformsufficientsubjectsofseparateprosecution。Ontheseaccounts，apeculiartribunalseemsbothusefulandnecessary。Atribunalofaliberalandcomprehensivecharactersconfinedaslittleaspossibletostrictforms，enabledtocontinueitssessionaslongasthenatureofthecasemayrequire，qualifiedtoviewthechargeinallitsbearingsanddependencies，andtoappreciateonsoundprinciplesofpublicpolicythedefenceoftheaccused；theproprietyofsuchaseparatetribunalseemstobeplain，butnotupontheassumedgroundthatthejudgesofthesupremecourtwouldnotpossesssufficientfortitudetoperformtheduty，orsufficientcreditandauthoritytoreconcilethepeopletotheirdecisions。2

3。Tocomposethiscourtofpersonswhollydistinctfromtheotherbranchesofgovernment?toformapermanentbodyforthissinglepurpose?andtokeepthemalwayscollectedattheseatofgovernmentforthepossibleoccurrenceofanimpeachment，wouldbeasinconvenientastoappointandcollectsuchabodyfromtimetotime，whenartimpeachmentisdeterminedon。

OnareviewofallthedepartmentsofgovernmentprovidedbytheConstitution，nonewillbefoundmoresuitabletoexercisethispeculiarjurisdictionthanthesenate。

Althoughliketheaccusers，theyarerepresentativesofthepeople，yettheyarebyadegreemoreremoved，andholdtheirstationsforalongerterm。Theyarethereforemoreindependentofthepeople，andbeingchosenwiththeknowledgethattheymay，whileinoffice，becalledupontoexercisethishighfunction，theybringwiththemtheconfidenceoftheirconstituentsthattheywillfaithfullyexecuteit，andtheimpliedcompactontheirownpartsthatitshallbehonestlydischarged。Precludedfromeverbecomingaccusersthemselves，itistheirdutynottolendthemselvestotheanimositiesofpartyortheprejudicesagainstindividualswhichmaysometimesunconsciouslyinducethehouseofrepresentativestotheactsofaccusation。Habituatedtocomprehensiveviewsofthegreatpoliticalrelationsofthecountry，theyare，naturallythebestqualifiedtodecideonthosechargeswhichmayhaveanyconnexionwith，transactionsabroad，orgreatpoliticalinterestsathome，andalthoughwecannotsay，thatliketheEnglishhouseoflordstheyformadistinctbody，whollyuninfluencedbythepassions，andremotefromtheinterestsofthepeople，yetwecandiscoverinnootherdivisionofthegovernmentagreaterprobabilityofimpartialityandindependence。

Nordoesitformasolidobjectioninpointofprinciple，thatinthispeculiarinstance，apartofthelegislativebodyshouldbeadmittedtoexercisejudicialpower。Insomedegreealllegislativebodiesnecessarilypossesssuchapower。Wehaveseenthatforsufficientcausetheymayexpelanyoftheirownmembers?theymaytryandpunishothersforattemptstocorrupt，bribe，orintimidatethem，andtheymaypunishforwhataretechnicallytermedcontemptscommittedintheirpresence，inallwhichtheyactjudicially。Butitissufficient，toclosethesubject，thatthepeopleatlargehaveconcludedthatthispowerwouldbebestdepositedinthisbody。

4。Fromthereasonsalreadygiven，itisobvious，thattheonlypersonsliabletoimpeachment，arethosewhoareorhavebeeninpublicoffice。

Allexecutiveandjudicialofficers，fromthepresidentdownwards，fromthejudgesofthesupremecourttothoseofthemostinferiortribunals，areincludedinthisdescription。Butintheyear1796，aconstructionwasgiventotheConstitution，founded，itisbelieved，merelyonitsphraseology，bywhichamemberofthesenatewasheldnottobeliabletoimpeachment。

Theirdeliberations，aftertheargumentsofcounsel，beingheldinprivate，wecanonlyinferfromthosearguments，thatthetermofficersoftheUnitedStates，asusedintheConstitution，washeldbyamajorityofthesenate，nottoincludemembersofthesenate，andonthesameprinciple，membersofthehouseofrepresentativeswouldalsobeexcludedfromthisjurisdiction。

AnamendmenttotheConstitutioninthisrespectwouldperhapsbeuseful。

Abreachofdutyisasreprehensibleinalegislatorasinanexecutiveorjudicialofficer，andifthispeculiarjurisdictionpossessessomuchvalueinrespecttothetwolatter，itisdifficulttoconceivewhythepublicshouldnothavethebenefitofitinregardtotheformer。

Noapprehensionsofpartialityinfavourofoneoftheirownbodyneedtobecarriedsofarastorequirethesubstitutionofanothertribunal。

InEngland，wherethereisnotagreaterportionofpublicvirtuethanhere，peersarenecessarilyimpeachedbeforepeers，andmembersofthehouseofcommonshavebeenfrequentlythesubjectsofimpeachment。Judgesareliabletotrialforeveryoffencebeforetheirbrethren，anditisinnocasetobepresumed，thatafairandfulladministrationofjusticewouldbewanting。Ofgreatpublicdelinquenciesthepeopledonotlongremaininignorance。Iftheoffencesofamemberofthehouseofrepresentativeswereculpablypassedoverbyhisbrethren，thepeoplebytherecurrenceoftheperiodicalelectionwouldsoonbeenabledtosubstituteotherstoprefertheaccusation，and，beingsensibleofthis，thehousewouldbeslowtoexposethemselvestothereproachoftheirconstituents，andthelossofpublicconfidence，byomittingtodotheirduty。Thesenateisobligedtoreceiveanddecideonthecharge，andtothestrongestmoralobligationsisaddedthatofanoathoraffirmation。ItisnotprobablethattheeffectoftheseUnitedimpulseswouldbecounteractedbyotherconsiderations，whichwouldinthemselvesbecriminal。

5。Thelegitimatecausesofimpeachmenthavebeenalreadybrieflynoticed。

Theycanonlyhavereferencetopubliccharacterandofficialduty。Thewordsofthetextaretreason，bribery，andotherhighcrimes，andmisdemeanors。

ThetreasoncontemplatedmustbeagainsttheUnitedStates。Ingeneralthoseoffenceswhichmaybecommittedequallybyaprivatepersonasapublicofficer，arenotthesubjectsofimpeachment。Murder，burglary，robbery，andindeedalloffencesnotimmediatelyconnectedwithoffice，exceptthetwoexpresslymentioned，arelefttotheordinarycourseofjudicialproceeding，andneitherhousecanregularlyinquireintothem，exceptforthepurposeofexpellingthemember。Buttheordinarytribunals，asweshallsee，arenotprecluded，eitherbeforeorafteranimpeachment，fromtakingcognizanceofthepublicandofficialdelinquency。

Wehavehithertohadbutthreeinstancesofimpeachment，thefirstofwhichhasalreadybeennoticed。Asnodecisionwasgivenonthemerits，itisimpossibletosaywhetherthecharges，whichwerechieflyfoundedonaconspiracytoinvadetheterritoriesofthekingofSpain，withwhomtheUnitedStateswereatpeace，andtoexcitetheCreekandCherokeeIndianstoconcurintheoutrage，wouldhavebeendeemedbythesenatesufficient，ifproved，tosupporttheimpeachment。Thesecond，onwhichaconstitutionalconvictiontookplace，wasagainstajudgeofadistrictcourt，andpurelyforofficialmisconduct。Thethirdwasagainstajudgeofthesupremecourt，andwasalsoachargeofofficialmisconduct。Itterminatedinanacquittal，therenotbeingaconstitutionalmajorityagainsthimonanyonearticle。

Asarticlesofimpeachmentcanonlybeexhibitedbythehouseofrepresentatives，ifitshouldhappenthatthesenateinthecourseoftheirexecutivefunctionsorotherwise，becameapprizedofunlawfulactscommittedbyapublicofficer，andintheiropinions，meritingatleastapublicinquiry，itwouldbetheirdutytocommunicatetheevidencetheypossessed，whetheractualorpresumptive，tothehouseofrepresentatives，butthebarecommunicationisallthatwouldbeconsistentwiththeirduty。Theywouldcautiouslyavoidtorecommendorsuggestanimpeachment，andthesamewouldbethecoursepursuedbythepresident。

Articlesofimpeachmentneednottobedrawnupwiththeprecisionandstrictnessofindictments。Theymusthoweverbedistinctandintelligible。

Nooneisboundtoanswertoachargesoobscureandambiguousthatitcannotbeunderstood。Additionalarticlesmaybeexhibited，perhapsatanystageoftheprosecution；certainlybeforethedefendanthasputinhisanswerorplea。

Noprecisenumberofsenatorsisrequiredtoconstitutethecourt，butnopersoncanbeconvictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwo-thirdsofthemembers，present。Thevicepresidentbeingthepresidentofthesenate，presidesonthetrial，exceptwhenthepresidentoftheUnitedStatesistried。AsthevicepresidentsucceedstothefunctionsandemolumentsofthepresidentoftheUnitedStateswheneveravacancyhappensinthelatteroffice，itwouldbeinconsistentwiththeimpliedpurityofajudgethatapersonunderaprobablebiasofsuchanatureshouldparticipateinthetrialanditwouldfollowthatheoughtwhollytoretirefromthecourt。

ItisnotstatedintheConstitutionwhetherthepresidentofthesenateisonthetrialofanimpeachmentrestricted，asinlegislativecases，tothecastingvote。Asheisconstitutedoneofthejudgesbybeingappointedtopresidewithoutanyrestriction，thefairinferencewouldbe，thatheisentitledtovoteliketheotherjudges，butonthetriallastmentionedofajudgeoftheSupremeCourt，thevoteofthevicepresidentdoesnotappearintheprintedjournal。

Thedefendantisentitledtothebenefitofcounselbutitisnotnecessarythatheshouldbepersonallypresent；thetrialmayproceedinhisabsenceifhehashadduenoticetoappear。

Theconsultationsofthesenate，aswelluponincidentalpointsasonthemainquestions，areconductedinprivate，butthejudgmentisrenderedinpublic。

Thejudgmentisofalimitedandpeculiarnature?itextendsnofurtherthantoremovalfromoffice，anddisqualificationtoholdandenjoyanyofficeofhonour，trust，orprofit，undertheUnitedStates。

Hereinwemayperceivetheimportanceandutilityofthissystemunderourregulations。InEnglandimpeachmentsmaybeprosecutedforcapitalcrimesandthecourtmayawardcapitalpunishment，ofwhichmanyinstancesoccurinthehistoryofthatkingdom。LordStraffordinthereignofCharlesI。andLordStaffordinthereignofCharlesII。werebeheadedonthesentencesofthecourtwhichdecidedwithouttheaidofajury，andbothofthemhavebeenconsideredratherasvictimstothespiritofthetimes，thanasmeritedoblationstojustice。Butwithus，althoughthepartyaccusedmaybefoundguiltyofthehighestcrime，hislifeisnotindangerbeforethistribunal，andinnocasesarehislibertyandpropertyaffected:indictment，trial，judgment，andpunishment，stillawaithimaccordingtotheusualcourseoflaw。

Whythen，itmaybeasked，hasthissystembeenintroduced，andwhy，ifthefirmnessandintegrityoftheordinarytribunalscannotbeoverpoweredbyanysupposedinfluenceofcharacter，wealth，oroffice，havewedeemeditexpedienttocopyfromaforeignnationaninstitutionforwhichthereisnotthesamenecessity，andwhichwedonotallowaltogethertoproducethesameeffects?Oneansweris，thatthesentencewhichthiscourtisauthorizedtoimposecannotregularlybepronouncedbythecourtsoflaw。

Theycanneitherremovenordisqualifythepersonconvicted，andthereforetheobnoxiousofficermightbecontinuedinpower，andtheinjurysustainedbythenationberenewedorincreased，iftheexecutiveauthoritywereperverse，tyrannical，orcorrupt:butbythesentencewhichmaybegivenbythesenate，notonlytheappointmentmadebytheexecutiveissupersededandrenderedvoid，butthesameindividualmayberenderedincapableofagainabusinganofficetotheinjuryofthepublic。Itisthereforerightandproperthatthepresidentshouldbedisabledfromgrantingapardon，andrestoringtheoffendertohisformercompetency；butthereisnorestraintonhispardoningwhenaconvictioninthecommoncourseensues，forsuchpardonextendsonlytothepunishmentwhichisthenpronounced，anddoesnotaffectthesentenceofthesenate。

Wemayperceiveinthisschemeoneusefulmodeofremovingfromofficehimwhoisunworthytofillit，incaseswherethepeople，andsometimesthepresidenthimselfwouldbeunabletoaccomplishthatobject。Acommissiongrantedduringgoodbehaviourcanonlyberevokedbythismodeofproceeding。

ButtheexpresswordsoftheConstitutionalsoextendtothepresidentandvicepresident，whopartakeofthelegislativecapacity，andarechosenbythepeople。Whenthiscorrectivejurisdictionisthusapplied；whenitreachesalljudicialofficers，allcivilofficersappointedbythepresidentduringpleasure，andinvolvesinitsgraspthevicepresidentandthepresidenthimself，itisdifficulttoconceivethatitwasintendedtoexemptmenwhosetreacherytotheircountrymightbeproductiveofthemostseriousdisasters，becausetheydonotcomepreciselywithinaverbaldescriptionsupposedtobeexclusivelyapplicabletothosewho，exceptinthetwoinstancesofspecificenumeration，receivecommissionsfromthepresident。Amemberofeitherhouseofthelegislaturebetrayinghistrustandguiltyofthemostculpableactsofanofficialnatureis，underthedecisionofthesenate，liable，indeed，toexpulsion，butnottoimpeachment；liabletotheordinarycourseoflegalproceedings，butnottodisqualification。

Yetasfromthejudgmentofthishightribunalthereisnoappeal；asthedecisionwhichhasbeengiveninthecaseadvertedtoisajudicialone，andprobablywillbeheldbindingonthemselvesonallfutureoccasions，wemustnowreceiveitasthesettledconstructionoftheConstitution。

WhetheranamendmentoftheConstitutioninthisrespectwilleverbemade，isnotfortheauthortoanticipate。

1。Federalist，No。65。

2。ThisisoneofthefewpointsinwhichtheauthoriscompelledtodifferfromthatexcellentworktheFederalist。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXIIICHAPTERXXIII。OFANOTHERSPECIALJURISDICTION。THEREisanotherspeciesofcourtshavingaspecialjurisdiction，fromwhichtrialbyjuryisalsoexcluded，yetwhosepowerextendstopecuniarymulcts，deprivationofoffice，imprisonment，personalchastisement，andevenlossoflife。Itwillbeatonceperceivedthatwealludetocourtsmartial。

AlthoughnotexpresslymentionedintheConstitution，thepowertoinstitutethemisunquestionablygivenbytheauthorityvestedincongresstomakerulesforthegovernmentandregulationofthelandandnavalforces，andtheamendmentheretoforenoticed，whichbeforeapersonshallbeheldtoanswerforacapitalorotherwiseinfamouscrime，requiresapresentmentorindictmentbyagrandjury，exceptsthelandandnavalforces，andthemilitiawheninactualserviceintimeofwarorpublicdanger，therebyindirectlyrecognisingtheestablishmentandtheefficientpowersofcourtsmartial。

Congresshasreasonablyandmoderatelyexecutedthispower，butthedetailsareinconsistentwiththeplanofthiswork。Thesubjectsofacourtmartialareonlythosewhofallwithintheabovedescriptions。Martialemploymentcreatesmartiallaw，andrequiresmartialcourts。Onthecivilclassofthecommunity，itcanneveroperate，exceptperhapsinoneinstance，whichonourpart，couldnotwellapplytooneofourowncitizensorinhabitants。

Itisasettledprincipleofthelawsofwarthataspymaybeputtodeath。

Onedetectedinhisobnoxiousemploymentwithinourlinesintimeofwar，althoughnothimselfasoldier，isalegitimatesubjectofthisseverity；

anduponthesameprincipleweshouldbeboundtoadmittherightoftheenemytoexecuteanyofourcitizensorsoldiers，apprehendedbythemintheperformanceofthesameact。

WehaveheretoforeadvertedtotheprocedureofpresidentMadisoninthecaseofacitizenoftheUnitedStateswhohadjoinedtheenemyduringthelatewar，andwasapprehendedasaspywithinourlinesonthefrontiers:

thecoursepursuedbyhisdirections，wasbothhumaneandconsistentwiththetrueprinciplesoflaw。Itgavetotheindividualthefairerprospectofacquittalonatrialbyjuryaccompaniedwithalltheguardsandprecautionsallottedtochargesoftreason；whileitmoreextensivelyenforcedaprincipleofwhichallshouldbeapprized，thatitislawfulfornoonetodeserthiscountryinthehourofherdanger，andliftaparricidearmagainsther。

WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXIVCHAPTERXXIV。OFGENERALTRIBUNALS，ANDFIRSTOFTHESUPREMECOURT。AVIEWofthegeneralsystemwillnowbetaken。

TheonlytribunalexpresslynoticedintheConstitutionistheSupremeCourt，whosepowerisco-extensivewithalltheexigenciesofthegovernment，andpervadeseverypartoftheUnitedStates，andtheterritoriesbelongingtothem。Inmanyparticulars，however，itpossessesonlyanappellatejurisdiction；

inafew，itsjurisdictionisoriginal。

Inthelatterareembracedallcasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministersandconsuls，andthoseinwhichastateshallbeaparty。

Casesofthefirstdescriptionmaybeeithercivilorcriminal。Theprotectionaffordedbythelawsofnationstodiplomaticfunctionaries，extends，however，sofarthatitisnoteasytoconceiveanycaseinwhichapersoninvestedwiththathighcharactercanbesubjectedeithertocriminalorcivilproceedings。Buthemaybeentitledtoprosecuteothers?hemayhavereceivedoutragesorinsultsaffectinghisnationalcharacter，forwhichredressmaybejustlydue。TheUnitedStates，whoareresponsibletoforeignnationsfortheirMinistersreceivingallduerespect，andanalmostunlimitedfreedomintheexerciseoftheirfunctions，supplythepropermeansforthesepurposes，bytakingonthemselvesandvestingintheirhighesttribunal，thecognizanceofsuchcases。Whentheproceedingsareagainstoneoftheseofficers，wemustconsiderthejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatesasbeingfromitsownnatureexclusiveofthestatecourts。

Itmaynotbeequallyclear；ifheshouldbethecomplainant，andseekredressineitheracriminalorcivilcaseintheforumofastate，thatthelattercouldnottakecognizanceofit。Theunityofthesystemwouldperhapsbebetterpromoted，ifthestatecourtswereauthorizedtodeclinethecognizanceofallsuchcases。TheUnitedStatesareresponsibletoforeignnationsforthedueadministrationofjusticeintheirowntribunalsonly，anditmightinvolvetheminsomedifficulties，ifstatecourts，whosejudgestheydonotappoint，andwhomonaccountofmalconducttheycouldnotimpeach，weretointermeddleevenontheapplicationoftheministerhimselfincasesofthisnature。Butifthestatecourtsarenotprohibitedbytheirownconstitutions，itdoesnotappearthattheycouldjustlyrefusetheirassistancetoaforeignministerwhothoughtitexpedienttoapplytothem，althoughperhapssomepoliticalinconveniencemayoccurtothemindreflectingonthepossibilityofwidelydifferentviewsbeingentertainedonthesamesubjectbyastatecourtandacourtoftheUnitedStates。

Congress1hasdeclaredthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourttobeexclusiveinallsuchsuitsorproceedingsagainstambassadorsorotherpublicministers，theirdomestics，&；c。asacourtoflawcanhaveorexerciseconsistentlywiththelawofnations，buttheyhavegonenofurther。

SuchcasescertainlycomewithinthetermsusedintheConstitutionaffectingambassadors，&；c。，andsuchjurisdictionmusthavebeenintendedtobeexclusive。

Thepowergiventocongresstodefineandtopunishoffencesagainstthelawofnations，hasbeenpartlyexecutedbycongress，2?offeringviolencetothepersonofanambassadororotherpublicminister，andsuingoutprocessagainsthimorhisdomestics，aredeclaredtobeoffencessubjectingthepartiestofineandimprisonment。Havingbeendefinedbycongress，theymayproperlybesaidtoariseundertheConstitutionandtobecognizableundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。Butotherviolationsofthelawofnationsthanthoseexpresslyenumerated，maybecommitted，andifitisasounddoctrine，(whichisintendedtobehereafterexamined，)thatthecriminaljurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesisconfinedtocasesexpresslyprovidedforbystatute，eithersuchoffences，howeverflagrant，mustgounpunished，andtheUnitedStatesincuranationaldisgrace，orthestatecourtsmustberesortedto。

Inrespecttocivilsuits，whenaforeignministermaysueanalien，thejurisdictionisconfessedlyconcurrent，3butitwouldseemthatifaforeign。nationbroughtacivilsuitinacourtoftheUnitedStates，itoughttobeinthesupremecourt，althoughherealsoitisapprehendedthatthestatecourtsmightsustainit。

Thereasonforplacingconsulsonthesamefooting，deservesinquiry。Consulsarenotdiplomaticfunctionaries，orpoliticalrepresentativesofaforeignnation。Theirgeneralcharacteristhatofcommercialagents。

Theymaybecitizensorsubjectsoftheforeignpower，ortheymaybecitizensandpermanentinhabitantsoftheUnitedStates。Thepresidentmay，athisdiscretion，acknowledgetheircapacityorrefusetodoso。Whenhedeemsitexpedient，hemayrevoketheadmissionofthem，4bywhichacttheywouldbeatoncestrippedoftheirprivilegesandimmunities，andreducedtothelevelofprivatepersons。

Itmaysometimeshappen，thataconsulintheabsenceoftheproperministerofhiscountry，maybechargedwithhighernationalduties，butinthiscase，thegreatercharacterabsorbsthesmaller。

Inrespecttothecitizensorsubjectsoftheirownnations，theyaresometimesadmittedbythenationwhichreceivesthemtoexercisefunctionspartakingofajudicialnature，buttheycannotbecarriedsofarastoaffectothers，norbeexercisedatallwithoutthepermissionofthegovernment。

Andtheirproceduresmustbedistinguishedfromacourt，oranestablishmentinthenatureofacourt，affectingtheinterestsofanyothersthanthenationtowhichtheconsulbelongs。Intheyear1793，theFrenchconsulsattemptedtoexerciseprizejurisdictionsintheUnitedStatesovercapturesmadefromtheBritish，withwhomFrancewasatwar；butthesupremecourtatoncedecided，thatnoforeignpowercanofrightinstituteorerectanycourtorjudicatureofanykindwithintheUnitedStates，unlesswarrantedbyandinpursuanceoftreaties。5

Butwhethersuchfunctionsarepermittedandexercisedornot，theothertrustsanddutiesofconsulsrequirethattheyshouldbetreatedwithmuchrespect。Thesovereignwhoreceivesthem，tacitlyengagestoaffordthemallthefreedomandprotectionnecessarytoenablethemtoexecutetheirfunctions，withoutwhichtheadmissionwouldbeillusoryandvain。6

Whatmaybedoneinsomeothercountriesbythemeregrantoftheexecutivemagistrate，mustwithusbeeffectedbyconstitutionalorlegislativeprovisions；

andtherefore，althoughatotalexemptionfromcivilandcriminalprocessisnotrequiredbythenatureoftheoffice，yetalimitationofthegeneraljudicialpoweroperatingtoacertaindegreeasanationalprotection，wasdeemedexpedient，andcannotbedisapproved。

Thelegislativeprovisionsthathavebeenmadeinrespecttothem，maybeconsideredasfoundedonthesamearticleintheConstitution。Ifthelawofnationsconsidersthemasentitledtoprotection，offencesagainstthemfallwithintheclassofoffencesagainstthelawofnations。

Casesinwhichastateshallbeaparty，originallysignifiedthoseinwhichastatewaseitherplaintiffordefendant，aswellsuitsbroughtbyastateagainstindividualsasthosebyindividualsagainstastate，andalsothoseinwhichthecontroversywasbetweentwostates；

buttheConstitutionhavingsincebeenaltered，7andastatebeingnolongerliabletoaprivateaction，thisprovisionmustbeconfinedtotheothertwocases。

Generalexpressionsmustalwaysbeconstruedaccordingtothesubject。

Ithasbeenjustlydecidedthatthewordscasesinlaworequity，applyaswelltocriminalastocivilmatters，8butitcannotbeconceivedthatastatewasintendedbytheConstitutiontobeabletoprosecuteintheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesoneofitsowncitizensforanoffencecommittedagainstitself，althoughitmighthavethepowertoinstituteinthatcourtasuitonacivilcontracteitherbetweenitselfanditsowncitizens，orcitizensofanotherstate，orforeigners。

Inallothercases，theSupremeCourtpossessesjurisdictiononlybyappealorwritoferror；thatis，itmayreviseandcorrecttheproceedingsinacauseinstitutedinaninferiortribunal，butcannotoriginateacause；